

Ottoman and Dutch Merchants in the  
Eighteenth Century

# The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage

Politics, Society and Economy

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# Ottoman and Dutch Merchants in the Eighteenth Century

Competition and Cooperation in Ankara,  
Izmir, and Amsterdam

*By*

İsmail Hakkı Kadı



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*Cover illustration:* David George van Lennep (1712–97). Opperkoopman van de Hollandse factorij te Smyrna met zijn vrouw en kinderen. [David George van Lennep (1712–97). Chief merchant of the Dutch Factory at Izmir and his wife and children]. Attributed to Antoine de Favray. Held in the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam (SK-A-4127).

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille
AŞS	Ankara Şer'iyye sicilleri
BOA A.DVN.DVE	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Bâb-ı Âsafî, Dîvân-Beylikçi-Kalemi, Düvel-i Ecnebiye
BOA CB	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Cevdet Belediye
BOA CH	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Cevdet Hariciye
BOA Cİ	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Cevdet İktisat
BOA CM	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Cevdet Mâliye
BOA D.BŞM	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Bâb-ı Defterî, Başmuhâsebe Kalemi
BOA ED	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri
BOA MD	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Mühimme Defterleri
BOA MM	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Mâliyeden Müdevver
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul
DLH	Directeuren van den Levantschen Handel en de Navigatie in de Middellandsche Zee (Directors of Levant Trade and Navigation in the Mediterranean Sea)
ET <sup>2</sup>	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> . 2nd edition (Leiden, 1960–2003)
f	guilders
GA	Stadsarchief Amsterdam
GL	Regionaal Archief Leiden
LD	Lion Dollar
NA	Nationaal Archief (Dutch National Archives), The Hague
RGP 9	K. Heeringa (ed.), <i>Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel. Eerste Deel: 1590–1660, Eerste stuk</i> (The Hague, 1910).
RGP 10	K. Heeringa (ed.), <i>Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel. Eerste Deel: 1590–1660, Tweede stuk</i> (The Hague, 1910).
RGP 34	K. Heeringa (ed.), <i>Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel. Tweede Deel: 1661–1726</i> (The Hague, 1917).

- RGP 95 J. G. Nanninga (ed.), *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel. Derde Deel: 1727–1765* (The Hague, 1952).
- RGP 115 J. G. Nanninga (ed.), *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel. Vierde Deel: 1765–1826, Eerste stuk* (The Hague, 1964).
- RGP 120 J. G. Nanninga (ed.), *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel. Vierde Deel: 1765–1826, Tweede stuk* (The Hague, 1966).
- SG Staten Generaal (States General)
- WNT Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal

## INTRODUCTION

This study examines the economic position of the non-Muslim merchant elite of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire in relation to the Ottoman central administration and its “economic policies”; to local economic, social and administrative actors and structures within the Ottoman Empire; and to the Dutch authorities and merchants engaged in the Levant trade. In doing so, it re-evaluates the Ottoman merchants’ role in the social and economic system of the Ottoman Empire and its interaction with western Europe. Until now, studies on Ottoman-European economic encounters have paid only piecemeal attention to the topic, resulting in rather obscure notions which lack coherence and are often contradictory.

I investigate two chains of events in the course of the eighteenth century. The first is the penetration of the Dutch into the mohair trade in the town of Ankara and the local resistance they encountered. The second is the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants’ penetration of Dutch trade with the Levant and Dutch resistance to their expansion. These challenges elicited responses by the various actors, some of whom sought the assistance of allies ranging from the Ottoman imperial court to European ambassadors and from local authorities in Ankara to merchants in Amsterdam. It is exactly this feature that gives us an unparalleled view of the activities of the non-Muslim Ottoman merchant elite. Thus, the study of these two significant but nevertheless little studied phenomena will enable us to draw a coherent picture of the Ottoman merchants’ role and position in relation to local administrative and economic actors in northwestern Anatolia, to the Ottoman central administration, and to Dutch authorities and merchants, who can be considered representative of other European nations trading with the Ottoman Empire.

Although the Greek, Armenian, and to a lesser extent Jewish subjects of the Ottoman Sultanate played a peculiar and very important role in Ottoman-Dutch trade in the eighteenth century, this is a largely unknown aspect of the history of Ottoman-European interaction. During the eighteenth century, these non-Muslim Ottoman merchants consolidated their connections to the local economy in western Anatolia, penetrated the Dutch trading network in the Levant, expanded their activities to Amsterdam, and even reduced the activities of the Dutch merchants who traded with the Ottoman Empire to a position inferior to their own activities.

Shortly after it was reported that the Dutch textile industry was consuming two-thirds of the total annual export of mohair yarn—3,000 to 3,200 bales, each bale weighing 200 pounds—from Ankara in 1700,<sup>1</sup> the Porte issued an imperial order expelling all “Franks” from the city.<sup>2</sup> This was the first of many times in the eighteenth century whereby local merchants were able to gain ground against western merchants in general and the Dutch in particular. During the following period of about one and a half centuries, the correspondents of Dutch authorities and merchants in the Levant on the one hand, and the home authorities and merchants in the Netherlands on the other, increasingly complained that “our trade” was in the hands of foreigners, and especially of the Greek and Armenian subjects of the sultan. The Ottoman merchants’ offensive was so effective that they not only continued to hinder the resettlement of European traders in Ankara but also penetrated the Dutch trading network in the Levant and settled in major trading centers in the Netherlands, first in Amsterdam and thereafter in Rotterdam.<sup>3</sup>

Although these developments constitute a remarkable and important aspect of the history of Ottoman Empire, they have attracted little academic interest. Van Rooy’s article<sup>4</sup> about the Armenian community of Amsterdam and Nanninga’s article<sup>5</sup> about the decline of Dutch traders due to Dutch free-trade policies in the Levant do not discuss the Ottoman context. Although some authors have studied related developments, such as increasing Greek mercantile activities in the Balkans and Central Europe,<sup>6</sup> and Greek naval activities in the Aegean, Mediterranean, and

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<sup>1</sup> RGP 34, 305, 6 February 1700, *Memorie behelsende het convenient van de Nederlandscher negotie en navigatie...*, Daniel Jan de Hochepped (Dutch consul in Izmir) to the SG.

<sup>2</sup> Jan Schmidt, *The Joys of Philology: Studies in Ottoman Literature, History and Orientalism* (1500–1923) (Istanbul, 2002), 2:306.

<sup>3</sup> See J. G. Nanninga, “De Nederlandsche Koopman in de Levant en de Vrije Handel (achttiende eeuw),” in *Historische opstellen opgedragen aan Prof. Dr. H. Brugmans ter gelegenheid van zijn 25-jarig jubileum als hoogleraar aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam door zijn oud-leerlingen, leerlingen, vrienden en vereerders, 1904–7 Maart 1929* (Amsterdam, 1929), 109–141.

<sup>4</sup> Silvio van Rooy, “Armenian Merchant Habits as Mirrored in 17–18th Century Amsterdam Documents,” *Revue Des Etudes Armeniennes* 3 (1966), 347–357.

<sup>5</sup> Nanninga, “De Nederlandsche,” 109–141.

<sup>6</sup> Such as Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” *Journal of Economic History* 20 (1960), 234–313; in *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire* (Paris, 2008), ed. Suraiya Faruqi and Gilles Veinstein, see Vassiliki Seirinidou, “Grocers and Wholesalers, Ottomans and Habsburgs, Foreigners and ‘Our Own’: The Greek Trade Diasporas in Central Europe, Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries,” 81–96; Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “The Allure of Red Cotton Yarn, and How it Came to Vienna: Associations of Greek Artisans and Merchants Operating between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires,” 97–132; and

Black seas,<sup>7</sup> similar developments that took place within the context of Ottoman-Dutch trade did not attract much attention.<sup>8</sup> For the Ankara part of the developments along with minor references to the European presence in Ankara, Jan Schmidt's article on eighteenth-century Dutch activities in Ankara is all that has been published on the topic.<sup>9</sup>

These developments in Ottoman-Dutch trade are important because they constitute the earliest sustained process through which a considerable number of Ottoman merchants were able to expand their activities to northwestern Europe after the Atlantic replaced the Mediterranean as the center of gravity of world trade. To put it in Wallerstein's well-known terms, the non-Muslim merchants of western Anatolia were able to expand their commercial activities to the "core regions" during the eighteenth-century crisis of the capitalist world economy and on the eve of the incorporation of western Anatolia into it. The fact that in the course of the eighteenth century the Ottoman merchants were able to infiltrate English and French trade with the Ottoman Empire is mentioned by several English and French consular reports and authors.<sup>10</sup> However, because English and French regulations regarding the Levant trade did not permit the participation of "foreigners" in "their" respective trades, the activities of Ottoman merchants remained clandestine and probably small in scale, and in any case closed to academic scrutiny. Therefore, compared to the English and French cases, the Dutch case and the relevant sources offer many more opportunities to analyze the role of Ottoman international traders in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe.

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Katerina Papakonstantinou, "The Pondikas Merchant Family from Salonica, ca. 1750–1800," 133–150.

<sup>7</sup> Such as George Leon, "The Greek Merchant Marine," in *The Greek Merchant Marine*, ed. S. A. Papadopoulos (Athens, 1972), 13–44; Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "Greek Mercantile Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1780–1820," *Balkan Studies* 28 (1987): 73–86; Nicolas Pissis, "Investments in the Greek Merchant Marine (1783–1821)," in *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Suraiya Faruqi and Gilles Veinstein (Paris, 2008), 151–164.

<sup>8</sup> As an exception we should point to Maurits van den Boogert, "Ottoman Greeks in the Dutch Levant Trade: Collective Strategy and Individual Practice (c. 1750–1821)," *Oriente Moderno* 25, no. 86 (2006), 129–147.

<sup>9</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:301–328.

<sup>10</sup> Elena Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700–1820)* (Athens, 1992), 170–171; Daniel Goffman, "Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City," in *The Ottoman City between East and West*, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (Cambridge, 1999), 110, 125; Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul: From Imperial to Peripheralized Capital," in *The Ottoman City between East and West*, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (Cambridge, 1999), 191–194; and Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600–1750* (New York, 1988), 88.

Beyond defining the position of the Ottoman merchants, the study of the competition between Dutch and Ottoman merchants in the eighteenth century provides insight into social and economic developments in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Of these developments, the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı*<sup>11</sup> is probably the most relevant. Various entries from Istanbul court records edited by Timur Kuran show that Ottoman merchants from different religious affiliations practiced their business under classical Islamic legal prescriptions.<sup>12</sup> In this respect the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* constituted a remarkable innovation, creating a privileged category for certain Ottoman merchants trading with Europe. Historians studying this institution have considered the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* to be a consequence of competition between the European embassies and the Ottoman government for selling *berats*<sup>13</sup> to Ottoman merchants.<sup>14</sup> However, when we analyze the establishment of this institution against the background of Ottoman merchants' commercial activities in the context of Ottoman-Dutch trade and their endeavors to gain the Porte's support for their commercial activities, we come to appreciate that the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* was much more than a result of the abuse of *berats* and should be considered in relation to these merchants' rise to economic prominence.

I explain that this rise of the Ottoman merchants in the eighteenth century and the expansion of their activities to the Atlantic resulted from

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<sup>11</sup> Literally "Europe merchants." By the beginning of the nineteenth century Ottoman administration initiated this institution to promote the international trade of Ottoman subjects by providing them with fiscal and juridical privileges comparable to the capitulatory privileges of European merchants.

<sup>12</sup> Timur Kuran, *Mahkeme Kayıtları Işığında 17. Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Sosyo-Ekonomik Yaşam, Cilt 2, Ticari Ortaklıklar* [Social and economic life in seventeenth-century Istanbul: Glimpses from court records], vol. 2: *Commercial Partnerships* (Istanbul, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Imperial diplomas of appointment. In this context the term refers specifically to the imperial diplomas accorded to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects who then entered the service of European diplomatic representatives as dragomans. These documents provided their holders and the servants of the latter with fiscal and juridical privileges comparable to the capitulatory privileges of Europeans in the Ottoman Empire. In the course of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of Ottoman subjects obtained these documents through European embassies at the Porte. While a number of these *berat* holders in practice functioned as dragomans at European embassies and consulates, a considerable number of these documents were obtained by nominal or honorary dragomans who did not serve any embassy or consulate but simply enjoyed the concomitant privileges.

<sup>14</sup> Bernard Lewis, "Beratli," *EF*, 1:1171. For a similar approach see Bruce Masters, "The Sultan's Entrepreneurs: The Avrupa Tüccarısı and the Hariye Tüccarısı in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24 (1992): 579–597.

their ability to use their local connections in Ottoman port cities and in the hinterland, their ability to “domesticate” the Ottoman state apparatus through their “interpersonal relations,” and their ability to penetrate western trade infrastructures, especially those of the Dutch. I argue that the activities of the Ottoman merchants expanded to the detriment of western traders, but not to the detriment of traditional economic elements within the Ottoman Empire. In this respect my approach agrees with that of Reşat Kasaba,<sup>15</sup> and opposes conventional interpretations of the role of the Ottoman merchants that attributes a compradore nature to their activities.

The term “compradore” is borrowed from the historiography on the Chinese encounter with western expansionism. The term has long dominated most Ottomanists’ approach to the Ottoman merchants and their place in the socioeconomic life of the Ottoman Empire. It was Bernard Lewis who first compared nineteenth-century non-Muslim Ottoman merchants to the compradores of Southeast Asia.<sup>16</sup> Several other Ottomanists, whether or not they use the term compradore, adopted this view and conceived these merchants as the main agents of western capitalist penetration of the Ottoman economy. These merchants are frequently mentioned in the context of western economic and political domination and the “semi-colonization” of the Ottoman Empire.

Although it may seem anachronistic, I think it is useful to review the emergence and discussions of the term compradore to arrive at a better understanding of the role attributed to non-Muslim Ottoman merchants. The term compradore originates from Chinese encounters with British gunboat policy, which resulted in the Anglo-Chinese trade treaty of 1842. The treaty opened five Chinese port cities to foreign traders, whose activities were limited to the “treaty cities.”<sup>17</sup> Beyond the official limitations placed on the activities of foreign merchants, the language barrier, the

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<sup>15</sup> Reşat Kasaba, “Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie in Mid-Nineteenth Century Western Anatolia?” *Review* 11, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 215–228.

<sup>16</sup> “At the same time a new native middle class was coming into being, as buyers, agents, importers, distributors, and generally as the financial and commercial representatives of foreign interests—in a word, as what are known in the Far East as compradores. The dangerous feature was that this new class consisted predominantly of non-Muslims.” Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), 448. For a similar view see also Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Nizam-ı Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri* (1789–1856), (Ankara, 1961), 5:72.

<sup>17</sup> For a comparison of the Chinese Nanjing treaty of 1842 with Britain and the Ottoman Baltalimanı Treaty of 1838 with Britain, see Reşat Kasaba, “Open-Door Treaties: China and the Ottoman Empire Compared,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 7 (Spring 1992): 71–89.

complexity of Chinese coinage, and the varying systems of weights and measures forced foreign traders to employ locals. Thus, for purchasing Chinese goods and marketing their own merchandise, foreign merchants were dependent on native intermediaries, whom they called *compradores*.<sup>18</sup> These intermediaries were condemned as traitors because of their direct connections with foreign traders, who were associated with gunboat policies and all the other evils of British imperialism.<sup>19</sup> In due time Chinese intellectuals began to “use the term ‘national bourgeoisie’ to denote all those whose interests are based on the growth of the national economy and the term ‘compradore’ to denote the agents of foreign imperialism whose activity is against the interest of the national economy.”<sup>20</sup>

Alec Gordon’s article, *The Theory of the “Progressive” National Bourgeoisie*,<sup>21</sup> primarily concerned with a critique of the concept “national bourgeoisie,” gives us some insight into the conceptualization of the term “compradore bourgeoisie,” since these two classes are always juxtaposed.<sup>22</sup> Gordon uses the term “progressive national bourgeoisie” to refer to

an indigenous bourgeoisie whose economic activities and interests are seen as being different from and not dependent upon those of imperialism. Consequently, it came to be seen mainly not as an importing and exporting mercantile bourgeoisie (*compradore*) but as a producing, industrial bourgeoisie interested in the national economy and its development against internal feudal restrictions and imperialist domination.<sup>23</sup>

For Ottoman merchants the term *compradore* was thus used with the assumption that their economic activities were detrimental to the Ottoman economy. Several factors gave rise to such interpretations in Ottoman historiography, one of which is related to the nineteenth-century political and economic circumstances of the Ottoman Empire and the other to the political and economic agenda of the Young Turks and the succeeding Turkish Republic.

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<sup>18</sup> Yen-P'ing Hao, *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West* (Cambridge, 1970), 15–43.

<sup>19</sup> A. Royaards, *Future Business Partners for Banks and Borrowers in South-East Asia (Adapted Version of the Comprador System)* (Twente, Netherlands, 1990), 1; Hao, *Comprador*, 11.

<sup>20</sup> *World Marxist Review* (August/September, 1959). cf. Alec Gordon, “The Theory of the ‘Progressive’ National Bourgeoisie,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 3 (1973), 197.

<sup>21</sup> Gordon, “Theory.”

<sup>22</sup> See Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (Harmondsworth, 1973), 366–369. Baran uses the term “compradore” not only for the mercantile bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries but also for the regimes in underdeveloped countries that are pursuing economic policies detrimental to the domestic industry. *Ibid.*, 350–360.

<sup>23</sup> Gordon, “Theory,” 192.



After the start of the Industrial Revolution and the Anglo-Turkish trade convention of 1838, European economic dominance over the Ottoman Empire became manifest; first English and then other European powers acquired extensive trade privileges, thus depriving the Ottoman government of the means to conduct an independent foreign trade policy. As a result, European economic pressure for Ottoman raw materials increased, and European commodities flooded the Ottoman market and transformed the traditional structure of the Ottoman economy, changing it, in Wallerstein's words, into "a peripheral economy." Other phenomena accompanying this process were a series of national revolutions by non-Muslim subjects of the empire, their cooperation with foreign powers, their growing prominence in economic life, and these foreign powers' intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs in their favor.<sup>24</sup>

The second important factor in such interpretations was the endeavors of the Young Turks and the later Turkish Republic to create a Turkish national bourgeoisie.<sup>25</sup> Forming an important part of the economic and political agenda of the Young Turks and the Turkish Republic, the attempt to create a national entrepreneurial class—or national bourgeoisie—was, on the one hand, a result of the assumed detrimental impact of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie during the preceding periods, and on the other hand, it reproduced the critical approach to these classes. Although the attempt to create a national entrepreneurial class predated republican Turkey, it was the new nationalist republic, with the establishment of a "national economy" on its agenda that created a viable environment for the implementation of this policy. Just as the "ethnic" purification of Turkey was achieved by a population exchange with Greece, the replacement of "alien" elements in the economy with "national" ones was envisaged as necessary for the establishment of a national state and economy. Blackening the "liberal" economic policies, the capitulations, as well as the non-Muslim merchants of the Ottoman Empire, functioned to legitimize the economic and social policies of the new republic.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See Reşat Kasaba, "Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire, 1750–1820," *Review* 10, nos 5/6 (1987): 805–847.

<sup>25</sup> For these endeavors see Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat 1908–1918* (Ankara, 1982); Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Ekonomi ve Toplum: Milli İktisat Milli Burjuvazi* (Istanbul, 1995); Zafer Toprak, *İttihad–Terakki ve Cihan Harbi: Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye'de Devletçilik 1914–1918* (Istanbul, 2003); Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, 2004), 125–126 and 195–196.

<sup>26</sup> This "classical dichotomy" between "national" and "compradore" bourgeois still has an important impact on popular opinion. However, the discriminative approach toward the origins of capital and the affiliations of its holders has gained new dimensions as well

Along with these factors, the historiography of the Levant trade provides a considerable corpus of studies for such interpretations, with its representation of the trade between the Ottoman Empire and western Europe as an activity almost exclusively carried out by European merchants.<sup>27</sup> Although most authors recognize the crucial role played by non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in this trade, they have treated their activities mainly as supplemental to the activities of European merchants, and confined to occupations like brokerage, money lending, interpreting, and domestic trade.<sup>28</sup> This has led to a rather distorted picture and a neglect of Ottoman merchants' centuries-long activities in the Ottoman economy.

However, there has been criticism of both the conceptualization and the application of the term *compradore bourgeoisie* in the case of Ottoman merchants. Gordon, for example, argues that the Soviet Union's leaders utilized the terms *compradore* and *national bourgeoisie* in their search for allies in colonial countries during the post-World War II period and that this juxtaposition served to legitimize their cooperation with some indigenous bourgeois classes in these countries.<sup>29</sup> Gordon cites Idris Cox (the British delegate to the international Marxist seminar held at Leipzig in 1959) as pointing out that "The Chinese comrades use the term 'national bourgeoisie' to denote all those whose interests are based on the growth of the national economy and the term 'compradore' to denote the agents of foreign imperialism whose activity is against the interest of the national economy."<sup>30</sup> However, the distinction made on a theoretical level appeared not to be applicable to practical developments, since in West Africa, for instance, "The national bourgeoisie has accepted the terms of political independence in agreement with British imperialism

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during last decades. The best depiction of this was probably a 1990s TV commercial for a newly privatized tire company. In the commercial the company was depicted as a crucial enterprise that freed the Turkish army (nation) from its dependence on non-Muslim merchants who greedily sought profits while the army needed tires for its heroic fight for independence.

<sup>27</sup> For example, Çadırcı suggests that the Ottoman-European trade was completely conducted by Europeans. See Musa Çadırcı, "II. Mahmut döneminde (1808–1839) Avrupa ve Hayriye Tüccarları," in *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071–1920)*, ed. Osman Okyar and Halil İnalçık (Ankara, 1980), 237–241.

<sup>28</sup> See Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, ed. Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, 1994), 839.

<sup>29</sup> Paul Baran was one of the authors who used these terms in this specific context in his analysis of the economic relations between the developed and underdeveloped countries. For his approach, see Baran, *Political Economy*, 337–369.

<sup>30</sup> *World Marxist Review*, August and September 1959. Cf. Gordon, "Theory," 197.

and there is no indication that it will lead a strong fight for economic liberation.”<sup>31</sup> In Gordon’s words, the conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that “The national bourgeoisie is a compradore bourgeoisie!”<sup>32</sup>

Gordon has several other criticisms of this Marxist-Leninist conceptualization, one of which is relevant here. In its overgeneralization and application to the whole colonial world, it depends on a unilinear developmentalist stance that “supposes the universal existence of ‘feudalism’ out of which the national bourgeoisie will emerge as a disruptive force. As a consequence of this determinism, the theory can see nationalism only as the reflection of the economic ‘reality’ of the inevitable growth of indigenous capitalism.”<sup>33</sup>

Reşat Kasaba is one of the authors who has complained outright about the use of the term *compradore bourgeoisie* in the case of the Ottoman merchants. In his article, “Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie in Mid Nineteenth-Century Western Anatolia?” Kasaba points out the underlying assumptions of authors who prefer to use the term. First, historians who compare the role of the Ottoman merchants to *compradores* argue implicitly that these merchants accumulated their wealth and prominence through collaboration with foreign capitalists. Second, they assume there was a continuous harmony of interest between these merchant classes and foreign capital.<sup>34</sup> Against these assumptions Kasaba argues that the accumulation of wealth in the hands of these merchant classes can be “traced back to the classical period when non-Muslim subjects occupied a privileged position in Ottoman trade with Europe. After the last decades of the eighteenth century they had become freer to trade, accumulate, and invest their funds.”<sup>35</sup> Kasaba also points to state finances<sup>36</sup> as a substantial

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Gordon, “Theory,” 197. However the emergence of these terms might also be placed in a context to which Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein point as the Marxist theorists retreat to (Smithian) political economy at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to these authors, under the influence of the re-emergence of state protectionist/mercantilist policies, Marxist theorists abandoned their world economic space-based class analysis and retreated to Adam Smith’s way of class analysis, which was based on state-defined economic space. See Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group in a World-System Perspective,” *Review* 6, no. 3 (Winter 1983), 283–304.

<sup>33</sup> Gordon, “Theory,” 199.

<sup>34</sup> Kasaba, “Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie,” 215–228.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 217.

<sup>36</sup> The peculiar position of the state finances in the Ottoman economy in general is not only illustrated by the fact that it created an important opportunity for investors, but also by the fact that most important developments regarding the financial techniques in the

source of capital accumulation in the Ottoman Empire, because the fiscal difficulties of the Ottoman administration created a profitable sector for investment in tax farms for these merchants. Together with tax farming, other fields of investment, such as usury, money changing, arbitrage, and intraregional trade were the sources of their capital.<sup>37</sup>

In opposition to the second assumption—the existence of a harmony of interests between these merchant classes and foreign capital—Kasaba compares British economic interests in the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century with the interests of indigenous merchants. He argues that the principal British interest in western Anatolia was to increase trade volume, penetrate the hinterland, and establish commercial agriculture, while the locals were more interested in usury and tax farming. The contradiction between these interests emanated from the fact that a more centralized Ottoman state with control over the resources of western Anatolia would serve the interests of the British, while the locals capitalized on the weakness of the center (tax farming and monetary instability were products of the weak center). Kasaba therefore concludes that a clash of interests, rather than absolute harmony, was the rule between British merchants and local intermediaries.<sup>38</sup>

Another objection to the use of the term *compradore* comes from Robert Vitalis. However, unlike Kasaba, Vitalis's criticisms are directed at the use of the terms "*compradore bourgeoisie*" and "*national bourgeoisie*" as analytical tools, rather than their application to certain cases. In his analysis of the antagonism between Abbud Pasha and Bank Misr in 1930s Egypt, Vitalis argues that "*Compradore capital and national capital are empty categories.*"<sup>39</sup> He points out, on the one hand, that like Abbud Pasha, Bank Misr also cooperated with foreign capitalists, and on the other hand, that Abbud Pasha took several initiatives to introduce industrial projects in Egypt.<sup>40</sup> Vitalis's reinterpretation of the relevant developments in interwar Egypt goes against the interpretations of Davis, who

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Ottoman Empire took place in this sector. See Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden, 1996).

<sup>37</sup> Kasaba, "Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie," 217–219.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 219. See also Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1988), 114; Reşat Kasaba, Çağlar Keyder, and Faruk Tabak, "Eastern Mediterranean Port Cities and Their Bourgeoisies," *Review* 10 (1986): 121–135.

<sup>39</sup> Robert Vitalis, "On the Theory and Practice of Compradors: The Role of 'Abbud Pasha in the Egyptian Political Economy," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22 (1990), 292.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 291–315.

attributes a national nature to Bank Misr and a compradore nature to its local competitors like Abbud Pasha.<sup>41</sup>

Fawaz's monograph on nineteenth-century Beirut is another study whose findings conflict with those interpretations that attribute a compradore nature to the non-Muslim merchant elite in the Ottoman Empire. In her search to find an explanation of Beirut's rise to economic prominence based on internal rather than external factors, Fawaz emphasizes the role of the local merchants in Beirut.<sup>42</sup> Quataert's monograph on Anatolian socioeconomic structures' response to western economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire should also be mentioned here. Focusing on the tobacco régime, railway and mining workers, dockyard porters, and the Ottoman boycott against Austria–Hungary after the latter's annexation of Bosnia–Herzegovina in 1908, Quataert shows that non-Muslim socioeconomic elements were far from being in uniform cooperation with European capital.<sup>43</sup>

In my own approach, I am not simply seeking to determine whether or not Ottoman merchants were indeed compradores—such a question would contain several flaws and anachronisms. The first of these flaws concerns the ambiguity of the term compradore. We have already shown that at the practical level the distinction between the so-called “national” and “compradore” bourgeoisies is not as clear-cut as some authors argue. It was possible to combine both industrial interests in local economies and mercantile interests in the metropolises of capitalism. Some actors even moved from one to the other. As a result, a distinction between these theoretical constructs becomes useless in practice.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, given my exclusive focus on the activities of Ottoman merchants in the eighteenth century, it would be anachronistic for me to argue that these merchants were, or were not, compradores. This is partly because the term compradore bourgeoisie only makes sense if it is juxtaposed to national bourgeoisie, and more importantly, if we can speak of a bourgeoisie in the strict sense of the term. Those who are familiar with Ottoman history will immediately realize that for the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire it

<sup>41</sup> See Eric Davis, *Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920–1941* (Princeton, 1983).

<sup>42</sup> See Leila Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut* (Cambridge, 1983).

<sup>43</sup> See Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration* (New York, 1983). See also Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 839–840.

<sup>44</sup> See Vitalis, “Theory and Practice,” 291–315 and Hao, *Comprador*, 106–153.

would not be appropriate to describe any class as national. The use of the term class, in its strict sense, for these merchants in the eighteenth century is equally problematic, since they operated, for the most part, in the context of a traditional (pre-capitalist) socioeconomic system with its peculiar social stratification.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, in the absence of any economic incentive or government policies for industrialization (an absence explainable by the general structure and loci of the Ottoman economic worldview) it would not be appropriate to discuss whether the interest of these merchants lay with the industrialization of the local economy or with trade with the metropolises of capitalism. Finally, the greatest part of the archival material used for this book, with its focus on the trade of Ottoman merchants, is related to their commercial transactions and therefore is not likely to resolve the compradore issue.

However, certain points raised during the debate about whether or not the Ottoman merchants were compradore are still relevant to a better understanding of the role of these merchants in the socioeconomic system of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. For example, looking at whether there was a harmony of interests between western merchants and Ottoman merchants is important, as it will help us to understand the socioeconomic position of the latter. Moreover, the impression that there was a hierarchical relation between western and Ottoman merchants, as suggested by the use of the term compradore and the role attributed to these merchants in the historiography of the Levant trade, is as doubtful as attributing a complete harmony of interest to the two varieties of merchants. Another assumption inherent in the very definition of the term “compradore” and its application to the Ottoman case—that the Ottoman merchants’ mercantile activities had an adverse affect on local manufacturers and hindered the industrialization of the economy in the Ottoman Empire—should be approached with suspicion as well. In the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, in the absence of a consistent state policy for industrialization and accompanying protectionist policies, local manufacturers did enjoy a degree of protection provided by traditional

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<sup>45</sup> For the problems of analyzing Ottoman social stratification and an attempt to apply the Weberian “status groups” to the Ottoman case, see Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11 (1969): 258–281. For an analysis of Ottoman social stratification during the “classical period” and its evolution until the beginning of the twentieth century, see Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York, 1996).

economic practices, such as preemptive purchase rights of the guilds and their exclusive rights to deal in certain goods. It is of crucial importance to point out that these rights and the concomitant practices were easier to sustain against the potential intrusions of local merchants when compared to European merchants who were equipped with capitulatory privileges. Therefore, it is not appropriate to interpret the commercial activities of local merchants and especially their competition with western traders as necessarily detrimental to local manufacturers. Quite the contrary, Ottoman merchants' endeavors to maintain their position in the Ottoman economy in the face of European penetration contributed to the vitality of local manufacturers, who would have been exposed to western economic dominance if local merchants had been replaced by their European counterparts.

When analyzing the relevant developments in eighteenth-century Ankara, Izmir, and Amsterdam, we must address certain issues, particularly the position of the Ottoman state with respect to the activities of Ottoman merchants. Several authors have pointed out that after the Ottoman administration reduced customs dues for certain western nations to 3 percent in the early seventeenth century, the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants were at a disadvantage, as they continued to pay 5 percent.<sup>46</sup> In the relevant literature this interpretation has prevailed, along with the belief that the Ottoman merchants enjoyed the protection of the sultan when engaged in international trade.<sup>47</sup> These apparently opposite views indicate that the position of the Ottoman state must be analyzed more closely. Concerning the competition between Ottoman merchants and western capitalists, Kasaba places the Ottoman state on the side of the latter. I argue, however, that, if we must place the eighteenth-century Ottoman state on one side or the other, it must certainly be the side of the Ottoman merchants.

Although the two views seem to be diametrically opposed, note that Kasaba's analysis deals with the nineteenth century while here I focus on the eighteenth. The two approaches can even be seen as compatible if we

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<sup>46</sup> The English customs dues were reduced to 3 percent in 1601. The Dutch were accorded the same privilege with their first capitulations in 1612. The French had to wait until 1673 for the same reduction. Despite this, Mehmet Bulut suggests (incorrectly) that the Dutch were the first European nation to be granted the lowest customs dues rate of 3 percent. Mehmet Bulut, *Ottoman-Dutch Economic Relations in the Early Modern Period, 1571–1699* (Hilversum, Netherlands, 2001), 119n70.

<sup>47</sup> Halil İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât," *ET*, 3:1179–1189.



take into consideration Wallerstein's views, which constitute the theoretical framework of Kasaba's analysis:

As new areas became incorporated into this capitalist world-economy, the existing political structures of such areas were commonly reshaped in quite fundamental ways . . . These states had to be too weak to interfere with the flow of the factors of production across their boundaries, and therefore with the peripheralization of their production processes. Hence, in some cases, pre-existing political structures had to be "weakened." But the states also had to be *strong* enough to ensure the very same flow, the same peripheralization. Hence, in other cases, pre-existing political structures had to be "strengthened."<sup>48</sup>

Adopting the perspective of these authors, it can be argued that the weakening of the grasp of the eighteenth-century Ottoman state on western and central Anatolia was in the interests of western capitalists. This is because the Ottoman state was still a formidable factor in the region and had the potential to hinder the designs of western capitalists to penetrate the hinterland, to interfere in local trade, and to extract more and more produce, activities which contravened the economic policies of the Ottoman state in this period. The fact that the western merchants and consuls in Izmir were not willing to have an Ottoman pasha in the city supports this view. The extensive interactions between western nations and local notables (*a'yân*) in western Anatolia<sup>49</sup> might be read as an attempt on the part of western merchants to bypass the policies of the Ottoman state through cooperation with centrifugal forces. Thus there was, apparently, a harmony of interests between the Ottoman state, which strove to maintain its control over the products and fiscal revenue of western Anatolia and the Ottoman merchants, who were mainly concerned with maintaining their traditional position in the local economy and trying to expand their activities beyond the boundaries of Ottoman dominions.

The issue of the capitulations must also be dealt with while examining the interrelationship between the Porte and the activities of the Ottoman merchants. Although several authors have pointed out the contradiction between *ahidnâmes* (capitulations) and the Islamic concepts of *dârü'l-İslâm*

<sup>48</sup> Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein, "Rethinking," 300.

<sup>49</sup> Necmi Ülker, "The Rise of Izmir, 1688–1740," PhD thesis (University of Michigan, 1974), 282; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 37, 39, 61–64, 116; Yuzo Nagata, *Tarihîte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerine bir inceleme* (Ankara, 1997), 47.



(abode of Islam) and *dârü'l-harb* (abode of war),<sup>50</sup> so far the apparent tension between certain capitulatory privileges and the “commanded nature” of the Ottoman economic system and the Ottoman fiscal system has escaped scholarly notice. For example, the capitulatory articles, which seemingly exempted European merchants from all taxes except customs dues,<sup>51</sup> together with the rather vague articles implying that these same Europeans were allowed to travel and to settle in the dominions of the sultan,<sup>52</sup> was in bold contradiction to the economic and especially the fiscal system of the empire. If these articles had been interpreted in their broadest meaning, none of the local Ottoman taxes and domestic customs dues would have survived until the eighteenth century. Quite the contrary, European nations either paid most of the domestic taxes when they went to the hinterland, or secured specific orders or additional capitulatory articles from the Porte to avoid individual taxes.

It is therefore not surprising that in the course of the eighteenth century, taxation of merchandise imported or exported by European merchants was a major issue that led to a great number of disputes between Ottoman authorities and European merchants. At first glance these disputes might seem to speak exclusively of the malpractices of the greedy European merchants, or the equally greedy Ottoman tax collectors, but in fact, the conflicts emanated mostly from the tension between the vague

<sup>50</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–30,” in *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-Inan (Cambridge, 1987), 312. Based on Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955), 168.

<sup>51</sup> “...ve müşârun ileyhimâ rızaları ile tâcirleri vilayetlerinden getürdükleri ve alup götürdikleri metâ’larından Haleb’de ve İskenderiye’de vesâ’ir yerlerde yüzde üç akçe gümrük vereler ziyâde vermeyeler ve metâ’ları ziyâde bahâya tutulmaya... ve bey’ için ihrâc olunan meta’dan İstanbul’da ve her kangı iskelede olursa âhar iskeleye alup giderüz dediklerinde gümrük taleb eylemeyeler ve âhar iskeleye alup gitmeğe mâni’ olmayalar ve hâdis olan kassâbiyye ve reft ve bâc ve yasâk kûl alınmayup...” BOA ED 22/1, 8/12. Dutch capitulations of 1680. See for the same articles in the Dutch capitulations of 1612 AH, Alexander de Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations. 1610–1630* (Leiden, 1978), 238, 239; “...ve elçileri hidmetinde olan konsoloslar ve tercümânlar olageldüğü üzere harâcdan ve kassâbiyyeden ve sâir tekâlif-i örffiyyeden mu’âf olalar.” BOA ED 22/1, 10/12. Dutch capitulations of 1680.

<sup>52</sup> “...vilâyetlerine tâbî’ olan yerlerin tüccârı ve adamları ve tercümânları memâlik-i mahrûsemize emn ü amân üzere meta’ları ile gelüp gidüp ticâret eyleyüp...” BOA ED 22/1, 7/12. Dutch capitulations of 1680. “...ve memâlik-i mahrûsemizde ve eğer âhar vilâyetlere giderken ve gelür iken rençberliklerinde iken birer tarikle esîr olurlarsa ol esirler gerü halâs olalar ve memâlik-i mahrûsemize emn ü amân üzere gelüb...” BOA ED 22/1, 9/12. Dutch capitulations of 1680. “...ve anlara tâbî’ olub memâlik-i mahrûsemizde mütemekkin olanlar eğer ulu ve eğer ergin olsun rençberlik edenlerden haraç talep olunmaya...” BOA ED 22/1, 10/12. Dutch capitulations of 1680. For the same articles of the Dutch capitulations of 1612, see De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 236, 240, 241.

articles of the capitulations and the “commanded nature” of the Ottoman economic system in general, and the Ottoman fiscal regulations in particular.

By the “commanded nature” of the Ottoman economic system, I refer to its peculiar structure characterized by state intervention, various regulations, and ancient practices that competed with market forces for the allocation of resources as well as products of the economy. The following, by Mehmet Genç, is a fine description of this quality of the Ottoman economic system:

For the implementation of this principle [provisionism] the Ottoman state adopted an interventionism which was strictly implemented on production and trade so as to increase the supply of goods, improve their quality, and keep their prices low.

We can sum up this interventionism, which encompassed all stages from the first producer to the final consumer, as follows:

In agriculture, middle-sized family farms were considered to be the type of farms which made the highest level of production possible. The prime goal was to protect, extensively, these family farms, which were allotted 60 to 150 *dönüm* [1 *dönüm* = 919.3 square miles] of land according to the fertility of the soil. The state maintained the proprietary rights to land and did not leave it to individuals [i.e., allow individual ownership, in order] to prevent these family farms from becoming smaller as a result of fragmentation or from becoming larger farms [if people] annexed additional land. This proprietorship regime, which was called *mirî*, meant that the land was hired to the peasantry with the stipulation that it would pass from father to son. Its purchase or sale, pawning, endowment or donation was not permitted. The peasants were not allowed to leave the soil uncultivated or move to cities or other places in a manner that would cause the agricultural production to decrease.

The prime area of consumption of agricultural production, which was deemed to have been maximized by means of these precautions and arrangements, was the *kaza*. In the Ottoman Empire, the *kaza* was a unit that centered on a city or a township, accommodating a population of 3,000 to 20,000 and from 20–30 to 100–150 dependent villages. Agricultural production had to meet the needs of this unit before anything else. Unless the needs of this unit were met, the production could not be transferred outside the *kaza*.

It was the monopoly of the tradesmen to purchase, process, and sell the raw materials and the foodstuff originating from agricultural production to the consumers at the *kaza* center. To maintain the equilibrium between production and consumption, the state organized these tradesmen into separate guilds for the production of each commodity and service, and subjected them to an arrangement to ensure that they would operate as an egalitarian community consisting of masters who owned shops and workshops whose

capacity would not exceed the average size, as in the case of agriculture with the farms of the peasantry.

After the needs of the *kaza* were met by the activities of the tradesmen who were organized in this way, the remaining production was allocated to the needs of the army and the palace, and the remaining part was entrusted to merchants for transfer to Istanbul, which was the center of the empire with a population of more than 500,000.

After these needs were met in stages, [merchants] were permitted to bring the remaining goods to the other regions and towns within the empire, where they were needed, with the stipulation that the specific domestic custom dues were paid.

If any goods were left over after all domestic needs were met, exportation was permitted...<sup>53</sup>

There have been several objections to various elements in this depiction of the “commanded nature” of the Ottoman system. However, within the scope of this study it is unnecessary to go into the details of these debates.

However, the assumption that the Ottoman economy was essentially a commanded economy seems to contradict the rather “liberal” articles of the capitulations of the eighteenth century. These contradictions can be explained in part by distinguishing between a static and a dynamic aspect of Ottoman capitulations. The static aspect of Ottoman capitulations refers to the logic on which they were based, which was in conformity with the Ottoman economic and fiscal system. This logic presupposed a clear-cut division of labor between local merchants and European merchants. According to this division of labor, the Europeans were supposed to come to the conventionally recognized centers of international trade, where they would meet local traders who would sell goods for which local taxes had already been paid.

This approach, however, goes against the widespread view that the privileges accorded to individual European nations were expected to be reciprocally accorded to Ottoman merchants who traded with these nations.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul, 2000), 60–61. Translation mine.

<sup>54</sup> Halil İnalcık, “İmtiyâzât,” “It was tacitly understood that reciprocal advantages were expected in return for the privileges conceded and that if these advantages failed to materialize the Muslim ruler could claim that the precondition of ‘friendship and sincerity’ had been broken. When the Venetians were unable to guarantee secure passage by land and sea for Muslim merchants operating in Venice, the Ottoman government warned them to remember their obligations to give reciprocal protection. In the capitulations granted by Türkmen princes of Anatolia and in Ottoman capitulations, the principle of reciprocity

If the capitulations presupposed a clear-cut division of labor between European merchants and local merchants, the question of whether or not the same privileges were to be accorded to Ottoman merchants was not relevant to the capitulations. In this respect, however, one must differentiate between the older examples of capitulations accorded mainly to the Venetians<sup>55</sup> and the later type which were accorded to France, England, and the Dutch Republic.<sup>56</sup> Although the Dutch capitulations did regulate the activities of Dutch merchants at Ottoman ports and mentioned the Dutch responsibility to assist Algerian corsairs when the latter arrived at Dutch ports,<sup>57</sup> they did not mention any Dutch responsibility with respect to the activities of Ottoman merchants at Dutch ports.<sup>58</sup>

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was expressly stated in such matters as compensation for damage inflicted at sea, individual (and not collective) responsibility for debt, the seizing of fugitive debtors, and the protection of lives and goods of victims of shipwreck."

<sup>55</sup> See the text of the Venetian capitulations of 1503 in Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahd-names. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents," *Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies* 1, no. 2 (1998): 377–387.

<sup>56</sup> Alexander de Groot's thought-provoking overview of the development of the Ottoman capitulatory regime does indicate this difference between Venetian capitulations and those accorded to the French, English, and the Dutch. See Alexander H. de Groot, "The Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," *Oriente Moderno*, 23, no. 3 (2003): 575–604.

<sup>57</sup> For instance the Dutch capitulations of 1680 contained the following article "...ve Cezayir-i Garb korsanları Nederlande'ye tâbi' limanlara vardıklarında ri'âyet olunup barut ve kurşun ve yelken vesâir edevât verilip lâkin korsanlar dahî Nederlande'ye tâbi' tüccâra rast geldiklerinde esir eylemeyip ve malların ğâret eylemeyeler bu hususa rızây-ı şerîfim yoktur ve Nederlande'ye tâbi' olan vilâyetlerden esir alırlar ise ıtlâk olunup malları dahî verile eğer korsanlar tecâvüz ettikleri müşârun ileyhim nâmeleri ile i'lâm eyleyeler her hangi beylerbeyi zamanında olur ise ol beylerbeyi ma'zûl olup ğâret olunan emvâl ve erzâk onlara tazmîn ettirile ve esir ettikleri ıtlâk oluna eğer emr-i şerîfe imtisâl etmezler ise onlar dahî Nederlande vilâyetlerine vardıklarında kalelerine ve limanlarına kabul etmeyip ta'addi ettiklerinde akd olunan ahde hâlel gelmeye..." BOA ED 22/1, 9/12, Dutch capitulations of 1680. For the same article in the Dutch capitulations of 1612, see De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 239.

<sup>58</sup> In a recent article Maria Pia Pedani argues that the clauses of reciprocity depended on the distance of the capitulatory country from the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations of the countries that were geographically close to the Ottoman Empire included clauses of reciprocity while those located far away did not include such clauses. See Maria Pia Pedani, "Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman Merchants in Venice," in *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles Veinstein (Paris, 2008), 3–4. The question of whether or not the capitulatory privileges were reciprocally applicable to Ottoman merchants must be considered together with the question of whether the Ottoman capitulations were bilateral agreements or accorded unilaterally by the Ottomans. For an overview of the latter aspect of the Ottoman capitulations, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Yeni*

With respect to the dynamic aspect of the capitulations, additional clauses were added in a process of developments that took place over the centuries and was not necessarily based on the logic of the capitulations themselves. These additional clauses came in response to practical situations and the demands of different parties. It is in this context that we should interpret the capitulatory privileges, which did not conform to this logic but were nevertheless accorded to European nations. Imperial orders, such as those which accorded the Dutch the right to settle in Ankara, are examples of this dynamic aspect.

Also with regard to non-Muslim merchants, we must clarify the way in which relevant decisions were made by the Ottoman central administration. This is important for an adequate understanding of the interaction between the two, especially because the capitulations did not provide an adequate framework for either the mercantile activities of Europeans in the interior of the empire or, conversely, for the mercantile activities of Ottoman subjects beyond the “well-guarded dominions” of the sultan. Despite the inadequacy of the capitulations in these respects, they continued to be used by European merchants as well as Ottoman merchants to request imperial orders from the Porte. The Porte interpreted the implications of a particular capitulatory article in a given situation not in a way that would justify old-fashioned notions of oriental despotism, but rather through a process in which different parties, including the Ottoman merchants, each played a part.

At this point a new approach borrowed from two anthropologists, Michael Meeker and Christopher Hann, provides a useful analytical tool as we try to explain how the Ottoman merchants played their part in the Porte’s decisions concerning their activities.

In his work on the southeastern Black Sea coast focusing on the town of Of from the late eighteenth century to the present, Meeker argues that interpersonal relations played a crucial role in the dissemination of Ottoman imperial power in the region. Interpersonal relations also opened the way for inhabitants of the coastal region to imperial participation, especially through religious education and conscription into the imperial army.<sup>59</sup>

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*Bir Hükümdar Aynası: Osmanlı Padişahlarının Kamusal İmgesi ve Bu İmgenin Algılanması*, trans. Gül Çağalı Güven (Istanbul, 2011), 135–137.

<sup>59</sup> Michael E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* (Berkeley, 2002).

Hann describes a similar feature for the same region in the republican era, which he calls the “domestication of the Turkish state.”<sup>60</sup> He uses this concept to contest the analyses of a majority of Turkish historians and social scientists who perceive an absolute opposition between the state and civil society in the Turkish state tradition. Hann argues that this Hegelian approach to state-society relations, combined with western ideas about oriental polities and center-periphery relations, is inadequate for understanding state-society relations in the eastern Black Sea region after the 1950s. Based on his own and other anthropologists’ observations, he shows that since the 1950s “the state has not simply penetrated the periphery, it has become part of each villager’s life”<sup>61</sup> and that Turkish citizens identify positively with the state, not negatively. Moreover, he argues, despite the absence of intermediate structures in a western sense, the people of the eastern Black Sea region were not simply passive recipients of state policies and decisions, but were able to lobby for their own regional interests and manipulate state policies in their favor.

The insights provided by these two authors enable us to avoid attributing a bourgeois character to the Ottoman state, while at the same time show that the non-Muslim merchant elite were able to manipulate the Ottoman government’s decisions in their own favor. Rather than contesting prevailing interpretations of relations between the Ottoman state and the holders of capital accumulated outside the sphere of administrative machinery, I aim to bridge the gap between these interpretations, as my findings show that in certain crucial issues non-Muslim merchants were able to exert influence on relevant decisions of the Ottoman bureaucracy.

In this context we should also mention that the frequent changes in the Ottoman government in the course of the eighteenth century, and each of these governments’ tendency to issue contradictory imperial orders, renders any generalization about the “policies” of the Ottoman central administration a problematic venture. Moreover, for most of the eighteenth

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<sup>60</sup> See C. M. Hann, *Tea and the Domestication of the Turkish State* (Cambridgeshire, 1990). The concept of domestication appears to have been used in a variety of ways by different anthropologists. See, for example, Barbara Rogers, *The Domestication of Women* (London, 1981) and Jack Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge, 1978). Hann’s use of the concept, as he mentions, has been inspired by the latter.

<sup>61</sup> Hann, *Tea and the Domestication*, 66. Interestingly, a comparable re-evaluation of state-society relations during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic has been carried out by another anthropologist who studied the eastern Black Sea regional town of Of. See Meeker, *Nation of Empire*. Meeker argues that “official Islam” and its institutions, and the military constituted the main avenues of imperial participation of the locals in the region.

century, the activities of Ottoman merchants beyond the boundaries of the empire, as well as their western competitors' penetration of the interior, seem not to have been central issues for the Ottoman administration, which apparently viewed these issues as outside the sphere of "policy making," even though they made frequent decisions related to them.<sup>62</sup> Given that the capitulations did not provide an adequate framework for decisions on these issues and the Ottoman administration considered them outside the sphere of policy making, we should not understand that the Ottoman administration's decisions were formed exclusively by the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants' influences at the Porte. Like the Ottoman merchants' interpersonal relations at the Porte, European diplomatic representatives also lobbied for the interests of their traders. However, the determining factor shaping the Porte's decisions was probably the Ottoman "economic worldview," which comprised three main principles: provisionism, traditionalism, and fiscalism.<sup>63</sup>

In explaining Ottoman provisionism, Mehmet Genç suggests that the Ottoman government approached the economy from the consumers' viewpoint rather than that of the producers; the government wanted as many goods on the market as possible—goods of the highest possible quality and with the lowest possible price. According to the same author, Ottoman traditionalism aimed at maintaining the economic and social status quo, which had been reached through a very slow process. Officials discouraged change, and when changes did occur, the Ottoman government's main policy objective was to return to the status quo. According to the same model, one of the most important objectives of the central bureaucracy was to increase the imperial treasury's tax revenues (fiscalism). When it was not possible to raise the state's income from taxation, the main objective was to keep it (at least) at its current level. State expenditures were also subject to fiscalism, in the sense that the Ottomans tried to keep them as low as possible. Although several authors have noted these same principles, it was Mehmet Genç who suggested that this tripartite model makes up the referential universe of all Ottoman economic practices. By means of this model we are able to comprehend

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<sup>62</sup> Other authors have commented on the Ottoman administration's failure to pursue consistent policies for even more important issues. See Christoph K. Neumann, "Decision Making without Decision Makers: Ottoman Foreign Policy circa 1780," in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah (Kirksville, Missouri, 1993), 29–38.

<sup>63</sup> Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 43–67.



several contradictory economic practices of the Ottoman state—practices that have led to contradictory interpretations.

Several authors have interpreted Ottoman provisionism and traditionalism quite differently than Mehmet Genç. Mehmet Genç sees Ottoman provisionism as a consequence of ethical and ideological considerations on the part of the Ottoman administration, and a result of the objective conditions of premodern economies (for example, limitations on production and transportation technologies). Certain authors, however, see Ottoman provisionism rather as a pragmatic policy intended to prevent popular opposition to the government.<sup>64</sup> In the first case, provisionism is seen as a principle to be implemented throughout the empire, while in the second case, provisionism is seen as a policy limited to the capital city, since popular opposition outside the capital did not pose an immediate danger to the Ottoman polity.

These different interpretations of Ottoman traditionalism have gone largely unrecognized, but are nevertheless quite an important aspect of the debate. In the interpretation of authors like İnalçık<sup>65</sup> and Masters,<sup>66</sup> the “mirror of princes” literature and other early Islamic literary works play a central role in Ottoman traditionalism. This means that the Ottomans’ economic practices were influenced by these texts, and in case of a problem, the Ottomans were likely to derive their solutions from them. Mehmet Genç sees Ottoman traditionalism as a principle of exclusively maintaining the long-standing socioeconomic equilibrium.<sup>67</sup> Because the relevant texts are static, the first interpretation of Ottoman traditionalism does not leave much room for change, while Genç’s interpretation allows piecemeal change in the system as long as the socioeconomic equilibrium is maintained. It is true that the texts in consideration were open to interpretation and could therefore accommodate a certain degree of change. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the overall flexibility of the Ottoman system and the changes that it was able to accommodate over the centuries, it seems to me more appropriate to interpret Ottoman traditionalism as an endeavor to maintain the extant socioeconomic

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<sup>64</sup> See the debate of Ahmet Güner Sayar, Ethem Eldem, and Mehmet Genç “Osmanlı’da Zanaat, Ahlak İktisat İlişkisi” in *Anatomi Dersleri: Osmanlı Kültürü* (İstanbul, 1995), 105–145.

<sup>65</sup> See Halil İnalçık, “The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy,” in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. M. A. Cook, (New York, 1970), 209–218.

<sup>66</sup> See Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance*, 192, 195.

<sup>67</sup> Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 48.



equilibrium than to see it as a devotion to the “mirror of princes” literature. Therefore, in analyzing the role of the Ottoman state, I follow Mehmet Genç’s interpretation.

This framework, outlining at least the “referential universe” of the Ottoman bureaucracy’s decisions on economic matters, can be used to describe the position of the Ottoman merchants as well as their western competitors in relation to the Ottoman polity. Mehmet Genç points out that, because of the Ottoman bureaucracy’s provisionist priorities, the goods imported by European merchants were welcome on the Ottoman market.<sup>68</sup> One may add that European merchants were also welcome, since they added to the revenue of customs officers at Ottoman ports. However, I argue that the activities of European merchants were not welcome beyond the ports, since their penetration of the interior was not in conformity with, but in contradiction to the fiscalist, provisionist, and traditionalist priorities of the Ottoman bureaucracy. When local merchants opposed Dutch penetration of the hinterland, they were thus acting in conformity with the economic priorities of the Ottoman central administration.

The second factor I analyze in this book is the interaction between local social, economic, and administrative elements (such as merchants, producers, guilds, provincial administrators, local power magnates, etc.) and the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants. For this purpose I focus on the attitudes and actions of these diverse elements on developments that took place within the context of the trade between Ankara, Izmir, and Amsterdam. While analyzing the impact of these factors, I show that non-Muslim Ottoman merchants made extensive use of their local connections to enhance their position vis-à-vis European merchants. Local connections ensured that they could access the products and markets of the hinterland better than the European traders, and that they could manipulate the local authorities in their favor.

The opportunities created by Ottoman-Dutch trade for the expansion of the activities of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants constitute the third factor examined in this book. Due to the peculiar organizational structure of Dutch trade with the Levant and the liberal trade policies the Dutch pursued, Ottoman-Dutch trade was the only consistent outlet for non-Muslim Ottoman merchants who wanted to expand their activities to the Atlantic.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 47.

Although England and France intermittently allowed foreigners to participate in their trade, especially during wartime, it was not until the early nineteenth century that they permanently opened up their Levant trade to the participation of foreigners. Thus, the participation of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants in the trade of these countries remained clandestine and probably negligible when compared to Dutch trade with the Levant. In any case, Dutch trade with the Levant constitutes an excellent case study for an analysis of the role of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants in the intercontinental trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe.

In analyzing Dutch Levant trade organization and Dutch trade policies in the Levant, I make use of a comparative method, contrasting the Dutch case with its French and English counterparts. This comparison is dynamic in the sense that it describes the evolution of these policies until the abandonment of monopolistic practices by the English and the French at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Dutch model became the rule rather than the exception. This analysis enables us, on the one hand, to make certain generalizations about the whole Ottoman-European trade, and on the other hand, it creates a viable basis for speculating about the impact of the monopolistic regulations of the western trading partners of the Ottoman Empire.

In focusing on Dutch trade with the Levant, I identify a number of interest orientations within the Dutch trading community. For the latter included a wide variety of actors, such as merchants, ambassadorial and consular functionaries, and the directorate of the Levant trade, as well as Dutch textile producers and ship owners. I remain alert to the complex clashes of interest between Dutch trading communities in different Ottoman ports, between the merchants in the Netherlands and those in the Levant, between merchants and textile producers, and between ship owners and merchants. This results in a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch trading community in comparison to the Ottoman merchants, the strategies adopted by Ottoman merchants when expanding their activities to the Netherlands, and the inability of Dutch merchants to prevent their advance.

The present book consists of three parts: In the first part I describe and analyze the competition between Ottoman and Dutch merchants for the mohair trade of Ankara in light of new archival data. I start with (chapter 1) a short description of the social and economic structure of the town of Ankara, and present the matrix of social, economic, and administrative actors and structures from which Ottoman and Dutch merchants could

form their coalitions while they were competing with each other for control of the mohair trade. The specificities of the mohair trade itself, and its importance in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe are also examined in this chapter. In the following chapters (chapters 2 and 3) I study the developments that took place in eighteenth-century Ankara for the control of this trade. The competition between these merchant communities was not limited to the economic sphere; manipulation of officials to obtain favorable treatment was an essential part of merchants' tactics. I also analyze some interesting incidents that occurred as a result of this rivalry.

In the second part I investigate the expansion of the commercial activities of Ottoman merchants to the Netherlands. Here I start (chapter 4) with the organization of the Dutch Levant trade, giving a comprehensive description of the relevant Dutch institutions and regulations with an emphasis on Dutch free-trade as distinct from English and French trade policies. These explanations show the peculiarities of Dutch Levant trade organization and explain its vulnerability to penetration by non-Muslim Ottoman merchants. I also discuss Dutch consular dues and other taxes related to the Levant trade; these are important because of their impact on the relative positions of merchants from different communities. This chapter is then followed by two chapters (5 and 6) that address the ways in which Ottoman merchants were able to penetrate the Dutch trading network. In chapter 5 I pay special attention to the partnerships between Ottoman and Dutch merchants in Izmir and the transactions between Ottoman merchants in Izmir and Dutch merchants in the Netherlands, because this kind of participation in the Ottoman-Dutch trade enabled Ottoman merchants to build up viable connections with the Netherlands. In these two chapters I also look at whether certain communities (Armenians, Greeks, Jews) were specialized, within the context of Ottoman-Dutch trade, in certain trades and whether these specializations can be traced back to their traditional activities in the Ottoman economy. I consider this point of crucial importance since it shows the extent to which these merchants depended, during the expansion of their activities to western Europe, on their traditional networks and roles within the Ottoman economy. Once the Ottoman merchants established their connections with the Netherlands, a final phase remained. During this phase a number of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants established themselves in major trade centers of the Netherlands, specifically Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Chapter 6 addresses the activities of these merchants, paying

special attention to the extent to which they maintained their economic and social connections in the Ottoman Empire. Again, this is analyzed in terms of what factors placed these merchants at an advantage or disadvantage compared to Dutch merchants trading with the Levant.

The third part, consisting of chapters 7 and 8, analyzes the Ottoman merchants' impact on the policies of both the Dutch and the Ottoman states. Dutch policies evolved from free-trade policies to a "faint protectionism" in the face of Ottoman merchants' increasing activities, which could not be countered effectively because of the diverse interest orientations within the Dutch trading community. From the Ottoman side, the activities of Ottoman merchants guided the Ottoman central administration toward a consistent policy aimed at promoting their commercial ventures beyond the boundaries of the empire. I conclude by relating my findings to current debates.

PART ONE

COUNTERING DUTCH COMMERCIAL EXPANSION IN  
NORTHWESTERN ANATOLIA



## CHAPTER ONE

### THE TOWN OF ANKARA AND ITS MOHAIR INDUSTRY

Before focusing on the commercial rivalry between Dutch and Ottoman merchants in Ankara we need to have a general look at the demographic, administrative, and socioeconomic structure of the town for a better understanding of how these factors influenced the competition between Ottoman and Dutch merchants there. First, I focus on the demographic makeup of Ankara, since socioeconomic conditions result very directly from this structure. There is no doubt that the administrative machinery and the *askerîs*<sup>1</sup> in Ankara must be considered as two of the most important influences on the course of the commercial rivalry under scrutiny. As will be seen in the next chapters, both rivals strove to achieve their ends not only by “pure mercantile competition” but also by manipulating the central and local authorities and power factions in their favor. In this chapter, in addition to demographics, therefore, we will also investigate the administrative structure of Ankara and undertake a detailed investigation of the mohair industry, since its products form the basis of the developments we address in the next chapters.

In an interesting essay on Ankara, Mehmed Ali Kılıçbay suggests that, due to certain peculiarities of its social and economic history, Ankara differed considerably from conventional Turkish-Islamic cities and resembled European cities.<sup>2</sup> The first point he mentioned within this context is the peculiar role that the *ahîs* (crafts unions) played in the history of Ankara. Several sources reveal that at the end of the thirteenth century, when Anatolia was in turbulence, *ahîs* increased their influence and played a crucial role in Ankara’s administration. The increasing influence of *ahîs* turned Ankara into a city characterized by production and trade like European cities that became autonomous by increasing their economic capacities. Another similarity can be seen in the establishment of the international mohair trade in Ankara. Like the earliest proto-capitalist cities

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<sup>1</sup> In Ottoman social stratification the *askerîs* (literally military men) comprised those who held official functions as military men or as civil functionaries.

<sup>2</sup> Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, “Sof Şehri Ankara,” in *Ankara Ankara*, ed. E. Batur (Istanbul, 1994), 65–70.

of Europe, such as those in northern Italy and Flanders, there emerged a textile industry in Ankara with an extensive emphasis on export to international markets. The fact that agricultural production did not play an important role in the city's economy constitutes another similarity. Rather than engaging, even to a small degree, in agricultural production, Ankara's resources were almost entirely directed to the production of mohair products.

While we may accept or reject Kılıçbay's conclusions, mainly drawn from a comparison of rather sketchy depictions of Ankara and western cities, we must agree that they do correspond to certain features that we can observe in the social and economic history of Ankara. Namely, that the dominant economic role of production and exportation of mohair had a considerable impact on social and economic relations in the city.

Ankara was located quite near the Ottoman capital and maintained overland connections to several other city centers. Tournefort notes that caravans from Ankara took overland routes of 20 days to arrive at Izmir, 10 days to Bursa, 8 days to Kayseri, 10 days to Sinop, 9 days to Izmit, 12–13 days to Istanbul, and that they arrived at the closest Black Sea coast city within 4 days.<sup>3</sup> It appears that after its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire Ankara grew quite rapidly into one of the largest cities in Anatolia. Faroqhi estimates the population of Ankara at about 25,000 by the end of the sixteenth century.<sup>4</sup> Based on the official tax registers of the period, Ergenç places the population of the city from approximately 23,000 to 25,000 by the beginning of the seventeenth century.<sup>5</sup> It seems that the population of the city reached about 25,000 people during the *celâlî* disturbances<sup>6</sup> in Anatolia at the end of the sixteenth century, and more or less maintained this population well into the nineteenth century. Özdemir calculates Ankara's population as 21,150 by the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant* (Amsterdam, 1718), 2:185.

<sup>4</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ankara ve Çevresindeki Arazi Mülkiyetinin ya da İnsan-Toprak İlişkilerinin Değişimi," in *Tarih İçinde Ankara: Eylül 1981 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Ayşıl Tükel Yavuz (Ankara, 2000), 70.

<sup>5</sup> Özer Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi Kent Tarihçiliğine Katkı: XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya* (Ankara, 1990), 53.

<sup>6</sup> On *celâlî* disturbances see Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlık ve Düzenlik Kavgası (Celali İsyanları)* (Izmir, 1999).

<sup>7</sup> Rifat Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara (Fiziki, Demografik, İdari ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapısı) 1785–1840* (Ankara, 1986), 106, 117, 126. See also Jülide Akyüz, "Ankara'nın



Although the number of people living in Ankara did not change much during these centuries, the composition of the population did evolve considerably. For example, while in the decade beginning in 1520 non-Muslim residents of Ankara amounted to 10 percent of the total population, this percentage increased to about 11–15 percent by the beginning of the seventeenth century and to 45 percent by 1830.<sup>8</sup> The mobility of the Armenian community contributed to this change. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Armenian community in Ankara was already the largest non-Muslim community in the city, amounting to two hundred families, while the Jews numbered about 450–500 people.<sup>9</sup> The Catholic Armenian community of Ankara grew as the Armenians who embraced Catholicism in Sivas, eastern Anatolia, Persia, and the Caucasus moved to Ankara to escape religious persecution.<sup>10</sup>

Like any other Ottoman city, Ankara was also divided into *mahalles*. The *mahalles* of Ankara were located in and around the citadel, which dominated the skyline of the city. Needless to say the citadel occupied a central role in social, economic, and political life: in case of an attack, people sought refuge in the citadel; its military played a crucial role in maintaining security in and around the city; the valuable belongings of the government, as well as of merchants, were stored in the citadel; and criminals were imprisoned there.<sup>11</sup> But this was not all. The citadel also accommodated the most popular *mahalles*, with the most expensive houses of Ankara,<sup>12</sup> while the majority of the *mahalles* and the business centers of Ankara remained outside the citadel.<sup>13</sup> Özdemir lists one hundred and seven *mahalles* mentioned during the 1785–1840 period in Ankara court registers. According to his findings, 57 of these *mahalles* were inhabited exclusively by Muslims, 27 by non-Muslims of various religious affiliations, and 23 *mahalles* housed both Muslims and non-Muslims. The Jewish

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Bütüncül Tarihi Çerçevesinde XVII. Yüzyılda Ankara (Şer'ıye Sicillerinin Sayısal ve Muhtevâ Analizi Denemesi)," PhD thesis (Ankara Üniversitesi, 2003), 82.

<sup>8</sup> Sevgi Aktüre, "17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Ankara," in *Ankara Ankara*, ed. E. Batur (İstanbul, 1994), 96; Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 57.

<sup>9</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 57.

<sup>10</sup> Henry J. van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870), 2:176; Rifat Önsoy, "19. Yüzyılda Ankara'nın Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi," in *Ankara Ankara*, ed. E. Batur, (İstanbul, 1994), 122.

<sup>11</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 78.

<sup>12</sup> Özer Ergenç, "16. Yüzyıl Ankara'sı: Ekonomik, Sosyal Yapısı ve Kentsel Özellikleri," in *Tarih İçinde Ankara: Eylül 1981 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Aysel Tükel Yavuz, (Ankara, 2000), 49.

<sup>13</sup> Semavi Eyice, *Ankara'nın eski bir resmi: Tarihi vesika olarak resimler-Ankara'dan Bahsedilen Seyyahlar-Eski bir Ankara resmi* (Ankara, 1972), 70.

residents of Ankara shared the Öksüzce and Hoca Hindi quarters with Muslim neighbors.<sup>14</sup>

Ankara possessed a sophisticated mercantile infrastructure. The most important component of this infrastructure was the *bedesten* at the *atpazarı* (horse market) on the eastern side of the citadel. The *bedesten* of Ankara housed 96 shops, where Muslim and non-Muslim merchants, primarily engaged in the textile trade, ran their businesses. There were about 10 large khans located around the *bedesten*, marking the heart of the city's economy. In total there were approximately 30 khans in Ankara; at least three of these khans were built in the eighteenth century, a clue to the vitality of the city during that period.<sup>15</sup>

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, under the threat posed by Celâli Tavîl Mehmed and Kalenderoğlu, the residents of Ankara took the initiative to build walls around the city. European travelers noted and depicted these walls before they were demolished. Tournefort,<sup>16</sup> who visited the city in 1701, and Paul Lucas<sup>17</sup> (in 1705) depict these walls in their Ankara gravures. As early as 1703, Motraye<sup>18</sup> noted that the walls were not in very good condition; by the end of the century they were totally useless. The walls were built to protect the city from the attacks of the bandits of the seventeenth century, but were left to disintegrate after the threat had passed.<sup>19</sup>

In administrative terms, the city was the capital of the *sancak* and *kazâ* of Ankara.<sup>20</sup> As elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire before the seventeenth century, the highest provincial administrator in Ankara was the *sancak-beyi*. He was expected to impose order within the *sancak* and to join in

<sup>14</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 93–98. Jülide Akyüz lists 88 *mahalles* through the eighteenth century. Akyüz, “Ankara’nın Bütüncül,” 69–72.

<sup>15</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 25–37; Ergenç, “16. Yüzyıl Ankara’sı,” 51, 88; Faroqi, “Ankara ve Çevresindeki,” 64. About the khans of Ankara, see also Ömür Bakırer, “Ankara Kent Merkezinde Özellikle Hanlar ve Bedestenin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Gelişimi,” in *Tarih İçinde Ankara: Eylül 1981 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Ayşıl Tükel Yavuz (Ankara, 2000), 105–127.

<sup>16</sup> Tournefort, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant*, 2:177.

<sup>17</sup> Paul Lucas, *Voyage du sieur Paul Lucas fait par ordre du Roi dans la Grèce, l'Asie Mineure, la Macedoine et l'Afrique*, vol. 1: *Contenant la description de la Natolie, de la Carmanie, & de la Macedoine* (Amsterdam, 1714), 110.

<sup>18</sup> Aubry de la Motraye, *Voyages du Sr. A. de la Motraye en Europe, Asie et Afrique* (The Hague, 1727), 1:311–315. Cf. Eyice, *Ankara'nın eski bir resmi*, 75.

<sup>19</sup> Musa Çadircı, “Yönetim Merkezi Olarak Ankara’nın Geçirdiği Evrim,” in *Tarih İçinde Ankara: Eylül 1981 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Ayşıl Tükel Yavuz (Ankara, 2000), 89. For a survey of the events following the arrival of Kalenderoğlu to Ankara, see Avram Galanti, *Ankara Tarihi: İkinci Kısım* (Istanbul, 1950), 34–35.

<sup>20</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 136.

imperial campaigns with the soldiers under his command. During imperial campaigns, the *sancakbeyi* appointed a *kaimakam* to carry out his duties in the province.<sup>21</sup>

In Ottoman towns, the extensive administrative authority of the *sancakbeyi* was counterbalanced by the juridical authority of the qadi. With respect to the administrative system, the primary function of the qadi was to prevent arbitrary abuses of authority on the part of the provincial governors. Thus, the provincial governors needed a ruling by the qadi to carry out their decisions regarding certain issues. These parallel administrative and juridical authorities resulted in a parallel administrative and juridical network through Ankara. While the qadi appointed *nâibs* to the *nâhiyes* of Ankara, the *sancakbeyi* appointed *subaşı*s to implement his authority in the same places.<sup>22</sup>

Like other qadis in the Ottoman Empire, the qadi of Ankara was directly appointed by the sultan upon the request of the *kazasker*. The posts of qadis in the empire were ranked according to the estimated revenue a post brought to its holder. The estimated revenue of the qadi of Ankara was three hundred aspers (*akçe*) a day—it was considered a luxurious post. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, such posts were assigned to the highest members of the religious (*ilmiye*) class such as the *şeyhül-İslâm* or *kazaskers*. These nominal qadis mostly resided in Istanbul and held the post from nine to sixteen months. Their day-to-day duties were carried out by deputies (*nâibs*), whom they appointed with the approval of the *şeyhül-İslâm*.<sup>23</sup>

The primary function of the qadi of Ankara was adjudication. He was expected to rule on all kinds of disputes between people, to approve marriages, and to settle inheritances. Along with these responsibilities, the qadi fulfilled certain administrative functions as well. He acted as an inspector to the functionaries in Ankara and ensured the announcement and implementation of imperial orders. As the highest member of the *ilmiye* class, he was authorized to appoint and dismiss other religious (*ilmiye*) functionaries, such as professors (*müderris*), *imams*, and preachers (*hatip*). Moreover, several local functionaries who exercised considerable authority over the social and economic life of the city, such as the *muhtesibs* (market inspectors) were placed under his supervision. His responsibility regarding local pious foundations (*vakıf*) was an important

<sup>21</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 68.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 63, 69.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 81–83; Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 178–180.

part of his authority because these institutions generally played a crucial role in civic life. Qadis in general, and the qadi of Ankara in particular, were charged with inspection of local tax farms (*mukâta'as*) as well.<sup>24</sup>

The muftis were among the more important functionaries active in religious affairs in Ankara. They were seen as the representatives of the *şeyhü'l-İslâm*, and were primarily concerned with issuing judicial opinions (*fetvâs*). Although they did not have extensive administrative and juridical functions comparable to the qadis, they enjoyed a highly esteemed social position.<sup>25</sup>

The central government interfered with Ankara's administration through governors and other functionaries, and interfered with the economic life of the town primarily through taxation. During the eighteenth century, the greatest part of the fiscal revenue of Ankara was collected through *mâlikânês* (tax farms with lifetime contracts). There is no doubt that the *damga emîni* or *damgacı* (collector of the stamp tax) was by far the most important person in the economic life of the city, since he administered and taxed the productive activities related to the mohair industry, the *damga mukâta'ası* (stamp tax farm).<sup>26</sup> His extensive authority over the mohair industry ensured that he was one of the most powerful figures in the civic life of Ankara.<sup>27</sup>

In general, as a capital of a *sancak* and a *kazâ*, Ankara accommodated a relatively high number of *askerîs*. For the sixteenth-century, Ergenç estimates the number of *askerîs* residing in Ankara at about 13–15 percent of the town's total population.<sup>28</sup> This figure included several administrative functionaries and military men, as well as some soldiers and civil servants.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately we lack comparable figures for later periods.

After the Köprülü era (ca. 1656–1703) Ankara began to be allotted—independently or together with other *sancaks*<sup>30</sup>—as a source of income (*bervech-i arpalık*) for the military elite or the highest members of the

<sup>24</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 84–88, 105; Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 184–202.

<sup>25</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 170, 205–206.

<sup>26</sup> The full name of the tax farm was *mukâta'a-i hasha-i tamga-yı Ankara ve Simsariye ve zarar-ı kassâbiye ve boyahane ve cendrehâne ve tevabii*. Deniz Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII. Yüzyılda Ankara Damga Mukataası," *Bilig* 32 (Winter 2005), 181.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 192–198, 209.

<sup>28</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 57.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 77; Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 151–153.

<sup>30</sup> For example by the beginning of the nineteenth century Ankara was assigned together with Çankırı to one *mutasarrıf paşa*. See Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 45, 133.

*ilmiye* class.<sup>31</sup> These nominal governors or *mutasarrıfs*, as they were called, resided mostly in Istanbul or elsewhere and governed Ankara through a *mütesellim*, whom they appointed with the consent of the sultan.<sup>32</sup> The fact that, during the eighteenth century, most imperial orders to Ankara were addressed to the *mütesellim* and not to the *sancakbeyi* or the *mutasarrıf* shows that the practical authority in Ankara was exercised by the *mütesellims*.<sup>33</sup>

This new practice of provincial administration was accompanied by the rise of *a'yân*s and influential families in the eighteenth-century Ottoman provinces. The impact of these parallel developments in Ankara meant that by the mid-eighteenth century the prominent families in the province began to compete for the posts of *a'yân* and/or *mütesellim* of Ankara. The Müderriszâdes, Nakkaşzâdes, Muslu Paşazâdes, Zennecizâdes, and Mimarzâdes were some of the families engaged in this struggle. It is interesting to observe that the two most successful families, namely the Müderriszâdes and Mimarzâdes, had their roots in the *ilmiye* class.<sup>34</sup>

The Müderriszâdes became increasingly important in mid-eighteenth century Ankara. One of the Müderriszâdes, namely Ahmed, was a former qadi who later became an *a'yân*. He was one of the most striking figures engaged in the interfamily struggles in eighteenth-century Ankara. Between 1740 and 1746 especially, he caused considerable trouble, both for the local people and the central government.<sup>35</sup> A petition submitted to the divan in 1741/42 complained about the unlawful activities of Müderriszâde Ahmed, who operated dye houses and polishing looms (*cenderhâne*) without the permission of the *damga emîni*. As such operations were among the prerogatives of the *damga emîni*, Müderriszâde Ahmed was ordered to close his dye house and polishing looms. It appears that he was later authorized to run a dye house and polishing loom, under the condition that he rented it from the *damga emîni*. However, after a period of time, he arranged to record his manufacturing facility as a pious foundation (*vakıf*) and began to operate independently. The *damga emîni* was

<sup>31</sup> Çadırcı, "Yönetim Merkezi," 90.

<sup>32</sup> Galanti, *Ankara Tarihi*, 45–46.

<sup>33</sup> Çadırcı, "Yönetim Merkezi," 90; Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 139–147.

<sup>34</sup> Çadırcı, "Yönetim Merkezi," 90; Yücel Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Yerli Ailelerin Âyânlıkları Ele Geçirışleri ve Büyük Hânedânlıkların Kuruluşu," *Belleten* 42 (1978), 687; Galanti, *Ankara Tarihi*, 47.

<sup>35</sup> Although Çadırcı mentions Müderriszâde Ahmed as the *mütesellim* of Ankara between 1740 and 1746, the documents supplied by Özkaya suggest he was not. Çadırcı, "Yönetim Merkezi," 90; Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında," 667–723.

nevertheless able to take control of the facility in 1753 under the condition that he would pay the yearly 250 piasters which Müderriszâde Ahmed had endowed from the revenue of his dye house and polishing loom.<sup>36</sup>

While he was active in Ankara, Müderriszâde Ahmed collaborated extensively with Muslu Paşazâde Salih Bey, whose power base was Yabanâbad. In 1744 the central government decided to send Müderriszâde Ahmed into exile to Kastamonu after the local populace complained about his unfairness and extractions. The government also sent an official (*kapıcıbaşı*) and a judge (*molla*) to Ankara to investigate the allegations and to record the claims of the populace. Müderriszâde Ahmed was able to avoid exile and took refuge with Ali Paşa, an ex-governor of the province of Anatolia. In 1746 he appeared again in Ankara. This time, he carried an agreement that he had signed by Seyyid Sunullah Efendi, a (probably redundant) qadi and *mutasarrıf* of Ankara. But his activities in Ankara seem to have provoked the locals once more into action against him, as the continuous complaints about his malpractices make clear. These complaints led to an imperial decree ordering his removal to Adana or Ereğli. Despite these complaints and imperial orders sent in response to them, Müderriszâde Ahmed continued to operate in Ankara, taking advantage of the mercenaries under his control. Although we know that these later activities led to another decree commanding his removal to Bursa in 1768, we do not know whether this decree had any practical effect.<sup>37</sup>

As we have already noted, the guilds of Ankara played a peculiar role in Ankara's history and retained their importance as social and economic factors into the eighteenth century. Ortaylı attributes the peculiarity of the importance of the guilds to the mentality and the lifestyle of the people of Ankara and argues that they were more similar in their orientation toward work to northern European peoples than to those of the Mediterranean.<sup>38</sup> Unfortunately, we lack a complete list of guilds and figures on the craftsmen before 1827, by which time the mohair industry had already lost its importance. For this year, Özdemir provides a detailed tax register that lists the craftsmen of Ankara according to their crafts or locations (*khan*, *kervansaray*, and *hamams*). The register lists 2,331 craftsmen engaged in 72 different crafts, and an additional 134 craftsmen in 23 locations. According to this list, textile related crafts were still the mainstay of most craftsmen

<sup>36</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 197–198.

<sup>37</sup> Çadircı, "Yönetim Merkezi," 90; Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında," 688–689.

<sup>38</sup> İlber Ortaylı, "19. Yüzyıllarda Ankara," in *Ankara Ankara*, ed. E. Batur (Istanbul, 1994), 118.

in this period, while only a few of them were engaged in mohair related activities: nine mohair wool producers (*tiftikçiyân*), four mohair yarn dyers (*tiftik boyacıları*), and forty-two cloth dyers (*bez boyacıları*) were present in the city.<sup>39</sup>

Considering their administrative structure, autonomy, and relations with the authorities, the guilds of Ankara were considerably similar to the guilds elsewhere in the empire; thus, Ankara craftsmen determined who was to be appointed as headman of their guild.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, the craftsmen of Ankara had a voice over which policeman (*ases*) was to be appointed to their market (*pazar*), khan or *kervansaray*. The craftsmen were also able to forbid one of their fellows to practice his trade if he violated the rules related to the craft.<sup>41</sup> Just as elsewhere in the empire, Muslim and non-Muslim craftsmen could be affiliated to the same guilds.<sup>42</sup> Since the majority of the non-Muslim population of Ankara was Armenian, mixed guilds consisted predominantly of Muslims and Armenians.

Although the broader Armenian trading diaspora of the early modern period remains outside the scope of this work, some remarks need to be made here about their social and economic position in Ankara. Eighteenth-century European sources quite frequently mention the predominant role of Armenian merchants in the overland trade routes crossing the Ottoman Empire from east to west. At the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, when Iranian silk constituted an important part of European exports from Aleppo and Izmir, Europeans noticed the Armenians' dominance over this trade. As Ankara's mohair was in demand in Europe, contemporary European sources were interested in the position of the Armenians with respect to the trade of this commodity.<sup>43</sup>

A French observer in the 1730s wrote that the Armenian merchants of Ankara consigned about 700–800 bales of mohair yarn a year to Izmir and Istanbul. They were also active in Beypazarı, where most of the coarse mohair yarn was produced. An annual amount of about 250 bales was consigned to Izmir by Armenian merchants.<sup>44</sup> It is clear that, over time,

<sup>39</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 228–232.

<sup>40</sup> Yücel Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları ve Osmanlı Toplum Yaşantısı* (Ankara, 1985), 66.

<sup>41</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*.

<sup>42</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 127.

<sup>43</sup> Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance*, 87.

<sup>44</sup> Halil Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Sanayii Bölgelerimiz ve Ticari İmkanları," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 2, no. 11 (August 1968), 65.



the Armenians of Ankara became increasingly dominant in the economic life of the town. A couple of decades later, in 1759, Dutch merchants Jacobus Leytstar, Gabriel Chasseaud, and Panchaud & Series noted that the local Armenians dominated trade in Ankara.<sup>45</sup> The Armenian success was not shared by the other non-Muslim communities. The Greeks and especially the Jews were the poorest of Ankara's residents during the eighteenth century.<sup>46</sup>

We have already mentioned that during the 1700s the Armenians in the other parts of the empire who converted to Catholicism moved to Ankara to avoid religious persecution. Ankara was a natural refuge for Armenian Catholics, as it was an important Catholic religious center in central Anatolia, with the church of St. Mary at its heart. The church of St. Mary—or Vank monastery, as it was called in Turkish—was the seat of an Armenian Catholic bishop whose authority reached as far as Tokat. As might be expected, relations between the Armenian-Gregorian and the slowly growing Armenian-Catholic communities were tense.<sup>47</sup>

During the last decades of the eighteenth century, the population of the traditional economic center of Ankara declined and the population of the non-Muslim quarters increased.<sup>48</sup> This limited demographic switch relates to a considerable social and economic transition, which mainly favored the non-Muslim elements of the town. As Van Lennep notes, the French revolution and the following wars brought a marked interruption in the mohair trade, which recovered only after the wars. After the industry's recovery, it was the Greeks who profited from it more than any other community.<sup>49</sup> Kinnier notes that by 1813 the remaining mohair trade in Ankara was carried out completely by Christians, who made up only one-third of the total population. Kinnier also notes that there was a grain shortage in the city and that the relevant trade was run solely by a monopoly of the local pasha and certain Armenian merchants.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> G. R. Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity: Ottoman-Dutch Relations during the Embassy of Cornelis Calkoen at the Sublime Porte, 1726–1744* (Amsterdam, 1977), 211.

<sup>46</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 65.

<sup>47</sup> Van Lennep, *Travels*, 176; Önsoy, "19. Yüzyılda Ankara'nın Sosyal," 122; W. J. Hamilton, *Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia* (London, 1842), 1:424. Cf. R. D. Barnett, "The European Merchants in Angora," *Anatolian Studies* 24 (1974), 132.

<sup>48</sup> Neriman Şahin Güçhan, "16–19. yy. Nüfus Tahminlerine Göre Osmanlı Ankara'sında Mahallelerin Değişim Süreçleri Üzerine Bir Deneme," in *Tarih İçinde Ankara II: Aralık 1998 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Yıldırım Yavuz (Ankara, 2001), 138.

<sup>49</sup> Van Lennep, *Travels*, 178.

<sup>50</sup> Eyice, *Ankara'nın eski bir resmi*, 79–80.





It is now time for a detailed investigation of the mohair industry, its products, the related productive activities, and its trade. Mohair is the wool of the Angora goat, with its origins in the Ankara region. The goats' wool is dazzlingly white and curly, grows about eight to nine inches long, and is as fine as silk. For centuries, Turks, Armenians, and Greeks living in the villages around Ankara and Beypazarı have herded these goats, primarily for their unique wool. These herdsmen enjoyed a global monopoly over the production of mohair from the beginning of the fourteenth century until the nineteenth century, when the Angora goat was successfully acclimatized to South Africa.<sup>51</sup> As early as the sixteenth century, mohair products were exported to Europe in considerable quantities, hence the reason for the great attention European visitors paid to mohair and Ankara at the time.

Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq visited Ankara in 1555 and described the Angora goat, noting that the wool of the Angora goats was fine, glossy, and almost as beautiful as silk. De Busbecq attributed the uniqueness of Angora wool to the grass of the pastures in the region where they grazed. He noted that women around Ankara spun yarn from these goats' wool, which was not sheared off, but combed out.<sup>52</sup> Dernschwamm, who was in De Busbecq's entourage, wrote a more extensive description of the techniques and the production process of mohair cloths. Dernschwamm reports that it was predominantly the women in Ankara and the nearby villages who spun and sold mohair yarn. These yarns were washed, then prepared for weaving on looms. After it was woven, mohair cloth was washed, dyed, flattened, and polished. Although Dernschwamm thought that the tools used for the production of mohair cloth were rather primitive, he acknowledged the quality and the popularity of the resulting fabrics.<sup>53</sup> In 1615, Simeon of Poland visited the city and stayed there for a month. He wrote that the whole populace of Ankara was engaged in the mohair industry and that merchants from all around the world, including

<sup>51</sup> Cemal Kafadar, "A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in Serenissima," *Journal of Turkish Studies (Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları)* 10 (1986), 205.

<sup>52</sup> Oghier Ghiselin De Busbeq, *The Turkish Letters of Oghier Ghiselin De Busbeq*, trans. Edward Seymour Forster (Oxford, 1927), 46.

<sup>53</sup> Franz Babinger, *Hans Dernschwam's Tagebuch: Eine Reise Nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasien (1553/55)* (Munich, 1923), 186–187. For a more detailed description of mohair cloth (camlet) production, see İhsan Abidin, *Tiftik, istihsalden istihlâke kadar* (Istanbul, 1932), 197–200.

Poland, came to the city to purchase camlets and other textiles.<sup>54</sup> Evliya Çelebi, who visited the city in 1640, made similar observations and also noted that the local merchants traveled abroad to sell locally-produced textiles.<sup>55</sup>

In 1740, Pococke—like the other European travelers—compared mohair to silk. He noted that the export of raw mohair was forbidden in Ankara, given that the city's inhabitants earned their livelihood spinning it. Local craftsmen used the produced yarn to make

fine camlets of three or four threads, which they sometimes water, and they make a stuff they call shawl of two threads, which is like our finest serges; it is either plain or striped, and both are worn by the Turks for summer garments; they make also camlets even to thirteen threads for European clothes . . . every thing that we call mohair, camlets and prunellas are made of it, and also the best plushes, of which great quantities of the flowered sort are made in Holland.<sup>56</sup>

The crucial role of the mohair industry within the local economy of Ankara required an adequate ordering of the productive activities within the framework of Ottoman social and economic institutions. This meant that, like other craftsmen in the Ottoman Empire, the mohair producers of Ankara were organized into guilds. The craftsmen who were exclusively engaged in activities relevant to the mohair industry were organized in four guilds, corresponding to four different crafts in the industry: weavers (*dokuyucular*), washers (*yuyucular*), dyers (*boyacılar*), and polishers (*perdahtçılar-cendreciler*).<sup>57</sup> The structure of these guilds was similar to that of other guilds in the Ottoman Empire.

Although the greatest part of the productive activities pertaining to the mohair industry was carried out by the spinners, the spinners were not organized in a guild. The overwhelming part of Ankara's population contributed to this stage of the productive process and sold their products (mohair yarn) on the street. The yarn which could not be sold on the street had to be offered to the weavers' guild.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnâmesi* (Istanbul, 1964), 162.

<sup>55</sup> Zekeriya Kurşun, Seyit Ali Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı, İbrahim Sezgin, and Robert Dankoff, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi* (Istanbul, 1999–2007), 2:226.

<sup>56</sup> Richard Pococke, *A Description of the East, and Some Other Countries, Volume II, Part II: Observations on the Islands of the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and Some Other Parts of Europe* (London, 1745), 2:90.

<sup>57</sup> Egenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 100.

<sup>58</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 203.

The weavers were the mainstay of the mohair industry. They were spread throughout the city with a higher concentration in the eastern area (Ayancıklar), which included four quarters: Molla Büyük, Çeşme, Direkli Mescid, and Kayabaşı. Additionally, some villages around the city, such as Erkeksu, Miranos, and İstanoz, were engaged exclusively in weaving mohair cloth. The local court records reveal that houses in Ankara had additional rooms to house usually two, though sometimes more (up to five) looms, totaling about one thousand looms in the city and surrounding villages by the end of the sixteenth century.<sup>59</sup> By the end of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, the number of houses with more looms increased, making it possible to find workshops with even six to eight looms.<sup>60</sup>

Mohair yarn was purchased and divided among weavers under the supervision of their *şeyh*, *kethüdâ*, and *yığitbaşıs*. Weavers either sold their fabrics in the *bedesten* themselves, or through middlemen, who represented an important link in the industry chain. It was not unusual for customers or middlemen to provide yarn to weavers, who then produced cloths for a fee. It appears that, as early as the seventeenth century, there was a group of middlemen who collected mohair from herd owners and delivered it to spinners, then collected cloth from weavers and delivered it to mohair washers (*yuyucular*), dyers (*boyacılar*), and polishers (*perdahtçılar-cendereciler*), and thereafter to the *bedesten*.<sup>61</sup> By the eighteenth century, this system seems to have incorporated the weavers as well. The weavers might receive yarn and a fee from the middlemen in return for the cloth they wove. We must note, however, that in the mid-eighteenth century these middlemen were a far cry from capitalist entrepreneurs because they were petty and dealt in small quantities.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, it is known that this kind of organization of productive activities (putting-out system)<sup>63</sup> is associated with proto-capitalism.

The cloth produced by the weavers had to be washed, dyed, polished, and sold. All of these phases of the production process had to be carried out at places designated by the *damga emîni*. The stamp tax farm (*damga*

<sup>59</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 89, 100–101; Ergenç, “16. Yüzyıl Ankara’sı,” 54.

<sup>60</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, “Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara’sında Sof İmalatı ve Sof Atölyeleri,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 41, nos. 1/4 (1982–83), 244; Sahillioğlu, “XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında,” 66; Aktüre, “17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Ankara,” 92.

<sup>61</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 101.

<sup>62</sup> Sahillioğlu, “XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında,” 62; Aktüre, “17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Ankara,” 93.

<sup>63</sup> On the putting-out system, see Oliver E. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York, 1985), 215–216.

*mukâta'ası*) was administered “freely” (*serbest*), meaning that the *damga emîni* had extensive authority regarding the organization of the productive activities relevant to his tax farm. All dye houses and polishing looms (*cendrehâne*) in Ankara were rented out by the *emîn*. The dye cauldrons and other implements used in the dye house were considered his belongings and the substances that were used at the dye house, such as bluing and dyes, had to be purchased exclusively from the *emîn*. When we consider that the *damga emîni* was able to procure an order from the Porte in the middle of the eighteenth century to close down the unauthorized dye house and press operated by Mûderriszâde Ahmed—one of the most influential figures in the city—we see that the authority of the *damga emîni* was not merely nominal. The *damga emîni* even had influence over commercial transactions concerning mohair wool, yarn, and cloth. The *bedesten* was assigned as the only place where the finished camlets and shawls could be legally sold. The guild elders’ authority was limited to the activities of their own craftsmen and probably had to be in accordance with policies adopted by the *damga emîni*. The fact that the local qadi was not authorized to intervene in disputes that concerned amounts of more than ten thousand *akçes* suggests that even the local qadis’ juridical authority over the stamp tax farm and the mohair industry was limited.<sup>64</sup> All this authority probably made the *damgacı* one of the most powerful figures in the city. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1789/90 Mustafa Ağa, who functioned as the *damga emîni* in Ankara, became the *mütesellim* (deputy governor) of the province.<sup>65</sup>

An interesting dispute between the Armenian patriarch and Armenian craftsmen in the town reveals a number of details about the relations between the *damgacı*s and the craftsmen. For example, it appears that, in theory, the disputes of the craftsmen (Muslim or non-Muslim) were to be settled by the *damgacı*, without the least intervention from other local authorities. Armenian mohair crafts guild members normally paid taxes to be collected by their guild elders and *emîns*, without the mediation of the patriarch. In the 1740s, however, the Armenian patriarch appointed a *mütesellim* to collect taxes from the Armenian craftsmen in Ankara. The *mütesellim* in his turn molested and imprisoned some of the Armenian merchants and craftsmen to force them to pay the taxes. To avoid the

<sup>64</sup> Disputes on amounts of more than ten thousand aspers were to be settled by the Porte.

<sup>65</sup> Karaman, “Şer’iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.,” 192–205.

intervention of their patriarch and the molestations of the *mütesellim*, the Armenian craftsmen allegedly abandoned their crafts, causing a considerable loss to the *damga mukâta'ası*. In February 1745, the Porte prohibited such interventions.<sup>66</sup>

Regarding the organization of mohair production, we should also mention that, as the center of the mohair industry, Ankara had extensive relations with the relevant industries around it. Mohair cloths (*sof-camlet*) produced in surrounding places like Tosya, Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sivrihisar, and Kalecik, were brought to Ankara to be processed by the dyers and polishers there.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, a part of the mohair yarn produced in Ankara was sent to Izmir, where a number of manufacturers produced exclusively for foreign markets.<sup>68</sup>

The products of the mohair industry of Ankara appear to be among the most luxurious cloths consumed by the upper classes of Ottoman society. This is also reflected in the fact that the sartorial laws issued intermittently by the Porte mention Ankara camlets and shawls among the items prohibited for women.<sup>69</sup> The palace was a major consumer of these products, and the Porte was apparently concerned with the well-being of the mohair industry of Ankara<sup>70</sup> and with upholding the quality of the shawls and camlets produced in the town.<sup>71</sup> The fact that the industry provided considerable revenue to the central treasury was another reason for the central government's close attention. In 1720, the Porte reiterated its earlier prohibition on the export of raw mohair because of its negative impact on the revenue of the stamp tax farm.<sup>72</sup> Since the stamp tax was levied on mohair yarn and cloth but not on raw mohair, it was clear that the exportation of raw mohair would have an adverse effect on the revenue of the tax farm.<sup>73</sup> The Ottoman administration may also have been prompted into action by the fact that Ankara residents were dependent on mohair-related economic activities for their livelihood. In any case, the

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 205.

<sup>67</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 100.

<sup>68</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 109.

<sup>69</sup> See for example RGP 95, 383–384, 03.06.1758, Elbert de Hochepied to Fagel; NA 1.02.20, 169/317–319; 166/877–878, 15.06.1758, Elbert de Hochepied to the DLH.

<sup>70</sup> Galanti, *Ankara Tarihi*, 85–86.

<sup>71</sup> BOA Cİ 70, 130; BOA CB 186.

<sup>72</sup> BOA MM 9491/132, 20 Za 1132/23.09.1720. I am indebted to Mehmet Genç for providing me this document.

<sup>73</sup> For a similar case in Bursa see Murat Çizakça, "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550–1650," *Journal of Economic History* 40 (1980): 533–550.

prohibition of the export of raw mohair was a peculiar policy, resembling mercantilism. Export of mohair yarn was also partly prohibited and controlled to ensure that the local cloth industry was adequately supplied.<sup>74</sup> This policy might explain how the mohair industry of Ankara survived well into the nineteenth century, while many other industries in the empire experienced the consequences of European competition somewhat earlier.<sup>75</sup> A French consular report dating from the end of the seventeenth century argued that exporting finished mohair goods was more advantageous than exporting mohair yarn because of the heavier taxes levied on yarn exports. According to the same report, cheaper labor in Izmir was another factor that made exporting finished goods more profitable than exporting raw material or semi-finished goods (yarn).<sup>76</sup>

Despite the considerable similarity between the policies the Ottomans pursued regarding the mohair industry and the mercantilist policies of European powers, it is still more appropriate to attribute the Ottoman policies to their provisionist, fiscalist, and traditionalist considerations. As we have seen, the local populace was extensively dependent on the industry, and the central treasury gained a considerable amount of fiscal revenue from it. On the traditionalist side, the Porte was inclined to maintain Ankara's social and economic equilibrium, and that depended on the smooth functioning of the mohair industry.

The Ottoman authorities frequently implemented a policy of limiting or prohibiting the export of certain goods; in the case of mohair, the prohibition concerned both wool and yarn. It was forbidden to export mohair yarn that was suitable for camlet (*sof*) production. A specific kind of yarn, *izmir ipliği* (Izmir yarn), which was not suitable for camlet production, was, in fact, the only yarn that could be exported.<sup>77</sup> It is clear that such prohibitions were in effect as early as the first half of the seventeenth century. For example, in 1639 an imperial decree addressed to the qadis of Ankara, Ayaş, Beypazarı, and Seferihisar prohibited the sale of mohair yarn to anyone but local craftsmen. The decree was aimed at overcoming a shortage in

<sup>74</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ottoman Craftsmen: Problematic and Sources with Special Emphasis on the Eighteenth Century," in *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi Deguilhem (New York, 2005), 108.

<sup>75</sup> For the performance of the Ottoman industry in the eighteenth century, see Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 153–171.

<sup>76</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 109.

<sup>77</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 210.

the local market caused by European demand for the product.<sup>78</sup> Another imperial decree issued in 1709/10 forbade the transport of mohair yarn to Izmir until March 1710, but encouraged its flow to Istanbul and other centers within the empire, probably to prevent a shortage in camlets and to supply manufacturers elsewhere in the empire.<sup>79</sup> It seems that the prohibitions on exporting mohair were eased during the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>80</sup> But the authorities still intervened in the trade when they deemed necessary: in 1821, Elhâc Mustafa Ağa, the *mütesellim* of Ankara, banned the sale of mohair yarn to all merchants from Izmir.<sup>81</sup>

We must keep in mind that the prohibitions were not permanent and that the authorities were somewhat flexible in their application. This explains how European merchants were able to export considerable amounts of mohair yarn from Ankara despite the prohibitions, which remained in effect, at least partly, well into the nineteenth century.<sup>82</sup> We must also bear in mind that while the Ottoman authorities tried to maintain the prohibitions, European merchants devised new schemes to counter them. One of these was to export Angora goat skins with wool on them.<sup>83</sup> Smuggling was certainly another alternative. In 1792, a French merchant was caught smuggling 20 loads of "Izmir yarn," some of which was suitable for camlet production.<sup>84</sup> Whenever the Ottoman authorities were informed that the Europeans were violating the export prohibitions, the Porte reissued and reformulated the prohibitions, or extended them.<sup>85</sup> By the nineteenth century, for example, the relevant prohibitions concerned the export of fine white mohair yarn, white mohair wool, and pelts with white mohair wool on them.<sup>86</sup>

It was not only the central government that supported the mohair industry of Ankara and the related craftsmen through laws and regulations; Ergenç's research in the local court records of Ankara shows that, in their struggle to maintain their preemptive purchase rights to mohair yarn, Ankara's weavers could count on the support of local authorities,

<sup>78</sup> Aktüre, "17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Ankara," 90. I am indebted to Mehmet Genç for providing me with a copy of the order forbidding the export of mohair yarn to Europe. BOA D.BŞM 199-A/8, 15 Şevval 1071/13 June 1661.

<sup>79</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 107.

<sup>80</sup> Aktüre, "17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Ankara," 91.

<sup>81</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 150–151.

<sup>82</sup> Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 253–255.

<sup>83</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 202.

<sup>84</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 239.

<sup>85</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 202.

<sup>86</sup> Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 253–255.



such as the tax farmers, who had a direct interest in promoting textile production. The *damga emîni*, especially, appear to be among the most faithful protectors of the industry. In most cases, these *emîns* strove to uphold the export prohibitions. Local spinners' preemptive purchase rights to mohair wool and weavers' preemptive purchase rights to mohair yarn were not exceptions.<sup>87</sup> For example, in 1645 the *damga emîni* Ali applied to the Porte, alleging that local weavers could not find mohair yarn to continue their operations and demanded the prohibition of the consignment of mohair yarn to Aleppo, Izmir, Sinop, and Samsun, where the commodity was exported to foreign countries. In response to this request, the Porte issued an order confirming an earlier prohibition on the export of mohair yarn.<sup>88</sup>

In the eighteenth century the *mâlikânecis*<sup>89</sup> seem to have entered the alliance between the local craftsmen and the *damgacıs*. By 1719/20, the *mâlikânecis* of the *damga mukâta'ası* submitted a petition to the Porte complaining about European merchants' having exported raw mohair wool from Ankara. The authorities took into consideration that the stamp tax farm was not a negligible source of revenue for the treasury and that the export of raw wool would considerably decrease the stamp tax revenues from mohair yarn. Therefore, the Porte ordered the confiscation of mohair wool that was exported from Ankara clandestinely.<sup>90</sup>

Whether they were directly involved in the relevant productive activities or not, the *askerîs* in Ankara had an immediate interest in protecting the mohair industry, since they profited from its fiscal revenue. Some findings from the local court records show that the *askerîs* also invested in mohair production, especially in ventures that required a large capital expenditure. When we consider that there were about one thousand looms at work weaving camlets and shawls in Ankara in the seventeenth century, we can conclude that weaving was the most widespread productive activity in the industry. This part of the productive process did not require a great investment, since one mohair loom cost about 1.5 piasters at the time. A press, however, required an investment of approximately 400 to 900 piasters, a substantial amount when the price of a house with

<sup>87</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 93.

<sup>88</sup> Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 252–253.

<sup>89</sup> Under the Ottoman tax farming system with a lifetime contract (*mâlikâne* system) the *mâlikânecis* were the investors who held the right to the revenue of the tax farm. They were mostly well-off people who resided in Istanbul and entrusted the organization of the business to *mültezims* (tax farmers) such as the *damgacı* in Ankara.

<sup>90</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 201.



two or three rooms was about 100–400 piasters. Consequently, this part of the productive process required the investment of capital stakeholders who, in Ankara, seem to have been the elite members of the *ilmiye* class. In August 1689, Mûderriszâde Abdurrahman Efendi purchased a camlet press from a certain Asvadar's family after the latter's death, for instance. Another example is the case of *şeyhü'l-İslâm* Ankaravî Mehmed Efendi, who purchased some shares in a camlet press and a dyeing workshop for 914 piasters.<sup>91</sup>

Sporadic documentation in the local court records of Ankara shows that people from the upper classes were also engaged in mohair trade. The dismissed governor (*sancakbeyi*) Humus Abdülgani Bey resided in Ankara and was engaged in the mohair trade when he established a business network that comprised several agents: Hacı Abdülaziz bin Yusuf, Rahmeti, Hacı Bekir, and İbrahim Bey in Ankara; and Hacı Mehmed and Baki in Istanbul. Other functionaries are noted in the records as investing their capital in mohair trade on their own rights, or lending it to merchants active in the trade.<sup>92</sup>

Merchants dealing in mohair related products had various ethno-religious affiliations. A document provided by Ergenç<sup>93</sup> lists the names of eighteen merchants who exported camlets from Ankara in 1599. The list includes three Muslim names along with fifteen non-Muslims: one Greek and the remaining fourteen Jewish. Quite interestingly, the list does not include any names which we could identify as Armenian despite what we know, that the local Armenians were very active in this trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to the list provided by Ergenç, the average quantity of camlets exported by Muslim merchants amounted to 20 loads (*yük*) (62 loads in total) as opposed to an average of 6.5 loads exported by the non-Muslim merchants (100 loads in total). Another piece of information is provided by an entry in the local court records of Ankara (dated 2 July 1601)<sup>94</sup> concerning the insolvency of a Polish merchant named Yorgi Veledi Paşko and his creditors, the local mohair merchants. As Yorgi could not pay the money he owed to his creditors, the court decided that the mohair he had stored in his warehouse should be divided among his

<sup>91</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, "Land Transfer, Land Disputes and Askeri Holdings in Ankara (1592–1600)," *Bibliothèque de l'Institut Français d'Études Anatoliennes d'Istanbul XXVIII: Memorial Ömer Lûtfi Barkan* (Paris, 1980), 87; Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 246; Aktüre, "17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Ankara," 92.

<sup>92</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 129–130.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 115–116.

creditors. The creditors consisted of thirty-nine Armenians from Ankara, ten Armenians from Kalecik, twenty-nine Muslims, and four Jews.

Although mohair trade was of crucial importance in determining Ankara's relations with the outside world, the productive activities extended through all parts of Ankara's society and transcended cultural, ethnic, religious, and gender divisions. First of all, goat herding and raising was a common economic activity for Turkish, Armenian, and Greek residents of Ankara.<sup>95</sup> Wool taken from these herds was spun by the women of Ankara, who produced yarn for the weavers.<sup>96</sup> The weavers themselves were certainly not a homogenous group, but consisted of both Muslim and non-Muslims. Faroqhi's investigation of local court records reveals that in the beginning of the seventeenth century the records on transactions concerning mohair-weaving workshops mention more non-Muslim than Muslim names. Faroqhi also notes that, by the end of the century, the discrepancy between Muslims and non-Muslims had grown. This implies that in the course of the seventeenth century the non-Muslims of Ankara became more prominent in the mohair weaving sector than they had been at the beginning of the century.<sup>97</sup>

Local mohair merchants who traded products from Ankara to Izmir displayed a certain degree of solidarity to hold their ground against local authorities. An imperial order addressed to the qadi of Izmir ordered the local authorities in the city not to interfere with the mohair merchants. The order explained that the stamp tax farm in Ankara was largely dependent on yarn trade to Izmir for its revenue and that molestations by local authorities dispersed the merchants to other places, to the detriment of the tax farm.<sup>98</sup>

As we have seen, mohair yarn, as well as mohair textiles such as camellet (*sof*) and shawl (*şal*), were popular export goods. European travel accounts and consular reports often note that trading in mohair products required a certain degree of familiarity with these goods, as prices could vary considerably based on quality. For instance, during the eighteenth century the price of mohair yarn varied from 1.5 to 28 piasters per *okka*,<sup>99</sup> depending on yarn quality.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 65.

<sup>96</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 94.

<sup>97</sup> Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 248.

<sup>98</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 205.

<sup>99</sup> One *okka* was approximately 1.2829 kilograms.

<sup>100</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 62.

Good quality yarn was soft, thin and had a consistent thickness. These qualities could vary, depending on the place of production. For example, although the mohair produced in Beypazarı was whiter than that of Ankara, the latter was considered to be higher quality due to its softness.<sup>101</sup> Yabanâbad (Kızılcahamam), Şorba (Pazar), and Beypazarı provided most of the coarse yarn sold.<sup>102</sup> In Ankara, the better yarn—worth 3 to 25 piasters—was sold in the market, while the lower quality yarn—worth 1 to 6 piasters—was sold by *kolcus*, or women around the city who spun it.<sup>103</sup> In the eighteenth century, a particular sort of thin yarn produced in Ankara was called Izmir yarn (*Izmir ipliği*) because it was mainly sent to Izmir for further shipment to Europe.<sup>104</sup> A letter from Thomas de Vogel, a Dutch merchant in Amsterdam, to L. Stechman, one of his correspondents in Izmir, gives a short description of the yarn that was preferred in Leiden. According to the description, the better yarn had to be produced from fine wool and should be thick and soft.<sup>105</sup>

Ankara weavers used higher quality yarn for the production of camlets and made shawls from lower quality yarn. The camlets produced in Brussels resembled those produced in Ankara, but the latter were woven more tightly. In 1750, a Dutch merchant in Ankara, Leytstar, explained to the secretary of the Dutch embassy in Istanbul that the camlet he had sent to Ambassadress De Hochepped was indeed more expensive than the camlets produced in Brussels. But he argued that the camlet he had sent was much finer as well. Leytstar also argued that the camlet was produced from an expensive yarn, priced at 25 piasters per *okka*.<sup>106</sup> Each roll of camlet was approximately 28–30 *endaze zira'* (approximately 18 meters) long and 6 *rub' 1 kirah*<sup>107</sup> (approximately 48 centimeters) wide.<sup>108</sup> In the 1730s, the price of one roll of camlet was between 100 to 125 piasters depending

<sup>101</sup> Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı*, 136.

<sup>102</sup> Faroqi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 254.

<sup>103</sup> Sahillioglu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 65.

<sup>104</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 195.

<sup>105</sup> GA 332, 39/575, 23.04.1765, Thomas de Vogel to L. Stechman (Izmir), "was UE gaaren wat fynder & van beeter stoffagie vetter & sagter zouden daar beeter konnen afkoomen maar nu maager van stof & heel wreed & grof synde..."

<sup>106</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 14.08.1750, Leytstar (Ankara) to Rigo (Istanbul),

<sup>107</sup> 1 *kirah* =  $\frac{1}{16}$  *endâze*, 1 *rub'* =  $\frac{1}{8}$  *endâze*, 1 *endâze* = 60 centimeters.

<sup>108</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 238. According to Karaman, by the beginning of the nineteenth century each piece of camlet officially had to be 32 *zira'* long and 6 *rub'* one *kirah* wide. Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 197.

on its color and thickness.<sup>109</sup> In the Habsburg ambassador De Busbecq's famous letters, he gives a short description of these camlets:

Here [Ankara] we also saw how the watered camlet, which I have already mentioned, made from the hair of goats, is dyed and given by means of a press its watered appearance from the "waves" produced by pouring water upon it. The pieces which have received the marks of very broad "waves" in continuous lines are considered the best and choicest. If the "waves" are smaller and of varying lengths and run into one another, this is counted as a defect, and the cloth is valued at a price less by several good pieces.<sup>110</sup>

Although De Busbecq seems to have paid close attention to the colors of Ankara's camlets, it appears that the European traders did not like these colors in general and therefore preferred to purchase undyed camlets.<sup>111</sup> Locally-dyed camlets received colors such as: red (*al*), rabbit's blood (*tavşan kanı*), light wine (*açık şarabî*), cinnamon (*açık dârçını*), light purple (*açık benefş*), dark purple (*koyu benefş*), Egyptian purple (*mısır moru*), light green (*açık yeşil*), pistachio green (*fistukî yeşil*), dark green (*açık neftî*), black (*siyah*), rose (*gülgûnî*), and light orange (*açık turuncu*).<sup>112</sup>

The lesser mohair yarn was used to produce an alternative cloth called shawl (*şal*), which was consumed in huge quantities in Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo. Shawl cloth produced in and around Ankara was a checkered cloth, coarser than camlet and woven from yarn worth 6 to 12 piasters. The length of one roll of shawl was similar to that of camlet (28–30 *endaze zira'* approximately 18 meters) and its width was 6  $\frac{1}{3}$  *rub'* (approximately 48 centimeters). In the 1730s, depending on its color, strength, and softness, the price of one roll of shawl varied from 15 to 45 piasters.<sup>113</sup> A standard shawl was produced from twenty hanks. The producers who used less were prosecuted.<sup>114</sup> The place of production also had significant implications on the quality and price of shawls. For example, shawls produced in Ankara were much more expensive than shawls produced in Tosya.<sup>115</sup>

Despite the crucial importance of the mohair industry of Ankara, the relevant sources do not provide extensive data for a detailed quantification of the activities in the industry, yielding only general information.

<sup>109</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 66; Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 108.

<sup>110</sup> Forster (trans.), *Turkish Letters*, 50.

<sup>111</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 66.

<sup>112</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 195.

<sup>113</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 66; Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 108.

<sup>114</sup> Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 196. According to Karaman, by the beginning of the nineteenth century each piece of shawl officially had to be 30 *zira'* long and 6 *rub'* wide. Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 197.

<sup>115</sup> Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı*, 77.

On 21 April 1590, Süleyman Ağa, the *sofçular şeyhi* in Ankara, went to the local court to record the payment of the taxes from 621 mohair looms in the city. Ergenç suggests that the total number of looms, including those in the nearby villages, might have been about one thousand at the time.<sup>116</sup> According to Önsoy, the number of looms was the same in 1812, and the people employed in the industry amounted to about ten thousand.<sup>117</sup> Although the number of looms remained constant, other developments from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries must have caused industry output to increase. For example, we have already mentioned that in the eighteenth century the number of rooms with more than two looms increased. This development might have resulted in an increase in the output per loom, and may have been accompanied by other innovations with the same effect.

In the absence of more exact and dependable data, our primary source on the volume of the output of Ankara's mohair industry remains the reports prepared by European diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire. According to one of these, a French consular report prepared around the 1730s, the total annual shawl and camlet output in Ankara was approximately 20,000 rolls.<sup>118</sup> Özdemir informs us that during the first eight months of 1817 total shawl production in Ankara was 5,896 rolls, totaling about 132,660 meters, and total camlet production was 1,137.5 rolls, totaling 27,300 meters.<sup>119</sup>

In addition to dominating Ankara's economy, mohair's importance is also linked to the high demand for it, both within and outside the Ottoman Empire. Faroqhi's research in the local court records of Ankara has revealed that as early as the last quarter of the sixteenth century the local markets of Ayaş and Yeregözü were integrated into international trade, especially with Venice. This trade passed mainly through Jewish merchants in Istanbul, because Izmir had not yet emerged as an international trade center.<sup>120</sup> Local court records also show that quite a lively trade in camlets had already emerged at that time. For example, between 15 June and

<sup>116</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 92.

<sup>117</sup> Önsoy, "19. Yüzyılda Ankara'nın Sosyal," 132.

<sup>118</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 62.

<sup>119</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 236–238. Based on a French source dated around the 1810s, Frangakis-Syrett writes that eighty-two thousand pounds of mohair yarn were used annually by local textile manufacturers, producing six hundred thousand pieces of shawl for the domestic market of the Ottoman Empire. Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 221. However, when we take into consideration the other information we have, six hundred pieces of shawl may be an exaggeration.

<sup>120</sup> Faroqhi, "Ankara ve Çevresindeki Arazi," 66.

7 September 1599, 57,000 aspers of *zarar-ı kassâbiye* were levied on 162 loads of camlets exported from Ankara. Since this specific tax was levied at one percent ad valorem, we can conclude that the total value of the exports in this period was about 5,700,000 aspers. Other evidence in the local court records shows that by the beginning of the seventeenth century several local merchants dealing in mohair had established connections with Venice, some of them even traveling there to conduct their business.<sup>121</sup> It appears that these entrepreneurs included Muslim as well as non-Muslim merchants.<sup>122</sup>

According to a document from 1645, Istanbul was the most important destination for mohair exports of Ankara, followed by Aleppo, Izmir, Sinop, and Samsun. The presence in this list of the latter two cities, located on the shores of the Black Sea, indicate that the mohair products of Ankara were also consumed in the Ottoman provinces around the Black Sea shores.<sup>123</sup> The greatest part of Izmir's demand for the commodity was due to its connection with international trade, rather than local consumption. During the first half of the eighteenth century, mohair yarn was one of Izmir's most important exports. In the period 1700–20, it was second only to silk.<sup>124</sup>

The composition of mohair products exported from Ankara, as well as their destinations, varied considerably over time. In 1816–17, the export of coarse yarn—originating mostly in Yabanâbad (Kızılcahamam), Şorba (Pazar), and Beypazarı—came to a halt, while by the beginning of the Napoleonic wars about one thousand loads of coarse yarn per annum was sent to Izmir for further consignment to European markets.<sup>125</sup> In 1816–17, Istanbul and Izmir remained important destinations for mohair consignments from Ankara, while other cities in the empire lost their importance.

It is not surprising that European merchants, eager for mohair, made their way to Ankara to purchase the product. Local court records reveal that by the beginning of the seventeenth century Venetian, Polish, and English merchants had already established themselves in the city to engage in the trade of mohair.<sup>126</sup> European travelers' observations confirm

<sup>121</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 14.

<sup>122</sup> Kafadar, "Death in Venice," 205.

<sup>123</sup> Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 252–253.

<sup>124</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 99.

<sup>125</sup> Faroqhi, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Sof İmalatı," 254–255.

<sup>126</sup> Ergenç, *Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi*, 115. David French has published a letter written by William Harborne to his agent James Towerson that suggests that as early as the sixteenth

the impression one gets from the court records. Simeon of Poland notes that some Polish Armenians engaged in mohair trade in Ankara in the early seventeenth century.<sup>127</sup> Jacques Savary informs us about French and Dutch merchants who settled in Ankara in the late seventeenth century.<sup>128</sup> The French traveler Aubry de la Motraye visited Ankara in 1703 and noted that French, English, and Dutch agents there purchased and consigned mohair to Izmir.<sup>129</sup> According to the French traveler Paul Lucas, who visited the city in 1705, there were many French and Dutch merchants in Ankara. He relates that he enjoyed the hospitality of Palmier and Daignan, French merchants who owned one of the most beautiful houses in Ankara.<sup>130</sup>

It is clear that during the first half of the eighteenth century there were English, French, and Dutch agents and merchants in the city. As none of these communities were large enough to sustain a national consulate, they displayed a certain degree of solidarity and shared the expenses they needed to sustain their existence in Ankara. The greatest part of these expenses were the so-called *avantias*<sup>131</sup> (arbitrary extortions) extracted by local authorities.<sup>132</sup> It is not surprising that the European merchants faced much more difficulty in Ankara than they experienced at the conventional centers of international trade like Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo. When they traveled beyond these centers, for example from Izmir to the hinterland, the Europeans became vulnerable to locals' xenophobia and to the arbitrary practices of local authorities. Therefore, the merchants procured imperial documents of safe conduct allowing them to travel in disguise—wearing turbans and bearing guns like janissaries—to avoid or

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century Harborne purchased goods from Ankara through his agents. David French, "A Sixteenth Century English Merchant in Ankara?" *Anatolian Studies* 22 (1972): 241–247.

<sup>127</sup> Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnâmesi*, 162.

<sup>128</sup> Jacques Savary, *Le parfait négociant* (Paris, 1749), 1:437, cf. Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 219.

<sup>129</sup> Eyice, *Ankara'nun eski bir resmi*, 75–76.

<sup>130</sup> Lucas, *Voyage du sieur Paul Lucas*, 108.

<sup>131</sup> On *avantias*, see Merlijn Olon, "Towards Classifying Avantias: A Study of Two Cases Involving the English and Dutch Nations in Seventeenth-Century Izmir," in *Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century*, ed. Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. de Groot, and Maurits H. van den Boogert (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000), 25–58; Merlijn Olon, "'Avanien in de Levant': een studie van het begrip avanie, geïllustreerd aan de hand van voorvallen volgende op het overlijden van Nederlands koopman Christoffel Capoen te Izmir, 30 juli 1686," MA thesis (University of Leiden, 1998); Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and Beratlis in the 18th Century* (Leiden, 2005), 117–158.

<sup>132</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 100.



at least lessen the potential difficulties that awaited them in the interior.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, we can infer that Ankara provided a fairly safe environment for the European merchants who resided and traded in the city. Their business activities, however, were at odds with local merchants, especially those of Armenian origin, who controlled the flow of mohair products from Ankara to Izmir. We will see later that these merchants were strongly determined to maintain their control over this trade and did not hesitate to confront their European competitors.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch were by far the largest importers of Ankara's mohair industry. It was estimated that, in this period, about 3,000 to 3,200 bales—at 200 pounds each—two-thirds of the total annual mohair yarn exports of Ankara, were exported to the Netherlands to be used, especially, in the Leiden textile industry.<sup>134</sup> However, in the course of the eighteenth century the Dutch were not able to maintain their primacy in the face of their French competitors, who took the lead in mohair exports at the same time that France became the biggest trade partner of the Ottoman Empire.

While Ülker<sup>135</sup> and Frangakis-Syrett<sup>136</sup> have published official figures on English and French mohair yarn imports, we should keep in mind that the English data we have are on English mohair yarn imports from the whole Levant, and the French data is on Marseille's mohair yarn imports from Izmir in particular. To find France's net mohair yarn imports, we must add the mohair yarn purchased from Aleppo and Istanbul, as well as that imported through the Netherlands.<sup>137</sup> Unfortunately, we lack comparable official data for Dutch mohair imports. However, this does not mean that we cannot make any meaningful comparisons.

According to the above estimates, at the turn of the eighteenth century the total amount of mohair yarn exported to Europe was about 3,000–3,200 bales at 200 pounds each (272–290 tons). This rough figure is confirmed by D. J. de Hochepped, the Dutch consul in Izmir, who estimated that in 1721

<sup>133</sup> Daniel Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650* (Seattle and London, 1990), 106.

<sup>134</sup> RGP 34, 305, 6 February 1700, *Memorie behelsende het convenient van de Nederlandscher negotie en navigatie . . .*, Daniel Jan de Hochepped (Dutch consul in Izmir) to the SG. On the importance of mohair yarn for Leiden textile industry, see İsmail Hakkı Kadı, "Amsterdam'daki Bir Kilisenin Anadolu'ya Uzanan Hikayesi," *Kebikeç İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14, no. 25 (2008): 219–237.

<sup>135</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 101–105.

<sup>136</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 305–307.

<sup>137</sup> Faroqhi, "Ottoman Craftsmen," 107.



the annual exportable amount of mohair yarn produced in Ankara and Beypazarı (after the local manufacturers had purchased for their needs) was approximately 4,000 bales.<sup>138</sup> One bale included about 75–100 *okkas* of mohair yarn and one *okka* was about 1,282 grams. Thus, the Dutch mohair imports from Ankara in 1700 amounted to around 181–193.5 tons.<sup>139</sup> According to Ülker and Frangakis-Syrett, the French imported about 122 tons in 1700, and the English imported about 102 tons. A French consular report from the 1730s estimates the French mohair yarn imports at about 1,200–1,300 bales, the Dutch imports at about 500 bales, and the English imports at about 300 bales.<sup>140</sup> This means that French mohair yarn imports would have totaled 115–167 tons, Dutch imports 48–64 tons, and English imports 29–38 tons. These amounts differ considerably from the data provided by Ülker and Frangakis-Syrett.<sup>141</sup> In 1740, Richard Pococke estimated the total amount of mohair yarn imported by France, England, and the Netherlands at about 500–600 camel loads, weighing 150 *okka* each.<sup>142</sup> This makes a modest total of 96–115 tons, which appears to be an underestimate when we compare it with the figures provided by Ülker and Frangakis-Syrett. To avoid distortions from the considerable annual fluctuations, I have calculated France's and England's average mohair imports during the five years preceding Pococke's visit to Ankara (1736–1740). These figures show that the average annual mohair import to France was 112 tons, and that of England was 84 tons, totaling 196 tons, excluding the Dutch exports for which we lack data. The Amsterdam merchant Thomas de Vogel noted that about 1,000 bales of mohair yarn arrived in Amsterdam in 1766: according to him this amount was about 600 bales more than usual for that time. This suggests that during this period the average Dutch import of mohair yarn was about 400 bales (38.5–51 tons).<sup>143</sup>

The transition from Dutch to French dominance in European mohair exports from Ankara during the eighteenth century has also been pointed out by McGowan, who notes:

<sup>138</sup> RGP 34, 374.

<sup>139</sup>  $[(3000 \times 200 \times 453.6) \div 3] \times 2 = 181$  and  $[(3200 \times 200 \times 453.6) \div 3] \times 2 = 193.5$ .

<sup>140</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 62. The exact date of this report is not known, but based on the information it contains, Sahillioğlu suggests it was prepared around 1730.

<sup>141</sup> For example, from 1726 to 1730 England's average annual mohair yarn import from the Levant was approximately 97.6 tons and that of France was approximately 67 tons.

<sup>142</sup> Pococke, *Description of the East*, 2:90.

<sup>143</sup> GA 332, 40/748, 21.07.1766, Thomas de Vogel to Louis Stechman.

When the French trade initiative of the last quarter of the seventeenth century began to take hold, the French demand for goat and camel hair was added to that of the Atlantic traders at Smyrna. Thus in the eighteenth century we find that eight of the French commercial houses at Smyrna maintain agents at Ankara to purchase goats' hair, while the Dutch and English maintain two each. More interested in sheep's wool than the Dutch or English, the French also tended to do more purchasing at Istanbul, though sales there were carefully regulated.<sup>144</sup>

Although it is possible to discern general trends concerning mohair yarn imports of different European nations, actual imports fluctuated dramatically from year to year, due to wars, plagues, and temporary supply and demand conditions. English mohair yarn import data shows this markedly. Mohair yarn imports of England peaked (above 180 tons) in the years 1708–09, 1711, 1723, and 1725, and were at the lowest levels (below 45 tons) in the years 1705–07, 1710, 1721, 1724, 1734, and 1739–40. We have already mentioned that the annual average English mohair yarn import from the Levant totaled about 84 tons in the years 1736–40. In contrast, the annual average English imports from 1698 to 1702 totaled around 106 tons. This may appear to be show a downward trend, but in fact English mohair yarn imports from the Levant did not decrease considerably during the period 1700–40.<sup>145</sup> The significant decrease took place only after the middle of the century. According to Ralph Davis, the value of English mohair yarn imports from the Ottoman Empire was £32,000 during 1699–1701, £40,000 during 1722–1724, and £20,000 during 1752–1754. He attributes this decrease to a fashion change in Europe, in which metal buttons replaced those made of mohair yarn.<sup>146</sup>

This decrease probably took place more in the trade with England than with any other European country, since we know that French imports continued to increase in the course of the eighteenth century. According to a French consular report, the English seem to have been solely interested in the highest quality mohair yarn: more so than other European nations. The English purchased mohair yarn for prices varying from 5 to 10 piasters per *okka*, while the Dutch paid from 3.5 to 10 piasters for the yarn they purchased.<sup>147</sup>

<sup>144</sup> Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe* (New York, 1981), 39.

<sup>145</sup> See figures in Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 101.

<sup>146</sup> Ralph Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century* (London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1967), 27, 31.

<sup>147</sup> Sahillioğlu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 65.

Mohair yarn exported to Europe was used for the production of various goods, depending on yarn quality. During the seventeenth century, mohair yarn exported to the Netherlands was used primarily for the production of a camlet known as "*Leidse Turken*." This was a high-quality, skill-intensive, light camlet produced from a mixture of camel and goat hair with wool and silk.<sup>148</sup> In England, mohair yarn from Ankara was used for buttons until it was replaced by metal buttons in the eighteenth century.<sup>149</sup> Evidence from Dutch archives suggests that the better part of the mohair yarn imported to the Netherlands was used for the production of camlets, while the inferior yarn was used for the production of buttons.<sup>150</sup>

As the figures regarding mohair yarn exports show, the French appear to have overtaken the Dutch in mohair imports during the early decades of the eighteenth century. This probably happened because of a decline in Dutch imports on the one hand, and a more or less steady increase in French imports on the other. Along with mohair yarn, France also imported a limited quantity of camlets until the 1740s, when this trade came to a halt. Unlike camlet imports, Marseille's mohair yarn imports from Izmir continued to increase overall, despite considerable annual fluctuations.<sup>151</sup> During the 1730s, textile producers at Rouen and Amiens complained about the Marseille monopoly over the import of Levant goods, alleging that they could have purchased Turkish yarns cheaper from the Netherlands if they were permitted to do so. The Chambre du Commerce argued, in response, that even the Dutch were importing Turkish yarns through Marseille, but Marseille could not prevent the granting of an *entrepôt* for Turkish commodities to Rouen.<sup>152</sup> The controversy between the textile producers of Amiens and the merchants of Marseille concentrated later mainly on the quality of mohair yarn obtained from alternative routes. While the Amiens party suggested that they could obtain higher quality

<sup>148</sup> Nicolaas Wilhelmus Posthumus, *De Geschiedenis van de Leidsche Lakenindustrie* (The Hague, 1908–39), 2:272; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge, 1997), 289.

<sup>149</sup> McGowan, *Economic Life*, 39.

<sup>150</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 14, 08.06.1736, Daniel van Eys to Rolland & Ploegstert, "... 't geene merkelyk differeert met de pryzen waertoe U Ed en de H:r Silvy myn goed hebben vercocht in een & dezelfde tyd, en van dezelfde qualijt zulk dat het tot onse overgroote schaad tourneerd temeer hy ons tegens ordre, met H: wyngaerd het slegste gaeren zend, dat ik van myn leven gezien hebbe, brengende ons 5 baelen a 30 sh[schiling] & 1 Bael a 22 sh[schiling] in reekg, die onbequem zyn, tot grynen te gebruyken, wegens hunne grofte, & tot knop gaeren zal moeten dienen, waerby ten minsten 50 Pct sullen veliesen ..."

<sup>151</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 193, 302–307.

<sup>152</sup> Paul Masson, *Histoire du français dans le Levant au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1911), 94.

yarn from Holland, the merchants of Marseille responded in 1741 with a detailed pamphlet arguing that this was not possible since the French merchants processed their mohair yarn consignment much more carefully when compared to other merchants. They argued that the yarn that arrived in the Netherlands was mostly consigned by Armenian and Greek merchants who sorted the yarn into five clusters, according to its quality while the French merchants sorted it into ten clusters.<sup>153</sup> The controversy lasted well into the early 1760s, when the merchants of Marseille complained about their inability to sell the mohair yarn they received from the Levant because of Amiens' import of the products from the Netherlands, which was allegedly mixed with ordinary wool.<sup>154</sup>

The French purchased their mohair partly from Izmir and partly from Ankara through the French commercial establishments there. During the early decades of the eighteenth century, there were two French commercial houses in Ankara. In the 1730s, the French pushed to increase this number<sup>155</sup> and attempted to establish a consulate in the city, but the Ottoman government was not willing to approve this demand. The French consular authorities of the time saw little chance for a change in this Ottoman policy in the near future.<sup>156</sup> Though the Ottoman government did not allow a French consulate in Ankara, they did not prevent the establishment of French commercial houses there. Around the 1730s, there were six French commercial houses in Ankara that purchased mohair yarn for prices varying from 1.5 to 8 piasters per *okka*—indicating that the French, in fact, purchased lower quality yarns than the Dutch and English,<sup>157</sup> as suggested by the textile producers of Amiens. A French consular report cited by Masson counts eight French, two English, and two Dutch commercial houses in Ankara in 1754.<sup>158</sup> From the year 1777 the letters of Ankara French trader Cauvin to Roux Frères in Marseille survived in the Archives of the Chambre du Commerce de Marseille, indicating

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<sup>153</sup> ACC H 200, *Troisième Mémoire des Négocians de Marseille, servant de reponse aux Objections des Negoçians d'Amiens sur le commerce de fils de chevre d'Angora*. I am indebted to *hocam* Suraiya Faruqi for generously sharing with me the documents from the Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille which I cite here and in the subsequent footnotes.

<sup>154</sup> ACC H 200, *Mémoire des Négocians de Marseille sur le Commerce des fils de Chevre d'Angora* (1760), *Précis des Mémoires des Negocians de Marseille sur le commerce des fils de chevre* (1761).

<sup>155</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 103–105.

<sup>156</sup> Sahillioglu, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında," 66.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

<sup>158</sup> Masson, *Histoire du français*, 441.

that the French merchants in the town continued to export products from the town in return for French woolen textiles.<sup>159</sup> Local court records reveal that the French maintained their presence in Ankara in one form or another until the end of the eighteenth century. One entry, dated 1786, mentions a French merchant in the city; another entry, dated 1787, tells of a French merchant named "Mosa Hason" who purchased a house within the citadel for 800 piasters; a third entry states that there were twenty-one French prisoners in the citadel in 1790.<sup>160</sup>

English merchants visited Ankara as early as the 1580s to purchase mohair products. By 1624 and onward some English settled permanently in Ankara, with the same purpose.<sup>161</sup> In his search for a legal rationale for the English to be established in Ankara and elsewhere in the interior of the Ottoman Empire, Paul Rycaut, English consul to Izmir (1667–78), argued that England should obtain the same privileges as the French, who he said had been granted the privilege to travel into the remotest parts of Ottoman dominions with the capitulations of 1673.<sup>162</sup> In general, the Levant Company was not willing to promote the establishment of English trade colonies and consulates in the interior of Anatolia. They believed that local administrators in the interior would not respect capitulatory privileges. There were a few exceptions to this policy, e.g., Erzurum and Ankara. In 1686, the Levant Company attempted to establish a trading community in Erzurum but gave up after broad resistance by local authorities. In Ankara, an English vice-consul or a company representative was appointed, and from a letter dated 18 July 1706, it becomes clear that the Levant Company was favorably disposed toward English initiatives in Ankara. The Company informed the English consul in Izmir that it was considering establishing a trading colony in Ankara. Despite this willingness on the part of the Levant Company, the resistance of local Armenians proved an important obstacle.<sup>163</sup> Consequently, there remained just two

<sup>159</sup> ACC LIX 751, letters of Cauvin (Ankara) to Roux Frères (Marseille).

<sup>160</sup> Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, 42, 132, 239.

<sup>161</sup> Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford, 1935), 72. The earliest English presence in Ankara might date back to as early as the time of William Harborne (ca. 1542–1617), English ambassador to the Porte from 1583 on. French, "Sixteenth Century English Merchant," 241–247.

<sup>162</sup> Paul Rycaut, *The History of the Turkish Empire, 1623–1677* (London, 1680), 307; cf. Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 208–209.

<sup>163</sup> Wood, *History*, 163; Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 100; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 32.

English factors in eighteenth-century Ankara;<sup>164</sup> they invested the capital remitted from Izmir and Istanbul in mohair yarn and consigned it to England through Izmir.<sup>165</sup>

It is not clear when the earliest Dutch merchants visited or settled in Ankara,<sup>166</sup> but we know that the Dutch interest in mohair products dates back to at least the late sixteenth century. As early as the 1590s, Dutch ships were carrying mohair yarn from Venice to Amsterdam.<sup>167</sup> Dutch ships also obtained mohair products from Izmir at the time. During this early period, however, the Dutch Republic had not obtained any capitulations from the Ottomans and therefore Dutch ships visited Ottoman ports under English or French flags. During the first decade of the seventeenth century, textile raw materials originating from the Levant became crucial inputs for the Dutch textile industry.<sup>168</sup> The consequence of the growing trade between the Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic was the capitulation of 1612.<sup>169</sup>

After the Dutch obtained their capitulation, trade between the two countries continued to grow. The late 1640s, especially, saw a rapid expansion of the Dutch Republic's "rich trades," an expansion that meant that the Dutch established control over mohair trade in Europe. The Ottoman-Venetian wars during 1645–69 accelerated this trend and helped the Netherlands and especially the city of Leiden to become the primary camlet producer of Europe.<sup>170</sup> During these years, the Dutch appetite for mohair yarn was such that merchants even made use of English ships and their correspondents in London to acquire the commodity.<sup>171</sup> The relocation of the center of Dutch Levant trade from Aleppo to Izmir accompanied these developments, since mohair yarn was exported primarily from the latter.<sup>172</sup> In this period, the terminology related to the mohair trade was formalized

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<sup>164</sup> According to a French memorandum dated 1754, there were two English factors in Ankara. Masson, *Histoire du français*, 441.

<sup>165</sup> Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 37, 201–202.

<sup>166</sup> The earliest evidence of a Dutch merchant in Ankara is the name of a Dutch merchant (Felemenk Bâzergâni Sinor) mentioned in a list of debtors of the stamp tax farm of Ankara in 1683. See Hülya Taş, *XVII. Yüzyılda Ankara* (Ankara, 2006), 67.

<sup>167</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585–1740* (Oxford, 1989), 54; GA 5075, 1040/104, 13.12.1638.

<sup>168</sup> RGP 9–10, 429–431.

<sup>169</sup> For the text and the developments prior to the Dutch capitulation of 1612 and its aftermath, see De Groot, *Ottoman Empire* and Bülent Arı, "The First Dutch Ambassador in Istanbul: Cornelis Haga and the Dutch Capitulations of 1612," PhD thesis (Bilkent University, 2003).

<sup>170</sup> Posthumus, *De Geschiedenis*, 2:272–279.

<sup>171</sup> GA 5075, 849/25, 11.06.1642.

<sup>172</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 225.

as well, as reflected in a notarial act in Amsterdam in which Andries Pels and Andries Surcouw, both merchants, stated that in their bill of lading and commercial agreements, the merchant frequently used the words “Stamma Dangore” which meant “Turchs Gaeren” (Turkish yarn, i.e., mohair yarn).<sup>173</sup> Other evidence from the same archives also indicates the existence of a lively mohair yarn trade in this period in Amsterdam.<sup>174</sup>

The textile industry of Leiden was the primary beneficiary of the growing Dutch share in the mohair yarn trade. After the late 1640s, camlets produced in Leiden were preferred in European markets to those produced elsewhere, such as Italy and Belgium.<sup>175</sup> In due time, the importance of the camlet industry for the economy of the city grew as well. For instance, it was noted that two-thirds of the employees of the textile industry of the city produced woolen cloth and camlet. George Downing, who happened to be in the Netherlands during the Anglo-Dutch war of 1665–67, noted that if the war continued to hinder the import of mohair yarn and Spanish wool, Leiden would become a small town.<sup>176</sup> Likewise, the importance of Levantine goods—especially, of mohair yarn—for the Dutch economy and employment in the Netherlands in general was made explicit in 1679 by the Dutch consul in Izmir.<sup>177</sup> One of the most concrete indications of the prominent role of mohair yarn in Leiden’s economy during those years is a building built by the Le Pla family on the Breestraat near the Leiden city hall. The Le Pla family was a merchant family with extensive interest in the mohair trade. One member of the family (Jan Le Pla Adriaenesz) represented Leiden at the DLH<sup>178</sup> (Directorate of Levant Trade) and another member (Pietro) settled in Izmir to purchase and consign mohair yarn to his family in Leiden.<sup>179</sup> When the Le Pla family built the building near the town hall of Leiden in 1673, they ornamented its pediment with Pieter Xavery’s sculpture *In Den Vergulden Turk* (In the gilded Turk), comprising statues of a Turk, Neptune, Mercury, and an Angora goat.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>173</sup> GA 5075, 815/145, 20.04.1644.

<sup>174</sup> For example, GA 5075, 1690/85 and 113.

<sup>175</sup> Pieter de La Court, *Welvaren van Leiden: Handschrift uit het jaar 1659*, ed. F. Driessen (The Hague, 1911), 95.

<sup>176</sup> T. H. Lister, *Life and Administration of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon* (Documentary appendix) (London, 1838), 3:361; cf. Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 308.

<sup>177</sup> RGP 34, 144.

<sup>178</sup> RGP 34, 72–74, 426.

<sup>179</sup> RGP 34, 159, 162, 167.

<sup>180</sup> For a photo of the sculpture, see Zeki Çelikkol, Alexander H. de Groot, and Bernardus Joshepus Slot, . . . *Lale İle Başladı: Türkiye ve Hollanda arasındaki dört yüz yıllık ilişkilerin resimli tarihçesi* (Ankara, 2000), 92.



The rapid expansions of the Dutch trade in mohair yarn and of the Leiden camlet industry came to a halt only during the maritime conflicts among the European powers in the late 1680s. These crises had a direct impact on employment in the camlet industry of Leiden.<sup>181</sup>

By the end of the seventeenth century, Dutch interest in mohair yarn and related industries gained new dimensions. By this point, some entrepreneurs from the Netherlands attempted to establish a camlet manufacturing plant in Ankara, where, allegedly, they would produce camlets that were much better than those produced in the Netherlands. Two of the entrepreneurs—a certain Wilhelmus (Guillelmo) Wesselink and Jan Michiel Simsim, an Armenian who had lived in Leiden and Haarlem and had mastered the craft—set out for Turkey in 1697. The rumors of their enterprise alarmed the camlet producers of Leiden and the merchants in Amsterdam, who moved to block the initiative. On 21 October 1697 Du Quesnoy, the director of the DLH, informed the members of the board about the issue and read a request from the burgomasters of Amsterdam. The request suggested that the products of the enterprise in question should be prevented from import to Spain, which was apparently an important market for Dutch camlets. The board members considered the initiative very harmful for the Dutch textile trade in the Ottoman Empire and found the measures suggested in the request insufficient and potentially harmful. They recommended instead that the burgomasters find the Dutch initiator of the venture and convince him to suspend it. The directors also suggested that the States General (SG) prohibit the extension of Dutch consular protection in the Ottoman Empire to Wesselink and Simsim.

Upon the request of the burgomasters and the DLH, the Dutch States General passed a resolution depriving Wesselink and Simsim of Dutch protection. Meanwhile (July 1698), the directors found out that the Dutch initiator of the venture in the Netherlands was Pieter Blijenberg, whom the burgomasters convinced to suspend the venture. On 18 February 1699, Blijenberg attended the meeting of the directors and signed a testimony in which he stated that he was neither engaged in a joint venture with Wesselink and Simsim nor interested in camlet production in Ankara, but had promised Wesselink and Simsim that he would give orders (*commis-sie*) to them, instead of Fremaux, who had not served him very well. After matters were settled in this way, Blijenberg applied to the States General

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<sup>181</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic* (Oxford, 1995), 611, 715–716, 859. For the development of the Dutch mohair yarn trade, see Kadi, “Amsterdam’daki,” 219–237.



to charge the Dutch consul and ambassador with the protection of Wesselink in Ankara. The States General, after consulting the DLH, passed a resolution approving the demand under the condition that Wesselink would not be involved in the production of any kind of textiles, only in the purchase of local products.<sup>182</sup>

The potential establishment of a camlet manufacturing plant in Ankara to rival those in Leiden was not the only danger threatening Dutch textile and mohair trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century. According to a memorandum enclosed with De Hochepped's letter of 6 February 1700, the Dutch textile and mohair trade was primarily threatened by English and French merchants, who could freely import Levantine goods to the Netherlands. The memorandum explained that English and French merchants who bartered their textiles for yarn in Izmir and Ankara consigned these goods to the Netherlands, where the demand for them was immense. The memorandum argued that in this way English and French merchants could easily sell their textiles in the Levant to the detriment of the Dutch, while at the same time taking advantage of the Dutch demand for mohair yarn. Moreover, English and French merchants' eagerness to barter their textiles for mohair yarn was pushing up the yarn prices in Izmir and Ankara, again to the detriment of the Dutch textile industry in general and camlet producers in particular. The memorandum argued further that it would be possible to purchase less expensive and greater quantities of mohair yarn in Izmir and Ankara, and to sell more Dutch textiles in the Levant, if the import of Levant goods were limited to Dutch nationals.<sup>183</sup>

However, the Dutch authorities soon realized that the French purchases were no longer meant for the Dutch market, but for the French manufacturers, who developed a new sort of fashionable cloth produced from Turkish mohair yarn. On 4 December 1700, De Hochepped wrote to Fagel that French competition in the mohair yarn trade threatened Dutch trade with the Levant in general, because mohair trade had been the backbone of the Dutch Levant trade: mohair yarn was the primary commodity the Dutch merchants purchased with the proceeds of the textiles they sold in the Levant. De Hochepped observed that the French had gained considerable ground against the Dutch, and that recently the French had been buying up considerable amounts of mohair yarn in Izmir while the

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<sup>182</sup> RGP 34, 269–271.

<sup>183</sup> RGP 34, 302–308.

English and the Dutch remained idle due to increasing prices. De Hochepped expected that this wave would push yarn prices up still further, because the demand in France was increasing while the exportable amount of the product in Ankara and Beypazarı was limited to 5,000 bales a year at most. The French appetite for mohair yarn was such that, to purchase the product, they even imported considerable amounts of fake coins, which they debased up to 25 percent. Moreover, French merchants decided to establish a new commercial house in Ankara to purchase the commodity.<sup>184</sup>

As the Dutch began to lose their dominant position in the international mohair yarn trade, they became more and more vigilant about the activities of their competitors. In a letter dated 4 February 1699, De Hochepped and the Dutch nation in Izmir related that the English succeeded in inserting an article in their capitulations that exempted their mohair exports from *bâc-ı ihrâc*, or *çıkâr bâcı*, as it was called in Ankara. The Dutch nation in Izmir suggested inserting a similar article in Dutch capitulations when they were renewed.<sup>185</sup>

All these conditions and developments reveal that in the beginning of the eighteenth century a number of different parties were interested in the mohair industry and the mohair trade. In summing up these parties, we should naturally begin with the Ottoman central government, which was both a prime consumer of the finished products and the final recipient of the fiscal revenue extracted from the industry. The local authorities we described and the tax collectors, especially the *damga emîni*, should surely be remembered within this context. The local populace, the greatest part of whom earned their livelihoods within the industry, and craftsmen and their guilds were also closely interested. Along with these elements, we must remember the local elite, who invested in mohair-related production activities as well as in its trade. Local merchants, especially those from the Armenian community, who dominated the trade of mohair products, were certainly not indifferent to developments with the potential to affect their livelihood. Last but not least, European merchant communities in Ankara were composed of different parties with competing agendas. While the Europeans sought to enrich themselves through the mohair trade, they inevitably crossed paths with the other previously-listed local actors, and especially with their own Armenian counterparts. A detailed study of this encounter is the subject of the next section.

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<sup>184</sup> RGP 34, 309–311.

<sup>185</sup> RGP 34, 279.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE HEYDAY AND INTERRUPTION OF THE DUTCH MOHAIR TRADE

In the previous chapter we saw that the relevant Dutch sources point to a fierce competition among European trading communities in the Levant to gain supremacy over the mohair trade. This competition meant that more and more European merchants made their way to Ankara and the resulting competitive pressure impacted mohair products and the related industries. It is clear that this competition had direct consequences for the locals with interests in the industry. Among the locals, those who had the most to fear from the increased European presence were certainly the Armenian merchants, who had dominated Ankara's mohair trade with the outside world. It was therefore inevitable that the European penetration of Ankara would provoke various kinds of resistance from these merchants. To keep this resistance in check, European merchants relied on their consular networks to procure imperial orders from the Porte.

It appears that none of the European nations had a consul in Ankara. An entry in the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri* reveals that by the end of the seventeenth century Karaman Veledi Ohannes had obtained an imperial diploma which appointed him as the Dutch dragoman in Ankara.<sup>1</sup> We do not know whether Ohannes was an honorary dragoman or a kind of diplomatic functionary who protected the Dutch community in Ankara. However, it is clear that the Dutch community in Ankara did not have any difficulty obtaining imperial orders from the Porte when it faced problems in and around the town. In 1701, the Porte issued an order to the governor of Ankara and the qadis of Ankara and Beypazarı to prevent the molestation of Dutch merchants looking to purchase top-quality mohair yarn and camlets in the town.<sup>2</sup> Another order, issued in early 1704, was addressed to the qadis of Ankara and Tokat, and aimed once again to protect Dutch merchants from harassment by locals.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the Dutch colony in Ankara also continued to grow. Two successive documents of safe passage

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<sup>1</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 163/572, evâil-i Muharrem 1116/5–15.05.1704. It was also noted that Karaman Veledi Ohannes was first appointed to the position on evâil-i C.Âhir 1107/6–16.01.1696; BOA ED 22/1, 163/575, evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1116/15–25.05.1704.

<sup>2</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 142/502, evâil-i R.Âhir 1113/04–14.09.1701.

<sup>3</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 160/560, evsıt-ı Şevval 1115/15–25.02.1704.

issued by the Porte should be considered as evidence of this trend. The first document was issued to Antonio van Breen's mother and wife, who wanted to travel from Istanbul to Ankara where Van Breen awaited them.<sup>4</sup> The second document was issued to Hendrik Markin (probably Hendrik van Diepenbroek), who wanted to leave Istanbul for Ankara with a *yasakçı*<sup>5</sup> and three other *müste'men* servants.<sup>6</sup>

These records reveal at least that the Dutch colony in turn-of-the-century Ankara was growing steadily without, it seems, unusual resistance from locals. However, serious threats to the European presence in Ankara were soon to emerge. The first local initiative against the Europeans in Ankara came in 1706, coinciding with the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), which had paralyzed trade between the Ottoman dominions and Europe. If we take the data on English and French mohair imports as representative of Ankara's mohair exports to Europe, we can conclude that the impact of the war on mohair trade was quite dramatic. Marseilles' mohair imports from Izmir fell to 46.8 tons in 1705, to 43.1 tons in 1706, to 9.2 tons in 1707, and to an absolute nadir of 7.4 tons in 1708—whereas Marseille had imported 139.1 tons in 1701. English mohair yarn imports from the Levant followed a similar pattern; after reaching a peak in 1704 with a total volume of 258.2 tons, imports fell to 43.6 tons in 1705, to 39 tons in 1706, and to 22.1 tons in 1707; recovering to 226 and 224.7 tons respectively in 1708 and 1709 and crashing again to 4.1 tons in 1710.<sup>7</sup>

This dramatic decrease in the amount of mohair exports explains why Ankara merchants at the time complained that they could not sell any mohair yarn in Izmir.<sup>8</sup> As the complaints of the locals increased, on 6 February 1706 the European merchants in Ankara were informed that some people were plotting a conspiracy against them with the aim of expelling them from the city. A meeting was arranged the next day. Along with the European community, a local Greek called Hagi Kavere and several local Armenians—"Torron Pasternalgioglu" (Pasturmacioğlu?), "Misterche" Ousun, and the Agop brothers—attended the meeting. The Europeans asked the locals what they knew about the scheme. The locals responded

<sup>4</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 165/581, evâhir-i Safer 1116/23.06–02.07.1704.

<sup>5</sup> Janissaries charged with protecting European diplomatic representatives and merchants.

<sup>6</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 165/582, evâhir-i Safer 1116/23.06–02.07.1704.

<sup>7</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 101–104.

<sup>8</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 10.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq, Antonio van Breen, Wesselink & Derveau) to Colyer.

that it was true that they did not want any Europeans in the city since the European merchants caused trade to stagnate, leading to probable ruin. However, they said that they had not taken any action against the Europeans because they believed that they alone were not capable of ensuring their expulsion from the city. The European merchants, in turn, tried to convince the locals that such an attempt would have disastrous consequences.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the European merchants' endeavors, the locals were evidently not convinced. On 9 January, the *mutasarrıf* of Ankara ordered the yarn market closed and organized a meeting at one of the biggest mosques of the city. The local qadi, mufti, and other city notables, such as the heads of the guilds related to the mohair industry, were present. The participation of the local populace, who earned their livelihood mainly from spinning, lent the meeting the energy of popular support. During the meeting, it was decided that the yarn market should be opened the next day, but that Europeans should be denied entry. Moreover, those present prepared a petition addressed to the Porte in which they accused the European merchants of malpractice and demanded their expulsion from Ankara. On the same day, the Europeans in the city gathered again to discuss the developments. This latter gathering took place at the house of the French merchants Palmier and Daignan.<sup>10</sup>

The next day (10 January) a general boycott was introduced that prohibited European trading houses from entering the market. Non-Europeans—both “Turks” and Christians, including the servants of the European merchants—were forbidden to enter European houses or the houses of those who traded with them. The authorities installed guards to observe the European houses and to ensure the implementation of the decisions. The *haraççı*, in his turn, seized the opportunity and imprisoned two servants of the European merchants to extract the poll tax from them. Although one of these servants was released, the other one was

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<sup>9</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 17.02.1706, *Relaas van t' geene in Angora is voorgevallen t' sedert den 6e February tot den 17e detto des Jaars 1706*. Although the Dutch sources of the time do not mention the specific reasons for the growing tension in town, it appears that the lifestyle and extravagance of the European merchants played an important role. P. Bosscha, *De Geschiedenis van Oostelijk en Noordelijk Europa Gedurende het Merkwaardig Tijdvak van 1687–1716* (Zaltbommel, Netherlands, 1860), 259–260.

<sup>10</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 17.02.1706, *Relaas van t' geene in Angora is voorgevallen t' sedert den 6e February tot den 17e detto des Jaars 1706*; NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

still in prison on 20 January. These measures led to the total isolation of the European merchants and succeeded in paralyzing their activities. The peasants living in the villages around the city were warned—under threat of the death penalty—to prevent any European attempts to dispatch letters outside the city.<sup>11</sup> Under these circumstances, the Europeans decided to write letters to the English, French, and Dutch ambassadors to seek urgent redress and assistance. In their detailed letter to their ambassador, the Dutch nation in Ankara demanded two imperial orders from the Porte. The first order was to be addressed to the qadi, governor, and other notables of Ankara, to threaten them with punishment and total ruin if they violated the capitulatory privileges. The same order should also ensure that the capitulations were truly observed, and clarify that, according to the capitulations, the Europeans were authorized to settle, travel, and trade in Ankara and its surroundings, and anywhere within the Ottoman dominions. The Dutch nation in Ankara demanded that the imperial order be carried to Ankara by an *ağa*, who would proceed directly to the local court on his arrival and read out the imperial order in the presence of the qadi, governor, and other notables of the city, record it in the local court registers, and then hand it out to the European merchants. They wanted the second imperial order to be addressed to the same authorities as the first one and charge them with the investigation of the recent incidents to find the instigators and report their names to the Porte for punishment.<sup>12</sup>

On Thursday, 11 February, a delegation comprising one representative for each of the three European communities present in Ankara visited the *mutasarrıf*, who received them civilly. The delegation asked the *mutasarrıf* what the locals wanted from the Europeans in the city. In response, the *mutasarrıf* showed them various documents and explained that local merchants claimed that their trade was totally ruined because of the European merchants, who had advised their principals in Izmir not to buy any yarn from the locals. The representatives of the European nations denied the accusations and claimed that if the accounts of the *damgacı* were

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<sup>11</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 10.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq, Antonio van Breen, Wesselink & Derveau) to Colyer; NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>12</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 10.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq, Antonio van Breen, Wesselink & Derveau) to Colyer.

investigated, it would become clear that all together the European traders had consigned 5,000 to 6,000 loads of mohair yarn that year to Izmir, while the total consignment amounted to about 15,000 to 16,000 loads. The delegation argued that the remaining 10,000 loads had been sent by the locals. The *mutasarrıf* replied that the locals were discontented, in any case, and therefore the Europeans would do better to go settle in Izmir or Istanbul. In response, the delegation told the *mutasarrıf* that they were aware of the sentiments of the locals but argued that these sentiments were unfounded and resulted from calumnies and jealousy. They also reminded the *mutasarrıf* that the grave state of the mohair trade was the result of the War of the Spanish Succession, which had paralyzed traffic in the Mediterranean. Despite all the European's efforts, the *mutasarrıf* made it clear to the delegation that he did not order but rather advised them to leave Ankara. The representatives of the European community asked the *mutasarrıf* whether he would grant free passage to them and ensure the safety of their cash and capital by storing it at the *kervansaray* or the *bedesten* if they were to leave Ankara. The *mutasarrıf* responded that he would not take any responsibility before the Porte responded to the petition submitted by the locals. At this point, the delegation said that they agreed to leave the city to forestall further interventions with their capitulatory privileges, but needed a couple of weeks to arrange things and prepare themselves and their commercial houses for departure. The *mutasarrıf* accepted their demands, offered his friendship and protection to the European community and told them that in the meantime they would also await the Porte's verdict on the issue.<sup>13</sup>

All these details about the meetings reveal that the campaign against the European presence in Ankara was primarily instigated by local merchants who had previously controlled trade from Ankara to Izmir and Istanbul. The stagnation of the mohair trade caused by the War of the Spanish Succession must have helped these merchants to mobilize mass local support, as well as to rally local authorities to their side. This appears to have left the Europeans totally alone in a seemingly hostile environment, whereas only a couple of years earlier, Ankara seemed to be a town in which Europeans could settle safely with their families.

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<sup>13</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.03.01, 130, 17.02.1706, Relaas van t' geene in Angora is voorgevallen t' sedert den 6e February tot den 17e detto des Jaars 1706.



Despite their agreement with the *mutasarrıf*, the Europeans saw that the boycott was not abolished the next day and therefore organized a meeting to deliberate on further actions. Meanwhile they heard that the number of people who were to bear the locals' petition to the Porte fell from between 20 and 25 to 6 or 7 individuals, as a result of growing ambivalence. The local mufti belonged to the hesitant camp and did not want to take any responsibility by issuing a *fetvâ* approving of the petition. On 13 February, therefore, he summoned the Europeans to his office and asked them to bring the documents related to the three respective capitulations. After inspecting the documents, the mufti promised to assist the Europeans on the issue by trying to convince the *mutasarrıf* and the qadi. However, the visit the Europeans paid to the local qadi on 14 February did not yield anything tangible.<sup>14</sup>

On the same day, the local delegation charged with bringing their petition to the Porte set off. Although the group comprised only six individuals, it included at least one local Greek; thus it represented more than one community within the city. If the rumors were true, the locals were enthusiastic in their support, even dispatching their own individual petitions. It was said that on 10 February a prominent local trader dispatched his petition to the Porte, and that other residents and shopkeepers of Ankara were considering following suit on their own behalf. The Dutch nation in Ankara wondered (in a letter) whether the residents and yarn buyers of Ayaş, Çankırı, and Kalecik would do the same thing, and whether these kinds of petitions would succeed in convincing the Porte that the Europeans were indeed responsible for the stagnation of the mohair trade. In fact, the European community in Ankara was unsure whether the locals had indeed dispatched petitions. On 20 February, the Dutch nation wrote that the courier who had brought the nation's earlier letters to Istanbul had reported that on his way to Istanbul he came across the locals charged with bringing the petitions to Istanbul. Although the group had left Ankara four or five days earlier, they were at a village located a half-day's distance from Ankara. The courier suspected that the group had no intention of submitting any petitions to the Porte, but rather had been ordered to spend time away as if submitting the petitions, so that in the meantime the Ankara officials could extract money from the Europeans.

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<sup>14</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.03.01, 130, 17.02.1706, Relas van t' geene in Angora is voorgevallen t' sedert den 6e February tot den 17e detto des Jaars 1706.



According to the courier, the *mutasarrıf* had also placed a number of his men along the route to Üsküdar to ensure that letters from the Europeans of Ankara would not arrive at the Porte. Despite his precautions, the European nations were able to dispatch several letters to their respective ambassadors on 10, 14, and 18 February.<sup>15</sup>

Before long, it was clear to everyone that the much-debated petition against the European presence in the city had indeed been dispatched to the Porte. But it appeared that the notables of Ankara had advised the group that took the petition to Istanbul not to submit it until they were extensively informed about the latest developments.<sup>16</sup>

On Monday, 15 February, the mufti and Müderriszâde attempted to convince the *mutasarrıf* to settle the dispute and to recall the petition from Istanbul. Allegedly, the *mutasarrıf* regretted having been deserted by his companions, but held his ground nonetheless. Meanwhile, the local *damgacı* seized his opportunity and forced the European merchants to consign their yarns to Izmir immediately with the caravan that was to depart before March,<sup>17</sup> so that he could extract the corresponding stamp tax before the end of his tenure.<sup>18</sup>

However, the situation in Ankara soon normalized and the European houses were frequented again by the locals. It was at this stage that Torron—a local Armenian who was alleged to be the greatest enemy of the Europeans in Ankara—let the European merchants know that he could settle the issue with the *mutasarrıf* and recall the petition if they were ready to pay a certain amount of money. The Europeans contracted him to arrange the issue for them, but Torron excused himself before following through.<sup>19</sup> Thanks to the endeavors of the mufti and Müderriszâde, by 20 February the tension had eased considerably. The Europeans once

<sup>15</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>16</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 27.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>17</sup> The taxes levied on goods that were exported from Ankara before March belonged to the former *damgacı*. Karaman, "Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVIII.," 208.

<sup>18</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 178/647, evâsıt-ı R. Evvel 1118/21.06–1.07.1706; NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>19</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.03.01, 130, 17.02.1706, Relaas van t' geene in Angora is voorgevallen t' sedert den 6e February tot den 17e detto des Jaars 1706.

again came and went comfortably without harassment or fear of further restrictions, and their houses were frequented again by locals, including their servants and brokers, but despite these improvements, they were still denied access to the market and yarn trade.<sup>20</sup> More importantly, on 27 February, the Dutch nation in Ankara noted that the *mutasarrıf*'s hostility was now directed at their brokers and dragomans, despite the fact that the latter had recently renewed their *berats*. The Dutch estimated that the *mutasarrıf* had spent about LD (Lion Dollars) 1,000 in dispatching the petition to Istanbul and other related actions and therefore tried to recoup his expenses by extracting that amount from the brokers and dragomans of the European communities. The Dutch wrote that the *mutasarrıf* threatened their agents using harassment and even the *bastinado*, and had imprisoned some, accusing them of having sought yarn for European merchants or simply having spoken in the Europeans' favor.<sup>21</sup>

On 27 February, the Dutch nation in Ankara expressed its regret and frustration that the yarn trade remained totally off-limits to them. The writers attributed the actions of the *mutasarrıf*, *qadi*, and the other notables to the specific instigators who had misled them. The writers also noted that the *damgacı* expected to continue in office for at least one more year and that he was planning to levy the *çıkar bâcı* on the European merchants as well. They complained that this innovation would be in the interest of the *damgacı* alone, while burdening the trade as a whole considerably.<sup>22</sup>

On 23 March 1706, about one month after the first incidents occurred in Ankara, Daniel Jan de Hochepped, the Dutch consul in Izmir, wrote to the DLH to inform the directors of the events and share his views about the issue. According to De Hochepped, the main instigators of the events in Ankara were certain native merchants who had provoked the people, and especially the leaders of the guilds, against the Europeans in the city. The consul argued that these merchants were jealous of the mercantile activities of the European traders in Ankara and seized the opportunity offered by the war-related downturn in the city's economy to conspire against the Europeans. In this, the newly-appointed *mutasarrıf* and the

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<sup>20</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>21</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 27.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

other notables of the city were willing accomplices. They rallied popular resistance to the presence of the Europeans in town, and their success was reflected in the fact that the petition addressed to the Porte was signed by thousands of Ankara residents.<sup>23</sup>

Although the crises occurred in Ankara, the crucial moves and decisions were made in Istanbul. As soon as news arrived in the capital, the Dutch, English, and French ambassadors at the Porte moved to assist their respective nations in Ankara. The ambassadors initially applied to the grand vizier to ensure the implementation of their capitulatory privileges and the punishment of the Ankara conspirators.<sup>24</sup>

While the ambassadors were soliciting a solution at the office of the grand vizier, the delegation of Ankara locals that brought their petition to Istanbul enjoyed a favorable reception with the mufti of Istanbul. However, the intervention of the Dutch, English, and French ambassadors at the Porte seems to have changed the balance completely in favor of the European merchants. The Dutch ambassador argued that in the English capitulations the sultan had explicitly clarified that merchants from that kingdom were allowed to settle in Ankara. As the Dutch capitulations included a clause whereby the privileges accorded to the English and French would also apply to the Dutch, it was illegal to expel the Dutch from Ankara.<sup>25</sup> The Porte seemed to have been convinced by the arguments of the ambassadors and rejected the demands of the Ankara delegation. In a letter dated 27 March, the Dutch ambassador to the Porte relayed the good news to the DLH, and informed them that the Porte had issued an imperial order to the *mutasarrıf*, qadi, and other notables of Ankara, forbidding local authorities from interfering in the commercial activities of the European merchants and commanding them to respect the privileges accorded to the relevant nations and to protect the latter against injustices.<sup>26</sup>

The imperial order was addressed to the *nâib* of Ankara, and pointed out that the Dutch merchants in Ankara had been dealing in local products and that there was no reason to interfere with their activities. Nevertheless, two local Armenian merchants, namely Torron and Agop, had interfered. According to the order, they had deceived Ankara officials and

<sup>23</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 22.03.1706, D. J. de Hocchepied to the DLH.

<sup>24</sup> NA 1.03.01, 101, 25.02.1706, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.

<sup>25</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 22.03.1706, D. J. de Hocchepied to the DLH; BOA ED 22/1, 178/645, evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1118/23.04–03.05.1706.

<sup>26</sup> NA 1.03.01, 101, 27.03.1706, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.

rallied other locals into hindering the Dutch merchants' activities, despite the article in the Dutch capitulations granting the Dutch general permission to travel and trade within the Ottoman dominions.<sup>27</sup> The imperial order commanded the *nâib* to warn Torron, Agop, and other locals not to interfere with the activities of the Dutch merchants in the city. The Porte also stipulated that if the locals did not stop interfering, the *nâib* must report the perpetrators to the Porte.<sup>28</sup>

As the Dutch merchants in Izmir had considerable investments in Ankara, during the crisis they readily supported their Ankara fellows.<sup>29</sup> They wrote to Colyer, the Dutch ambassador to the Porte, and begged him to do everything possible to implement the capitulations and to punish the instigators and others who played a role in the crisis.<sup>30</sup> In return, when the crisis came to an end, the Dutch nation of Ankara wrote of their profound gratitude to their fellows in Izmir. According to their letter of 28 March, the delegation that took the petition from Ankara to Istanbul returned with letters from the grand vizier, the mufti, and the *şeyhü'l-İslâm*, all of whom clearly expressed their disapproval of the demands of the locals. The delegation also brought the letters of the English, Dutch, and French ambassadors. Upon the arrival of the delegation and the letters, the *mutasarrıf*, mufti, *nâib*, and some other city notables arranged a meeting. The next day, the *mutasarrıf* summoned the Englishman, Roberto Constantine, and the Dutchman, Roberto Malbranq, to his office. To avoid any popular disturbance, he did this secretly, sending an ordinary person to call them. When Constantine and Malbranq arrived at his office, the *mutasarrıf* presented Constantine with the letters from the ambassadors and demanded that they be read in his presence so as to compare their contents with the letters that the *mutasarrıf* had received from the Porte. After they opened

<sup>27</sup> It is important to know that the relevant article did not mention Ankara explicitly, but rather accorded the Dutch merchants a general permission to travel and to trade within the Ottoman dominions "... memâlik-i mahrusamızda olan beylerbeyilere ve beylere ve kadırlara ve iskele emînlerine ahkâm-ı şerife irsâl olunup fermânı celilüşşânım bu vecihle sadır oldu ki mademki müşarun ileyhim tarafından şerâiti ahd ü peymân ve ihlas ve müddeti kemayenbağı siyânet oluna bu tarafta dahî kendi malları ve sâ'ir esbâb ve meta'larıyla eğer deryadan gelen kalyonları ve sâir gemileri ve içinde olan adamları ve esbâb ve meta'larıyla eğer karadan gelen adamları ve davarları ve meta'larıdır asla bir ferd dahlî taarruz eylemeyip kendi hallerinde ve kar ü kesblerinde olalar..." BOA ED 22/1, 177/641, 6 Z. Hicce 1117/20.03.1706.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbranq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>30</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 22.03.1706, D. J. de Hochepied to the DLH.

and read the letter from the English ambassador, they called the French merchant Horatio Palmier and two other Dutch merchants, Abraham de Mons and Simon van Breen. When these men arrived, the letter of the French ambassador was opened and read out. After all the documents from Istanbul were scrutinized, it became clear that the locals could not achieve their ends, and the *mutasarrıf* let the European merchants know that they could now stay in Ankara in safety and participate freely in the mohair trade. The next day, the European traders observed that the decision at the office of the *mutasarrıf* proved to be effective and that the locals complied with it completely.<sup>31</sup>

This “preliminary” crisis revealed that if the locals in Ankara wanted to effectively expel the Europeans from the city they had to first convince the Porte, since it had the final voice in the matter. If the problem in Ankara had been a case of the harassment of European merchants by certain influential individuals, the Porte’s verdict on the issue might not have had the same immediate impact. However, the achievement of the locals’ plot depended on the cooperation of various influential actors and it was inevitable that at least some of these actors were ready to follow the instructions of the Porte. The Porte’s attitude toward such demands was determined by factors quite different from those that determined the attitudes of Ankara’s residents. While the locals in Ankara perceived the activities of the Europeans from the standpoint of the local economy and social structures, the Porte had to take into account the legal, diplomatic, and international dimensions of the issue as well.

This latter point was illustrated by the European ambassadors’ efforts to counter the locals’ demands. Nevertheless, Colyer, the Dutch ambassador, wrote of the unwillingness of the French and English ambassadors to press the issue at the Porte and to ensure the punishment of the instigators of the incidents in Ankara. Colyer argued that it would only be possible to obtain further satisfaction from the Porte if his colleagues were more cooperative. The Dutch nation in Izmir wrote back to their ambassador on 8 April, emphasizing that the trade in Ankara was extremely important and indispensable for them, and if the French and English ambassadors were not willing to press the issue, the Dutch ambassador should do everything he could to obtain the desired support from the Porte.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 31.03.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>32</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 30.04.1706, D. J. de Hochepied to the DLH.

While the Dutch ambassador to the Porte was pushing the issue as far as he could, an unexpected development gave him a golden opportunity. On 2 May the grand vizier, Mehmed Paşa, was dismissed from office and replaced by Kaymakam Silahdar Ali Paşa. As soon as the new grand vizier took office, the Dutch ambassador applied for and obtained an order from him addressed to the *mutasarrıf* of Ankara and the *nâibs* of Beypazarı and Ankara.<sup>33</sup> The imperial order stated that the capitulatory articles that were applicable to the English were also applicable to the Dutch<sup>34</sup> and that the Dutch were authorized to deal in mohair and mohair yarn, just like the English merchants.<sup>35</sup> The Porte reminded the local authorities that a previous order forbade interference with the business of the Dutch merchants and again warned the local authorities to act in accordance with the capitulations and the relevant imperial orders.<sup>36</sup>

This order was followed by other orders reflecting the apparently definitive but temporary diplomatic victory of the Dutch ambassador. In mid-June the latter obtained an imperial order addressed to the *mutasarrıf* and *nâib* of Ankara which permitted the Dutch to produce or purchase wine for their own consumption. The order warned local authorities not to interfere with the acquisition of wine by Dutch merchants.<sup>37</sup> Another imperial order followed at the end of June and was again addressed to the *mutasarrıf* of the *sancak* and the *nâib* of the *kazâ* of Ankara. The order rebuked the local *damgacı* for forcing the Dutch merchants to consign their mohair yarn to Izmir before his tenure ended at the end of March so that he could extract the corresponding stamp tax (*resm-i damga*).<sup>38</sup>

It appears that shortly after the imperial orders had been issued, matters in Ankara were settled completely. We see that in mid-July a certain Dutch merchant, whose name was written “Şamuyil Fermûş”—probably a member of the Fremaux family—obtained a document of safe passage to travel together with his two servants from Istanbul to Ankara and to

<sup>33</sup> NA 1.03.01, 101, 25.05.1706, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.

<sup>34</sup> “... Françe ve İngilterelüye verilen ahidnâme-i hümayûna mastûr ve mukayyed olan hususlar Nederlandelü hakkında dahî mukarrer olup ânlara verilen ahidnâme-i hümayûn mücibince eğer meta'larıdır ve sâiridir amel oluna şer'-i şerîfe ve ahidnâme-i hümayûn-ı izzet-makrûnuma muhâlif kimesne mâni' ve müzâhim olmaya...” BOA ED 22/1, 178/645, evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1118/23.04–03.05.1706.

<sup>35</sup> “... İngilterelü Ankara ve Beğpazarında sof ve muhayyer ve tiftik ipliği iştirâ edüp götürmek istediklerinde yüzde üç gümrüğün verdikten sonra bâc-ı ihrâc nâmıyla rencide olunmayıp bir akçeleri ve bir habbeleri alınmaya...” Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 178/646, evâil-i R.Evvel 1118/12–22.06.1706.

<sup>38</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 178/647, evâsıt-ı R.Evvel 1118/21.06–1.07.1706.

do business there.<sup>39</sup> Another document of safe passage was granted in the beginning of November to Giacomo Oushoorn, who wanted to travel with one of his servants to Ankara.<sup>40</sup> A third document of safe passage is different from and more interesting than the earlier ones, since it shows that the Dutch merchants in Ankara felt confident enough to move their families to Ankara as well. On 22 April 1707 the Porte accorded a document of safe passage to the wife of Abraham de Mons, whose name was spelled as Zabite (Elizabeth?), to travel to Ankara with her three female slaves and two servants.<sup>41</sup> In fact, the settlement of whole Dutch families in Ankara was not a new phenomenon. On 30 September 1706, D. J. de Hochepped, the Dutch consul in Izmir, wrote to the DLH that, unlike the French and English, who each had only one factor in Ankara, the Dutch had four commercial houses and some of the Dutch merchants lived there with their families.<sup>42</sup> The fact that several Dutch merchants had settled in Ankara with their families should be considered an indication of safe conditions, despite the occasional crises threatening the European presence in the town.

After the crisis of 1706 was resolved, the Dutch diplomatic authorities in the Levant began to reflect on the issue of how to maintain the safety and order of the colony in Ankara. D. J. de Hochepped suggested that the Dutch appoint a headman for their community in Ankara. On 30 September 1706, he wrote to the directors that the grand vizier had suggested that each European ambassador appoint a headman over their community in Ankara to ensure that their respective nations behaved properly and did not provoke the locals against themselves.<sup>43</sup> In fact, in an earlier letter D. J. de Hochepped had pointed out that in the absence of a minister to oversee their behavior, some individuals from the European community in Ankara had provoked the local populace by their licentious actions, such as wearing prohibited clothes. Therefore, the consul recommended that the European community in Ankara be more careful not to make

<sup>39</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 179/648, evâhir-i R.Evvel 1118/1–12.07.1706.

<sup>40</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 180/655, evâhir-i Receb 1118/27.10–06.11.1706.

<sup>41</sup> "... hâlen Ankara'da ticaret üzere olan Dimons nâm müste'menin 'an asl Netherlande vilâyetinden götürüp bu tarafta olan zevcesi Zabite nâm müste'mene zevci mesfûrun yanına gitmek murad etmekle yanında olan üç re's memlûku cariyeleri ve iki nefer müste'men hizmetkârlarıyla herkanınızın ...," BOA ED 22/1, 183/669, 20 Muharrem 1119/22.04.1707.

<sup>42</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 30.09.1706, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.



such mistakes and provoke the local populace, since local revolts against such behavior might have serious consequences.<sup>44</sup>

The English ambassador, however, was unwilling to appoint a consul to Ankara, because there was only one English commercial establishment there. Moreover, this establishment bore no relation to the English Levant Company. The same considerations also held for the French, who had only one commercial house in Ankara; this contrasted with the Dutch, who boasted four commercial houses and a number of families there. De Hochepped thought that the Dutch colony in Ankara would grow in time and pointed out that the wife of Abraham de Mons was about to travel to Ankara to settle there with her husband. Moreover, according to De Hochepped, the recent incidents had shown that the bad behavior of a single person could endanger the existence of the whole colony by leading to popular discontent and opposition to the entire European presence. Therefore, it would be a good idea to appoint a headman for the Dutch community in Ankara to oversee their activities and behavior. De Hochepped argued that the ambassador to the Porte and especially the Dutch consul and community of Izmir should be consulted about who to appoint as Ankara headman, because the Dutch community in Izmir had a great deal of shared trade with Ankara. De Hochepped also suggested that, due to the extraordinarily high costs of presents and other expenditures in Ankara, the headman should be accorded a salary of at least LD 1,000 and that this sum should be obtained from a new duty to be levied on each load of mohair yarn brought by Dutch merchants from Ankara to Izmir.<sup>45</sup>

Such serious, rational reflections came only in the aftermath of the crisis; during the crisis the letters of the Dutch diplomats sounded notes of high emotion and rumors. For example, during the crisis De Hochepped related that the Porte ordered the Europeans to be removed from the vicinity of the mosques.<sup>46</sup> This must have been only a rumor, as we could not verify such an attempt from any other sources. It seems quite normal that during a period of high tension and agitation such rumors circulated through the Dutch community in the Levant. Likewise, the letters written from Ankara to Istanbul and Izmir were full of anxiety about the extremely difficult conditions in Ankara: how the capitulations had been

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<sup>44</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 22.03.1706, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>45</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 30.09.1706, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>46</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 30.04.1706, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.



denigrated and how Dutch trade was threatened.<sup>47</sup> Letter writers accused local non-Muslim merchants of being conspirators and pleaded with the Dutch representatives not to allow the locals, or *re'ayâs*, to thwart their trade in "splendid and illustrious mohair yarn"; a trade they had been engaged in for so many years with such prestige, and the importance of which had been appreciated throughout the entire world.<sup>48</sup>

The *mutasarrıf* of Ankara at that time was also mentioned quite frequently in such letters and depicted as a barbarian and outrageous personage. The Dutch community in Izmir alleged that about four years before the events of 1706, locals had attempted to get rid of the Europeans in Ankara, but they could only put their plan into effect after the appointment of the *mutasarrıf*, who was a native of nearby Kalecik. The Dutch alleged that the *mutasarrıf* was favorably disposed toward the locals' cause, not only because three or four well-known local Armenians had bribed him, but also because he had personal interests in the yarn trade. They claimed that, due to his personal engagement and the LD 300 which local Armenians gave him for the expenses of the couriers who brought the petition to the Porte, the *mutasarrıf* acted on his own, without deliberating with the local mufti and the other notables of the city.<sup>49</sup>

Despite the explicit suggestions of D. J. de Hochepped, who advised the appointment of a consul to oversee the activities of the Europeans in Ankara, steps were not taken in that direction. In fact, it is not clear how the Porte would have responded if the Dutch had attempted to appoint a consul to Ankara. Nevertheless, in 1708, irresponsible behavior on the part of the Europeans in the city, which De Hochepped felt could be prevented by the appointment of a consul, constituted the immediate cause that once again moved the locals against the Europeans in Ankara. A number

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<sup>47</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 27.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>48</sup> "splendible en doorlugtige stamme," NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.03.01, 130, 10.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq, Antonio van Breen, Wesselink & Derveau) to Jacobus Colyer.

<sup>49</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 20.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq & Co., Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.03.01, 130, 10.02.1706, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Roberto Malbrancq, Antonio van Breen, Wesselink & Derveau) to Colyer.

of offenses<sup>50</sup> committed by Constantine, an English resident of Ankara, gave the locals the opportunity to move definitively against the whole European community in the town.

After the events of 1706, the situation in Ankara appears to have remained calm for two years. In this period, English merchants in the city seem to have increased their share in the mohair trade considerably. According to the registers of the local *damgacı*, Hasan Ağa, in one year more than 400 camel loads<sup>51</sup> of mohair yarn was consigned to the English in Izmir. Most of this yarn was provided by the partnership Constantine & Bower. Bower left Ankara with an “English convoy” to Izmir just before the crisis of 1708 occurred.<sup>52</sup>

The Europeans in Ankara realized that the offenses committed by Constantine, who had provoked the peasants of a farm that belonged to the mufti of Ankara, would cause trouble, and tried to convince Constantine to neutralize the authorities by bribing them. Constantine responded in a rather arrogant manner, saying that others did not need to bother themselves with his business and that he could avoid problems without any expenses because of his friendship with the local pasha, *nakîb*, and some other *eşrâf* (effendis) in the city. Although some time passed without any

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<sup>50</sup> Although the Dutch nation in Ankara lists the specific offenses in a letter to Jacobus Colyer dated 29.02.1708, because of the strange language they use it is not very clear what these offenses were. The offense committed by Constantine may have been that he walked through a cornfield while bearing arms. A fight erupted when the farmer of the cornfield complained about Constantine's behavior. During the fight, caps as well as green turbans flew in the air. Afterward, Constantine also fought with a local “emir.” The farm Constantine had crossed probably belonged to the local mufti, which compounded the problem. The relevant sentences are: “... En de t' scheynt de negotierende kooplieden deses lands t'zy uyt jalousie, voor twee jaren tot haar oogwit niet raken hebben kunnen, of te wel dat opgemelte Engelse Sig:r Constantine aan de inboorlingen als onderdanen deses lands t'sedert eenige aanstoot gegeven soude hebben, soo gevarteert werd meest gecauseert werdende in spasse tempo naar buytene &c. Waardoor gespargeert werd t'een schiflick [giftçi] somtyts ter stad inkomende loopen clagen, door hare ploeg of koorn land geloopen, met t' anderhand gevaar geweest, mutzen en groene sarielen afgevlogen, en de derde gelyk nu jongst in circa drie weeken geleeden seekere Emir eenigsints gequest, detto sig:r Constantine selve niet ongemolesteert of sonder slagen afgecomen soudén hebben, die dog meest syn E. bediende best gevoelen hebben moeten; dan detto nu laaste actie omtrent seker schiflick of dorplieden der passagie van syn wyngaart ruym twee uren desen stad, waarvan dese mufty patroon en hem selven wesentlyk toebehoorende, soo ons gerapporteert word t' nu wel dagelyk opdesselfs patroon voorsien hadden, en slegt bygestaan hebben soudén, indien niet met goud en andere clyno dien afgekogt hadden &c.” NA 1.01.03, 6925, 29.02.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara to Colyer.

<sup>51</sup> “Cargas.” Each camel load comprised two bales of yarn.

<sup>52</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 29.02.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Melbrancq, Fremaux & Oushoorn, Wesseling & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to Colyer.

action on the part of the locals, after the departure of a mohair caravan to Izmir, the Europeans in Ankara realized that the silence of the locals would not last. It appears that after Constantine offended the peasants and the rumors about his offenses spread around the city, the *damgacı* went to the mufti and asked him to keep the peasants silent until the mohair caravan departed because the *damgacı* had six *kese* deficit in his tenure and wanted to cover the deficit by collecting the stamp tax from this last mohair caravan to Izmir.<sup>53</sup> On the occasion of the departure of the last caravan, the *damgacı* collected the *çıkar bâcı*, above the ordinary stamp tax, by threatening the merchants with a newly procured verdict from the Porte that ordered the removal of the Europeans from Ankara.<sup>54</sup>

As soon as the caravan departed from Ankara, the misbehavior of Constantine was brought to the local agenda. Locals debated whether Constantine had tried to appease the peasants by paying them a sum of LD 150, and whether the peasants had accepted the money. While related rumors were circulating in the city, the Dutch community heard that a meeting was organized in which the participants began planning to expel all Europeans from Ankara.<sup>55</sup>

In a letter written on 29 February 1708, the Dutch nation in Ankara complained about the escalation of local antipathy toward them, even though the Dutch had lately “driven little trade” and had not taken part in the last offenses. They alleged that they had been subjected to affronts despite their own proper behavior and in accordance with the advice of their ambassador. They recommended that their government protest the behavior of the locals on the grounds that a considerable number of Ottoman merchants made use of the Dutch shipping and insurance system and traded with the Netherlands in complete freedom without being subject to additional taxes or extortions.<sup>56</sup> These arguments are interesting, as they illustrate that the Dutch merchants in Ankara attributed a reciprocal character to the privileges they expected to enjoy in Ankara. One must remember that neither the English nor the French could have put forward

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 16.04.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Melbrancq, Fremaux & Oushoorn, Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>55</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 29.02.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Melbrancq, Fremaux & Oushoorn, Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to Colyer.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

such arguments because they did not allow Ottoman merchants to participate in the trade between the Levant and their countries.

Local traders once more prepared a petition against the European presence in Ankara and were rumored to be planning to send it to the Porte. Allegedly, the *damgacı* accepted to support the local traders, who promised to match his six *kese* deficit. According to the Dutch, neither the local qadi nor the pasha was willing to support the initiative of the “conspirators.” Nevertheless, the initiative might have serious consequences since the mufti and other Ankara functionaries were ready to lend their support. Moreover, it was likely that the complaints of the local yarn merchants, *damgacı*, and *gümruk emîni* would be heard with a sympathetic ear in the grand vizier’s office. The Dutch nation related that the Dutch were planning to show the pasha their capitulations and the imperial orders the ambassador obtained two years before, in May 1706. They hoped that local authorities would recognize that these orders stated clearly that the privileges applicable to the English and French were applicable to the Dutch as well and that the Dutch were authorized to trade in Beypazarı and Ankara as elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions. The Dutch merchants begged their ambassador at the Porte to do everything to ensure that the Porte would not lump the guilty with the innocent, since the petition prepared by the local merchants targeted all the Europeans in the town. They also told the ambassador that they were ready to pay the expenses to obtain the relevant orders from the Porte. For this purpose, they had given the relevant orders to the Dutch trading house Rombouts & Diepenbroeck in Istanbul.<sup>57</sup>

The efforts of the Dutch in Ankara to prevent possible reprisals against them were not limited to these letters to their ambassador to the Porte. Taking the seriousness of the developments into consideration, they visited the qadi with their capitulations and imperial orders. It appears that the qadi received the Dutch merchants very well, telling them that he would respect their privileges and uphold the imperial orders, since the Dutch merchants had been behaving as honest merchants. A local “effendi” told the Dutch merchants that the last initiative of the locals was motivated only by the offenses of Signor Constantine. Nevertheless, the Dutch learned that most of the notables of Ankara were against the

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

presence of Europeans and hoped to obtain an imperial order from the Porte against them.<sup>58</sup>

The Dutch nation was totally frustrated by this information and requested that their ambassadors take action: these developments were not only against the interests of the Dutch merchants in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, and the Netherlands, but were also an intolerable insult to their national privileges, as expressed and clarified in recent orders. They begged Colyer to protest at the Porte as he deemed appropriate. Meanwhile, the Dutch ambassador advised the merchants in Ankara to let Signor Constantine make use of the imperial orders and the *ahidnâmes* held by the Dutch nation in Ankara. This shows that the Dutch did have some contact with the English, though they had almost no contact with the lone French trading house in Ankara.<sup>59</sup>

On 8 March 1708 the Dutch nation in Ankara wrote once more to the ambassador to the Porte and reported that since its last letter (on 29 February) there had been no more protests or riots against the Europeans or the Dutch in particular, and that tranquility prevailed at the moment. However, some rumors concerning a new threat to the interest of the European merchants in Ankara originated now from Istanbul. As the tenure of the *damgacı* in Ankara expired, it was said that either the previous *damgacı* or the new one was lobbying in Istanbul to introduce the *çikar bâcı* on the mohair yarn exports of the European merchants. The Dutch nation reminded the ambassador that in one of his earlier letters he wrote that the introduction of the *çikar bâcı* for the Dutch would be an apparent violation of the Dutch capitulatory privileges and therefore they did not consider its re-introduction possible.<sup>60</sup>

As soon as the letters of the Dutch nation in Ankara arrived in Istanbul, Colyer sent his first dragoman to the Porte to gather information on the topic (on 7 March). The next day, the dragoman informed the ambassador that, four months earlier, Kör Ali Ağa, the immediate superior to the *damgacı* Hasan Ağa, attempted to create some difficulties for the Europeans at the Porte. Kör Ali Ağa relented when he realized that, only two years earlier, the Porte had turned down similar initiatives with express imperial orders permitting the European nations to stay and trade in Ankara.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 08.03.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Melbrancq, Fremaux & Oushoorn, Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to Colyer.

However, Ali Ağa took up the issue again upon hearing of the offenses committed by Signor Constantine. He convinced the *defterdâr* to issue a verdict ordering that the Europeans, who had settled in Ankara in violation of the usages, should leave Ankara for the cities on the coast. The verdict, as Ali Ağa related to the first dragoman of the Dutch embassy, alleged that the European merchants in Ankara consigned Turkish yarn to Izmir and Istanbul in bales that were two times larger than the usual bales, but paid their stamp tax as if they were normal bales, causing considerable loss to the imperial treasury. To the surprise of the French, English, and Dutch ambassadors at the Porte, the verdict of the *defterdâr* was full of further allegations, as well as demands that were totally contrary to the capitulations. On 14 March 1708, Colyer wrote to the Dutch nation in Ankara that he had spoken with Ali Ağa and tried to convince him that the expulsion of the European merchants from Ankara was in fact against the interest of the stamp tax farm. Colyer promised that the Dutch merchants would bale their yarn according to the usages and avoid any fraud. The ambassador also granted that in case of suspicion, the *damgacı* would have the right to weigh mohair yarn bales belonging to the Dutch merchants. It appears that during the meeting the *damgacı* impressed the ambassador with his extensive knowledge about the activities of individual European merchants in Ankara. Consequently, the ambassador advised the Dutch merchants in Ankara to remain cooperative and work in harmony with the *damgacı*.<sup>61</sup>

On 25 March Colyer wrote about the developments in Ankara to his correspondents in the Netherlands: the Dutch States General and the Directorate of the Levant trade. The ambassador related that the *damgacı* (Hasan Ağa) and his superior in Istanbul (Kör Ali Ağa) had suffered considerable losses due to the recent stagnant conditions of trade and alleged fraudulence on the part of European merchants in the city. Therefore, these two functionaries seemed ready to support the locals' initiative against the Europeans in Ankara. Colyer also informed his correspondents that they (Hasan and Ali Ağa) had been able to procure a verdict from the *defterdâr* at the Porte ordering the removal of Europeans from Ankara. Colyer explained that he had joined the English and French ambassadors at the Porte to show that the verdict was contrary to the capitulations and thus he succeeded in securing a temporary cancellation of the verdict,

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<sup>61</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 14.03.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.03.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

with certain conditions. According to Colyer's letter, the temporary cancellation was secured after the ambassadors promised that the Europeans in Ankara would no longer disturb and provoke the locals, and that they would not use larger than ordinary mohair yarn bales that diminished the income to the imperial treasury. Colyer's letter sounds quite optimistic about the effects of his agreement with the *damgacı*. He related to the States General that the *damgacı* was satisfied with the fact that he had written to the Dutch community in Ankara and warned them to act in accordance with these provisions.<sup>62</sup>

It appears that Colyer enjoyed little assistance from his French and English counterparts during his endeavors at the Porte. On 14 March he related that the English and French ambassadors at the Porte alleged that they had not received any petitions from their respective communities in Ankara and therefore he (Colyer) had to lead them to clear the way for all Europeans there.<sup>63</sup> These remarks were later voiced again in the letters of D. J. de Hochepped who, generally speaking, seemed more realistic about the developments than the ambassador. De Hochepped attributed the problems in Ankara to the resentment of the native merchants. He argued that these natives would do anything and spend everything they could to effect the removal of Europeans from Ankara.<sup>64</sup>

A letter written on 16 April 1708 by the Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Izmir offered a basis for the pessimism of De Hochepped. In their letter, the merchants in Ankara related that they were facing the most extreme affronts and difficulties ever experienced by Europeans in Ankara. The reason for the new developments was the arrival of an imperial order with *damgacı* Hasan Ağa, who had returned to Ankara on the night of 10 April, having been re-appointed to the same post. The order Hasan Ağa brought to Ankara appeared to have been approved by the grand vizier and the imperial divan. It ordered the immediate removal of all Europeans from Ankara to the cities on the shores.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 25.03.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the SG; NA 1.03.01, 101, 25.03.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.

<sup>63</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 14.03.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.03.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>64</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.03.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG; NA 1.03.01, 130, 31.03.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>65</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 16.04.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Melbrancq, Fremaux & Oushoorn, Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.



Upon arrival of the imperial order, local authorities and notables, including the pasha, qadi, mufti, *damgaci*, and effendis gathered several times to deliberate on how to implement the order. During a meeting at the residence of the governor on the afternoon of 14 April, the verdict was read out in the presence of the European merchants in the city and they were notified that they had three days to leave the city. Although the Europeans countered by saying that this was contrary to the capitulations, they could not obtain anything beyond the granting of two days more; thus they had to leave the city by Thursday morning, 19 April. Interestingly, the women of the European community were excluded from immediate expulsion, and each trading house was allowed to leave one person behind to collect outstanding debts, liquidate their belongings, and settle their remaining business. The *damgaci* and the qadi promised the Europeans that they would ensure that their remaining belongings and outstanding credits, etc. would not be damaged because of their departure. They also claimed that they had been true friends of the Europeans and that they would like to welcome them back if they could procure an imperial order permitting their resettlement in Ankara. However, they said, it was presently necessary for the Europeans to leave to avoid popular disturbances.<sup>66</sup>

The Dutch in Ankara realized that they were completely vulnerable to the wishes of the locals, and that neither their own ambassador, nor those of the English or French could help them. They felt humiliated, notwithstanding the fact that the governor offered to provide them with escort until they passed Beypazarı. Despite these frustrations, the Dutch merchants did not give up their struggle. They planned to settle in Beypazarı or another safe place to wait and see whether the ambassadors would be able to secure their re-establishment in Ankara.<sup>67</sup>

When the Dutch community in Izmir received the news from Ankara, they wrote a letter to the ambassador to the Porte, begging him to act promptly to redress the situation and to ensure the resettlement of the Dutch and other Europeans in Ankara. The Dutch consul in Izmir argued that the developments had to be considered violations of all European nations' privileges and therefore the Dutch, French, and English ambassadors must act together to gain any concession from the Porte and ensure

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 30.04.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 03.05.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the SG.

<sup>67</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 16.04.1708, Dutch nation in Ankara (signed by Abraham de Mons & Simon van Breen, Melbrancq, Fremaux & Oushoorn, Wesselink & Derveau, Antonio van Breen) to the Dutch nation in Izmir.



the resettlement of their respective countrymen in Ankara. Moreover, he wondered why the English and French ambassadors had ignored the problem until it became such a disastrous crisis, and noted that the locals could not have obtained the imperial order without the knowledge of the *defterdâr* and the grand vizier. The consul also wondered how it was possible that the “ministers” of the Porte could permit the implementation of the *defterdâr*’s verdict, despite the fact that the capitulations explicitly indicated that a verdict issued by the *defterdâr* could not contradict the capitulations, and if it did, the verdict should not be respected or implemented.<sup>68</sup>

When the news arrived in Istanbul, the Dutch ambassador realized that his optimism had been misplaced. On 3 May he wrote to the States General that he and his English colleague seemed to have secured the cancellation of the verdict. But, following an express order of the grand vizier, the *damgacı* had quietly left Istanbul for Ankara to implement the order without taking into consideration the counter-arguments of the ambassadors. The ambassador complained that the Ottoman authorities had not even informed the European ambassadors about their decision on the issue.<sup>69</sup>

As the Dutch ambassador could not obtain anything from the Porte, he turned to his English colleague, Sir Richard Sutton (ambassador from 1710 to 1714). Sutton was ready to act on the crisis, and the two ambassadors agreed to press the issue further at the Porte. First, they addressed the issue to the *re’isü’l-küttâb* and to the *kahyâ* of the grand vizier. The ambassadors told these functionaries that they found the decision unacceptable because the order in question was based on ungrounded allegations of fraudulence and the verdict was completely at odds with their capitulatory privileges. They also complained that the Porte had implemented its decision without notifying the respective ambassadors, and by doing so deprived the ambassadors of any means to counter these claims. The ambassadors argued that the decision was based on the one-sided allegations of the *damgacı* and his followers, and disregarded the arguments of the English and Dutch commercial houses that had been in Ankara already for almost one hundred years. According to the Dutch ambassador, the *re’isü’l-küttâb* and the *kapı kahyâsı* told the ambassadors that the order had prohibited the European merchants from settling in Ankara,

<sup>68</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 30.04.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>69</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 03.05.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the SG.

but not from traveling or trading there. The Ottomans found it especially intolerable that the European merchants had moved their wives and children to Ankara and given the locals the opportunity to complain that the Europeans enriched themselves extremely, to the detriment of the subjects of the Grand Signior.<sup>70</sup>

After this initial attempt, the ambassadors brought the case to the attention of the grand vizier. However, when the English ambassador Sutton succeeded in arranging an audience, the Dutch ambassador was not allowed to join him. The Porte probably wanted to prevent the issue from becoming a diplomatic crisis, with the Porte against all the European nations. Consequently, on 1 May the English ambassador went to the meeting alone and complained to the grand vizier about the developments in Ankara. In turn, the grand vizier told the ambassador that the order of the *defterdâr* was issued with his knowledge and approval. The ambassador argued then that the *defterdâr*'s order was contrary to the English capitulations and earlier imperial orders. Therefore, he requested the annulment of the order and the promulgation of new orders in accordance with their capitulations so that the European merchants in Ankara could return to their business. The grand vizier, however, was not ready to comply with these demands and ended the debate by noting the offenses committed by European merchants in Ankara.<sup>71</sup>

After the English ambassador had been granted an audience, the Dutch ambassador also wanted to visit the grand vizier to press the issue. But despite all his attempts to gain an audience, the Dutch ambassador's request was never approved by the Porte: officially because of the illness of the Grand Signior (Ahmed III).<sup>72</sup> On 3 May 1708, the Dutch ambassador wrote to the Dutch States General that he was planning to visit the *sipâh ağası*<sup>73</sup> and the Grand Admiral to bring the issue to their attention. The ambassador noted also that the French ambassador had done nothing about the issue, saying that his nation had no interest in it. The Dutch ambassador was determined to do everything he could, but did not see much prospect for success since the grand vizier was an obstinate man who did not consult the other ministers. He therefore asked the States

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.05.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>72</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 25.05.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.05.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>73</sup> The commander of the first cavalry unit of the janissary corps. Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (İstanbul, 1993), 3:230.

General for instructions about what to do in case he was not able to secure the resettlement of the Dutch merchants in Ankara.<sup>74</sup>

When the Dutch ambassador was writing his letter of 3 May to the States General, the Dutch, French, and English merchants who had left Ankara on 19 April had already arrived in Istanbul (on 26 May). Abraham de Mons, who had been living in Ankara with his wife and four sons, was among those who arrived in Istanbul. Only one Dutch merchant and the English Signor Constantine remained in Beypazarı. Allegedly, the residents of Beypazarı were favorably disposed toward the European presence in their town and had applied to the Porte to allow the settlement of European merchants there. It appears that Signor Constantine and his Dutch companion remained there in the hopes that the Porte would approve the locals' demand.<sup>75</sup>

While the Dutch ambassador was striving to secure resettlement privileges for the Dutch community in Ankara, the French ambassador did not intervene on the subject at all, to the disappointment of his Dutch colleague. Meanwhile, the English ambassador had obtained an imperial order permitting English merchants to return to Ankara for six months to clear up their business, under the condition that they did not engage in trade. Initially, the Dutch ambassador did not apply for a similar order because he still hoped to convince the grand vizier to permit the return of the Dutch merchants, at least to Beypazarı. Because the residents and the jurists of Beypazarı had applied to the Porte for permission for the Europeans to settle in Beypazarı, the Dutch ambassador was quite optimistic about the success of this plan.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, several ministers at the Porte advised Colyer not to push the issue too much, because they thought that the residents of Ankara would soon submit a petition similar to that of the residents of Beypazarı.<sup>77</sup>

However, subsequent news from Ankara suggested that local opposition to the European presence in the city was not weakening, but becoming stronger; in fact, the European women and those who stayed behind to settle the remaining business details of their trading houses were under pressure to leave town. Due to these developments, the Dutch ambassador, who was awaiting an audience at the Porte, felt obliged to take action

<sup>74</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 03.05.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the SG.

<sup>75</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 10.05.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG; NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.05.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG; NA 1.03.01, 130, 31.05.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>76</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 25.05.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>77</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 30.05.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the SG.

and submitted a petition to the Porte on 6 June. The Porte's resolution on the issue was very clear, though disappointing to the ambassador. All the Dutch demands regarding the resettlement of the Dutch merchants in Ankara or Beypazarı were rejected. The Dutch ambassador, knowing that he had no choice but to comply with the Porte's resolution, submitted another petition demanding six months for the Dutch merchants to travel to Ankara and settle their business without engaging in any trade. The Dutch ambassador's last move was aimed at gaining some time until he might be able to convince the Porte on the permanent resettlement of the Dutch merchants to Ankara.<sup>78</sup> The Porte approved the latter Dutch demand, as it had accorded the same permission to the English, and addressed an imperial order to the *mutasarrıf* and *nâib* of Ankara. The order mentioned the names of several Dutch merchants who used to live in Ankara but had recently left for Istanbul: Dimones (Abraham de Mons), Feramus (Fremaux), Vaske (Wesselink), and Vamirne (van Breen). It was clarified that these merchants were allowed to travel to Ankara for six months to sell their belongings there, to consign the mohair yarn in their warehouses to the ports, and to settle their debts with the locals.<sup>79</sup> Soon afterward, the English merchant Constantine sold his house in Ankara to Elhâc Mustafa Ağa, the *mutasarrıf* of *Haymana hassı mukâta'ası*.<sup>80</sup>

Meanwhile the Dutch and English ambassadors at the Porte suggested launching a boycott on buying mohair yarn from Ankara merchants. Since Izmir was the main outlet for the mohair exports of Ankara, the situation in Izmir would determine whether such a boycott was tenable. The Dutch consul in Izmir, however, reported that a boycott on mohair yarn was not tenable, as several Dutch ships were waiting for cargo at the port of Izmir. If these ships were not allowed to load mohair yarn, they would suffer considerable losses. Moreover, the consul argued that it would be more logical not to put any strain on the trade if they wished to re-establish the European merchants in Ankara.<sup>81</sup>

While the Dutch authorities and merchants in the Levant were searching for a means to effect the resettlement of their traders in Ankara, a new imperial order, issued around the end of June, put an end to their hopes.

<sup>78</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 16.06.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>79</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 186/687, evâsıt-ı R.Evvel 1120/29.05–08.06.1708. The order arrived on 1 R.Âhır 1120/28 June 1708 in Ankara. AŞS, 85/429. A similar order accorded to the English arrived on 23 R.Evvel 1120/12 June 1708 AŞS, 85/427.

<sup>80</sup> AŞS, 85/59, 1 July 1708.

<sup>81</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.05.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

The extensive order was based on information included in an *i'lâm* submitted to the Porte by the *mutasarrıf*, qadi, and the *mültezim* of the stamp tax farm of Ankara. The order was addressed to Salih, the *mutasarrıf* of the province of Ankara; the qadis of Ankara and Beypazarı; and also to the *voyvoda* of Beypazarı. Since the imperial order repeated much of the information in the *i'lâm* of the local authorities, it gives a fairly clear picture of their point of view on the latest developments. They held that from ancient times, mohair yarn produced in Ankara and Beypazarı had been brought to Izmir by local merchants, who sold the yarn to the Europeans and paid the corresponding stamp tax properly. However, during the last couple of years, the European merchants who had settled at the ports throughout Ottoman dominions had left these ports and settled in Ankara and Beypazarı, an innovation contrary to the usages. These European merchants were guilty of the clandestine export of mohair, and through a variety of schemes evaded their tax obligations or paid less than they owed. Due to the European presence and malpractices, the merchants who used to come from other places (*diyâr-ı âhardan gelen tüccar-ı sâire*) stopped visiting Ankara, and these developments led to a considerable loss of stamp tax farm revenue in the town. Therefore, taking into consideration the fact that the European presence in Ankara and Beypazarı was a new phenomenon, the Porte had removed them to Izmir to prevent further disorder and fiscal losses. This decision had an immediate positive effect on the general situation in Ankara and also on the finances of the stamp tax farm. But the presence of European merchants disturbed these improvements again and led other merchants to depart. Alleging that they had to complete some remaining business, sell their belongings, and settle their debts, the Europeans asked for an imperial order to permit them to travel to Ankara for six months. But they announced that they had been permitted to re-establish themselves in Ankara, thereby disregarding the temporary character of the permission they received from the Porte. At the same time, it had become clear that their belongings in Ankara were nothing more than some jars and small items of hardware which did not need any supervision at all.<sup>82</sup>

Based on this narrative version of the events, the Porte ordered the definitive removal of Europeans from Ankara and Beypazarı to Izmir. The Porte especially emphasized its concern that a European presence in

<sup>82</sup> AŞS, 85/433, evâil-i R.Âhir 1120/19.06–28.06.1708. The order was recorded in the court registers of Ankara on 16 R.Âhir/04.07.1708.

these places would cause considerable losses to the stamp tax farm. It also ordered European merchants who had claims on the locals to settle these issues immediately in the local court, collect their claims, and then leave, to bring these disturbances and fiscal losses to an end.<sup>83</sup>

When the Porte's final order was issued, the Europeans realized that they had lost the case definitively. The first indication in the sources that they had given up the struggle is a document of safe passage obtained for Abraham de Mons, who was to move his family from Ankara and Beypazarı to Istanbul. As the passport was meant for all members of the family, comprising six persons (three male and three female) excluding Abraham himself, it was clear that they had no plan to return to the town again.<sup>84</sup>

On 17 July Colyer reported the latest developments to the DLH and related his repeated demands for an audience, his petitions, the Porte's refusals, and his last move to obtain permission for the six-month period. It appears that after Colyer secured the order that granted the Dutch merchants six more months to leave Ankara, the French ambassador followed suit and obtained a similar order from the Porte. According to Colyer, it was the local mohair yarn merchants who had caused all these difficulties and ensured that the Porte did not make any concessions to the Europeans. Allegedly, Greek and Armenian yarn merchants had convinced the Porte that the stamp tax farm of Ankara would not suffer any losses if the Europeans were expelled from Ankara and Beypazarı. Moreover, they also promised that they would cover the losses in case there were any, as long as no European merchants were allowed to trade in those places. To support this offer, local merchants had even submitted security debentures to the Porte. Colyer said that after the Europeans were granted six more months and returned to Ankara, local authorities joined the local merchants and announced that they would not permit any European merchant to trade in the city. This resolute opposition from local authorities and merchants stimulated the Porte to revoke its previous orders without notifying the respective European ambassadors and order the immediate expulsion of the English, French, and Dutch merchants from Ankara.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 187/688, evâhir-i R.Âhir 1120/8–17.07.1708. Abraham de Mons and his family went first to Istanbul and afterward to Izmir. They arrived in Izmir on 23 September (NA 1.03.01, 130, 30.09.1708, D. J. de Hochepied to the DLH).

<sup>85</sup> NA 1.03.01, 101, 17.07.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.

After the Porte's final order was announced to the Europeans in Ankara, they had no alternative but to leave the town within two days. On 20 July, one Dutch merchant who had left Ankara for Istanbul arrived there with the English merchants.<sup>86</sup> Some of the Dutch merchants who arrived in Istanbul went to Izmir afterward. On 19 August, Guillelmo Wesselink, Abraham Derveau, Giacomo Oushoorn, and Hermanus Clicquet arrived in Izmir,<sup>87</sup> followed by Abraham de Mons on 23 September.<sup>88</sup>

On 31 August 1708, De Hochepped wrote to the Dutch States General that there was no further hope for an imperial redress of the issue. Moreover, the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul was now engaged in the redress of another affront—he had been expelled from his summer house on the Bosphorus! The consul suggested that the Dutch States General write a letter to the sultan to complain about the policies of the grand vizier. According to the consul, a foreigner could never be sure about the security of his life and property in the empire, since everything depended on the caprice of the grand vizier, who had blatantly disregarded the capitulations. The consul felt that the Christian powers should intimidate this pompous government into cooperation, otherwise, the local people would continue to create more obstacles for the European merchants. The consul suggested embarrassing the “Muhammadans” into renewing the capitulations, with the addition of special articles ensuring that the recent events would not happen again.<sup>89</sup>

On the same day, the Dutch ambassador to the Porte wrote to the Netherlands with the same pessimism, announcing the expulsion of the European merchants from Ankara. The ambassador explained that he and his English and French counterparts had applied to the grand vizier but did not receive any answer. Finally, the ambassador conceded that there was little to do to redress the situation.<sup>90</sup>

On 30 August, before De Hochepped's suggestions arrived in The Hague, the States General had already decided to dispatch a letter asking the sultan to restore the Dutch nation in Ankara upon the request of merchants in the Netherlands. Moreover, it was said that the British Queen had also decided to write a similar letter, at the request of the English Levant Company. Although the Levant Company considered the re-establishment of

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<sup>86</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.07.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 30.09.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>89</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6925, 31.08.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>90</sup> NA 1.03.01, 101, 31.08.1708, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.



English factors in Ankara as actually detrimental to English Levant trade, they requested the dispatch of such a letter because they considered the practices of the Porte an infringement on the capitulations.<sup>91</sup>

As time passed, the Dutch authorities in the Levant began to make more grounded analyses of the developments. On 3 December, De Hochepped suggested that it was impossible to prevent similar provocations unless the Europeans consented to the *çıkâr bâcı*, which amounted to no more than LD 4 per camel load of mohair yarn. According to De Hochepped, the crucial factor that provoked the local merchants and administrators against the European merchants was the fact that the local merchants paid the *çıkâr bâcı*, while the European nations were exempted from the tax by means of a specific article of the English capitulations of 1680.<sup>92</sup>

Although the Dutch had also been exempted from the tax since 1686, by means of an imperial decree,<sup>93</sup> in 1699 the Dutch community of Izmir wanted to insert an explicit article in their capitulations to strengthen the legal base of this privilege.<sup>94</sup> It is important to note that the order exempting Dutch merchants from the *çıkâr bâcı* referred to the English exemption from the tax and cited the article of the Dutch capitulations that accorded the Dutch merchants all the privileges granted to the English. In fact, the original article of the Dutch *ahidnâme* referred also to the privileges of the French,<sup>95</sup> which suggests that the Dutch enjoyed the

<sup>91</sup> RGP 34, 330, 3.12.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> "Ankara ve Beypazarı nâiblerine hüküm ki; Âsitâne-i Sa'âdetimde mukîm Netherlande elçisi arz-ı hâl gönderip Netherlande tüccarı memâlik-i mahrûseme getürdükleri ve alıp götürdükleri meta'larından yüzde üç akçe gümrüklerin virüp ziyâde taleb olunmaya ve reft ve bâc alınmaya deyu ahidnâme-i hümayûnda mastûr ve mukayyed iken taht-ı kazânızda Netherlande tüccârından tamga emîni olanlar ahidnâmenizde reft ve bâc yazılıp bâc-ı ihrâc yazılmamakla yük başına dörder gürüş resm-i bâc-ı ihrâciyye alınız deyû rencide idüp mürâfa'a-i şer'-i tarik (?) olduklarında İngiltereliye virilen ahidnâme-i hümayûnda mukayyed olan hususlar Netherlandelüler hakkında dahi icrâ oluna deyu mastûr ve mukayyed bulunmağla Ahidnâme-i hümayûnum mûcibince resm-i bâc ve ihrâc men' ve def' olunmak için bundan akdem cânib-i şer'den hüccet-i şer'iyye verilmişken hâlen ol hüccet-i şer'iyyeye muğâyır rencide ve remîdeden hâli olmadıkların bildirip men' ve def' olunmak bâbında hüküm-i hümayûnum recâ etmeğin Ahidnâme-i hümayûn mûcibince amel olunmak için yazılmıştır." BOA ED 22/1, 24/73, evâhir-i Safer 1097/16–25.01.1686.

<sup>94</sup> RGP 34, 279, 4.02.1699, Dutch consul and nation in Izmir to Jacobus Colyer.

<sup>95</sup> The article stated: "Françe ve İngiltereliye verilen ahidnâme-i hümayûnda mastûr ve mukayyed olan hususlar Netherlandelü hakkında dahi mukarrer olup onlara verilen ahidnâme-i hümayûn mûcibince eğer meta' vesâiridir amel oluna" BOA ED 22/1, 10/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680. De Groot gives the translation of the same article in the capitulation of 1612 as "The points written and registered in the capitulation granted to the French and the English are also established in favour of the Dutch. As to the merchandise and other things..." De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 256.



status of most-favored nation<sup>96</sup> in their capitulations, and that the Dutch exemption from the tax was based on this status, not on an explicit article in their capitulations.

De Hochepiéd argued that such a Dutch concession with regard to the *çıkâr bâcı* would eliminate the provocation to the local merchants. More importantly, as long as the European merchants remained liable to the tax, the *damga emîni* in Ankara would favor the European merchants instead of the locals. With the support of the *damga emîni* it would be much easier to avoid local merchants' plots against the Europeans.<sup>97</sup>

After this letter, the correspondence of the Dutch authorities and diplomats becomes silent on the issue. Probably the Dutch authorities saw little prospect for redressing the situation and preferred to wait for a more favorable conjecture to that end. Meanwhile, the Dutch ships departing from Izmir continued to export mohair yarn, as the product was indispensable for the Dutch textile industry.<sup>98</sup> However, European merchants no longer interfered with the trade of the product from Ankara to Izmir. The local merchants who tried to re-establish their control over this part of the trade succeeded, at least temporarily.

The allegations of the Dutch merchants and authorities about the role of local non-Muslim merchants in the crisis of 1708 were not ungrounded. An entry in the local court registers reveals that the whole campaign against the European presence was organized by a group of local and visiting merchants, comprising predominantly Armenians.<sup>99</sup> It appears that these merchants had collected money among themselves to finance the travels of the messengers and other expenses of the campaign to expel

<sup>96</sup> Basing ourselves upon its implementation we can assume that this clause provided the Dutch the status of most favored nation. See İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât."

<sup>97</sup> RGP 34, 330, 3.12.1708, D. J. de Hochepiéd to the SG.

<sup>98</sup> In 1710 the Dutch ship *De Elisabeth* ran ashore while coming into harbor in Zeeland with cargo of mainly Turkish yarn and, to a lesser extent, dimitis. GA 5075, 4219/790, 15.04.1710, loading inventory.

<sup>99</sup> According to the entry, some of the mohair merchants who contributed to the financing of the campaign against the European merchants in Ankara were Veli ibne'l-hac Mehmed, Uzun Agob veled-i Minas, Artun veled-i Narsis (...) veled-i Todori, Yosofaki veled-i Benlü, Avriîlâki veled-i (...) İvaz veled-i Artam, Manol veled-i Minaki, Kayser veled-i Anastas, Yakomi veled-i (...), Hacadur veled-i Uğurlu (...) veled-i Carabeth, Serkiz veled-i Abraham (...) veled-i Andonaki, Kel Yasef veled-i Bali, Mirat veled-i Anastas, Aydın veled-i (...) oğlu Artun, Rebi-oğlu, Minas veled-i (...), Köle Aydın, Serkiz veled-i Agob, Lazaros veled-i Yorgi, Küçük Minas (...) Serkiz veled-i Sefer, Minas veled-i Eteğiuzun, Hacadur veled-i Bahadır, Konstantin veled-i Mikail, Acem Markos, Acem Serkiz, Dimitri veled-i Pavlos, Acem Kel Naturavid veled-i Akoğlan (...) Yahudi, Şişeci Yahudi. AŞS, 88/77, 20 Safer 1125/17.03.1713. I am indebted to Mehmet Genç for providing me with this document.

the European merchants from Ankara. However, we must remember that a similar campaign had failed in 1706 because the Porte did not approve the demands of the locals. Therefore, the expulsion of the Europeans from Ankara should not be attributed exclusively to the efforts of the local merchants but rather to the strength of the strategy they adopted and the coalition they created. The fiscal losses of the stamp tax farm seem to have been an important factor in the formation of the coalition that effected the expulsion of the European merchants in 1708. It is not difficult to understand the opposition of local merchants toward the growing European presence in Ankara and Europeans' increasing share in the mohair trade, since it posed a competitive threat to the local merchants' livelihood. The fact that the Europeans were exempted from the *çikar bâcı* must have added to the frustration of the local merchants, as this exemption provided an advantage to their competitors. The *damgacı*'s support for the cause was fiscally-linked and related to this exemption: The increasing share of European merchants in mohair trade must have had a negative impact on the revenues of the stamp tax because of their exemption from the *çikar bâcı*. This fiscal loss seems to have proved an effective argument to win the support of the Porte, while the stagnation of trade due to the war provided a viable context for mobilizing mass support for the cause.

It might seem as if the coalition formed in 1708 in Ankara was somewhat tenuous, destined to dissolution as soon as conditions changed. However, we should not overlook the fact that when the European merchants moved to the inland towns of the Ottoman Empire they posed serious threats to the economic, social, and especially the fiscal system of the Ottoman Empire while at the same time threatening the livelihood of local merchants who controlled the trade between these inland towns and port cities. Thus, there was also a structural aspect to the coalition: they sought to conflate the fiscal considerations of Ottoman authorities with those of the local merchants who sought to maintain their trade.

The developments in Ankara at the beginning of the eighteenth century have also shown that the penetration of European merchants into Ottoman inland towns was a development that the Ottoman social, economic, and fiscal system did not accommodate easily. This development was in contradiction to the "commanded nature" of the Ottoman economy and the inner logic of the Ottoman economic, social, and fiscal system. Moreover, the same development went against the division of labor between the local merchants and European merchants, a notion on which the capitulation system seems to have been based. While it is true that the Europeans had legalized their presence in Ankara with additional clauses

to their capitulations or by means of special imperial orders, the tension between, first, the Ottoman system that enabled a division of labor between local and European merchants, and second, the penetration of European merchants into the Ottoman hinterland, always had the potential to result in the type of crises discussed in this chapter.

## CHAPTER THREE

### EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND OTTOMAN OPPOSITION

The ultimate defeat and expulsion of the European community of Ankara did not mean that the Europeans abandoned their ambitions to resettle in the city. In July 1710, two years after the definitive order of the Porte, the Dutch and the English ambassadors in Istanbul brought the issue to the attention of the new grand vizier.<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that neither the Dutch ambassador nor the Dutch consul in Izmir thought there was much chance the audience would yield favorable results. According to the consul, despite all the European ambassadors' efforts at the Porte, there was little hope for the return of Dutch merchants to Ankara. This was primarily because of the influence of exiled members of the *ilmiye* class and other prominent figures in Ankara with direct interests in the mohair trade. Whenever the Porte considered the return of the Europeans to Ankara, these personages would stir up the residents to make it clear that European merchants were not welcome there. The consul also felt that the grand vizier would be obliged to side with the majority because he was a religious Muslim.<sup>2</sup>

However, to the surprise of even the Dutch ambassador, during the audience the new grand vizier readily approved the demands of the Dutch and English ambassadors and issued new orders to Sâlim Paşa, the governor of Ankara, and to the *nâibs* of Ankara and Beypazarı, and the *voyvoda* of Beypazarı.<sup>3</sup> The order explained that the Dutch merchants were originally expelled from Ankara by orders of the imperial divan and the finance department (*mâlîye*), due to the complaints about their bad behavior and the damages they caused the locals. The order explained that the Dutch ambassador at the Porte had recently submitted a petition asking to redress the situation and allow the Dutch merchants to travel to Ankara and trade in accordance with their *ahidnâme* and traditional practices. The order, which was approved by the Porte, clarified that the merchants in question were not authorized to rent or buy real estate or

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<sup>1</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 09.08.1710, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>2</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 16.08.1710, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>3</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 192/715, evâsıt-ı C.Âhır 1122/06–16.08.1710.

settle anywhere in or outside Ankara, except at the khans in the town. The Porte stated that now the Dutch merchants were allowed to trade in Ankara under these conditions and that no one should interfere with their business. If these merchants did not behave in accordance with their capitulations, the authorities were supposed to report their offenses to the Porte.

The fact that the new grand vizier readily withdrew an order issued only two years earlier reveals that there was not a long-term "Ottoman policy" concerning the European presence in Ottoman inland towns in general and their presence in Ankara in particular. The Porte remained indifferent to the question of the European merchants' presence until one of the parties approached it with petitions, at which point the Porte made its decision according to the prevailing conditions. Thus the replacement of a grand vizier created unexpected opportunities for those who wanted to alter an earlier decision of the Porte. One may consider the Porte's move as an attempt to gain the favor, or at least the neutrality of western powers prior to the war with Russia (1711).<sup>4</sup>

The tone of the letter Colyer wrote to the DLH on 20 August 1710 reveals that he did not expect such an easy accomplishment.<sup>5</sup> He related that he and the English ambassador had been lucky to obtain the relevant orders before the grand vizier was removed from his office.<sup>6</sup> It appears that they obtained these orders by giving valuable "presents" to the *re'is efendi* and other civil servants at the chancery, despite the fact that the *gümruk emîni*, instigated by some Jews and Greeks, offered LD 10,000 to the *sadâret kethüdâsı* to block the decision.

The consul in Izmir soon received the news but still expressed his anxiety about the response of the locals, who might oppose the order at any time.<sup>7</sup> His anxiety proved to be ill-grounded, at least initially. Once the Europeans obtained the reversal, they gradually re-established themselves in Ankara. Although the number of Dutch trading houses did not increase to the pre-1708 level and the Dutch houses' importance remained limited, the new community succeeded in gradually eroding the limitations exerted on their presence in the town by the imperial order of 1710.

<sup>4</sup> I am indebted to Murat Çizakça for this latter approach.

<sup>5</sup> NA 1.03.01, 101, 20.08.1710, Jacobus Colyer to the DLH.

<sup>6</sup> Grand Vizier Köprülüzâde Numan Paşa came into office on 16 June 1710 and was removed about two months later, on 18 August 1710. Mustafa Küçük, et al., *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Katalogları Rehberi* (Ankara, 1995), 311.

<sup>7</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 27.08.1710, D. J. de Hochepied to the DLH.

The re-establishment of the Dutch nation in Ankara was a gradual process. At the end of 1710, the Dutch consul in Izmir informed the DLH that the Dutch merchant Abraham Derveau had unexpectedly established an association with an English merchant called Benyamin Jonges, with the intention of settling in Ankara and doing business there.<sup>8</sup> After this first initiative, other Dutch merchants ventured to re-establish themselves in Ankara. The next to do so was probably Daniel van Breen, whom Jan (Giovanni) Deyl joined in 1719.<sup>9</sup>

By 1719, the Dutch merchants who had settled in Ankara had already breached the limitations on their presence in the town as laid out in the imperial order of 1710. An order issued in October 1719 did not attempt to reiterate the previously introduced limitations, but instead condemned the behavior of some officials who had tried to extract *bâc* from Daniel van Breen when he tried to produce wine for himself and his men in the house where he resided.<sup>10</sup> The order alleged that this merchant had been living in the town for several years and no one interfered before when he produced wine at his house. A comparable order was issued in the same month, condemning the molestation of English merchants who wanted to rent houses from the *askerîs*.<sup>11</sup> There is no doubt that these later orders contradicted the order of 1710, which stipulated that the European merchants not reside in or outside the town, only in the khans. It is clear that disregard for the limitation on lodging was rampant, and it was only a matter of time before the other limitations lost effect. For instance, in 1739 the Dutch merchant Jan Deyl even appears to have owned a mill outside Ankara. Likewise, his countrymen Daniel and Justinus van Breen owned a vineyard and houses in the area, one of which they rented to their business partner Abraham de la Fontaine.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 18.12.1710, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>9</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:285. Deyl departed from Izmir with a group of people that included Herman van der Horst, the pastor of the Dutch Protestant community of Izmir; Oushoorn; Daniel Alexander Baron de Hochepped, the son of the Dutch consul in Izmir, who later became consul (1724–59); Bernard Mould, chaplain of the English community; and an English merchant named Smith. The group was planning to travel as far as Ankara but gave up their plans because of several inconveniences. See Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:285–293.

<sup>10</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 220/873, evâhir-i Z.Kâde 1131/04–14.10.1719. It is clear that not all European merchants had moved from khans to houses. An entry in the Ankara court records reveal that on 4 July 1719, one of Ankara's European residents lived in Hacı Abdülkerim Efendi Hanı. AŞS, 94/266, 16 Şaban 1131/04.07.1719.

<sup>11</sup> AŞS, 95 291/188; Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları*, 146.

<sup>12</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1168, 9.5.1739, Justinus van Breen to Romboutus; cf. Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:306–307.

Another indication of the growth and eventual decline of the Dutch presence in Ankara is the *berats* issued by the Porte for the dragomans they employed in the town. At the end of 1720, the Dutch transferred the *berat* of the Dutch dragoman in the town to another person. The relevant entry reveals that Karaman Veledi Ohannes had held the *berat* from 1704 (Evâli Muharrem 1116/6–16 May 1704) to 1720 but was no longer capable of fulfilling his duties. Giovanni Batista Glavani replaced him in the same capacity.<sup>13</sup> The *berat* of Glavani was renewed in 1734 on the occasion of the accession of the new sultan to the throne.<sup>14</sup> After his death, Glavani was succeeded by a certain “Pavlo Bayalu” who received his *berat* on 31 March 1737.<sup>15</sup> This last Dutch dragoman in Ankara died in 1749, at which point the *berat* was transformed to the Peloponnesus and granted to the dragoman of the Dutch consul in Patras.<sup>16</sup> The fact that the Dutch sources do not mention any dragomans in Ankara suggests that these were “honorary” dragomans who obtained their *berats* and Dutch protection by bribing the Dutch ambassadors at the Porte. Nevertheless, the fact that in 1749 the *berat* reserved for the dragoman in Ankara was transformed to the Peloponnesus can still be considered an indication of a decreasing Dutch presence or interest in the town during this period.

It is clear that in the period after the reversal of the imperial orders more Dutch merchants moved to Ankara or frequented the city. One indication of this traffic is the record of the number of passports obtained by Dutch merchants who went there. In 1721 Jan Deyl obtained a passport from the Porte to travel from Izmir to Ankara with two of his *müste'men* clerks.<sup>17</sup> In 1735, two more passports seem to have been obtained by Dutch merchants who traveled to the town. One was granted again to Jan Deyl, who wanted to travel from Ankara to Istanbul and back.<sup>18</sup> The second passport was accorded to Daniel van Breen and Abraham de la Fontaine,<sup>19</sup> who

<sup>13</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 225/891, selh-i Muharrem 1133/01.12.1720.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.; BOA ED 22/1, 268/1083, 20 Muharrem 1147/22.06.1734; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 210.

<sup>15</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 268/1083; BOA ED 22/1, 275/1131, 29 Z.Kade 1149/31.03.1737.

<sup>16</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 275/1131, 29 Ramazan 1159/15.10.1749.

<sup>17</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 226/896, evâsıt-ı Receb 1133/07–17.05.1721.

<sup>18</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 274/1115, evâsıt-ı C.Âhir 1148/28.10–07.11.1735; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 210: quoting Glavani as Galadani (sic.).

<sup>19</sup> On the families Van Breen and de la Fontaine in general and Daniel van Breen and Abraham de la Fontaine in particular, see Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:306–307. Schmidt informs us that the Izmir merchant Jean Derveau acted as the mentor of Justinus van Breen, who was a nephew of Daniel van Breen and was with his uncle in Ankara. It is interesting to observe that the first European merchant who settled in Ankara in 1710 was

were business partners. According to their passport, they were planning to travel from Ankara, where they resided, to Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo, and then return to Ankara.<sup>20</sup> Another passport was quite interesting since it was accorded in 1737 to Theodore Glavani, probably the son of Giovanni Batista Glavani who held the *berat* reserved for the Dutch dragoman in Ankara. Theodore Glavani was described as a *berat* holder at the entourage (*adamı*) of the Dutch consul in Izmir. Although the other passports clearly indicated the destination of the intended journey, the passport obtained by Glavani was quite superficial and vague in this respect. It explained that Glavani was to travel to Istanbul to arrange some business of the consul and that he also traveled sometimes to Ankara and Izmir to collect consular dues. Since we do not have any evidence that the Dutch consular authorities collected any consular dues in Ankara we may assume that this was merely an excuse to obtain the passport from the Porte.<sup>21</sup> Thanks to Jan Schmidt's meticulous study of the records of De la Fontaine & Van Breen, the Dutch firm in Ankara, we know that Theodore was in fact a clerk for this firm, along with Jean Slaars and Domenico Moroni.<sup>22</sup>

If not as frequently as before, the Dutch merchants in Ankara continued to experience certain difficulties in their relations with local authorities and merchants. It must have been such difficulties that prompted an imperial order in 1727 addressed to the *nâib* of Ankara. The order condemned the molestation of Jan Deyl and Daniel van Breen, who were residing in the town quietly and inoffensively.<sup>23</sup> Three years later, another order was addressed to the *nâib* and the *mütesellim* of Ankara, again condemning the behavior of a resident who had been causing problems for Daniel van Breen.<sup>24</sup> It appears that Van Breen had bought a house from an inhabitant of Ankara and that this transaction resulted in a commercial dispute between the two. The order again did not mention the imperial

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from the Derveau family (Abraham Derveau), and that the members of the van Breen family went afterward.

<sup>20</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 275/1126, evâhir-i Receb 1148/06–16.12.1735; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 210. Bosscha-Erdbrink does not mention Abraham de la Fontaine, although he was also mentioned in the passport.

<sup>21</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 280/1160, evâil-i C.Evvel 1150/27.08–05.09.1737. The original of the passport is to be found at NA 1.02.20, 370.

<sup>22</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:308.

<sup>23</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 241/962, evâil-i Safer 1140/18–28.09.1727.

<sup>24</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 246/986, evâhir-i Safer 1143/2–12.09.1730.



prohibition against European real estate ownership, though it condemned the behavior of the troublesome inhabitant.<sup>25</sup>

The available evidence gives the impression that in this period the disputes between locals and Europeans resulted mainly from the “expansionist tendency” that characterized the activities of the European merchants. By “expansionist tendency” I mean a general tendency to expand on the privileges they enjoyed in Ankara. Unfortunately, the greatest part of the petitions submitted by European ambassadors to the Porte is not available to the historians, while the imperial orders issued upon receipt of these petitions are available.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, it is almost impossible to trace the demands of the ambassadors that were rejected by the Porte, though we are informed about approved petitions through imperial orders and the letters written by the ambassadors to home authorities. It would seem that the ambassadors were unwilling to inform the home authorities about failed petitions, though they were happy to inform them about their successes. This bias of the material might give the impression that all the demands of the European ambassadors at the Porte were universally approved by the Ottoman government. However, both fragmentary information from Ottoman archives and the records of the embassies reveal that this was not the case. It is against this background that we should consider a petition submitted to the Porte accusing the *voyvoda* of Beypazarı of extracting excessive and unjust sums from Dutch and French merchants when they wanted to export mohair yarn, belts, raincoats, and white mohair from the town.<sup>27</sup> Since the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri* does not include a relevant order, we may assume that the Porte deemed the demands of the Dutch merchants unworthy of support.

<sup>25</sup> Van Breen was certainly not the only European who purchased real estate in the town after the issuing of the imperial order. See Akyüz, “Ankara’nın Bütüncül Tarihi Çerçevesinde XVII.,” 38.

<sup>26</sup> The available correspondence between the Porte and the embassies comprises 19,003 documents and is kept under the code A.DVN.DVE in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (Yusuf İhsan Genç, et al., *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* (Ankara, 1992), 306–307). Of these documents, 368 are the remaining correspondence between the Dutch embassy and the Porte between 1104 and 1252 (1692–93 and 1836–37). These documents are kept in folders 138–144; an excellent catalogue has been prepared by graduates of the Department of Archival Studies at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Marmara University. Ali Karakuş, Yusuf Elçi, M. Ferit Akkuş, “Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Bâb-ı Asafî Divân-ı Hümayun Düvel-i Ecnebiye Kalemî Hollanda Evrâkı Kataloğu,” MA thesis (Marmara Üniversitesi, 1996).

<sup>27</sup> BOA Cİ 1786, 1141/1728–1729.

About five years later, the Porte did issue an order to the qadi of the region around Beypazarı, but this was related to a conflict between the Dutch merchants in Izmir and the *nâib* of the town.<sup>28</sup> The order reveals that a certain Hacı Abdülkerim, a resident of Beypazarı, had been purchasing mohair yarn in the town on behalf of Dutch merchants in Izmir. It appears that, just before he died, Hacı Abdülkerim had purchased nine loads of yarn for his Dutch correspondents in Izmir and paid the export dues in accordance with regulations concerning the *müste'mens*. Afterward, the yarn was entrusted to the camel drivers who were to transport the yarn to Izmir. However, because Hacı Abdülkerim died before the yarn left town, the *nâib* took the yarn into custody for three months and did not release it until the Dutch merchants paid an additional 95 piasters. The ambassador demanded the reimbursement of the latter amount to their dragoman in the region. It is noteworthy that the Porte did not order the reimbursement of the money, but rather ordered the qadi to reconsider the case.

Despite the increasing Dutch presence and the considerable efforts of the Dutch merchants, consuls, and ambassadors to reassume their earlier position in the mohair trade, they did not gain much ground in this respect. On 10 January 1721, De Hochepped wrote an extensive letter to the States General to share his reflections on the state of Dutch-Levant trade at the time. De Hochepped wrote that although everyone had hoped that Dutch-Levant trade would recover after the cessation of hostilities related to the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), this expectation had not come to fruition, years after the Utrecht treaty (1713) ended the hostilities between France, Spain, England, and the Dutch Republic. He attributed the recession of the Dutch trade to the increasing French competition stimulated by the voracious appetite of Provence's and especially Marseilles' merchants for Ottoman products, and by the success of Lanquedoc's textiles, which enjoyed the advantage of being less expensive and more suitable for Turkish tastes than the English and Dutch textiles. De Hochepped describes how French merchants zealously took up the mohair yarn trade, which had previously been considered the main (branch of) trade (*hooftnegotie*) of the Dutch.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 268/1087, evâil-i R.Âhir 1147/31.08–09.09.1734; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 210. Bosscha-Erdbrink erroneously notes that the merchants in Izmir laid a claim on Hacı Abdülkerim, when in fact the petition was against the *nâib*.

<sup>29</sup> RGP 34, 373–374.

Nevertheless, a considerable amount of mohair products continued to be sent from Izmir to Amsterdam. The cargo list of the ship *Anna Elizabeth*, which departed from Izmir to Amsterdam on 10 September 1734, reveals that mohair yarn constituted an important part (421 bales) of its cargo, secondary only to cotton (535 bales).<sup>30</sup> A letter from Rolland & Ploegstert, a Dutch firm in Izmir, to Daniel van Eys, a textile manufacturer and trader in Leiden, informs us that another ship on the same route carried another 60 bales of mohair yarn.<sup>31</sup> In fact, the correspondence between the two parties reveals that, especially in 1735 and 1736, the Dutch market was saturated with the product and that merchants were even unable to sell all the mohair yarn in hand.<sup>32</sup>

During this period, the growing Dutch community in Ankara carried out their business either in association with other merchants or independently. Jan Deyl, for example, seems to have acted independently, while the other merchants formed various business partnerships. One of these firms was the one established, probably during the 1720s, by Abraham de la Fontaine with Daniel van Breen and his nephew Justinus van Breen. The firm De la Fontaine & Van Breen appears to have dealt almost exclusively in mohair products and employed, along with the aforementioned clerks, a certain Armenian, Agop Surunoğlu, as their broker and cashier (*sarraf*). The deteriorating relations between Daniel van Breen and Abraham de la Fontaine and, more importantly, the death of the former in 1737 led to the establishment of a new partnership between Abraham de la Fontaine, Justinus van Breen, and Pieter Leytstar.<sup>33</sup> According to their agreement, the new firm was to be directed by Abraham, who was said to be incompetent and incapable in matters of business because of his misconduct, excessive drinking, and extravagance.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, some time after the new firm was established, the Dutch ambassador received a number of complaints about the situation of the firm. These complaints forced the Dutch ambassador to dispatch two commissioners to Ankara to arrange matters and liquidate the firm of De la Fontaine & Van Breen.

<sup>30</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, cargo list of the ship *Anna Elizabeth*. Captain Jan Vaick departed from Izmir to Amsterdam on 10 September 1734.

<sup>31</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, 02.03.1736, Rolland & Ploegstert to Daniel van Eys.

<sup>32</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 14, 27.09.1735, 14.11.1735, 09.12.1735, Daniel van Eys to Rolland & Ploegstert; GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, 01.03.1736, 02.03.1736, Rolland & Ploegstert to Daniel van Eys.

<sup>33</sup> For more details on the firm and its administration see Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:307–309.

<sup>34</sup> Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 137.

The commissioners, Romuldus Rombouts and Frederik Willem van Frijbergen, arrived in Ankara on 13 March 1738; after examining the books they advised Justinus van Breen to leave the firm. In November 1738, Justinus left the partnership and set up his own business.<sup>35</sup>

Soon after Van Breen left the partnership in June 1739, the firm Leytstar & De la Fontaine went bankrupt.<sup>36</sup> As its creditors heard the news, they poured into the office of the firm, where some of them—such as Mermeroğlu Ali Ağa and Emin Efendi—wanted immediate recompense. Unable to meet his obligations, Leytstar fled. Serkis Pemergioğlu, who had been acting as a broker for the firm, was beaten and wounded when he tried to prevent Leytstar's escape, telling Leytstar that his fleeing would ruin him and Agop Ayvoğlu, the firm's other broker. Leytstar was captured and imprisoned, along with De la Fontaine. Later interrogations at the embassy revealed some rumors about Leytstar's offenses during his stay in Ankara. If we are to believe the three Armenian brokers of the firm (Serkis Pemergioğlu, Agop Ayvoğlu, and Agop Surunoğlu) and Abraham de la Fontaine, Leytstar had slept with a "Turkish" woman, fathered a child, and escaped trial by presenting a watch to Müderriszâde's *kahyâ*. They also reported that Leytstar had beaten a servant of the *haraççı* (poll tax collector) who entered his house, and had once beaten up a janissary, who then died of his wounds.<sup>37</sup>

Under the threat of a heavy *avania*, Cornelis Calkoen intervened to arrange a settlement. He arranged an order from the Porte to move De la Fontaine, Leytstar, and their brokers to Istanbul. The group left Ankara on 23 July and was imprisoned in the bagnio on arriving in Istanbul. Meanwhile, the ambassador organized a meeting for 17 October with representatives of the Dutch communities of Izmir and Salonica and with representatives of the English and French merchants resident in Pera. The gathered representatives appointed an impartial committee to handle the scandalous affairs and made an advance payment of 5 percent of the claims. The sum they needed for the payment was provided by a general

<sup>35</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:311–312. For the mercantile activities of Justinus van Breen and his correspondents, see Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:312.

<sup>36</sup> Cornelis Calkoen, Dutch ambassador at the Porte, informed home authorities on the situation in his letter on 15 September. NA 1.01.03, 3459 (microfilm 4240), 05.09.1739, resolution of the SG.

<sup>37</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1156, 25.09.1739, vergaderinge gehouden in t' Hof van zyn Excellentie tot Belgrado op Vrydag den 25e September 1739. The witnesses did not confirm that Leytstar had fathered a child, only that he had slept with a woman. Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:313–314.

collection among the Dutch merchants and by use of one percent of the Dutch consular duties collected in Izmir and Istanbul.<sup>38</sup>

These immediate precautions helped to prevent an *avania* while the accounts of the firm were examined. The examination revealed that the firm owed LD 39,000. Of this sum, LD 13,000 was due for differences in payment for certain quantities of mohair yarn, while approximately LD 17,000 had been squandered on the plaintiffs' extravagant lifestyle.<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile, the Porte was informed about the investigation and the proceedings by Başkâtib Abdülbâkî Efendi.<sup>40</sup> As the prospects for a settlement grew, De la Fontaine and Leytstar, still kept at Baba Cafer bagnio, pleaded to the sultan for their release.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, in March 1740, a settlement was reached when the Dutch ambassador succeeded in obtaining the Porte's consent for a payment of 15 percent to the creditors. Colyer's letters reveal that the ambassador should be grateful to the *re'isü'l-küttâb*, Mehmed Ragıp Efendi, and to the Porte's dragoman Alexander Ghika, whose cooperation proved crucial in convincing the creditors to accept the payment. It appears that the Porte threatened the creditors that if they did not agree to the settlement, the Porte would grant a declaration of insolvency (*müflis fermânı*)<sup>42</sup> to the bankrupt merchants, with the consequence that the creditors could not claim anything. Nevertheless, the ambassador thought it would take some time before all the creditors submitted their papers and receive their money.<sup>43</sup>

Quite interestingly, between 17 and 26 April 1740, the Porte issued an imperial command to the *nâib* of Ankara. The Porte ordered the *nâib* to act in accordance with the *i'lâm* of the *nâib* of Galata, who said that Leytstar and De la Fontaine had transferred their house and belongings in Ankara, along with their belongings kept at the embassy, to a certain

<sup>38</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:314; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 187–188.

<sup>39</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:313–314; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 187–189.

<sup>40</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1092/20, 21 Receb 1152/24.10.1739.

<sup>41</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1092/53, undated petition of De la Fontaine and Leytstar.

<sup>42</sup> See Ignatius Mouradgêa d'Ohsson, *Tableau general de l'empire othoman: divisé en deux parties don't l'une comprend la legislation mahométane, l'autre l'histoire de l'empire othoman* (Paris, 1788–1820), 3:178; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 189n110. I am indebted to Arif Bilgin, who shared with me his observations from the *şer'yye sicilleri* and informed me that if the authorities were convinced that a bankrupt person did not have any possessions to pay his debts he was declared insolvent and then released.

<sup>43</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6974, 28.03.1740, Cornelis Calkoen to the SG; *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 189.

Dutch merchant (his name is spelled Kaşen) to whom they owed 2,000 piasters. Paulo Pepano was mentioned as the proxy of “Kaşen,” who was to take care of the house and relevant belongings in Ankara.<sup>44</sup> This transaction must have been carried out to facilitate the liquidation of these goods rather than to actually transfer the belongings to “Kaşen,” since other creditors would not have permitted such a transfer while they had to be content with a payment of 15 percent. Paulo Pepano auctioned the belongings in Ankara for LD 1,677.13 on 6 July 1740.<sup>45</sup>

A number of *i'lâms* obtained from the qadi of Galata after the settlement was reached reveal that the creditors indeed did submit their papers and receive their payments.<sup>46</sup> For instance, on 7 June 1740, Uzunoğlu Asvadır, a proxy of İstanozlu Aretun from Ankara, received 340.50 piasters for a 2,770 piaster debt; on 24 June, Carabeth Veledi Agop, acting on behalf of another merchant from Ankara, received 150 piasters for 1,000 piasters due; another proxy acting on behalf of a merchant from Kayseri followed suit on 15 February 1741 and obtained 172 piasters for his 1,150 piasters. The available sources also mention Elhâc Yusuf (1,700 piasters) and a non-Muslim Sultâna (2,000 piasters) among the creditors.<sup>47</sup>

The bankruptcy of the firm Leytstar & De la Fontaine, and subsequent developments reveal that the European merchants in the Ottoman Empire operated more or less within a juridical context. However, it is apparent that the interpersonal relations of the parties engaged in disputes played a crucial role in determining the Ottoman local and central administration's attitude toward a case. The fact that a number of Europeans ventured to move to Ankara and settled their families in the town reveals that these merchants trusted the juridical system and were fairly confident about their own local interpersonal networks as well as those of their respective ambassadors at the Porte. The fact that the Dutch capitulations did not provide a viable base for the Dutch presence in Ankara appears not to

<sup>44</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 285/1199, evâhir-i Muharrem 1153/17–26.04.1740.

<sup>45</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:315.

<sup>46</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1092/11, 14, 19, 30, 35. While the Dutch embassy was successfully arranging the bankruptcy of the firm, Europeans in Ankara were engaged in a quarrel with the workers (*işçi tâifesi*) who packed mohair yarn bales to be carried from Ankara to İzmir. For a full treatment of this incident, see İsmail Hakkı Kadı, “A Silence of the Guilds? Some Characteristics of İzmir's Craftsmen Organizations in the 18th and early 19th Century,” In *Ottoman İzmir: Studies in Honour of Alexander H. de Groot*, ed. Maurits van den Boogert (Leiden, 2007), 75–102.

<sup>47</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1092/20, 21 Receb 1152/24.10.1739.

have discouraged Dutch merchants from moving there, probably because of these factors.

Nevertheless, the bankruptcy of the firm Leytstar & De la Fontaine must have discouraged other Dutch merchants from settling and starting business there. During the immediate aftermath of the bankruptcy, Jan Deyl seems to be the only Dutch merchant who remained in Ankara. Deyl was originally from Leiden,<sup>48</sup> but had moved to Ankara as early as 1721 and obtained passports from the Porte on different occasions. Although it is noted that he owned a mill outside Ankara, it is highly probable that Deyl was mainly engaged in money lending, rather than in trade. He also administered the estate of the deceased Daniel van Breen, in which capacity he paid 400 piasters to Justinus van Breen, and to the wife and children of the deceased.<sup>49</sup> Another trace of his activities as a moneylender is to be found in the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri*. An imperial order addressed to the *nâib* of Ankara explains that the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul informed the Porte that Deyl had been molested by certain individuals to whom he had lent the money of some orphans. It appears that the borrowers did pay back the money, with interest, to Deyl. But afterward they tried to extract the money again by suing Deyl in the local court. The Dutch ambassador argued, and the Porte approved that the case be heard at the imperial divan in accordance with the capitulations granted to the Dutch.<sup>50</sup> Probably, this step was prompted by the fact that moneylending for interest was theoretically prohibited, though widely practiced, in the Ottoman Empire. The debtors in Ankara seem to have seized the opportunity to use this contradiction to their own benefit.

Deyl was known as an unsociable man and was suspected of murdering a female Russian slave. After this incident, he left town in disgrace for a while.<sup>51</sup> The *nâib* and *mütesellim* of Ankara had once attempted to take Deyl's two Russian slaves after the Porte ordered the sequestration of slaves of non-Muslim subjects (*re'ayâ*). But this attempt was hindered by the Porte; upon the petition of the Dutch ambassador, the Porte clarified that the relevant order concerned only the *re'ayâ* and that the question of the Russian slaves of the Dutch *müste'mens* was to be settled between the Dutch and Russian authorities.<sup>52</sup> About one and a half years later, another

<sup>48</sup> NA 1.01.03, 3496/117 (microfilm 4269), 03.02.1749, resolution of the SG.

<sup>49</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:306, 312.

<sup>50</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 280/1162, evâil-i C.Âhir 1150/26.09–5.10.1737.

<sup>51</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:318.

<sup>52</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 288/1218, evâhir-i R.Âhir 1155/24.06–03.07.1742.



imperial order was issued to Ankara commanding the local authorities to send Deyl to Istanbul with the janissary (*yasakçı*) who came to Ankara to accompany Deyl to Istanbul. This order too was issued upon the demand of the Dutch ambassador, who alleged that some locals had been complaining about Deyl. The ambassador argued that his stay in the town was inappropriate and demanded his immediate removal (*pâyımâl irsâl olunmak*) to Istanbul.<sup>53</sup>

This hasty deportation proved disastrous for Deyl. On Deyl's way to Istanbul, Ali Ağa, an ex-*mütesellim* of Ankara and a native of Kalecik, robbed Deyl of virtually all his gold, money, and other belongings.<sup>54</sup> A few months later, Deyl returned to town with a passport and an order from the Porte. The passport explained that Deyl was expelled from Ankara upon the complaints of fellow *müste'mens*, with whom he was not on good terms. Because he was moved hastily he could not arrange his affairs: he owned real estate and collected some rent. Moreover, he also needed to settle affairs with a number of his debtors. In conclusion, the passport clarified that no one should prevent him from arranging his business affairs and then returning to Istanbul.<sup>55</sup> The second document that the Porte granted to Deyl was an order addressed to the local *nâib* commanding him to put Ali Ağa on trial and to settle the issue concerning Deyl's claim about the money which Ali Ağa took from him forcibly.<sup>56</sup>

We do not know whether Deyl ever traveled to Istanbul afterward. What we know is that he died in Ankara about one and a half years later, on 3 January 1746. It took about three years to settle his inheritance. After his death, the inheritance and the miserable state of his children were brought to the attention of the Dutch States General, who ordered (4 November 1746) Des Bordes, the Dutch charge d'affaires at the Porte, to handle the inheritance and take care of the children.<sup>57</sup>

Michael Damiral, a French merchant in Ankara, and Justinus Leytstar were appointed as trustees for the inheritance. By July 1747, the trustees had finished their job and Des Bordes was able to inform the home authorities about some of the details of the inheritance. The inheritance

<sup>53</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 292/1245, evâhir-i Z.Hicce 1156/04–14.02.1744.

<sup>54</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 297/1266, evâil-i C.Evvel 1157/12–22.06.1744. The belongings that were taken from Deyl comprised "yedi yüz fındık altun ve bir yük nükûdın ve bir bârgir yüki mikdarı eşya..."

<sup>55</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 298/1267, evâil-i C.Evvel 1157/12–22.06.1744.

<sup>56</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 297/1266, evâil-i C.Evvel 1157/12–22.06.1744.

<sup>57</sup> NA 1.01.03, 3484/254 (microfilm 4261), 14.03.1747, resolution of the SG; NA 1.03.01, 104, 06.05.1747, Des Bordes to the DLH.



yielded some LD 4,500, and several insolvable debentures worth LD 8,306. The latter amount was owed to the Deyl's estate mainly by dead or bankrupt individuals. The arrangement of the inheritance appears to have been quite difficult because of the intervention of the local *subaşı* and the fact that Deyl did not keep regular account books. Due to these difficulties, Des Bordes was obliged to install a dragoman and a janissary to assist the trustees<sup>58</sup> and to obtain an imperial order from the Porte commanding the local *nâib* to put the debtors who refused to pay their debts on trial.<sup>59</sup>

In his dealings with the Porte, the Dutch ambassador brought the orphans to the forefront as the legitimate inheritors to Deyl. However, it was not the orphans, but Deyl's sister in Leiden who appears to have been the legitimate inheritor, since the children were born out of wedlock. Deyl had fathered these three girls from his slave, who died some time before him. The oldest girl too died of a breast illness soon after her father's death. In January 1748, the remaining two girls were sent from Izmir to Leiden, where they were to be brought up by their paternal aunt, Margaretha Deyl, who was married to Pieter de Wilde.<sup>60</sup>

The death of Deyl did not mean the end of the Dutch presence in Ankara. Justinus Leytstar, the brother of Pieter Leytstar (who went bankrupt in 1739), had already moved to Ankara in 1743. Following in the footsteps of the Leytstars' younger brother, at the end of 1740, the Istanbul firm of Justinus and Jacobus Leytstar also went bankrupt. Afterward, Justinus moved to Izmir, and thereafter to Ankara, together with his wife and his brother, Jacobus Leytstar.<sup>61</sup> Actually, according to the passports obtained from the Porte, Justinus and his four *müste'men* servants went from Istanbul to Ankara during the first half of 1743.<sup>62</sup> His wife Annemarie, two children, five servants, and three female slaves joined him some five months later.<sup>63</sup> The Leytstar family then rented a house belonging to the daughter of the local qadi. The passports issued from the Porte do not mention the

<sup>58</sup> NA 1.03.01, 104, 03.07.1747, Des Bordes to the DLH and 03.07.1747, Des Bordes to the SG.

<sup>59</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 309/1316, evâsıt-ı Şevval 1159/26.09–05.10.1746.

<sup>60</sup> NA 1.01.03, 3496/117 (microfilm 4269), 03.02.1749, resolution of the SG; NA 01.03.01, 138, 16.01.1748, D. A. de Hocchepied to the DLH.

<sup>61</sup> Schmidt, *Jays of Philology*, 2:316.

<sup>62</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 289/1224, evâhir-i Safer 1156/15–25.04.1743.

<sup>63</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 290/1229, evâhir-i Receb 1156/9–19.09.1743. Annemarie was from the De La Fontaine family. See NA 1.03.01, 105, 17.11.1757, D. J. de Hocchepied to the DLH. This familial relationship must be the reason for the extensive business relations between Justinus Leytstar in Ankara and Muysard & De La Fontaine in Izmir. See Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 190n, and Schmidt, *Jays of Philology*, 2:317.

names of the servants who accompanied Justinus and his wife. But his correspondence with his contacts in Istanbul reveals that he was affiliated with Giovanni Battista Caruso, a Dutch protégé originally from Messina, and employed a servant called Yusuf and at least two brokers: a certain Gaspard, and Pedros Chivrikoğlu<sup>64</sup> whom he seemed to trust a great deal. When we consider Leytstar's complaints about the behavior of his business partners, Caruso and Glavani—which Leytstar attributed to the instigations of Giacomo Fremaux in Izmir—we may assume that Leytstar was not on good terms with these individuals.<sup>65</sup> Glavani was probably a former clerk of the firm De la Fontaine & Van Breen, which bestowed another legacy on Justinus in the person of Mr. Moroni, who had served the former firm as a clerk as well. In one of his letters, Leytstar explained that the grandfather and father of this Moroni had been under Dutch protection and that he was ready to pay some sequins if the ambassador would obtain a *berat* for him as well.<sup>66</sup>

As one would expect, Justinus's commercial activities mainly consisted in trade in mohair products, which he provided to his correspondents in Izmir and Istanbul.<sup>67</sup> In addition, Justinus also provided camlets and shawls for the ambassadress.<sup>68</sup> Probably due to his earlier experience as the treasurer of the Dutch community in Istanbul,<sup>69</sup> in 1749 Daniel Alexander de Hochepped, the Dutch consul in Izmir, advised the DLH to appoint Leytstar as the treasurer of the Dutch community in Izmir.<sup>70</sup> Leytstar, however, turned down the proposal as he considered the salary of 1,000 piasters unsatisfactory.<sup>71</sup> This refusal may indicate Leytstar's satisfaction with his commercial activities and prospects in Ankara.

By September 1757, Justinus, his wife Annemarie (de la Fontaine), and their daughter decided to travel to Izmir. However, Annemarie died one month later in Ankara. Consequently, Justinus and his daughter left for Izmir without her,<sup>72</sup> just five days after her death, and arrived in Izmir on 1 November. Although Justinus and his daughter were planning to return

<sup>64</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:316.

<sup>65</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 08.04.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>66</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 26.10.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>67</sup> For his business contacts in Izmir and Istanbul see Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:317.

<sup>68</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 06.03.1750, Leytstar to Rigo and 08.04.1750, Leytstar to Rigo, 20.12.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>69</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 289/1224, evâhir-i Safer 1156/15–25.4.1743.

<sup>70</sup> NA 01.03.01 138, 19.11.1749, D. A. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>71</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 14.08.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>72</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:317.

together to Ankara by the next spring,<sup>73</sup> the girl married David van Lennep and remained in Izmir.<sup>74</sup> The marriage proved crucial for the further business career of Justinus, since Van Lennep was one of the more important Dutch merchants in Izmir, having close business relations with the Amsterdam merchant De Vogel.<sup>75</sup> The marriage appears to have brought new commercial connections, as we have Thomas de Vogel in Amsterdam complaining in the sources about the poor quality of mohair he received from Leytstar in Ankara through David van Lennep & Ensle in Izmir.<sup>76</sup>

In 1760, Justinus Leytstar associated himself with a certain Antonio Guisepppe Santi and continued to correspond with both David van Lennep & Ensle in Izmir<sup>77</sup> and Thomas de Vogel & Zoon in Amsterdam.<sup>78</sup> During the years 1763–65 Leytstar & Santi consigned a considerable amount of mohair yarn and other mohair products to Thomas de Vogel & Zoon via David van Lennep & Ensle. However, the dealings appear to be far from satisfying to the involved parties. Moreover, Leytstar & Santi had meanwhile established connections with Cauw & Co. who probably offered more satisfactory business. Consequently, on 19 July 1765 Thomas de Vogel wrote to David van Lennep & Ensle that he was ready to offer his services to anyone—including Leytstar & Santi—for a two percent commission, if the other party was willing to consign goods on his own

<sup>73</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 17.11.1757, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>74</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6961, 15.02.1758, D. A. de Hochepped to the SG. A family portrait including Justinus, his daughter, David van Lennep, and their children was published in F. J. E. van Lennep, *Late Regenten* (Haarlem, 1962), opposite page 214. For a color photo of the same family portrait see Alexander H. de Groot, *The Netherlands and Turkey: Four Hundred Years of Political, Economical, Social and Cultural Relations (Selected Essays)* (Istanbul, 2007), 99.

<sup>75</sup> Leonard Thomas de Vogel (d. 1794), the junior partner of the Amsterdam firm Thomas de Vogel & Zoon (active between 1756 and 1772) and the sole owner of the firm Leonard Thomas de Vogel, married Catharina van Lennep in 1756 (Cathalogue Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, 332 Archief van de familie De Vogel en aanverwante families). Catharina van Lennep was probably a paternal aunt of David van Lennep, since Leonard Thomas addressed David as “mijn neef.” See GA 332, 35/630.

<sup>76</sup> GA 332, 36/400, 20.10.1758, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep & Ensle. Jan Schimdt mentions that Justinus Leytstar remained in Izmir for three years and returned to Ankara in 1760. Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:317. If this is true, then the Leytstar mentioned by Vogel must be the firm rather than the man.

<sup>77</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:317.

<sup>78</sup> GA 332, 38/181, 06.09.1763, Thomas de Vogel to Leytstar & Santi (Ankara). In this first direct letter to Leytstar & Santi, De Vogel asked whether they preferred to communicate in Dutch or French. Unfortunately, we do not have the letters De Vogel received from correspondents in the Levant, while the letters written by him are still kept in the municipal archives of Amsterdam.

account. This implied that he was no longer interested in joint ventures with Leytstar & Santi.<sup>79</sup>

Leytstar did not remain much longer in Ankara; 1766 found him back in Izmir,<sup>80</sup> while Santi remained in Ankara and continued his own business, at least until 1777. Meanwhile, a number of other Dutch merchants moved to Ankara to explore the prospects of trade in mohair products. Jan Pieter Panchaud did so by establishing a partnership with Series, an Armenian from Diyarbakir who held a dragoman *berat* for the Dutch consulate in Izmir. The partnership remained active in Ankara until at least 1765. Afterward, it moved to Istanbul, where it went bankrupt in 1801.<sup>81</sup> Another partnership concerned a French merchant named Michael Damiral and the Dutch merchant Romuldus Rombouts, who moved to Ankara in October 1757 and died there in May 1759. The last firm that was established in Ankara under Dutch protection was that of Gabriel Chasseaud, Chasseaud & Co., in June 1759.<sup>82</sup>

As we have seen, the Dutch did not capitulate to the locals after they were expelled from Ankara in 1708. However, their presence there remained fragile after that and they were vulnerable to the ongoing stirrings of the locals. Just before the firm Leytstar & De la Fontaine went bankrupt, Justinus van Breen noted that locals had again begun to speak negatively about the European presence in the town. The French, especially, attracted much of the criticism because they excluded the locals from their trade with the Levant.<sup>83</sup> Though the English were pursuing the same policy, they were probably criticized less because their share in the mohair trade was less than that of the French. Nevertheless, when the locals took action they did not differentiate between European countries, but demanded the expulsion of all of them.

By the middle of 1750, the European community in Ankara was thrown into commotion again when they learned that the local Armenians had submitted a petition to the Porte demanding the expulsion of the Franks. The Armenians' petition was followed by another, signed by twelve Jewish

<sup>79</sup> GA 332, 40/4, 19.07.1765, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie.

<sup>80</sup> A number of members of the Leytstar family died in Istanbul and were buried there. See Alexander H. de Groot, "Old Dutch Graves at Istanbul," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 5 (1973), 8.

<sup>81</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:317; Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 211 fn. The name of Series is indicated as Tuhman in some sources and André in others. BOA ED 22/1, 267/1078, evâhir-i Şevval 1146/26.03–04.04.1735.

<sup>82</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:318–319.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

brokers in the town, and addressed to the *şeyhü'l-İslâm*. The *şeyhü'l-İslâm* replied that there was no need for a further *fetvâ* and that the issue had been arranged previously. Nevertheless, as soon as they heard about the initiative, the Europeans in Ankara showered their ambassadors with petitions to forestall another decision to expel them. On 20 July in his letter to Jean Louis Rigo (secretary of the Dutch ambassador in 1733 and 1755), Justinus Leytstar argued that there was no reason for the locals to complain about the European presence and claimed that they were instigated by resentment of the Europeans' trade. He explained that all the European communities in town had written relevant petitions to their ambassadors and that they had decided to collectively fund their lobbying initiatives at the Porte. Justinus also argued that the ambassadors' endeavors would bear fruit since the European presence in the town was also favorable for the *mîrî*, i.e., the treasury.<sup>84</sup>

Despite the alarm in Ankara, the Dutch ambassador considered the issue a temporary scare and did not take any immediate action.<sup>85</sup> The anxiety among the Franks in Ankara continued to grow, however, as they met more and more unfriendly behavior by the locals. Leytstar had such an encounter with a "Turk" who showed him a promissory note indicating the promise of a payment of 1,100 piasters to a Jewish merchant, Isaak Mose Anacava, who had been a creditor of the old bankrupt firm Leytstar & De la Fontaine. Leytstar thought that Anacava was working on behalf of another "Jew" called Topal Aretun, who had been troublesome and notorious for his hatred of Europeans.

The developments in Ankara gained a new dimension when Governor Halil Paşa was replaced by Murtaza Paşa, rumored to be unreasonable. Since the Europeans had been on good terms with Halil Paşa, they feared that the new appointment would have dramatic negative consequences for them, especially because of prevailing tensions.<sup>86</sup> Again, the European communities in the town pleaded that their ambassadors make the issue a common cause and take precautionary steps at the Porte to ensure that their fears did not come true.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. and NA 1.02.20, 367, 20.07.1750, Leytstar to Rigo. The following account of the events during 1750–51 is mainly based on Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:318–319. Some details not mentioned by Schmidt have been taken from the documents indicated in the footnotes.

<sup>85</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 05.10.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>86</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 20.12.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>87</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 23.12.1750, Leytstar to Rigo.

Meanwhile, a new scandal broke out: it was rumored that Richard, one of the French merchants in Ankara, had violated a Greek woman there. Since Richard was not in Ankara at the moment the scandal broke, his office in the town was sealed and his associate, Henry, imprisoned. On 14 January 1751 Leytstar noted that due to his and the English merchant Abbot's friendship with Müderriszâde Efendi, Richard's case did not escalate to the point of prompting the total expulsion of all Europeans.<sup>88</sup> Only one week later (on 20 January), however, he wrote that the case had in fact escalated to that point, and therefore the Europeans agreed to make the issue a general cause.<sup>89</sup> While the dangers of a general *avania* and expulsion grew, Leytstar was asked to leave his house, located in the vicinity of a mosque, which he had rented from the daughter of the local qadi. Nevertheless, as he had already paid 500 piasters for six years' rent and 600 piasters for repairs to the house, the landlords were pleased and the qadi assured him that no action would be taken against him.<sup>90</sup>

The tension in the town increased and on 18 January some hundreds of people gathered in front of the local governor's residence and protested against the Europeans. According to Leytstar, without the help of certain individuals, all the Europeans would have ended up in prison. Of particular importance was the assistance of the two *damgacıs*, Mehmed Ağa and Bekir Ağa; Kasım Efendi, a confidant of the governor; and, again, Müderriszâde Efendi. It appears that the *damgacı* had even written a letter to the French ambassador asking him to procure protective orders from the Porte and dispatch them to Ankara.<sup>91</sup>

A letter written by the French merchants in Ankara to their ambassador confirms the crucial role played by the *damgacıs* and explains that Henry was obliged to pay 1,500 piasters in fines and the French community as a whole had to contribute an additional 1,200 piasters. According to the French nation, however, the tension cooled down, especially after Richard's return from the Porte with firm imperial orders that shocked those agitating against the Franks. As soon as the local qadi received the imperial orders, he released Henry from prison.<sup>92</sup> In the process of smoothing over their difficulties, the European community as a whole accumulated considerable expenses in "presents" given to the governor,

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<sup>88</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 14.01.1751, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>89</sup> NA 1.02.20, 367, 20.01.1751, Leytstar to Rigo.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> NA 1.02.20, 371, 20.01.1751, French nation in Ankara to the French ambassador to the Porte.

the qadi, the *damgacı*, Müderriszâde Efendi, the local mufti, and some of their servants, although it is not clear whether these were separate from the sum mentioned in the letter as paid by the French community. The local Greeks were ultimately obliged to pay a fine of 300 piasters.

The imperial orders mentioned by the French nation must indeed have eased the tensions, as no further disturbances took place for some time. Meanwhile, the Dutch ambassador at the Porte had also arranged for an imperial order for Leytstar and his partner Giovanni Battista Caruso, issued between 6 and 16 February. The imperial order condemned Leytstar and Caruso's molestation by certain people, and clarified that they could not be held responsible and fined for the misbehavior and deeds of the *müste'mens* from other countries.<sup>93</sup>

The tranquility in Ankara did not last. Only a couple of years later, the French Guillaume Damiral, the son of Michael Damiral, was accused of fathering a child with a local woman and escaped to Istanbul on 25 May 1753. This time, the problem was solved quickly, before it could escalate into a general crisis. Such solutions were not inexpensive. Michael Damiral paid about LD 2,000, apart from several "presents" he gave to the *kapıcıbaşı*. According to the settlement, the Franks, including the Dutch merchants, were obliged to abandon their houses and move to the khan. Writing on 27 February 1754, Panchaud explained that a *kapıcıbaşı* had arrived from the Porte, resolved the issue, and gone back. He wrote that the woman had not yet given birth to the child, despite the fact that nine months had already passed after Guillaume's departure. According to Panchaud, this indicated that the whole case was false and the related expenses, to which he had contributed some LD 400, were simply *avania*.<sup>94</sup>

As they had narrowly escaped a crisis, the Dutch merchants remained careful not to make any mistakes that might incite locals against them. Even the Dutch ambassador's request for a goat was turned down by Panchaud, who was warned that the locals would consider it an attempt to transfer mohair production and trade to their home country.<sup>95</sup> They also seem to have respected the obligation to move to the local khan, where they remained together with the French merchants at least until 1757.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 322/1388, evâsıt-ı R.Evvel 1164/10.02.1751.

<sup>94</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:320–321 and NA 1.02.20, 372, 27.02.1754, Jan Peter Panchaud to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>95</sup> NA 1.02.20, 372, 13.03.1754, Panchaud & Series to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>96</sup> NA 1.02.20, 372, 22.05.1754, Panchaud & Series to Elbert de Hochepped.



By the beginning of 1755, Panchaud noted that the situation in the city was again reasonably tranquil.<sup>97</sup> An imperial order issued at the end of that year, however, reveals that Leytstar at least still underwent certain vexations. The order condemned the behavior of a local *zimmi* who had been disturbing Leytstar, claiming that eighteen years before Leytstar had stood surety for the credit owed to him by De la Fontaine. The order clarified that the claim went against the *ahidnâme* since it was not based on official documents but on false witnesses, and also violated the legal code that forbade bringing such claims to the court after fifteen years had passed.<sup>98</sup>

Two years later, it was Panchaud who encountered more serious difficulties. At about 10 o'clock in the morning on 11 November 1757, Panchaud, accompanied by his servant, was returning from visiting a friend when he encountered a large crowd on the street. Lately, due to scarcity and excessive bread and wheat prices, Panchaud had encountered similar crowds waiting in front of bakers to purchase bread. As he thought that this was a crowd waiting for bread, he withdrew and walked behind a wall toward the khan where the European merchants resided. Unfortunately for Panchaud, the crowd turned out to be a congregation gathered in front of a mosque for a funeral prayer. Soon after his arrival, the khan was besieged by an angry mob bearing knives; the crowd wanted to remove him from the khan to kill him on the street. Panchaud was saved with difficulty by his business partner Series, who took responsibility for Panchaud's action and convinced the crowd to settle the issue in court. Following the agreement, Panchaud, his servant, and Series, accompanied by the angry mob, went to the local court. The charge brought against Panchaud was that he had not waited for the end of the prayer before passing by. When Panchaud replied that he did not know that he was required to do so, the crowd became furious. Due to the increasing tension, the qadi decided to subject Panchaud and his servant to a *bastinado* of 150 strikes. Series intervened, arguing that Panchaud was a Frank (*frenk*) and therefore did not know the local language and customs. The qadi was convinced by the argument and exempted Panchaud but ordered the punishment of the servant, who was a local and required to know better. Panchaud was removed to the customs office, as it was considered safer for him there. But Panchaud soon realized that this was not the case: the *damgacı* carried out the *bastinado*

<sup>97</sup> NA 1.02.20, 372, 18.01.1755, Panchaud & Series to Elbert de Hochepeid.

<sup>98</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 337/1465 evâil-i Safer 1169/06–16.11.1755.



and then imprisoned him.<sup>99</sup> He was released five days later, on 16 November, and left the town the following day for Istanbul, where he arrived on 30 November.<sup>100</sup>

Instances of harassment of the Europeans did not end there. Writing on 1 December to the Dutch community in Izmir, the merchants in Ankara complained about the qadi. They surmised that because the qadi could not bring any legal suits against the Franks, he had turned against their local brokers to punish the Europeans through them, as the Europeans could not do any business without the assistance of the brokers. All these brokers were imprisoned (some on 20 November and the rest on 1 December) and threatened with bastinado if they did not pay LD 100 each toward the needs of the town. The Dutch merchants argued that even the richest merchants in Ankara did not pay such amounts and that their brokers were not able to afford it. The European merchants in the town were also not willing to help their brokers with the payment, since this would motivate the local authorities to take recourse more frequently to similar methods to extract money from the Europeans. The Dutch merchants in Ankara reminded the merchants in Izmir that they too had vested interest in the Ankara mohair trade, and asked them to encourage the ambassador to push the issue at the Porte, to ensure that their brokers were freed from such *avantias*. Without orders from the Porte and the punishment of the culprits, their belongings and capital in the town would not be safe any longer.<sup>101</sup>

On the day they wrote the letter to Izmir, the Dutch merchants in Ankara came to realize that none other than Müderriszâde was behind all the troubles. Allegedly, Müderriszâde had been ruling the town according to his caprices, without even consulting the town's governor, mufti, or qadi. More importantly, a certain Karaoğlu Hacı Kevork, "a deadly enemy of the Franks" who was a prominent agent of Müderriszâde, was identified as the main inciter of his boss. This enemy, the Dutch merchants wrote, "suggested [to Müderriszâde] everything he could invent to vex the Franks and to cause them to spend money."<sup>102</sup>

<sup>99</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6961, 03.12.1757, extract from the minutes, 3 December 1757.

<sup>100</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 03/12/1757, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the DLH. For a shorter account of these and the following events see Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:321–322.

<sup>101</sup> RGP 95, 379–380, 01.12.1757, Dutch merchants in Ankara to the consul, treasurer, assessors, and members of the Dutch nation in Izmir (signed by Rumoldus Romboutus, Jacobus Leytstar, Panchaud & Series); NA 1.03.01, 105, 02.12.1757, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul; NA 1.01.03, 6961, 31.12.1757, D. A. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>102</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 02.12.1757, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul.

After the brokers were kept in prison for twelve days, Mùderriszâde realized that he could not extract the money without further measures; he gathered a meeting with his circle. During the meeting, the qadi was forced to summon the brokers to the meeting; they were subjected to *bastinado* and then imprisoned in the citadel. These measures proved effective, as the brokers agreed to pay LD 100 each (LD 2,400 in total) and the *damgacıs* agreed to stay surety for them. The power of Mùderriszâde was such that the local qadi, out of fear, rejected the Dutch merchants' request for an *i'lâm* (report), which Istanbul required of them in order to push the issue at the Porte. The qadi rejected this demand, even rejecting the considerable sum the Dutch merchants offered him, but clarified that he would not grant any similar document to their rivals either. The qadi and Mehmed Ağa, one of the *damgacıs* in Ankara, let the merchants know that they had attempted to stop Mùderriszâde by telling him that his deeds were against the law and violated the orders of the Porte, but could not convince him because of his stubbornness.<sup>103</sup>

As the issue of European merchants appeared again on the top of the local agenda, their "tolerated illegal practices" attracted more attention and were brought, one by one, to the attention of the court. Michael Damiral and Rombouts were summoned to the court, where the qadi fined them LD 500 for living in a house in town. One witness also told the court that at night Damiral and Rombouts lured Turkish and Greek women to the house; the defendants were able to settle this particular issue for LD 100. As tension increased, it was also rumored that the brokers of the European merchants would soon be prohibited from entering Frankish houses and the *bedesten*. On another occasion, a French merchant was beaten up.<sup>104</sup>

In the letter they wrote on 2 December, the Dutch merchants in Ankara asked the support of the Dutch nation in Istanbul to convince the ambassador that the issue was a "national *avania*," so that related expenses could be paid from the treasury of the DLH.<sup>105</sup> They requested similar assistance from the Dutch community of Izmir one day earlier.<sup>106</sup> Before their letter arrived in Izmir, the community there had likely already been informed

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:321–322.

<sup>105</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 02.12.1757, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul.

<sup>106</sup> RGP 95, 379–380, 01.12.1757, Dutch merchants in Ankara to the consul, treasurer, assessors, and members of the Dutch nation in Izmir (signed by Rumoldus Romboutus, Jacobus Leytstar, Panchaud & Series).

about the problem by the Dutch merchants and authorities in Istanbul.<sup>107</sup> The community in Izmir made the decision to assist the Dutch nation in Ankara during their meeting on 3 December<sup>108</sup> and informed the Dutch authorities in Istanbul,<sup>109</sup> who made a similar decision on 19 December and informed the Dutch nation in Ankara accordingly.<sup>110</sup>

Elbert de Hochepped, the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul, also moved to assist the Dutch merchants in Ankara. When he received word of the imprisonment of Panchaud, he submitted a petition to the Porte demanding Panchaud's release. The Porte dispatched the relevant order with an official who was to investigate the issue and report the situation, and include an *i'lâm* from the qadi. The ambassador soon learned that Panchaud had already been released, so asked for the official to delay; on 22 November, he dispatched a janissary instead—deemed a cheaper alternative to an official—to assist the Dutch merchants in Ankara to obtain an *i'lâm*.<sup>111</sup> In fact, as the community in Ankara and the janissary failed to fulfil this mission,<sup>112</sup> it was decided to dispatch the official anyway.<sup>113</sup> The official, Yusuf Çavuş, departed on 16 December bearing several documents, among them an imperial order and letters obtained by the dragomans of the Dutch embassy. These letters, from the *kazasker*, the ex-mufti, and the mufti in charge in Ankara, were addressed to the qadi and Müderrisizâde Efendi.<sup>114</sup> Meanwhile, De Hochepped arranged for four attestations from various merchants who arrived from Ankara, and dispatched these documents to the home authorities to inform them about the developments.<sup>115</sup>

On 28 December, Yusuf Çavuş arrived in Ankara. He delivered the letters addressed to the Dutch merchants and then went directly to the court and read the imperial order out in the presence of a rebellious crowd.

<sup>107</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 22.11.1757, Oudermeulen to the Dutch nation in Izmir.

<sup>108</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6961, 03.12.1757, extract from the minutes.

<sup>109</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 06.12.1757, Dutch nation in Izmir to Oudermeulen.

<sup>110</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 20.12.1757, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the Dutch nation in Ankara.

<sup>111</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6961, 22.11.1757, Oudermeulen to the Dutch nation in Izmir; NA 1.03.01, 105, 03.12.1757, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the DLH.

<sup>112</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 02.12.1757, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul.

<sup>113</sup> RGP 95, 381m1, 12.12.1757, Elbert de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>114</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 16.12.1757, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the Dutch nation in Ankara. These initiatives required a total expense of LD 305 (LD 41 for dispatching a janissary by horse to try to obtain an *i'lâm* from the local qadi, LD 250.1 for dispatching Yusuf Ağa, LD 13.3 for the order obtained for him from the *yeniçeri ağası*) NA 1.03.01, 105, 19.12.1757, Cornelis van der Oudermeulen to the DLH.

<sup>115</sup> NA 1.01.03, 6961, 15.12.1757, D. A. de Hochepped to the SG.

While he was reading the order, the crowd became louder and more disruptive. After the *çavuş* silenced the mob, the arrangement of a settlement was postponed for another occasion. In the following days, the *çavuş* insistently demanded an *i'lâm* from the qadi, but the latter, despite having promised to grant it, put off the *çavuş* because no one dared to testify in court out of their fear of Müderriszâde.<sup>116</sup>

Writing on 31 December, the Dutch merchants in Ankara expressed their fury about the *damgacı* who had beaten Panchaud and was now also reported to have said “Né jappabildi Deinek Janinda kaldı.” The Ankara community saw little chance of settling the issue adequately in the local court because the locals and Müderriszâde were hindering the process and manipulating the court’s decisions. Therefore, they suggested that it should be resolved in Istanbul. Meanwhile, Yusuf Çavuş was treated courteously by the Dutch, who promised to reward him if he could solve the issue in their favor. In return, the *çavuş* appears to have promised the Dutch that if he was not able to obtain a favorable *i'lâm* from the court, he would submit a petition to the Porte to report the “reality.”<sup>117</sup>

Two days later, the Dutch merchants wrote another letter, relating that on 1 January, around midday, the qadi had given the requested *i'lâm* to Yusuf Çavuş. The Dutch merchants reported that the *çavuş* immediately realized that the account given in the *i'lâm* did not reflect the truth, as it was neither in conformity with the information he had gathered from impartial people, nor did it accord with the account previously given by the qadi. Although he tried to convince the qadi to make some improvements in favor of Panchaud, the qadi did not consent, out of fear of Müderriszâde. During a long night of discussions, the merchants told Yusuf Çavuş that he should not accept this false *i'lâm*. The *çavuş* replied that he had done everything to get a more favorable one, and now if he did not accept the *i'lâm*, it would cause further upheaval. The discussions appear to have produced a new strategy upon which the parties finally agreed. It was decided that Yusuf Çavuş would write two petitions, one addressed to the *yeniçeri ağası* and the other to the *kul kahyâsı*, explaining the merchants’ version of the story and reporting that the *i'lâm* procured from the qadi was full of calumnies. The *i'lâm* and the petitions written by Yusuf Çavuş were immediately sent to Istanbul.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>116</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 31.12.1757, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 02.01.1758, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul (signed by Rumoldus Romboutus, Jacobus Leytstar, Panchaud & Series).

The merchants in Ankara explained that through “good promises” they were able to ensure that Yusuf Çavuş’s account was as favorable as possible for them. Moreover, the *çavuş* seems to have been very confident about the impact of his petitions, as he told the merchants that if the Dutch pushed the issue adequately at the Porte, they would enjoy complete success, even the punishment of their enemies. Yusuf Çavuş confidently told the merchants that if they could obtain the order he requested in his petition, no one would dare to trouble the Dutch, English, and the French in Ankara ever again. The *çavuş* had also written a letter to Caratza (Karaca), the first dragoman of the Dutch embassy, probably advising him on his next moves at the Porte. Yusuf Çavuş insisted that the petitions he wrote should be shown, not to the grand vizier, but to their addressees, the *kul kahyâsı* and the *yeniçeri ağası*.<sup>119</sup>

It took some time before the Dutch community in Istanbul reported the developments in the capital back to Ankara. Although the letter of 2 January of the Dutch community in Ankara had arrived in Istanbul on 8 January, the nation in Istanbul did not reply immediately, because they thought that the return of the messenger without good news would have a negative effect; therefore the messenger was kept in Istanbul awaiting a positive development. Meanwhile, they did dispatch a letter (probably in secret) on 11 February, reporting that they had made use of Yusuf Çavuş’s petitions criticizing the behavior of Müderriszâde. The officials at the Porte began to investigate how many times Müderriszâde had been sent into exile, possibly to arrange a similar journey for him for the last time. As soon as this was achieved the *damgacıs* were to face the same fate with Panchaud.<sup>120</sup>

Finally, on 15 March the Dutch community in Istanbul wrote with good news. They had obtained two imperial orders from the Porte; one commanding the removal of the two *damgacıs* from office and another threatening five individuals and Müderriszâde with severe punishments. The two orders and a letter to Yusuf Çavuş were dispatched immediately in simple covers, addressed to Series, to prevent interception on the way. The Dutch community in Istanbul considered the problem successfully solved and asked the merchants in Ankara to send Yusuf Çavuş immediately back to Istanbul, to save money.<sup>121</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 11.02.1758, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the Dutch nation in Ankara.

<sup>121</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 15.03.1758, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the Dutch nation in Ankara.

De Hochepped was quite enthusiastic when reporting his diplomatic victory, with some exaggeration, to the home authorities. He narrated that he had secured the removal of the judge (*nâib* or *qadi*) and the two *damgacıs* by means of an order obtained from the *çavuşbaşı*, their superior. Moreover, he explained that he had obtained another order prohibiting molestation of and agitation against Dutch merchants under penalty of death. Furthermore, he had, allegedly, obtained a letter from the *kazasker* of Anatolia addressed to Müderriszâde and the mufti of Ankara, declaring that their deeds required punishment but this time they were forgiven because they were old men. De Hochepped was very confident about his diplomatic victory and claimed that from that point forward, no one in Ankara would dare to molest Europeans because this meant risking severe punishment by the sovereign, without even a legal process.<sup>122</sup>

It is clear that before 30 March both the local *nâib* and the two *damgacıs* were replaced by others.<sup>123</sup> The letter written by the Dutch community in Istanbul on 15 March confirms that the replacement of the *damgacıs* was a result of the embassy's efforts. However, no other source confirms that the replacement of the *nâib* was a result of De Hochepped's endeavors. Although the Dutch ambassador mentioned several documents, only two imperial orders on the issue are recorded in the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri*. The first order was the one issued between 22 November and 2 December 1757, upon the arrival of the first news about the imprisonment of Panchaud. This order was not dispatched to Ankara immediately because news of the release of Panchaud arrived in Istanbul before it was sent off. The second order was issued between 11 and 22 March 1758 and brought an end to the incidents.<sup>124</sup> Interestingly, the content of the two orders is largely the same. The first order gave a short account of the incidents as reported to the Porte by the Dutch ambassador, but also listed the persons who had besieged Panchaud's room at the khan. These were Bakkal Tosun, Tekeoğlu Mehmed, Külçüncüoğlu, İsmailoğlu Molla Mehmed, and a barber, Hasanoğlu Mehmed. As the narrative was based on the information submitted by the Dutch ambassador, the Porte ordered the local *qadi*

<sup>122</sup> NA 1.02.20, 169, 310–312; NA 1.02.20, 166/860–862, 17.03.1758, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>123</sup> The imperial order issued between 11.03.1758 and 21.03.1758 (see below) reveals that the *damgacıs* were replaced. The letter of the Dutch nation in Ankara dated 30.03.1758 (see below) mentions the new and the old *nâib*.

<sup>124</sup> More precisely before or on the 15th, because the Dutch nation in Istanbul mentions the order on that day.

to release Panchaud if he had really been beaten and imprisoned, and also demanded an *i'lâm* containing a full account of the events based on information gathered from impartial people.<sup>125</sup>

The second order, without explicitly mentioning Mûderriszâde, begins with a description of the malpractices of those “who claim to be *a'yân*” in Ankara. It explains that these people committed several acts of extortions against the *müste'men* merchants in general and the Dutch in particular. The narration describes the last incident exactly as it was described in the previous order. Then the order explains that the previous order (commanding the release of the Dutch merchant and his servants, an end to the extortions, and specifying that all incidents should be reported in the form of an *i'lâm* to the Porte) did not bring an end to the extortion and the daily lives and business activities of the Dutch merchants in Ankara had been paralyzed. The order continues, stating that the ambassador had again submitted a petition seeking the protection of the Dutch merchants from threats and molestations at the hands of the *damgacıs*, other officials, and the five aforementioned individuals. In conclusion, the Porte condemns the molestation of the Dutch merchants and commands the *mutasarrıf* and the *nâib* to report anyone who continues to do so.<sup>126</sup>

As the second order repeats information in the earlier order, we can conclude that the Dutch ambassador was successful in convincing the Porte of his version of the incidents. The second order also reveals that the *damgacıs* who had subjected Panchaud to the bastinado had indeed been removed from office, since they are described as “those who had been *damgacıs* previously” (*sâbıkâ damga emîni olanlar*), while the order mentions “those who are currently *damgacıs*” (*halîyâ damga emîni olanlar*) when it reiterates the prohibition of molestation of Dutch merchants.

On 30 March, the Dutch community in Ankara wrote a letter showering their compatriots in Istanbul with thanks and compliments for their efforts and help. They reported that the messenger had arrived in Ankara with the imperial order and the *kazasker's* letter to Mûderriszâde. These documents were used by Yusuf Çavuş to obtain an adequate *i'lâm* from the new *nâib*. The Dutch in Ankara then asked whether it would be possible to obtain additional imperial orders, like those obtained by the English and the French: one to free their brokers from further *avantias* and another to effect the repayment of the money extracted from them during

<sup>125</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 347/1507, evâsıt-ı R.Evvel 1171/22.11–2.12.1757; AŞS, 141, 169–170.

<sup>126</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 348/1513, evâil-i Receb 1171/11–21.03.1758; AŞS, 141, 202.



the last incidents. For convenience, the nation enclosed with their letter copies of the orders accorded to the English and the French, together with the *i'lâm* Yusuf Çavuş obtained from the new *nâib*. The new *i'lâm*, as the Dutch merchants claimed, was contrary to the *i'lâm* obtained from the previous *nâib* and revealed that the Dutch merchants had not done anything to incite people against them, rather, others had acted on the instigation of "certain persons who had been pressuring not only the Franks but all the people of the town with their tyrannical rule." With these final orders and precautions, the Dutch community hoped that Müderriszâde would be left unable to continue his malevolence.<sup>127</sup>

Two weeks later, the Dutch nation in Ankara informed the authorities in Istanbul of the expenses they had incurred during the disturbances. The total expenses had reached LD 1,059.58, excluding the LD 130 extracted from Rombouts. The English and French merchants in the town had contributed LD 413.88 to the expenses, while the remaining was to be paid, together with the expenses incurred in Istanbul, from the treasury of the DLH.<sup>128</sup> Along with the Istanbul expenses, the total amount was LD 1,929.40, which the DLH considered an exorbitant amount.<sup>129</sup>

The incidents that took place during 1757 and 1758 revealed again the absence of an "Ottoman policy" on the presence of European merchants in inland towns of the empire. It is clear that the Porte had the last word, but its decisions were not taken in accordance with any long-term policy, but rather were based on the conditions related to specific occasions. The specific conditions that led to the Porte's decision in 1758 were quite different from those of 1708. The fact that the 1757–58 uprising against the European presence began with Panchaud's encounter with a funeral congregation indicates that the movement started spontaneously and lacked a uniform agenda and strategy. It seems that Müderriszâde forced the other local authorities in the town to act in accordance with his wishes, rather than organizing different parties' opposition to the Europeans. The fact that the *nâib* did not want to issue an *i'lâm*, despite the Porte's explicit order, reveals that he feared angering Müderriszâde and perhaps did not dare to deceive the Porte with a false account of the events. As he finally issued an *i'lâm* that allegedly contained false information, we may assume that his fear of Müderriszâde was a more important consideration for him,

<sup>127</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 30.03.1758, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul.

<sup>128</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105, 13.04.1758, Dutch nation in Ankara to the Dutch nation in Istanbul.

<sup>129</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/2.09.1758, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.



and probably for all the other local authorities in general, than fear of the Porte. This relates to the strange role of the *damgacı*s, who were normally quite prominent local figures, and had been the main actors during the earlier incidents. In the incidents of 1757 and 1758, they appear mostly as peripherals of Müderriszâde rather than powerful actors. This indicates the rather dynamic character of power relations within this Ottoman Anatolian town in the eighteenth century. Local mohair merchants, for their part, did not seem to factor much in the course of these incidents, but probably supported Müderriszâde's actions through their interpersonal network, as embodied in Karaoğlu Hacı Kevork, the Armenian trustee of Müderriszâde.

This time the Dutch acted much more efficiently than in the expulsion of 1708. Their savvy use of Yusuf Çavuş's services, along with his interpersonal connections at the Porte, seem to have played a crucial role in effecting the removal of some local authorities from office and bringing about the diplomatic victory of Elbert de Hochepped.

Under the illusion of his diplomatic victory, Elbert de Hochepped later wrote to the home authorities, telling how the English and the French ambassadors had visited and congratulated him for his victory and told him that they would never have dared even to demand from the Porte what he had obtained.<sup>130</sup> This should be considered together with Elbert's previous complaints about the unwillingness of the English and French to assist him. When the first news on the issue arrived in Istanbul, Elbert had asked his English and French colleagues to make the issue a common cause, but they were apparently unwilling to do so, even though their own communities wanted them to move in that direction. The attitude of the French ambassador was especially irritating to De Hochepped; he quoted the Frenchman as responding: "Messieurs retirez vous."<sup>131</sup> At the time, De Hochepped accused the other ambassadors of having caused these new vexations by neglecting earlier offenses directed at their own nations. Even several weeks after the news on the incidents had arrived in Istanbul, the English and French ambassadors were reported to have

<sup>130</sup> NA 1.02.20, 169/312–315; NA 1.02.20, 166/867–869, 03.05.1758, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>131</sup> NA 1.03.01, 105/16.12.1757, Dutch nation in Istanbul to the Dutch nation in Ankara. The French ambassador at the time was Chevalier Vergennes (1717–87), later French minister of foreign affairs.

sat idle.<sup>132</sup> However, the request of the Dutch nation in Ankara for orders similar to those already obtained by the French and the English ambassadors reveals that this was not the case. Probably, when the English and the French ambassadors saw that the Dutch were the scapegoat this time, they preferred to let them flounder and tried to quietly arrange the affairs of their own respective communities. It is important to note that this was reportedly against the will of the English and French nations in Ankara, who probably saw quite clearly that they shared a common destiny with the Dutch and wanted to assist them, at least financially. If this was really the consideration of the English and French merchants when they contributed to the expenses of the “Panchaud issue,” they were soon justified by another incident.

In 1759, the Porte issued a decree ordering the local authorities throughout the empire to prepare lists of European merchants who owned real estate in Ottoman dominions and also of those who were married to local women.<sup>133</sup> The *mübâşir* who brought this order to Ankara demanded LD 7,000 to 8,000 from the Europeans in the town. Thanks to the mediation of Müderriszâde, this amount was reduced to LD 1,500 and half of the sum was paid by the French merchants, while the other half was paid by the English and the Dutch.<sup>134</sup> Not surprisingly, this time the three ambassadors moved together to effect the reimbursement of the sum. Nevertheless, the Dutch ambassador was not optimistic about any swift success to the undertaking, since the *mübâşir* had not yet returned to Istanbul.<sup>135</sup> One month later, the ambassador reported that the French and the English ambassadors had decided not to push any longer at the Porte for reimbursement of the sum extracted by the *mübâşir*. Therefore, he too gave up his claim, though he feared that this might expose the Dutch merchants in Ankara to further extortions, as the Frankish establishments in the town “were not staying on solid feet and are exposed to the caprices of the governor and the notables.”<sup>136</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Dutch ambas-

<sup>132</sup> RGP 95, 381, 03.12.1757, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH; RGP 95, 381ni, 12.12.1757, Elbert de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>133</sup> RGP 95, 393–395, 01.10.1759, 18.10.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to Fagel; NA 1.02.20, 167/83–85, 18.10.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>134</sup> Jan Schmidt notes that LD 1,500 was paid by the French and another LD 1500 by the Dutch and the English. Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:322n4. The Dutch ambassador at the Porte wrote to the DLH that the total sum was LD 1,500.

<sup>135</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/87–90, 03.11.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH; NA 1.02.20, 167/92–93, 15.11.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>136</sup> “Om onse natie aldaar niet alleen to desagrementen en avanies bloot te stellen, op een plaats alwaar de franken etablissementen gantsch niet op solide voeten staan,

sador came to realize that the last "*avania*" in Ankara was but a part of a much wider phenomenon, as he received similar complaints from Dutch establishments throughout the empire, including Patras, Negroponte, Athens, Salonica, Izmir, Aleppo, and İskenderun. At this last port city, the Dutch vice-consul was obliged to pay LD 550 to the *mübâşir* who brought the same order. In all of these places, the *mübâşirs* and/or the qadis appear to have forced the Dutch communities to pay the *mübâşir*'s travel expenses, gratuities or other fees. De Hochepped regretted again that his diplomatic colleagues in Istanbul were not cooperative. He described to the home authorities that it was necessary to oppose such innovations because, once they were established a couple of times, they became standard practices in these places.<sup>137</sup> Thereafter, the ambassador was able to obtain six orders addressed to Ankara, Aleppo, Izmir, Negroponte, Peloponnesus, and Salonica condemning these new practices and warning the local authorities about continuing them.<sup>138</sup> These orders were only meant to prevent further practices since the ambassador had no hope to secure restitution.

Meanwhile, Gabriel Chasseaud had moved to Ankara in June 1759 to explore opportunities in the mohair trade. Probably because he decided to move to Ankara during a rather difficult period, Chasseaud was provided with an imperial order addressed to the highest officials in Ankara and its vicinity, commanding his protection from any kind of abuse and molestation. Although it resembles many orders issued by the Porte for the needs of the Dutch merchants, this order is unique in that it was not issued to redress a problem; but was of a preventive nature. Thus it was similar to the orders that were issued after a dragoman obtained a *berat* from the Porte. These orders contained clauses that warned the local authorities against any molestations regarding the newly appointed dragoman.<sup>139</sup>

Despite the fact that De Hochepped was able to provide the Dutch merchants in Ankara with numerous imperial orders, the Dutch presence in the town was on the decline. After the last *avania* in 1759, information in the sources on the Dutch presence in Ankara becomes increasingly scarce. The last letter from Chasseaud to the embassy dates from 1760 while that

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en van de willekeur, van den Pacha en de voornaamste van het land ten eenemaal zyn afhangende" NA 1.02.20, 167/97–99, 18.12.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>137</sup> "en vermits zulke innovaties doorgaans door de tyd, als een fundamentaal gebruyk werden geconsidereert" NA 1.02.20, 167/117–119, 18.03.1760, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>138</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 361–362/1574–1579, evâsıt-ı Receb 1173/27.02–08.03.1760.

<sup>139</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 353/1534, evâsıt-ı C.Evvel 1172/9–19.01.1759.

of Panchaud was written as late as 1765.<sup>140</sup> By the second half of the same year, André Series and his three *müste'men* "servants" obtained a passport from the Porte to travel from Ankara to Izmir and then to Istanbul; he was probably leaving Ankara permanently.<sup>141</sup> Thus the Dutch community left the other European nations to bear the vexations that were to follow. By 1771 the central government issued an order to prevent molestation of the English and French merchants in Ankara, and in 1775 the French ambassador at the Porte felt obliged to intervene on behalf of the French merchants in the town, who had been obliged to transport their goods by Arapoğlu's camels. On this occasion as well, the *damgacı* was alleged to have extracted excessive taxes from the French merchants.<sup>142</sup>

As the Dutch sources became silent on Ankara after about 1765, so too do the Ottoman sources. By the end of 1785 and the second half of 1787, the Porte issued two more orders concerning "Dutch trade" in Ankara.<sup>143</sup> The orders contained the same substance, addressed to the local authorities of Ankara and condemning the malpractices of the *damgacı*, who demanded excessive taxes for the Ankara yarn purchased by the "Dutch" merchant who resided in Izmir. This "Dutch merchant" was none other than Diodato Abro, an Armenian who had become the first dragoman of the Dutch consulate in Izmir after his superior Gio Homero was removed from office, accused of having harmed Dutch interests.<sup>144</sup> Diodato was from an Armenian family that extended their connections to Amsterdam no later than the third decade of the eighteenth century. On 22 July 1726 Makartom di Jacob, an Armenian merchant in Amsterdam, empowered Pieter Aved in Amsterdam to collect money from insurers in case his merchandise, consigned by Pieter and Stephano Abro from Izmir, was damaged on board the Dutch ship *Johanna Maria Galey*.<sup>145</sup> Stephano Abro had commercial relations with Muyssard & De la Fontaine in Izmir, and Flament & Walton, Thomas de Vogel, and Johannes di Aretun, another

<sup>140</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:322.

<sup>141</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 396/1712, evâil-i R.Evvel 1179/18–28.08.1765.

<sup>142</sup> Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı*, 128–129.

<sup>143</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 453/1974, evâsıt-ı Safer 1200/13–23.12.1785; BOA ED 22/1, 458/1990, evâhir-i Zilkade 1201/3–13.09.1787.

<sup>144</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/409–412, 16.10.1762, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH. Abro's *berat* as the first dragoman was issued on 21 R.Evvel 1176/10.10.1762/10.10.1762 (BOA ED 22/1, 410/1782).

<sup>145</sup> GA 5075, 8617/1014, 22.07.1726.

Armenian merchant, in Amsterdam.<sup>146</sup> He was under Dutch protection when he went bankrupt in April 1740, losing some 10,000 to 12,000 piasters.<sup>147</sup> By then, another family member, Peterus di Matas Abro, had established himself in Amsterdam.<sup>148</sup> A Marcar Abro, probably a son of Diodato, was the first dragoman of the Dutch consulate in Izmir in 1815.<sup>149</sup> Another Abro was probably the dragoman of the Dutch embassy in Istanbul by 1825. A paternal cousin or nephew of the latter was the dragoman of İbrahim Paşa in Peloponnesus, and a maternal nephew, Bogos di Jousouf, was dragoman of Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt. Bogos di Jousouf was reported to be the single head of Egyptian trade affairs.<sup>150</sup> During the second half of the eighteenth century, Diodato was trading with the Netherlands and consigned mohair products, along with other goods, to his business correspondents there.<sup>151</sup>

This short account of the family, business, and diplomatic career of Diodato Abro also reflects what was going on elsewhere while the Dutch merchants in Ankara were enduring all that has been described in this chapter.

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<sup>146</sup> GA 332, 33/12, 06.08.1739, Muysard & De la Fontaine a Izmir to Thomas de Vogel Amsterdam; GA 332, 33/15, 29.08.1739, Muysard & De la Fontaine a Izmir to Thomas de Vogel Amsterdam; GA 5075, 10217/300, 06.06.1740; GA 5075, 11322/60, 16.10.1749.

<sup>147</sup> RGP 95, 126.

<sup>148</sup> GA 1053/1.

<sup>149</sup> RGP 120, 862.

<sup>150</sup> RGP 120, 1150.

<sup>151</sup> RGP 120, 1433, 1436, 1440, 1444, 1449, 1452, 1459, 1466.

## PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Although scholars studying the European communities in Izmir have pointed out that European merchants faced stiff opposition to their attempts to penetrate the hinterlands of Izmir, no one has researched the dynamics, actors, instruments, or impacts of this opposition. Researchers have not paid adequate attention to the positions that different social, economic, and administrative actors took regarding European penetration, the factors that determined their positions, or the importance of each of these (groups of) actors in setting the character of the opposition to European enterprise in Anatolia during the eighteenth century.

Our investigation of the Dutch presence in eighteenth-century Ankara helps illuminate at least some of these neglected areas. In summing up the events described in the previous chapters, we can say that the local opposition to European presence was a coalition comprising a diverse and changing group of actors motivated almost exclusively by their own economic interests, rather than by cultural differences or xenophobia. For this reason, it is probably more appropriate to speak of *competition* and not *opposition*, per se, since local actors' unfriendliness toward European business interests stemmed from the locals' need to protect their own interests in the mohair industry. The predominance of economic concerns in motivating locals' fierce resistance did not mean that the competition itself was limited to the business realm. On the contrary, the local competitors utilized all means they could access, including administrative action, agitation, popular demonstrations, and violence, in addition to economic initiatives such as boycotts and taxation.

The story of the Dutch merchants in Ankara reveals an ever-changing milieu of groups involved in competition with the Europeans: local individuals and mobs of local people; Armenian and other local mohair merchants; shopkeepers; guild elders; yarn merchants; the Dutch merchants' servants, brokers, and dragomans; the *ulemâ*, *eşrâf*, *haraççı*, *damgacı*, *nâib*, mufti, and governor of the area; and the Müderriszâdes. Thus a variety of different coalitions could be, and were, formed. The mutable nature of the coalitions is best illustrated by the changing positions individuals with the same role might take. Two Müderriszâdes feature prominently in our narrative. In 1757, the second of these took exactly the opposite position toward the Europeans as the first Müderriszâde took in 1706.

The Mûderriszâde in 1706 presented the European merchants' case to the governor, while his relative in 1757 was the Europeans' major oppressor, acting without regard for local authorities, even the governor. This reversal shows that even the relative importance and impact of each actor was subject to change with time and circumstances. Within this rather dynamic environment there are still constants that deserve attention.

Not surprisingly, the local mohair traders, who were mostly of Armenian origin, invariably took part in the coalition opposing the Dutch presence in Ankara. These merchants were a visible and active part of the opposing coalition throughout the entire sequence of events. It is clear that they were ready to align themselves with various other groups and to use extra-economic means to oust their European competitors from the mohair trade. The *damgacı*s were also almost always aligned with the resistance, except when they were neutralized or drawn to the Europeans' side through "gifts," as in 1750–51. It must have been very expensive for the Europeans to buy a *damgacı*'s favor, since he stood to reap great profits from re-introducing the *çikar bâcı* during periods of crisis—whether permanently or as a temporary measure. The incidents of 1706–08 reveal that the *çikar bâcı* was a topic of great interest to both the *damgacı*s and local merchants. If we ignore the events of 1757, during which he was singled out as the main oppressor by the Dutch merchants, it seems that in general the Mûderriszâde cooperated more with the European merchants (as in 1706, 1750–51, and 1759) than any other local actor or group. The governors appear more likely to be in the opposing coalition—at least during the disturbances—if they were not, indeed, at the head of the coalition, as in 1706. The *nâib* and the mufti generally took the same stance, except for the case of 1706, when the mufti appears to have assisted the Europeans after examining their capitulations and the *nâib* remained with the opposition. For the most part, these men aided the opposing coalition, unless they were neutralized with "presents."

Popular participation in the opposition in Ankara must have lent it energy in 1706, 1751, and 1757. In 1708 as well, though there was no mass mobilization on the streets as in the other years, local people en masse seem to have signed the petitions against the Europeans. The *ulemâ*<sup>1</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup> NA 1.03.01, 130, 16.08.1710, D. J. de Hochepied to the DLH. "...aangesien men verstaad. dat de inwoonders van Angora opgelust(?) door de geexileerde wethgeleerden en andere groote Turken van die stad die den inkoop van de Turkse garens voor het merengedeelte inhanden hebben en naar haar convenient dirigeren. haar opentlyk tegens dat restablisement opnieuw komen te opposeeren sodanig dat verklaard soude hebben de franken

the *eşrâf*, who had considerable interest in the mohair industry, were also stalwart members of the coalition against European enterprise in the area. Although not mentioned in the sources as present in every instance of resistance, the Jewish brokers of the town are mentioned as part of the opposing coalition. Several individuals were singled out on different occasions by Dutch merchants as the main instigators of the “violence” against the Europeans. These individuals bear mainly Armenian, and to a lesser extent Greek and Jewish names. This implies that the opposition to the Europeans had an important non-Muslim flavor. We should, however, keep in mind that the individuals who attacked Panchaud at knifepoint in 1757 are not mentioned by name in Dutch sources, despite the fact that Ottoman sources do identify them by name. This fact should be taken as an indication of the manner in which the available sources could be biased.

One must note that when the European merchants were effectively expelled from Ankara in 1708 the governor, mufti, qadi,<sup>2</sup> and the *damgacı* were in the opposing coalition together with the local yarn merchants, *ulemâ*, and *eşrâf*. This is not to suggest that this coalition effected the Porte’s decision on the expulsion of the Europeans from the town; in fact there were several other factors in play when the Porte’s intervention was required. The members of the coalition themselves probably did not seek a complete expulsion of Europeans from the town, rather they sought to keep the Europeans’ activities at a tolerable and controlled level.

As we have seen, the Dutch did not have a guaranteed base of support on which to depend in Ankara. It appears that on the local level they had to be content with the assistance of a limited number of brokers, servants, and dragomans, along with their fellow Europeans and the occasional cooperation of some of the local authorities and notables. Their names suggest that the Dutch merchants drew their employees from among Ankara’s Armenians. The fact that they seemed to employ only Armenians may have been part of the reason that in 1750 Ankara’s Jewish brokers submitted a petition to the *şeyhü’l-İslâm* demanding the expulsion of the Europeans from the city. We see that the Dutch merchants

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aldaar niet meerder te willen dulden . . .”; NA 1.02.20, 367, 28.02.1751, Leytstar to Rigo cited by Schmidt, *Jays of Philology*, 2:319.

<sup>2</sup> Although the qadi seemed to have cooperated with the Dutch at the beginning of the incidents, the final order of the Porte which expelled all the Europeans from the town reveals that he also confirmed the account on which the order was based.



in Ankara enjoyed the cooperation of only a handful of local Armenians while the great majority of local Armenians and their coalition partners actively opposed the Dutch presence. A more important support base for the Dutch merchants must have been their fellow Europeans in Ankara. We see that in 1708 the Dutch merchants let the English use the imperial orders that the Dutch had themselves obtained from the Porte. In return, in 1757 other European groups contributed to the expenses of the "Panchaud issue."

It is difficult to imagine the possibility of there being any Dutch presence in eighteenth-century Ankara if not for their ambassadors' repeated interventions on their behalf at the Porte. Since the Dutch ambassadors frequently asked their English and French colleagues to make the incidents in Ankara their common cause, it was probably of crucial importance that the Dutch solicitations at the Porte be backed by English and French representatives as well. When the local threat was directed against all Europeans, irrespective of nation, the other ambassadors were, of course, more likely to cooperate. However, the factors influencing the motivation of each ambassador were complex and related to their country's internal politics as well; in 1706, the Dutch ambassador reported that the English ambassador was not willing to appoint a consul to Ankara because the English commercial establishment did not belong to the Levant Company. It seems that if the actions of members of a particular European nation provoked local opposition directed only at that particular nation in Ankara, the ambassadors of the other nations were more likely to avoid any common diplomatic effort and remind the Porte that their nations had nothing to do with the incidents. This was the case with the French ambassador's attitude, for example, in 1708 and 1757.

A general analysis of the decision-making process of the Ottoman central administration is beyond the scope of this book. The Porte's response to the developments in eighteenth-century Ankara, however, enables us to make a few observations on the process. In our introduction, we noted that Meeker<sup>3</sup> emphasizes the power of interpersonal relations for both the dissemination of imperial power and the participation of the people in imperial affairs throughout the empire. The incidents in Ankara suggest that the process of decision-making at the Porte was not as closed to local participation as past notions of oriental despotism, or the more recent

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<sup>3</sup> Meeker, *Nation of Empire*.

emphasis on the centralist nature of the Ottoman state would suggest. Some concrete cases might be useful to illustrate this point.

The first example concerns the strategy Yusuf Çavuş used in 1757 to “sell” the Dutch version of the accounts on the “Panchaud issue” to the Porte. If we recall, the *i’lâm* procured from the qadi on the issue was allegedly biased, so Yusuf Çavuş wrote another account of the incidents and sent it to the Porte. Yusuf Çavuş knew that the issue should normally be addressed to the grand vizier or to the *re’isü’l-küttâb*, and therefore wrote to Caratza, the dragoman of the Dutch embassy, to submit the documents directly to the *yenîçeri ağası* and the *kul kahyâsı*. Those familiar with the structure of the Ottoman central administration will immediately wonder what the *yenîçeri ağası* and the *kul kahyâsı*, the two highest commanders of the janissary corps, had to do with the issue. These men probably offered more promise for satisfactory results because of their personal relationships with Yusuf Çavuş, who apparently hailed from among the *çavuşs* of the janissary corps.

Yusuf Çavuş’s strategy in 1758 procured favorable results for the Dutch at that time, a fact that may reveal the strategies the local traders adopted to influence the decisions of the Porte in the eighteenth century. The initiative that brought about the expulsion of the European merchants from Ankara in 1708 might initially seem to have been effected through an ordinary bureaucratic decision-making process, since it was brought up through the hierarchical order: from the local merchants to the local *damga emîni*, Hasan Ağa, in Ankara; from Hasan Ağa to Kör Ali Ağa in Istanbul, who was apparently the *mâlikâneci* of the *damga mukâta’ası*; from Ali Ağa to the *defterdâr*; and finally to the grand vizier. Thus, there is nothing extraordinary about the way in which the demands of the locals reached the Porte. However, the extraordinary decision of *expulsion* must have been a result of the interpersonal character of the same seemingly routine hierarchical relations.

We can see similar strategies throughout the course of events. In 1710, for instance, when the Dutch obtained the Porte’s permission to resettle in Ankara, at the instigation of certain Jews and Greeks the *gümriük emîni* offered LD 10,000 to the *sadâret kethüdâsı* to block the decision. Here again, we see personal relationships influencing the Porte’s decision. Otherwise, one wonders why these Jews and Greeks did not bring their LD 10,000 directly to the *sadâret kethüdâsı* instead of applying to the *gümriük emîni* as a kind of intermediary. Another example concerns an interpersonal relationship that moved in the opposite direction. Although the imperial orders issued after the incidents of 1757 do not mention the

Müderresizâdes, who were an *ilmiye* family, the Müderresizâde of the time did receive personal letters from the *kazasker* and the *şeyhü'l-İslâm*, who all must have belonged to the same interpersonal relationship network.

It is not surprising that these kinds of relations had a relatively stronger impact in the provincial town of Ankara than in the imperial capital. The alleged impact of the Armenian Karaoğlu Hacı Kevork on Müderresizâde in 1757; the influence of the friendship between Leytstar and Abbot on the one hand, and the Müderresizade on the other in 1751; and finally, in 1708, the English merchant Constantine's claim to friendship with the local pasha, *nakîb*, and some other *eşrâf*, even though he was lying, tells us that these kinds of relationships were very important in determining the relative strengths of contestants in any matter.

Just as interpersonal relations mattered greatly in determining an individual's influence over decision-making in the capital and in the provincial town of Ankara, turnover at the local or central government level could have a huge impact as well. The Porte's approval of the return of the Dutch merchants to Ankara in 1710—just after the change of the grand vizier—surprised the Dutch ambassador but should not shock the Ottomanist. Equally revealing, in this respect, is the panic among the European merchants in Ankara after they heard that Murtaza Paşa, who was rumored to be a rather unreasonable man, was appointed as the governor to Ankara in 1750.

Here we should also address the contradictory practices and orders of the Porte, which are well illustrated by the developments in Ankara, especially by those pertaining to real estate ownership by European merchants. It is known that real estate ownership by European merchants (*müste'mens*) was theoretically prohibited in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>4</sup> Europeans living in Ottoman dominions were well aware of this prohibition, but purchased real estate nevertheless. The 1759 imperial order commanding local authorities to prepare lists of the European merchants who owned real estate in Ottoman dominions and who married local women threw the entire Frankish community of İzmir into distress.<sup>5</sup> But one wonders why the Ottoman administration ignored the fact that the European merchants "illegally" owned real estate, even when disputes relating to

<sup>4</sup> Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, "Tanzimat Devrinde Yabancıların İktisadi Faaliyetleri," in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Ankara, 1992), 111–113; NA 1.02.20, 167/383–385, 03.07.1762, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>5</sup> RGP 95, 393–395, 01.10.1759, 18.10.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to Fagel; NA 1.02.20, 167/83–85, 18.10.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

such estates had been addressed to the Porte. In such cases, the Porte issued its verdicts without mentioning the illegal nature of the *müste'mens* ownership of real estate in the Ottoman dominions.<sup>6</sup>

It seems probable that the Porte did not concern itself much with the practical implementation of the capitulations and the other relevant regulations as long as certain social groups or local authorities did not submit petitions requesting the Porte's intervention. As long as new developments did not harm the interests of certain people or provoke any individual or social group, the Porte saw no reason to intervene—even to set things right. This interpretation of these phenomena fits well into Ottoman traditionalism, which manifested itself in a similar fashion in the Porte's decisions on other social and economic issues, such as the guild affairs. This approach influenced developments in Ankara after 1710 only in the sense that the limitations set by the Porte on the European presence in the town were, in some sense, irrelevant, provided the activities of the Europeans remained at a tolerable level for the various local interest groups.

Two themes that resurface throughout the course of the events described in this chapter require additional attention here: Europeans' sexual relations with local women, and the impact of the European presence in the town on the revenues of the *mîrî* in general and the *damga mukâta'ası* in particular.

We have seen that European merchants' relations with local women were issues on every occasion except the incidents of 1706 and 1708.<sup>7</sup> In 1751, the French merchant Richard, who was not in Ankara at the time of the accusation, was rumored to have violated a local woman. In 1753, another French merchant, Damiral, fled because he was alleged to have fathered a child with a local woman—though she had still not given birth nine months after his departure. In 1757, during the “Panchaud issue,” the same Damiral and his Dutch associate Rombouts were accused of luring local women into the house in which they resided, in disregard of the Porte's regulations on housing. In all of these cases, the rumors, if not the facts, led to the extraction of considerable amounts of money from the accused. There were also, however, certain occasions in which relations with local women did not lead to any trouble. For example, during

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<sup>6</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 127/453, 140/449, 155/541, 164/579, 165/585, 182/666, 196/738 etc.; BOA ADVN.DVE, 81/43a.

<sup>7</sup> In this respect, the developments in Ankara were not unique. See Van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, 120.

the process of the bankruptcy of Leytstar & Abraham de la Fontaine, three Armenian brokers of the firm (Serkis Pemergioğlu, Agop Ayvoğlu, and Agop Surunoğlu) and Abraham de la Fontaine testified in the Dutch embassy that Leytstar had had relations with local women. Another case which attracted even less attention involved Gabriel Chasseaud, who reported in 1760 to the ambassador that he had been obliged to marry a young Greek woman, a close relative of Peter Abbott's "Greek" wife—who, for her part, only spoke Turkish. If we leave aside the Anglo-Greek Abbot family with their two daughters<sup>8</sup> it is difficult to accept that Chasseaud was forced into the marriage without any reason. Nevertheless, we are informed about the issue only through his letter to the Dutch ambassador to the Porte. When we put all these pieces of information together we see that European men's sexual relations with local women were accommodated somehow, though rumors of these relations helped the opposition to bolster their anti-European rhetoric, mobilize popular support, and trouble the Europeans in court, as occurred in 1751.

If cries of violated women would attract the ready attention of local authorities and the masses, arguments based on fiscal revenue were most effective at the level of the Porte. This was the case in 1708, when local authorities reported extensively on the European merchants' fraudulent practices that were reducing the revenue of the stamp tax farm. Equally important was the argument forwarded by Justinus Leytstar to Rigo in 1750, stating that the European presence in Ankara was not detrimental but favorable for the *mîrî* (treasury; Leytstar used the Turkish word). In their 1708 argument, however, local authorities also argued that the European presence was an innovation and contrary to ancient practices; this was certainly an effort to further appeal to the traditionalist tendencies of the Porte.

The recurrence of these two themes—relations with local women and the fiscal impacts of the European presence—implies also the formation of a "social memory" through which the parties articulated their experiences and took recourse to them whenever they needed to choose a strategy. This is most recognizable during the disturbances of 1758–59, when it was rumored that the restrictions on European movement introduced during the events in 1708—in which the brokers of the European merchants were forbidden to enter the *bedesten* and the Europeans' houses, for instance—were introduced again.

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<sup>8</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:318–319.

As for the economic meaning of all these developments, this point will become clearer when we analyze them in the light of two terms introduced by Frederic Chapin Lane: "protection cost" and "protection rent." As Lane notes:

The profits of a merchant engaged in trade over long distances were limited by the real or potential competition of other merchants. If one merchant or one group was as good as another in gathering information and guessing about supply and demand, the one able to operate with lower costs would gain larger profits. A very substantial part of costs was what had to be paid for protection and for insurance against losses that might be inflicted by violence-using enterprises if their exactions were not paid. Some trading enterprises secured more protection than others, or equally good protection at less cost, and this difference in their costs enabled them to make extra profits which I call protection rents.<sup>9</sup>

In light of Lane's approach we can say that the initiatives taken by the local traders against their European competitors increased the "protection costs" of the European merchants<sup>10</sup> while at the same time they reduced the "quality" of the protection the European merchants enjoyed. The Europeans could not, in fact, find any protection between 1708 and 1710, regardless of what they were ready to pay for it. Moreover, since the European merchants in Ankara were dependent on local brokers for acquiring goods for export, they suffered another handicap in their competition with the local merchants. Evidence from the account books of the De Vogel family shows that the European traders had to pay LD 1.5 per bale to their local brokers. Moreover, the service these brokers provided to the European merchants was probably not as good as the same service the local traders were able to do themselves, *sans* brokers. A more important extra expense with which the mohair exports of the European merchants were burdened was the extraordinary high commission of 4 percent that they paid to the agent in Ankara. This commission was 2.5 percent at most in Izmir (it varied according to the goods). When we consider that the insurance premium paid for the transportation from Izmir to Amsterdam also amounted to about 2.5 percent, we understand that this commission constituted an extraordinary burden for Dutch mohair consignments. The

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<sup>9</sup> Frederic Chapin Lane, "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," in *Profits From Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises* (Albany, 1979), 57.

<sup>10</sup> I have in mind the expenses that were made for the "presents" given to the authorities to curry favor with high-ups, to obtain the Porte's support against local merchants, and to ensure the implementation of the "capitulatory privileges."

logic of such a high commission rate was based on the fact that—as we have seen in the series of events described in this chapter—maintaining the European colony in Ankara was a highly risky undertaking, entailing higher operating costs than the conventional centers of trade in the empire. The high commission rate paid to the Dutch correspondents in Ankara should be attributed to these particular circumstances.

Here we must also address the argument that the capitulations placed local merchants at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis European merchants, especially from the seventeenth century on, when the customs dues were reduced to 3 percent for the capitulatory nations. Despite the fact that the capitulations indicated that local officials should not extract any taxes from European merchants after they paid the 3 percent customs dues, the implementation of these clauses was much more complicated in practice.

In the introduction of this book we suggested that there was an apparent tension between the “commanded” nature of the Ottoman economy and the capitulatory privileges accorded to European nations. This tension became especially apparent when European merchants attempted to penetrate the hinterland and acquire goods at their places of origin, i.e., before local taxes were paid for these goods. The resulting conflicts and fiscal practices reveal the basic assumption on which the capitulatory privileges were based—that the European merchants would remain at the port cities to purchase goods, for which all local taxes were paid before European merchants purchased the goods for export. The fact that all mohair products exported by European or local merchants were subject to the stamp tax should be considered an indication of this underlying assumption. The European consuls and ambassadors had repeatedly tried to gain exemption from these local taxes. In this context, let us consider the *çikar bâcı*.

Despite the fact that the Dutch had obtained an imperial order exempting them from the *çikar bâcı*, in 1700 they were well aware of their vulnerability to taxation and were considering insertion in their capitulation of an article explicitly exempting them from the tax.<sup>11</sup> The events of 1706 and 1708 proved that their anxieties were well founded, but also showed that even if they had renewed their capitulation with an explicit article on their trading in Ankara and the exemption from the *çikar bâcı* this in itself would not protect them from sharing the fate of their English fellows

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<sup>11</sup> RGP 34, 279.

in Ankara. It is striking that when the *damga emîni* attempted to reintroduce the *çikar bâcı* during the disturbances, he did not try to argue the more obvious fact, that the Dutch capitulations did not contain an explicit article exempting them from the tax. Interestingly, other letters written by the Dutch during the disturbances reveal that they were quite confident of the legality of their exemption from the *çikar bâcı*. Ultimately, however, De Hochepped recognized the crucial importance of the tax in determining the course of events of 1708.

In considering related developments in eighteenth-century Ankara, one more point needs to be clarified here. As the short account on the career of Diodato Abro revealed, a corresponding process was in motion concerning the wider context of Levant trade in general and the Dutch trade with the Levant in particular. The Dutch merchants' argument in 1708 that they should not be prevented from trading in Ankara while Ottoman merchants could trade freely with the Netherlands, and the 1751 rumor—if not completely factual—that French merchants in Ankara were targeted by local merchants because the French excluded Ottoman merchants from French trade with the Levant, reveal that the developments in Ankara were not isolated from this broader context. This larger picture is the subject of the subsequent chapters.



## PART TWO

### OTTOMAN COUNTER-EXPANSION



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DUTCH LEVANT TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

While the local merchants in Ankara persistently struggled to maintain their control over the trade between Ankara and Izmir, within the context of wider Levant trade, the competitiveness of Europeans was boosted by their extensive control over the seaborne trade of the latter city. This control was enhanced by sophisticated commercial infrastructures, such as trading companies that Ottoman merchants could also utilize. Here, my investigation focuses on the organization of the Dutch Levant trade since its peculiar organizational structure made this branch of Ottoman-European trade especially vulnerable to the inroads of the Ottoman merchants. I make frequent comparisons between the Dutch case and the English and French cases in order to explain the vulnerability of the Dutch Levant trade. In fact, certain crucial differences between Dutch trade organization and policies in the Levant and those of the English and French are the reason for this work's focus on the Dutch case. It is known that England and France barred foreigners from their trade with the Levant for the greater part of the eighteenth century, while the Dutch pursued more liberal policies with regard to outsiders. Therefore, study of the relevant sources on Dutch Levant trade gives us insight into the activities of Ottoman merchants, while Ottoman participation in the English and French Levant trades was clandestine and remains closed to scholarly investigation for lack of documentation.

In this chapter, our focus is not exclusively limited to the organizational aspect of the Dutch Levant trade; taxes and other fees levied by Dutch authorities on this trade are also relevant because these levies and the variations in their rates were influential in determining the competitiveness of the goods traded by merchants of different nations.

We may consider western European trade with the Levant to have been divided organizationally into two parts, based on geographical location. Although it is difficult to make a clear distinction between these two segments, it is possible to say that one part of the trade infrastructure involved institutions within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, and the other part encompassed institutions in the traders' home countries. There is no

doubt that capitulations and other Ottoman regulations shaped, to a certain extent, the first organizational realm of western European trade in the Levant.

Readers familiar with the nature of the contacts between the Ottomans and the Europeans know that the primary texts regulating the activities of European nations in Ottoman dominions were the capitulations. Although the capitulations did not regulate all aspects of the organization of western European trade in Ottoman ports, these texts did include certain articles with implications in this respect.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, these texts also included certain articles regulating the taxes to be levied on goods subject to international trade. Therefore, it is useful to begin our investigation by looking at the prescriptions of the capitulations with regard to the organization and taxation of western European trade with the Ottoman ports.

The appointment of European consuls to Ottoman ports was one of the topics with which the capitulations dealt. The relevant articles of the capitulations mentioned explicitly that every capitulatory nation could appoint a consul to a location where the merchants of that nation were active and needed someone to supervise their activities. Although the procedure of appointing consuls was not extensively regulated in these articles, in practice, the ambassador in Istanbul submitted a petition to the Porte, indicating the name of the candidate and the place to which he was to be appointed as consul. Upon receipt of such petitions, the Porte issued a *berat* confirming the appointment and the privileges of the consul. In the capitulations, it was mentioned explicitly that Ottoman authorities could not intervene in the appointment process and that the European ambassadors were free to appoint whomever they wanted.<sup>2</sup> It seems that the Ottoman authorities did not hinder these processes unless the appointment concerned an Ottoman subject; this was considered illegal.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the freedom accorded to European nations with respect to

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 231–265.

<sup>2</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, “... ve sâir memâlik-i mah-rûsamda vakî' iskelelerden konsolosların tebdîl edip ol hizmetin uhdesinden gelir adamlar ta'yîn edip gönderdikte kimse mânî' olmaya...”

<sup>3</sup> During the eighteenth century, Ottoman authorities seemed quite careful to ensure that consuls appointed by European nations were chosen from among Europeans (*kendü cinslerinden*). In the Dutch case, for instance, the consuls appointed to the Aegean islands were chosen from among the local Greeks, which action provoked the Porte to revoke their *berats*. BOA ED 22/1, 395/1708; NA 1.02.20, 1092/9, evâhîr-i c.evvel sene semâne ve seb'îne ve mâe ve elf/24 November 1764; BOA CM, 24837, 9 Muharrem 1119/12 April 1707; BOA MD 115, 277/2, evâsîr-i Muharrem 1119/April 1707; BOA MD 114, 175/2; BOA MD 114, 1/43, 1114–1115/1702–1703; BOA ED 22/1, 186/686, 15 Safer 1120/6 May 1708; BOA ED 22/1, 395/1708,

their representatives extended far beyond the consuls and also included the other embassy and consulate staff, such as dragomans and *yasakçıs*,<sup>4</sup> who were appointed without any interference by Ottoman authorities. The appointment of the dragomans also included a procedure similar to that of the consuls,<sup>5</sup> while there was nothing comparable for *yasakçıs*.

Another group of capitulatory articles that influenced the organization of European trade establishments in the Levant related to the juridical autonomy accorded to the European nations. According to the capitulations, juridical cases that involved individuals from the same European nation were to be settled by their own authorities without any intervention from Ottoman officials.<sup>6</sup> When a case involved a subject of the Porte, however, the case was to be tried by Ottoman courts. Thus the capitulations stipulated that European traders obtain *hüccets* from Ottoman courts to have the conditions of their commercial dealings recorded, so that in case of a dispute between native and European merchants, Ottoman authorities could examine these *hüccets* and make their adjudication accordingly.<sup>7</sup> The capitulations also provided a kind of diplomatic immunity to the consuls and dragomans by stipulating that these personages could not be imprisoned by local authorities and that the cases that involved them were only to be tried at the imperial divan in Istanbul, not

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evâil-i C.Evvel 1178/26.10–04.11.1764. When Elbert de Hochepped was informed that the sg had appointed a Greek subject of the Porte to the consulship of Patras in 12 February 1752, he wrote a letter to Fagel alleging that although it was preferable to the Dutch nation to maintain consuls at all ports of the Ottoman Empire, it was even more desirable not to appoint them from among the subjects of the Porte, since the Ottoman authorities did not recognize these individuals' appointments. RGP 95, 240–242, 3.5.1752, Elbert de Hochepped to Fagel.

<sup>4</sup> *Yasakçıs* were chosen by the ambassadors and consuls from among the janissaries to function as their guards. It appears that in some cases the European consuls and ambassadors utilized the service of these soldiers as couriers, since they could travel more safely through the empire.

<sup>5</sup> See Van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, 93–97.

<sup>6</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...Nederlande vilâyetlerinde olanların da'vâ ve husûmeti vâki' olup dem-i diyet da'vâları olursa elçileri ve konsolosları âyinleri üzere görüp fasl edip kadılardan ve zâbitlerden bir ferd dahl ü ta'arruz kılmayalar..."

<sup>7</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...Nederlande vilâyetlerine tâbi' olan yerlerin bezirganları ve konsolosları ve tercümanları Memâlik-i mahrûsamızda bey' ü şîrâ ve ticâret ve kefâlet hususlarında ve sâ'ir umûr-ı şer'iyye v'ki' oldukça kadiya varıp sebt ü sicil ettirip veya hüccet alalar sonra niza' olur ise hüccet ve sicile nazar olunup mücebi ile amel oluna bu ikisinden biri olmayıp da mücerred celb ve ahz için ettikleri da'vâ istima' olunmayıp mâdem ki kadılardan hüccet olunmaya ve sicilde mastûr bulunmaya hilâf-ı şer'-i şerîf rencide olunmayalar..."

in local courts.<sup>8</sup> Another aspect of this juridical autonomy involved the inheritances of European merchants: they were free to handle these matters without interference by Ottoman authorities.<sup>9</sup> In the capitulations it was also stipulated that when a European merchant was taken to the court of a qadi, the trial could not begin unless a dragoman of the nation to which the merchant belonged was also present in court.<sup>10</sup>

The capitulations also included certain articles related to the taxation of European trade in Ottoman ports. During the eighteenth century, these articles set the tax rate of goods imported and exported by the capitulatory nations at three percent on an ad valorem basis.<sup>11</sup> This rate was not valid for gold and silver money, which were totally exempt from all taxes.<sup>12</sup> When the European merchants, after having paid the relevant customs dues, wanted to transport their goods from one port to another within the empire, they did not need to pay customs dues again.<sup>13</sup> The capitulations also indicated that Europeans residing in Ottoman dominions were exempt from all local taxes. European ships, on the other hand, had to pay three hundred aspers as *selâmetlik akçesi* upon their departure from Ottoman ports.<sup>14</sup> One important point mentioned in the capitulations concerns

<sup>8</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "... tâcirlerin ahvâli için nasb eyledikleri konsoloslardan bazı kimseler da'vâ ettiklerinde kendilerin habs etmeyeler ve evlerini mühürlemeyeler konsolosları ve tercümanları ile daâvâları olanların husûsları Âsitane-i Sa'âdette istima' oluna ve zikr olunan mevâddın hilâfına mukaddem ve muahhar emir ibraz olunur ise istima' olunmayıp Ahidnâme-i hümayûnum mûcibince amel oluna..."

<sup>9</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...Nederlande vilâyetlerine tâbî' olanlardan biri mürd olsa Ahidnâme-i hümayûna muhâlif emvâl ve erzâkına beytûlmâlcılar mâl-ı gâibdir deyu vesâir vecihle dahl ü ta'arruz etmeyeler..."

<sup>10</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...Nederlandelü ile bir kimesnenin niza'ı olsa kadiya vardıkta Nederlandelünün tercümanı hazır bulunmaz ise kadı da'vâlarını istima' etmeye eğer mühim maslahat ise gelince tevkif oluna ammâ anlar dahî ta'allül edip tercümanımız hazır değildir deyu 'avk etmeyeler..." For an extensive investigation of the juridical implications of the capitulations see Van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, 33–52.

<sup>11</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...ve müşârun ileyhimin rızâlarıyla tüccarları vilâyetlerinden getirdükleri ve alup götürdükleri metâ'lardan Haleb'de ve İskenderiye'de vesâir yerlerde yüzde üç akçe gümrük vereler ziyâde vermeyeler..."

<sup>12</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...tüccar tâifesi Memâlik-i mahrûsamıza gelip ve gidüp alış veriş edip getirdikleri altın ve guruştan resm-i gümrük alınmayıp..."

<sup>13</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...bey' için ihrâc olunan meta'dan ma'adâ çıkarmayup gemilerinde kalan meta'dan İstanbul'da ve herhangi iskelede olursa âhar iskeleyle alıp gideriz dediklerinde gümrük taleb eylemeyeler ve âhar iskeleyle alıp gitmeye mâni' olmayalar..."

<sup>14</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...onlara tâbî' olup Memâlik-i mahrûsamızda mütemekkin olanlar eğer ulu ve eğer ergin olsun rençberlik

the so-called *konsolosluk hakkı*, or *konsulato resmi* (consular dues), which was collected by the consulates in return for the services they provided to merchants. According to the relevant articles, the amount of these dues was to be determined by European authorities without the intervention of Ottoman officials. It was stipulated that each European consul had the right to levy these dues on goods imported and exported by ships carrying his nation's flag.<sup>15</sup>

As we can see from this summary, the Ottoman capitulations dealt exclusively with the institutions established in Ottoman dominions, while the offshore and foreign aspects of organization of this trade were completely disregarded. With regard to institutions within Ottoman dominions, the capitulations stipulated that each nation maintain a consul and enough dragomans at the ports where it traded, or ensure its countrymen's protection through one of the other European consuls present at that particular port. Accordingly, the capitulations allowed European nations to set up their own financial systems to sustain consular services provided to the merchants. The limited judicial autonomy accorded to the capitulatory nations meant that these nations should also run their judicial or semi-judicial systems to solve disputes involving individuals from their own nations. Despite some ambiguity in these articles of the capitulations, the consular networks established by each European nation were similar to each other. A close look at the Dutch case is certainly useful to gain an insight into the organization of these institutions. For this purpose, I will focus on the major adjustments made in the regulations related to the Dutch consulates in the Levant in the 1670s, when the Dutch Levant trade organization established the solid structure it maintained through the eighteenth century.

In the 1670s, growing intra-communal conflicts plagued the Dutch nation in Izmir. The dissatisfactions of the merchants and the consul were reflected in the petitions they sent to the home authorities, prompting the

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edenlerden hara talep olunmaya ve elileri hizmetinde olan konsoloslar ve tercümanlar olageldiđi üzere harâcdan ve kasâbiyyeden ve sair tekâlif-i örfiyyeden mu'âf olalar... hâdis olan kassâbiyye ve reft ve bâc ve yasakkulu alınmaya ve gemileri gittiklerinde üç yüz ake selâmetlik resminden ziyâde talep olunmaya..."

<sup>15</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 5–11/12, evâil-i Ramazan 1091/24.09–03.10.1680, "...ve tüccâr tâifesi Nederlandelü olsun gayrı her kim olursa olsun Netherlande gemilerine tahmîl edip getirdikleri ve alıp götürdükleri her nereden olursa olsun gümrük alına gelen meta'lardan elilik ve konsolosluk hakkını Netherlande üstâdı ceneralleri vaz' ettikleri âdet üzere eliye ve konsoloslarına vereler kimesne mâni' olmaya..." This point was also mentioned in the *berats* given to Dutch consuls. See for example NA 1.02.20, 1093/5; BOA ED 22/1, 129/457.

Dutch authorities to formulate extensive new regulations re-organizing the Dutch consular network in the Levant.<sup>16</sup> The most important of these regulations was a statute approved by the SG (States General) in 1675 that primarily concerned the consular dues to be levied on goods imported and exported from Izmir and Istanbul, though it had some implications for other aspects of the organization of Dutch Levant trade as well.<sup>17</sup> The first article of the statute prescribed that the rate of consular dues to be levied on goods handled by Dutch merchants in Izmir and Istanbul was 1.5 percent ad valorem on imports and on exports. In the same article, it was explicitly mentioned that this duty was to be levied on all goods imported, exported or managed by Dutch merchants, whether these goods were transported on Dutch or foreign ships.<sup>18</sup> This article was in apparent contradiction to the capitulatory article that authorized Dutch consuls to levy consular dues only on merchandise carried by Dutch ships, without any regard to the nationality of the merchants to whom the goods belonged. The first article of the statute of 1675 also indicated that the cash belonging to Dutch nationals, whether in gold or silver, was subject to a 3/4 percent consular dues. On 30 July 1692, the SG raised the rate of consular dues to 2 percent for goods and 1 percent for cash, and in 1750 it suspended the practice of levying a 1 percent consular due on Dutch

<sup>16</sup> See the following works by W. E. van Dam van Isselt, "Enige lotgevallen van Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna van 1668–1688," *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 6 (1907): 78–136; "De klachten, tusschen 1672 en 1675 ingebracht tegen Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna (1668–1688)," *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 6 (1907): 277–351; "Het ontwerp-regeeringsreglement voor de Levant van 1673 en het formulier van 1675," *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 6 (1907): 379–429; "Het 'in train brengen' van het in 1675 voor de Levant ontworpen formulier (1675–1680)," *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 7 (1909): 289–332; and "De dertien 'discreperende' koopleden te Smirna. (1685–1687)," *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 8 (1910): 1–42.

<sup>17</sup> RGP 34, 208–217, Formulier, waernaer ende volgens hetwelcke den heer resident tot Constantinopolen, consul tot Smirna, aengesteld bij de H. M. heeren Staten-Generael der vereenigde Nederlanden, en de gantsche Nederlantsche natie in de Levant residerende, respective, haer sullen hebben te reguleren ontrent den ontfanck en distributie van de ambassaet- en consulaet-rechten. On Dutch consular dues see also Didericus Warnerus Canneman, "De Batavorum Mercatura Levantica," PhD thesis ([The Hague] Hagae Comitatus, Leiden, 1839), 205–209.

<sup>18</sup> At the beginning of the eighteenth century, English consular dues were similar to that of the Dutch: 2 percent for all imported and exported goods and 1 percent for coins. In the early 1710s these fees were doubled to 4 percent on imported and exported goods and 2 percent for coins. However, according to the regulations introduced on 20 December 1686, English merchants were obliged to pay 20 percent for goods they transported with foreign ships. Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 205–206.



merchants' goods carried on foreign ships.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, consular dues on jewels and coins belonging to Dutch merchants were reduced to  $\frac{1}{4}$  percent from the beginning of 1752 onward.<sup>20</sup>

The treasurers of the Dutch nation in Istanbul and Izmir were responsible for collecting these dues (art. 2). These treasurers met once a week with the consuls and assessors. During these meetings, they recorded the accounts of revenue and deposited funds into the general treasury. Upon the arrival or departure of a convoy, the consul, assessors, and the treasurer met the next day to ensure that the money entered the general treasury as soon as possible. These meetings were used not only for dealing with revenue, but also for deliberating on matters pertaining to trade in general (art. 9). While the treasurer in Izmir was appointed by the DLH and received a salary, in Istanbul the treasurer's role was initially carried out by the ambassadorial secretary, who was assisted by two assessors in this task (art. 3–4). It did not take long, however, before a treasurer was appointed to the embassy as well.<sup>21</sup>

The assessors at the embassy and the consulates were appointed by the DLH from among the Dutch merchants. It was prescribed that they be three in number, in each consulate and in the embassy. These assessors served the nation for one year. Four months prior to the expiration of the assessors' period of service, the consul, treasurer, and assessors would recommend four new candidates to the DLH, which would then appoint two new assessors from among these persons. In this way, it was ensured that one of the earlier assessors remained in service during the next year (art. 5). The ambassador and treasurer, as well as the president of the assessors in Istanbul, were responsible for keeping track of funds, and for sending an account of embassy revenue and expenses to Izmir once every six months (art. 6). This meant that the financial affairs of the Dutch consular network in the Levant were centralized in Izmir, not in Istanbul.

The tenth article of the statute stated that the ambassadors and consuls were responsible for administering the oaths, sworn annually by the treasurers, assessors, and all Dutch merchants in the Levant. As the home authorities attached great importance to these oaths, their texts were also

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<sup>19</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/13, 19.6.1750, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped. In fact, in 1714 the Dutch nation of Izmir applied to the DLH for the suspension of the practice. But the DLH refused to comply with the request, alleging that it would harm Dutch shipping and textile exports to the Levant. RGP 34, 356–357.

<sup>20</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/19, 21.09.1751, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>21</sup> By 1699 there was also a treasurer in Istanbul. RGP 34, 293–294.

prescribed at the end of the statute. On 30 July 1692, the SG introduced a penalty of LD 400 for those who failed to swear the oath. In the course of the eighteenth century, Dutch merchants repeatedly and persistently tried to convince the home authorities to abolish the practice, but the DLH made no concessions in this regard.<sup>22</sup> The statute of the 1675 also stipulated that all captains, mates, secretaries, and other individuals who had authority in loading and unloading ships had to sign and hand in cargo manifests to the ambassador, consul, treasurer, or the assessors, and to swear a special oath upon loading and unloading their ships (art. 11). The statute introduced a double control of cargoes to ensure that the consular dues were collected properly. Along with the captains' obligation to submit the cargo manifest of his ship, within three days after the arrival or departure of a ship, all merchants had to submit an account of the merchandise they had remitted or received from it. Then the consular dues had to be paid within eight days after the accounts were submitted (art. 12).

The thirteenth article of the statute set the ambassadors and consuls to assist treasurers and assessors in collecting consular dues from the Dutch, as well as from foreigners. The consul, treasurer, and assessors were also empowered to nominate and appoint competent dragomans and janissaries to the service of the nation (art. 14). According to the statute, ordinary gifts that the nation gave to the Ottoman authorities were to be arranged together by the ambassador/consul, treasurer, and the assessors. In case an extraordinary expenditure was to be made, all Dutch nations in Ottoman dominions had to convene to decide the matter. If the treasury in Istanbul lacked the necessary funds to make such expenses, the treasurer in Izmir had to remit sufficient money to Istanbul (art. 15).

Articles 16–19 regulated the salaries of the ambassador in Istanbul and the consul in Izmir. According to these articles, the ambassador received a six-month salary of f (guilders) 6,250, or 2,500 reals of eight, and the consul in Izmir received f5,000, or 2,000 reals of eight.<sup>23</sup> However, several expenses were included in these salaries. The ambassador was responsible for his own housekeeping, rent, and related expenses, and had to employ

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<sup>22</sup> See Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 109–141.

<sup>23</sup> The English consul in Izmir received 3,000–4,500 dollars per annum during the eighteenth century. Wood, *History*, 217–218. Wood notes that the English consuls' appointments were higher than the French equivalents, and therefore English consuls could make better appearances than their French counterparts. A real was a Spanish silver coin widely circulating in the Levant.

as many dragomans and janissaries as the nation needed. He also had to pay a six-month salary of f300, or 120 reals of eight, to the chaplain, and provide him with lodging and food. The ambassador was also responsible for the salary of the embassy secretary, who received 200 reals of eight; the consul was expected to provide the chaplain with lodging and food and arrange a place of worship. The six-month salaries of other functionaries in the consulate of Izmir were fixed as follows: the chaplain received f300 or 120 reals of eight; the treasurer received 350 reals of eight; and the chancellor received 100 reals of eight. The salaries of the dragomans and the janissaries were left to the discretion of the consul, treasurer, and assessors.

Although the statute of 1675 was intended to regulate the collection of consular dues and the administration of the financial affairs of the Dutch diplomatic establishments in the Levant, it also outlined the organization of these establishments.<sup>24</sup> Another statute, about the organization of clerical affairs in the Levant, was approved by the SG in 1678.<sup>25</sup> On 17 January 1686, the SG approved a directive regulating juridical procedures concerning commercial disputes between Dutch merchants in the Levant, according to which such disputes were to be judged by the ambassadors or consuls and assessors. The verdicts of these functionaries could later be brought to court in the Dutch Republic.<sup>26</sup> The organization of other European consular networks was quite similar to that of the Dutch.<sup>27</sup> This similarity should be attributed to what De Groot called "the framework of reception of foreign elements" which predated the Ottoman presence in the Levant.<sup>28</sup>

The second part of the organization of western European trade in the Levant encompassed the institutions established in European countries, and the regulations that shaped these institutions. Neither the capitulations nor other Ottoman regulations governed this aspect of the Levant trade. Consequently, each European nation set up different institutions with different regulations. The most important factors in the international differences in organizations and regulations were probably domestic

<sup>24</sup> On the administration of Dutch "nations" in the Levant, see also Canneman, "De Batavorum Mercatura Levantica," 97–137.

<sup>25</sup> RGP 34, 229–232.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 251–254.

<sup>27</sup> See Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 76–103.

<sup>28</sup> Alexander H. de Groot, "The Organization of Western European Trade in the Levant," in *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancient Regime*, ed. Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (The Hague, Leiden, 1981), 241.

social, economic, and political conditions within the countries. But a comprehensive investigation of these conditions is beyond the scope of this work. Here, it is important to mention only that certain common features of these organizations—and the need to organize Levant trade at all—generally stemmed from the long distance involved in this trade and the prevailing insecurity of Mediterranean travel.<sup>29</sup> In connection with these factors, unstable market conditions in the Levant also necessitated trade regulations and institutions. Although it took some time for the western European capitulatory nations to build up a well-defined and well-regulated organizational structure, by the beginning of the eighteenth century the French, English, and Dutch—the major western European trade partners of the Ottoman Empire—had established their organizations and set their regulations, which did not undergo radical changes until the end of the eighteenth century.

In his aforementioned article on the organization of western European trade in the Levant, De Groot writes: “No companies flourished in the Mediterranean except the English.”<sup>30</sup> This statement should not be understood to mean that western European trade with the Mediterranean was generally free trade, open to all nations’ participation. In fact, the Dutch were the only nation among the major western European trade partners of the Ottoman Empire who pursued free trade policies in the Levant. The most important institution relevant to Dutch Levant trade was established on 25 June 1625 with the support of Cornelis Haga (Dutch ambassador at the Porte from 1611 to 1639) and by the request of several Amsterdam merchants taking part in trade with the Levant.<sup>31</sup> This body, the “Gentlemen Directors of Levant Trade and Navigation in the Mediterranean Sea”<sup>32</sup> (DLH), was not a company with a monopoly, but rather a board of control and advice. Members of the DLH were chosen by the burgomasters of Amsterdam from among Amsterdam merchants trading with the Levant. The board comprised seven members who held weekly meetings and discussed issues related to trade and navigation in the Mediterranean. The burgomasters of Amsterdam replaced three or four board members each year.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 231–244. If we are to take insurance rates as an indication of the extent of (in) security, we should note that these rates (between Amsterdam and Izmir) were 3 percent on 24 May 1734 and 5 percent on 15 November 1735. GL Firma Van Eys, 11/895–896, 1047–1048.

<sup>30</sup> De Groot, “Organization of Western European Trade,” 235.

<sup>31</sup> RGP 10, 968–972.

<sup>32</sup> *Directeuren van den Levantschen Handel en de Navigatie in de Middellandsche Zee*.

Although it was established and controlled by the municipality of Amsterdam, the directorate of Amsterdam also acted as a state institution in the interest of merchants, and dominated the Levant trade policies of the Dutch Republic until the nineteenth century. One of the most important tasks of the directorate was to correspond with the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul and with consuls in the ports of the Levant and North Africa. Although the States General formally appointed the consuls and ambassadors in the Levant, it was the directorate of Amsterdam that, in practice, determined these appointments by advising the SG.<sup>33</sup> The DLH enjoyed considerable autonomy in its conduct of Levant trade. It adjusted the fees to be levied on goods arriving at Levant ports and devised measures to safeguard Dutch shipping there. New regulations introduced in 1625, 1627, and 1633 widened the authority of the board over these issues.<sup>34</sup> The directorate was, however, responsible to the general accountancy office (*Generaliteytsrekenkamer*) in financial matters,<sup>35</sup> while measures regarding the security of Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean had to be taken in cooperation with the admiralty. Moreover, the directorate of Amsterdam had to deliberate important matters with *buiten leden* ("outside members," meaning the directors of Levant trade in other cities in the Dutch Republic) during general meetings, which took place at least once a year. Furthermore, principal regulations related to Levant trade had to be approved by the SG.<sup>36</sup>

A document dated 12 August 1749 lists the civil servants employed by the DLH as follows: a secretary, a collector (*ontfanger*), an appraiser-assessor (*taxateur*), and a clerk.<sup>37</sup> The DLH also had a correspondent at The Hague, who maintained the DLH's relations with the SG. To cover their expenses, the directors of Amsterdam were empowered to levy certain dues on ships departing to and arriving from the Mediterranean. One of these levies (*vrachtgeld*) was calculated on the basis of freight and was levied as 5 percent of the freight. This due was levied on ships arriving from the Mediterranean to Amsterdam.<sup>38</sup> The second tax was the *lastgeld*, fi per last, which was levied on all ships departing for or arriving from the

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<sup>33</sup> Niels Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 15, no. 1 (1967), 31, 48; De Groot, "Organization of Western European Trade," 234; RGP 34, 970–971.

<sup>34</sup> De Groot, "Organization of Western European Trade," 234–235.

<sup>35</sup> RGP 95, 12.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 1011.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 224–225.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, x, 86–91.

Mediterranean.<sup>39</sup> Foreign ships destined for and arriving from the Mediterranean were also liable to the *lastgeld*.<sup>40</sup> During the eighteenth century, the *levantrecht* was another due that ended up in the treasury of the DLH, despite the fact that it was collected by the officials of the admiralty. It was assumed that a 1 percent *levantrecht* was levied on all Levant goods reaching the Netherlands, directly or indirectly, without regard to the flag of the importing ship. There were important variations, however, in different ports until the SG decided (22 July 1749) that the tax be levied on all Levant goods at a rate of ½ percent.<sup>41</sup> Beyond these taxes, on 21 May 1770 the SG introduced an additional due, aimed at protecting Dutch shipping in the Levant from Ottoman merchants who were hiring “foreign” ships and carrying their goods to the Netherlands aboard these ships. The SG prescribed that all goods arriving from the Levant to the Netherlands on foreign ships were subject to an additional 5 percent ad valorem tax, which was to be calculated according to the tariff of 1762.<sup>42</sup>

These taxes were collected at the ports in the Netherlands, while at the Levant ports consular dues were the primary source of income of Dutch consular establishments. In addition to the consular dues, merchants trading under Dutch protection had to pay other fees as well. One example of

<sup>39</sup> One *last* amounted to about 2 tons or 2 m<sup>3</sup>. See WNT, “Last.”

<sup>40</sup> During the second half of the seventeenth century the *lastgeld* for the ships departing to and arriving from the Levant was 10 *stuivers* per last. (The Dutch currency system at the time comprised four main elements, these were the guilder: *stuiver*: *duit*: *penning*. Two *pennings* were equal to one *duit*, 8 *duits* were equal to one *stuiver*, and 20 *stuivers* were equal to one *guilder*.) The burgomasters of Amsterdam wanted to increase the tax to 20 *stuivers* per last in 1669. But the DLH decided to tax the ships according to size, without regard to their real loading, and kept the *lastgeld* at 10 *stuivers* per last. On 26 June 1675 the *lastgeld* was raised to 20 *stuivers* per last (RGP 34, 13–14, 19). It is clear that the *lastgeld* was levied at 20 *stuivers* (1 guilder) per last during the eighteenth century (RGP 95, XI, 86–91, 100, 582–628). See also Hermann Wätjen, *Die Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit Ihrer Hoechsten Machtstellung* (Berlin, 1909), 178–180.

<sup>41</sup> RGP 95, 335. The *levantrecht*, which was originally called *tanza*, was introduced in the seventeenth century and collected by the admiralty from 1 February 1666 onward (RGP 34, 13). In 1735, the DLH tried to ensure that the *levantrecht* was levied uniformly on all goods originating from the Levant and arriving at several ports in the Netherlands, but apparently failed (RGP 95, 64–73). In 1737 the merchants of Rotterdam wanted to discharge the tax to disburden the Levant trade. Leiden merchants opposed the idea, especially discharging the *levantrecht* from finished textiles such as “*bordaten*” and “*dimitten*.” There was a plan to adjust the tax to 0.5 percent for raw materials (*ongefabriceerde goederen*) and 1 percent for finished goods (RGP 95, 97 fn. 2). It appears that the rate of the *levantrecht* was already decreased to ½ percent on “*drogerijen*, *verfstoffen*, *cattoene garens*, *Turkse garens*, *fruyten als rosijn*, *vygen en corenten*, *zyde of pluys van szde*, *coffy*, *cattoene*, *woollen*, *geytewollen*, *kameelshair*, *rijs*, *potasch*, *soda*, *caroba*, *hout*, *zout*, *wax*, *corduanen* en alle soorten van huyden en leeren,” before the resolution of 22 July 1749. RGP 95, 98.

<sup>42</sup> NA 1.02.22, 113/32, 21.05.1770, resolution of the SG.

these fees was introduced at the request of Dutch merchants in Izmir on 22 February 1704. The levy was intended to finance the Dutch community's endeavors to renew its capitulations with the insertion of a tariff. During the early years of the eighteenth century, the Dutch merchants in Izmir, especially, argued that English merchants enjoyed a considerable advantage over the Dutch since the English had been to insert a tariff in their capitulations. Allegedly, this tariff helped the English merchants to avoid the chicaneries of Ottoman customs officials. Since the merchants were ready to finance the costs of such an adjustment in their capitulations, the DLH approved levying LD 1 on every piece of Dutch cloth imported to Izmir, Istanbul, and Aleppo. Although the intended renewal of the Dutch capitulation did not take place, the tax remained in effect under the name *tot maintien van de tariff* ("for maintaining the tariff")<sup>43</sup> and it appears that by the 1740s it had evolved into a ¼ percent ad valorem tax levied on all goods entering the scope of Dutch Levant trade.<sup>44</sup> *Dragomanie*,<sup>45</sup> or *şerbetlik hakkı*, was another due that the Dutch authorities levied on goods carried by Dutch ships. Although Nanninga<sup>46</sup> suggests that this specific due was exacted exclusively from foreigners, it appears that all goods carried on Dutch ships were subject to the payment. The *dragomanie* was calculated as 2 ½ percent of the consular dues and was reserved for the dragomans in the service of Dutch consuls and ambassadors.<sup>47</sup>

Since the directors of Amsterdam were exclusive representatives of the interests of Amsterdam merchants trading with the Levant, a number of subsidiary boards were established in other cities of the Dutch Republic to represent the interests of the merchants of those places. The earliest of these boards was established in Hoorn in 1658, followed by a Rotterdam board in 1670. The board in Rotterdam also included delegates from Dordrecht and Leiden. These boards were followed by Zeeland (Middelburg) in 1696 and Ostend in 1817.<sup>48</sup> These directorates collected the same taxes in their respective quarters as the Amsterdam directorate, but in general were not as influential as the latter in determining Dutch trade policies

<sup>43</sup> RGP 34, 322–323, 368–369.

<sup>44</sup> RGP 95, 211–213, 11.03.1748, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>45</sup> On *dragomanie* see also Canneman, "De Batavorum Mercatura Levantica," 209–210.

<sup>46</sup> See Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 131–132.

<sup>47</sup> RGP 95, 452, 22.01.1765, Ordonantie van de Heer Consul en Assessooren (Te Smirna) Weegens de Maakelaardy aan de Draaglieden; NA 01.03.01, 138, 16.01.1749, A. van den Sanden to the DLH.

<sup>48</sup> De Groot, "Organization of Western European Trade," 234. See also Canneman, "De Batavorum Mercatura Levantica," 44–96.



in the Levant. In their decisions and activities, the directors of Amsterdam sometimes faced the opposition of the subsidiary directorates, who argued that the Amsterdam board acted high-handedly. The admiralty also complained at times that the DLH interfered with their business.<sup>49</sup>

The organization of English Levant trade constituted a striking contrast to that of the Dutch. It was organized as a monopoly of a chartered company (the English Levant Company), which first received exclusive rights to trade with the Levant in 1581 for an initial seven years, and then, after several temporary extensions, received these rights in perpetuity in 1605. The head of the company was the governor, who was elected annually by a special general court of election or meeting of all members. Elections to other posts in the company's administration were also conducted during these meetings.<sup>50</sup> The English Levant Company was not a joint stock company, but a company whose members traded independently under strict regulations. The charter of 1605 was granted at a time when anti-monopoly ideas prevailed in Parliament. Therefore, membership to the company was not limited to a certain number of merchants, but was open to all subjects of the British crown who fulfilled certain criteria. Thus, while foreigners were completely excluded from membership, subjects of the British crown could apply for membership if they possessed certain qualities. Members of the company were expected to be "mere merchants," that is merchants who did not take part in retail trade. They had to pay an entrance fee of £25 if they were younger than twenty-seven years, and of £50 otherwise. Londoners who wanted to join the company had to be freemen of London, while no such prescriptions existed for people outside London. Although the Levant Company theoretically did not prohibit non-members from taking part in English trade with the Levant, it did so in practice by levying an additional 20 percent due on goods of non-members who took part in this trade.<sup>51</sup>

The English Levant Company not only regulated membership to the company but also the employment of apprentices, or "factors," who were installed in Levant ports to carry out the business of their principals in England. Generally the factors were "the sons of freemen or of gentlemen and cadets of noble families" apprenticed to company members. Employment of Ottoman merchants as factors was strictly prohibited by com-

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<sup>49</sup> RGP 34, 1; RGP 95, 72n1; Wätjen, *Die Niederländer*, 182.

<sup>50</sup> Wood, *History*, 1–40, 205–228.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 40–41, 49; Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 50.



pany regulations. Apprentices were also held to considerable premiums, payable by the candidate to the principal. English factors received 2–3 percent from their principals in return for their services. Before the death or departure from trade of their principals, factors could not offer their service to other company members, but they could trade in their own right while also handling the business of their principals.<sup>52</sup>

In researching strategies to overcome English and Dutch competition in the Levant in 1670, Colbert (1619–83), the renowned finance minister of France, decided to create a French Levant company modeled after the English one. Although this project was ill-fated, Colbert's other undertakings laid the ground for French success in eighteenth-century Levant trade. Throughout the eighteenth century, the near-monopoly of a small group, the merchants of Marseille—who were responsible for the failure of Colbert's Levant Company imitation—characterized French trade with the Levant. The keystone of the organization of French trade with the Levant was the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille, which effectively controlled this trade. The chamber acted as an arbiter and policymaker on matters concerning trade with the Levant. Though the French ambassador in Istanbul, who was appointed by the crown, counterbalanced the chamber's influence, the French Levant trade organization was extensively centralized at the chamber, and was much more comprehensively regulated than that of either the Dutch or the English.<sup>53</sup>

The French traders in Levant ports (*régisseurs*) resembled their English counterparts in that they were sent by their *majeurs* to handle the latter's business in these ports. The *régisseurs* were friends, partners, sons, nephews or younger brothers of the *majeurs*, who simply established and financed them. Like the English factors, *régisseurs* handled the goods of their *majeurs* and received 2 percent commission on sales and 3 percent on purchases. To prevent disorder and competition among the merchants, the chamber and other French authorities limited the number of *régisseurs* at the end of the seventeenth century by limiting the settlement of French merchants in the Levant to those with the permission of the chamber. Moreover, the chamber also fixed the number of French trading houses in each Levant port. In the course of the eighteenth century, new regulations were launched by the crown and finance ministry. These

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<sup>52</sup> Wood, *History*, 215. For the factors see also Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 75–95.

<sup>53</sup> Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden, 1999), 40–42; Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 44n2.

regulations, which did not always please the chamber, increased the restrictions on *régisseur* qualifications, introducing a lower age limit, a maximum residence period of ten years, and a security of 60,000 *livres*. Another set of regulations was aimed at organizing the supply of French goods in the Levant. The “arrangements,” as they were called, related to textile producers and merchants, and introduced fixed prices, monitored and proportional sales, and limits to the number of textile producers for Levant markets.<sup>54</sup> In sum, “French mercantilist policies ensured that Ottoman merchants—in the same way as other foreigners—were excluded from the Levant trade through all sorts of prohibitions, ranging from the right to export or import goods to and from France to that of settling on French territory.”<sup>55</sup>

The Dutch neither implemented such restrictions against foreign merchants, nor maintained any hierarchy comparable to the French (*majeurs* versus *régisseurs*) and English (principals versus factors) between Dutch merchants in the Netherlands and Dutch merchants in Levant ports. In the Dutch case, the latter were free traders who could offer their services to anyone they wished and conclude joint ventures with merchants in the Netherlands.<sup>56</sup> According to Wätjen, there were two sorts of Dutch merchants in the seventeenth-century Levant. One group comprised brokers who handled the business of Dutch merchants in the Netherlands and received a fixed commission for their services. It appears that these merchants remained for the greater part of their life in the Levant. The other group of merchants were junior partners of certain Dutch firms in the Netherlands and served their home firms as agents for a limited period.<sup>57</sup> For the eighteenth-century Dutch Levant trade, the Levant connections of Daniel van Eys, a textile producer in Leiden, probably reflect the rule rather than the exception.<sup>58</sup> Rolland & Ploegstert<sup>59</sup> in Izmir wrote to Daniel van Eys on 9 September 1734 that they were interested in the fabrics Van Eys had consigned earlier to Saffi Samours, another merchant in Izmir,

<sup>54</sup> Eldem, *French Trade*, 57, 203–210, 260.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 280.

<sup>56</sup> The joint ventures between Dutch merchants in the Levant and those in the Netherlands took the form of commenda and its derivatives in the sense that they were venture-based profit-loss sharing partnerships. I would like to thank Prof. Murat Çizakça, who kindly answered my questions on this kind of business partnership.

<sup>57</sup> Wätjen, *Die Niederländer*, 184–189.

<sup>58</sup> On Daniel van Eys and his firm see J. W. Veluwenkamp, “De Leidse Lakenonderneemer Daniel van Eys, 1688–1739,” *Jaarboekje voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde van Leiden en Omstreken* 84 (1992): 109–124.

<sup>59</sup> The firm was a partnership of Johan Ploegstert and Nicolas Rolland.

though Rolland & Ploegstert had not previously communicated with Van Eys. Van Eys duly informed the merchants in Izmir with a letter dated 20 January 1735. Rolland & Ploegstert found the prices too high, however, and decided not to invest in the fabrics, but told Van Eys that they were ready to handle his business if he wanted to send a consignment. They told Van Eys that he could investigate their reliability through their other correspondents in Leiden and Amsterdam.<sup>60</sup> As Van Eys decided to experiment with their service, he consigned two shipments of clothes to Rolland & Ploegstert; one, worth f1,824 CIF, on 27 September 1735,<sup>61</sup> and another, worth f1,608 CIF, on 15 November 1735.<sup>62</sup> The returns of Van Eys' consignments arrived on 2 May and 21 August 1737 in the Netherlands, except for a remainder of LD 63.65, which arrived in late 1739.<sup>63</sup> In the meantime, the partnership between Johan Ploegstert and Nicolas Rolland came to an end (before March 1737) and both merchants offered their services independently to Van Eys (Johan Ploegstert on 13 March 1737 and Nicolas Rolland on 6 April 1737).<sup>64</sup> From their correspondence, it is clear that while they were handling Van Eys' venture, Rolland & Ploegstert had been doing business with other merchants in Amsterdam and Leiden, such as Jacob Arollenvaux, who was a burgomaster of Leiden and a cousin of Daniel van Eys.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, Daniel van Eys was himself also doing business with other merchants in Izmir, such as Jean Francois Tiran and Jean Silvy fils & Co., with whom he had invested in a joint venture in fabrics.<sup>66</sup>

This short account clearly shows that the Dutch merchants in Izmir were neither apprentices nor factors of firms in the Netherlands. It is probable that the majority of them handled the consignments of Dutch entrepreneurs at home for commissions amounting from 2 to 2.5 percent for sales<sup>67</sup> and from 2.5 to 4 percent for purchases,<sup>68</sup> making a total of 5–6 percent of the investment. This did not mean that they were bound to a certain "principal" in the Netherlands, since they could contact whomever they wished, and trade in their own right, as well as invest in joint

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<sup>60</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a.

<sup>61</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 11/1032. CIF refers to cost, insurance, and freight.

<sup>62</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 11/1047–1048.

<sup>63</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, Grootboek/243.

<sup>64</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a.

<sup>65</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, 18 April 1735, Rolland & Ploegstert to Daniel van Eys; GL Firma Van Eys, 14, 1 September 1735, Daniel van Eys to Rolland & Ploegstert.

<sup>66</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a.

<sup>67</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 11/962–963, 1110.

<sup>68</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 11/1138–1139, 1192–1193.

ventures. This peculiarity of the Dutch organization of Levant trade proved to be a crucial factor in enabling the Ottoman merchants to take the first step toward penetrating the entire Dutch Levant trade network, all the way to Amsterdam. This first step was to take over the Dutch merchants' place in the Levant by establishing direct contacts with entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. This would have been impossible in the French and English contexts because of those countries' regulations on Levant trade.

The English Levant Company's control over English navigation in the Mediterranean was another way to prevent outsiders from participating in English Levant trade. The company exercised this control by compelling its members to consign their goods exclusively by so-called "general," or "joint," ships. General ships were introduced in 1625 for the first time and were appointed and dispatched once a year. Company members were sometimes allowed to consign their goods by private ships, but the use of private ships was mostly forbidden, under penalty of an additional 20 percent duty on goods. General ships were basically intended to ensure that neither Levant markets nor English markets were glutted with each other's goods. However, since the cargo space of general ships was apportioned among the members of the company, their use also served to prevent outsiders from consigning goods to and from England.<sup>69</sup> In 1744, as a result of heavy criticism from its members, the company freed merchants from compulsory use of general ships. Nevertheless, even thereafter, the greater part of English Levant trade was carried by general ships of the company.<sup>70</sup>

In accordance with their free trade policies, the Dutch also pursued rather liberal policies with respect to Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean. An individual ship owner would decide independently to undertake a voyage to the Levant and announce the voyage to the public, stating the ship's destination, armament, and number of crew members.<sup>71</sup> The authorities did control whether these ships were furnished with sufficient armament and crew in accordance with regulations.<sup>72</sup> In wartime and under extraordinarily insecure conditions, the DLH asked the admiralty to escort Dutch ships to their destination. The admiralty, however, was not always willing to comply with the demands of the DLH; if the admiralty provided warships, they were careful to keep these voyages as short

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<sup>69</sup> Wood, *History*, 136–137.

<sup>70</sup> Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 173–177.

<sup>71</sup> See RGP 95, 547.

<sup>72</sup> RGP 34, 7; Wätjen, *Die Niederlander*, 196–197.

as possible, rendering the voyages less profitable for ship owners.<sup>73</sup> On 17 June 1711, the DLH complained that even though they had paid the corresponding expenses, they were not provided with a convoy during the War of the Spanish Succession. Consequently, the merchants had had to pay a 50 percent insurance premium for their return journey, while the English and French merchants, having been provided with a convoy, could insure their merchandise at a premium of 14 percent. Such difficulties did not end after the war, as the extensive regulations that prescribed high armament and other facility standards for Dutch ships heading to the Mediterranean rendered these voyages impossible in the face of English and French competition, because the latter nations could operate between Amsterdam and the Mediterranean without being bound to Dutch standards and regulations. After the War of the Spanish Succession, the DLH alleged, and due to these difficulties, the greater part of Dutch trade with the Levant was in fact carried by French and English ships.<sup>74</sup> The SG, however, remained unwilling to comply with the demands of the DLH and the Levant merchants, and French and English participation in the transport of Dutch goods continued to increase. Fearing that foreign ships' growing domination of Dutch trade would undermine their position, Dutch merchants in Izmir decided not to transport their goods by foreign ships, hoping that this would maintain the status of Dutch shipping in the Levant.<sup>75</sup>

The DLH and the Dutch merchants in the Levant paid close attention to the shipping policies of their republic, since these policies had considerable impact on Dutch trade with the Levant. On 24 January 1699 the DLH presented a report to the SG about the state of Dutch Levant trade, pointing out that it had undergone a considerable decline recently due to the infiltration of other European nations in the Dutch trade with the Levant. It was alleged that other nations bought Levant goods in large quantities; after their ships unloaded a part of their cargo in their own countries, they remitted the greater part of these goods to the Netherlands, to the detriment of Dutch merchants. The DLH proposed forbidding the import of Levantine goods except those imported directly by Dutch ships. The DLH also suggested that the nations that allowed the Dutch to participate in their trade with the Levant be exempted from this prohibition. The

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<sup>73</sup> RGP 34, 292–293, 295–297.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 6–7.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 364–366, 384.

DLH argued that this practice would also benefit Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean.<sup>76</sup> The first support for the proposition of the DLH came from the Dutch community of Izmir. On 6 February 1700, Daniel Jan de Hochepped, the Dutch consul in Izmir, sent the SG a summary of the discussions that took place at a relevant meeting of the Dutch community in Izmir. De Hochepped reported that the Izmir Dutch supported the idea of limiting the import of Levant goods to the Netherlands to those borne by Dutch ships, or the ships of nations that accorded the same free trade to the Dutch. De Hochepped pointed out that France prohibited the export of Dutch textiles to the Levant on French vessels during the Nine Years' War (1688–97), and that this had contributed considerably to the decline of the Dutch textile exports to the Levant. He also related that French merchants bartered a considerable amount of French textiles for Levantine goods, which they remitted from Marseille or other places to the Netherlands without paying any consular dues or other fees to Dutch authorities. It was difficult for Dutch merchants to compete with goods remitted by the French, who paid 2 percent consular dues in contrast to the Dutch 4 percent dues (2 percent for imports and 2 percent for exports). According to the merchants' calculations, there was extreme danger for fine goods such as silk and mohair yarn, though for bulky goods such as cotton, extra freight expenses for remitting these goods via Marseille were prohibitive. They estimated that the freight charge for 4,000 pounds of cotton remitted directly from Izmir to the Netherlands was about 80 rix dollars,<sup>77</sup> while it would amount to 90 rix dollars if it were remitted via Marseille. This discrepancy could amount to 15 percent of the value of the cotton, providing the Dutch a protective barrier against such practices. However, the case was quite the opposite for fine goods, for which the discrepancy amounted only to 1–2 percent. This included mohair yarn. Since foreign nations, especially the English and French, were allowed to sell Turkish mohair yarn in the Dutch Republic freely, they bartered considerable amounts of textiles from their countries for mohair yarn in Izmir, then remitted the yarn to the Netherlands. In this way, the French and the English could easily sell their textiles in the Levant and at the same time push up the prices of mohair yarn in Izmir, apparently to the detriment of the Dutch textile industry. If the import of Levantine goods to the Netherlands by foreigners were outlawed, Dutch merchants would be able to purchase

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 275–277.

<sup>77</sup> 1 rix dollar (Rijksdaalder) = 2.5 guilders.

mohair yarn for lower prices and would also be able to sell more Dutch textiles in the Levant. Despite the fact that regulations introduced with the treaty of Rijswijk (1697) stated that the French and Dutch were free to import Levantine goods into both countries, the French disregarded these regulations and hindered the entrance of Dutch ships and their cargo if they attempted to unload and sell Levant goods in Marseille.<sup>78</sup>

It might seem that the suggestions of the DLH and the Dutch nation in Izmir were exactly the same. In fact, there was a slight but crucial difference between the two. While the directors proposed limiting the import of Levantine goods to the Netherlands exclusively to goods that were imported directly from the Levant by Dutch ships, without explicitly demanding the total expulsion of foreigners from this trade, the Dutch nation in Izmir explicitly proposed to exclude foreigners and limit Dutch Levant trade to goods transported directly by Dutch ships. This difference became more marked in the course of the eighteenth century, and became clearer in the discussions about the participation of Ottoman merchants in Dutch Levant trade.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch had plenty of reasons to be alarmed about the state and future of their trade with the Levant. Between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, the greatest part of Dutch exports to Izmir was fine woolen textiles produced in the Netherlands from Spanish wool. During the 1670s, the Dutch exported 3,000 half-pieces of these textiles to the Levant, a quantity that rose to 6,000 half-pieces before the beginning of the Nine Years' War.<sup>79</sup> With the beginning of that war, Dutch trade with the Levant was interrupted suddenly, giving way to textiles from France, which forbade the import of Dutch textiles to Izmir on French vessels. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch consul in Izmir reported that the total import of Dutch woollens to the Levant had decreased to fewer than 3,000 half-pieces, due to the competition from French textiles and from what they called English "londens," which were imitations of Dutch textiles in their assortments and colors. The competition from the English and French textiles, and the free trade policies of the republic were blamed for the situation.<sup>80</sup> On 4 December 1700, Daniel

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<sup>78</sup> RGP 34, 302–308.

<sup>79</sup> 1688–1697. Jonathan Israel considers the Nine Years' War as the turning point in the history of the Dutch overseas trading system. Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 341, 359; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 858.

<sup>80</sup> RGP 34, 303–305.



Jan de Hochepped wrote that the French had gained considerable ground against the Dutch, and that the French had been recently buying considerable amounts of mohair yarn in Izmir while the English and Dutch could not due to rising prices. De Hochepped also reported that the recent French mohair yarn purchases were not intended for the Dutch market, but for their own textile industries, since recent rumors from Marseille related that the French had developed a new sort of a fashionable cloth produced from large amounts of Turkish mohair yarn. The new wave was expected to push prices up, because the demand in France was increasing considerably while the exportable amount of the product in Ankara and Beypazarı was limited to 5,000 bales at most. The French desire for mohair yarn was such that they transferred considerable amounts of cash to Izmir to purchase the product.<sup>81</sup>

Despite all efforts by the DLH and Dutch merchants, the crisis in Dutch Levant trade had not ended by the 1720s. On 10 January 1721 Daniel Jan de Hochepped wrote to the SG that the Dutch trade in Izmir had been declining markedly because of the successful activities of French merchants from Marseille and Provence. Allegedly, the French had introduced a new kind of fabric, produced in the Languedoc, that appealed to consumers in the Levant due to its lower price and additional colors and widths. The French sold these textiles for very low prices and compensated their losses by means of the returns they procured in the Levant, such as olive oil, grain, barley, and other provisions, including cheese, which could be easily and profitably marketed in Provence. Although the export of grain was forbidden by Ottoman regulations, the French knew how to overcome this prohibition by bribing the authorities. The French advance in procuring Anatolian products was not limited to these goods, but also extended into the main (branch) of Dutch trade (*hooftnegotie*), that is, the mohair yarn trade.<sup>82</sup>

This short account of the state of Dutch trade in the Levant during the first quarter of the eighteenth century reveals that in this period the Dutch had good reason to complain about French and English inroads into their trade with the Levant. For the remainder of the century, however, it was not the English or French inroads into Dutch trade but those of Ottoman merchants that dominated discussions in related sources. The complaints of the Dutch communities in the Levant, as well as several

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 309–311.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 374.



consular and ambassadorial reports combined to move the home authorities toward less liberal trade policies during the course of the eighteenth century. Consequently, Dutch trade with the Levant became increasingly controlled under newly-introduced regulations without altering its general free trade character, while the English and French monopolistic trade organizations, under attack by liberal parties, loosened and later abandoned their monopolistic structures. The French intermittently suspended monopoly regulations before abandoning them completely at the end of the century. When French navigation in the Mediterranean was stymied by the superior English navy during the naval conflicts of the eighteenth century, the French allowed foreigners to trade between France and the Levantine ports. This was the case during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) and the Seven Years' War (1756–63). During these conflicts, Ottoman merchants were able to make significant inroads into the French trading network. As the Dutch remained neutral during the latter conflict, they were also in a position to infiltrate French Levant trade.<sup>83</sup>

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the French, like the English, began to adopt more liberal trade policies and a less-exclusive approach to the participation of foreigners in French trade with the Levant. The first step in this direction was taken by the crown in 1781. Despite fierce protest from the merchants of Marseille and French merchants in the Levant, the crown authorized foreigners to participate in French trade, with the exception of trade in textiles, which remained reserved exclusively for French merchants. Although a counter movement succeeded in revoking this decree in 1785, more liberal policies followed. In 1791, the French parliament revoked all monopoly regulations, including those related to textile trade. Despite the fact that the extra 20 percent customs dues imposed on foreigners was intermittently introduced until 1815, after 1791, French trade with the Levant was no longer a monopoly. More importantly, due to the ensuing wars and Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, the commercial infrastructure of France had been totally destroyed by the end of the eighteenth century. This development, as well, stimulated foreign inroads into French trade with the Levant.<sup>84</sup>

Under attack by several interest groups, the monopolistic structure of the English Levant Company also loosened during the eighteenth century. The company faced the first onslaught of negative opinion during

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<sup>83</sup> Eldem, *French Trade*, 246.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 247–248; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 93–95.

the temporary decline of trade between 1718–20, which forced it to suspend the obligatory use of general ships and, in 1744, to loosen several restrictions on company membership. The company remained scrupulous about ensuring that even British Jews were excluded from Levant trade, much less foreigners. However, growing criticism led to the adoption of more liberal policies on company membership in 1753. British Jews were accepted into the company on the condition that they did not employ Levantine Jews as factors. Despite these adjustments, public discussions of the English Levant Company and its effects on trade did not cease, as reflected in the oft-cited writings of Adam Smith, who wrote in 1776 that the trade with Turkey was still far from being a free trade. By the end of the eighteenth century, continuous wars compelled the English to suspend their monopolistic practices temporarily. When the American Revolutionary War (1775–83) paralyzed English trade, all restrictions on English Levant trade were lifted and the import of Levantine goods by English or foreign ships from any port was permitted from 1780 until the end of the war. It is important to mention that, independently from these developments, a considerable amount of goods originating from the Levant found their way to England through Leghorn (Livorno) and the Netherlands, which had been working to undermine the Levant Company's monopoly since earlier times. The crucial turning point came in 1797, when the Ottomans succeeded in arranging a temporary reciprocal trade agreement with Britain allowing Ottoman merchants to trade directly with members of the Levant Company. Following this agreement, a ship loaded with goods consigned by Ottoman merchants to Levant Company members left Izmir for London in 1798. Although English factors in the Levant protested against these “temporary” adjustments, they were still in effect by 1804. The company was still unwilling to surrender all its control over English Levant trade, however. In 1804, it introduced new regulations aimed at limiting rights and trade activities of Ottoman merchants who were English protégés. In 1819, however, the English were compelled to expand these rights to include the establishment of Ottoman commercial houses in London to prevent the Ottoman merchants from operating from Izmir. To participate in complete freedom in English trade with the Levant, the Ottoman merchants had to wait until the Levant Company was completely abolished in 1825.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Wood, *History*, 151–160; Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 55–57, 136–138, 152–157; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 112–114.



As we can see from these short accounts, crucial differences between the organization of Dutch Levant trade and that of the English and French meant that the former was much more vulnerable to the inroads of the Ottoman merchants in the eighteenth century. This vulnerability meant that after the rise of Atlantic trade, the Ottoman merchants who wanted to extend their commercial networks beyond the Mediterranean primarily made their way to the Netherlands. Dutch merchants and authorities did not remain idle when faced with the inroads of the Ottoman merchants, rather they developed a "faint protectionism," which we will investigate extensively in the next chapters. In this respect, the Dutch case constitutes a striking contrast to the English and French cases. Both the English and French trade policies in the Levant evolved from monopolistic regulations toward more liberal policies in the course of the eighteenth century, while Dutch adjustments introduced during the same period moved away from free trade in the interest of protecting Dutch merchants against Ottoman mercantile competition. Part of the reason for the Dutch-English contrast relates to the stagnation that occurred in the English Levant trade. The Levant Company, with its exclusive rights to trade with the Levant and its monopolistic structure, attracted most of the blame for this stagnation; when Dutch trade stagnated it was Dutch liberalism and the inroads of foreigners that was criticized. The Dutch merchants of Izmir were vociferous critics of this mode and were among the interest groups that forced the Dutch authorities in the course of the eighteenth century to introduce new regulations to stop the inroads of the Ottoman merchants. Each time the Dutch took new measures against them, however, the Ottoman merchants responded with new strategies to continue to expand their trade with the Netherlands.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE OTTOMAN PENETRATION OF DUTCH TRADING NETWORKS

In studying the developments that took place with respect to the European presence in Ankara during the eighteenth century, we have seen that relations between Ottoman and Dutch merchants were of an antagonistic nature, especially when the Europeans extended their enterprises beyond the conventional centers of international trade. It is apparent that the Ottoman merchants considered inland trade in western Anatolia to be their territory, and did not hesitate to use every means to prevent Europeans from taking control of it. The following chapters focus on the expansion of the activities of Ottoman merchants to the Netherlands, and argue that during this process relations between Ottoman and Dutch merchants were characterized by the same antagonism, especially when Ottoman merchants began to dominate the trade between Izmir and Amsterdam, which the Dutch considered to be their domain. Although this division of labor conformed to the underlying idea of the capitulations, it was not compatible with the realities of the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century European and Ottoman merchants were no longer content with the roles granted them in this division of labor, and they ventured beyond these roles to explore more opportunities. Just as we studied European ventures in northwest Anatolia in the preceding chapters, we now focus on Ottoman exploration of European trade routes in the following chapters, including, in the next chapter, Ottoman merchants' activities in Amsterdam. In this chapter, I limit my investigation to other forms of Ottoman participation in Ottoman-Dutch trade, i.e., partnerships between Ottoman and Dutch merchants in Izmir, and, especially, business transactions between Ottoman merchants in Izmir and the Dutch merchants of Amsterdam.

We direct our attention here toward certain aspects of Ottoman participation in Dutch Levant trade: the Ottoman administration's approach to the activities of its merchants beyond the boundaries of the empire; Ottoman merchants' relations with Dutch merchants and authorities during these activities; and the impact of Ottoman merchants' local connections on their competitiveness. Some of these areas are investigated in subsequent chapters. The issues we analyze in the chapter at hand shed light on the factors determining Ottoman merchants' competitiveness relative

to Dutch merchants, as well as on relations between the two merchant communities.

In this chapter, I argue that local connections within the Ottoman Empire were the crucial factor that influenced the entire course of events through which the Ottoman merchants eventually conquered Dutch Levant trade. To highlight the crucial role of these local connections, I emphasize the fact that the expansion and decline of Greek and Armenian merchants were clearly conditioned by the trades with which the two groups were associated within the Ottoman Empire. That is to say, the role Armenian merchants played in Ottoman-Dutch trade was conditioned by the mohair trade, which had traditionally been an "Armenian trade" within the Ottoman Empire, as we saw in the chapters on Ankara and the mohair trade. Likewise, the fate of Greek merchants who traded with the Netherlands was closely linked to the trade in cotton. However, the association of Greek merchants with the cotton trade did not emanate from a traditional role in the trade of this commodity but rather from the fact that the Greek merchants who were active in this trade had roots in the major cotton-producing areas in western Anatolia. During the expansion of Ottoman mercantile activities to Amsterdam, local Armenian and Greek connections in the Ottoman dominions meant that they could consign shipments at lower costs than their Dutch competitors and access higher-quality goods than the Dutch could obtain.

Unfortunately, we cannot prove this last conjecture with detailed comparative data on the consignments of Dutch and Ottoman merchants because of several specific problems. The first of these problems stems from the very question of quality. Using archival sources to evaluate objectively the quality of a certain consignment of mohair yarn, cotton, or cotton yarn would be impossible even if these sources had provided us extremely detailed data on these consignments. One might suggest that purchase prices in Izmir and Ankara and sale prices in Amsterdam could be a solid indication of the quality of the merchandise. But the deficiency of such a method becomes apparent when we consider that the prices of the relevant goods fluctuated frequently and considerably in the Levant as well as in Amsterdam. Moreover, due to reasons that will be explained below, the available sources by no means provide sufficient data to compare the expenses incurred by Dutch merchants and by Ottoman merchants for their consignments. Under these conditions, we have no choice but to rely on information given by the merchants in their letters and to analyze this information in light of the available data on the consignments from Izmir to Amsterdam.

The participation of Ottoman merchants in Ottoman-Dutch trade did not come about through a smooth process. Like the early Dutch merchants in Ankara, Ottoman merchants trading between Izmir and Amsterdam were considered interlopers by the Dutch, who thought of this part of the trade circle as “theirs” and were keen to keep it that way. Certain features of the Dutch-Ottoman competition in Ankara seem to have also been present in the competition between Izmir and Amsterdam. First, when the competition exceeded a tolerable level it took on an extra-economic character, prompting administrative involvement. Second, the Dutch merchants were obliged to seek support and form coalitions against the “interlopers.” Third, some of the Dutch merchants found it more profitable to collaborate with the Ottoman merchants than to oppose them. This last feature also suggests that relations between the two groups were complex and not exclusively antagonistic; cooperation, it seems, also took place.

The available evidence reveals that Armenians from the Ottoman Empire engaged in Ottoman-Dutch trade as early as the seventeenth century, and that their activities were concentrated mainly in the mohair trade. At this earliest stage of Armenian participation in Ottoman-Dutch trade, a number of Armenian merchants even made their way to Amsterdam. It is probable, however, that most Armenian merchants in Izmir consigned their goods to their Dutch correspondents in Amsterdam without journeying there themselves. For such transactions, the parties utilized “bottomery” (*bodemerij*)<sup>1</sup> contracts, whereby the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam opened credit to their Armenian correspondents in Izmir in return for a pawn of mohair yarn, which the latter consigned to Amsterdam. The amount of credit opened by the merchants in Amsterdam also included the insurance premium for the transaction so that all risks in transportation were fronted by the creditor. After the yarn arrived in Amsterdam and was sold, the creditor made back his money. In 1669, the Armenian Jacob Michiels in Izmir owed 3,660 rix-dollars to Robbert Stile, for which the latter received 28 bales of mohair yarn.<sup>2</sup> In 1670, the Amsterdam merchant Johannes Laurens received 17 bales of mohair yarn from Coggia Owenes Ersersaal under similar conditions.<sup>3</sup> It is apparent that such transactions had the potential to result in complicated commercial

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<sup>1</sup> See WNT, “Bodemerij.”

<sup>2</sup> GA 5075, 683/1, 15.03.1669.

<sup>3</sup> GA 5075, 683/45, 23.05.1670.

disputes. It was probably due to such a dispute that in 1671 the Leiden merchant David van Royen, just arrived from Izmir, made the notarized declaration that Cogia Baltazar, an Armenian merchant in Izmir, had consigned 21 bales of mohair yarn to Cornelis Blijenberg in Amsterdam.<sup>4</sup>

For the Armenian merchants in Izmir, an alternative to bottomery contracts was to make use of the mediation of Dutch merchants in Izmir. We owe the earliest information on such transactions mainly to disputes emanating from them. For instance, in 1681 Hızır Şah, an Armenian merchant in Izmir, entrusted 4,234 *okkas* of mohair yarn to a Dutch merchant in the same city. The latter paid the Armenian merchant LD 6,277 and consigned the yarn to a Dutch correspondent in the Netherlands. After the yarn was sold in Amsterdam, the Dutch merchant in Izmir claimed that it yielded only LD 4,819 and demanded the remaining LD 1,392 from Hızır Şah. Hızır Şah, however, was convinced that the yarn must have yielded more and refused the claim. The Dutch merchant had no choice but to apply to the local court of Izmir, where the qadi ruled in his favor. Hızır Şah refused to comply with the verdict and fled the city. Even when the parties were summoned to the imperial divan for a final verdict, Hızır Şah did not show up.<sup>5</sup>

There is substantial evidence that Armenian merchants in Izmir became increasingly interested in trading directly with the Netherlands during the seventeenth century. A petition submitted in 1659 by the remarkable number of 33 Armenian merchants in Izmir to the Dutch States General is a case in point. Quite interestingly, the Armenian merchants in Izmir demanded the replacement of the Dutch consul Mortier, who was allegedly hindering the transportation of their merchandise to the Netherlands on Dutch vessels.<sup>6</sup>

We have already mentioned that by the beginning of the eighteenth century, traffic between the Levant and western Europe was paralyzed as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14). Although the war also had an adverse effect on mohair trade between the Levant and the Netherlands, a lively trade in mohair yarn seems to have continued

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<sup>4</sup> GA 5075, 3679A/951, 06.07.1671.

<sup>5</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 15/28, gurre-i Muharrem 1092/21.01.1681.

<sup>6</sup> René Bekius, "A Global Enterprise: Armenian Merchants in the Textile Trade in the 17th and 18th Centuries," in *Carpets and Textiles in the Iranian World, 1400–1700*, ed. Jon Thompson, Daniel Shaffer, Pirjetta Mildh (Oxford, 2010), 206–235.



in Amsterdam.<sup>7</sup> More interestingly, Dutch merchants in Amsterdam continued to consign mohair yarn to their correspondents in Antwerp<sup>8</sup> and to form partnerships to invest in the mohair trade, in spite of the seemingly unfavorable wartime circumstances.<sup>9</sup> A number of disputes between Armenian merchants and Dutch merchants in Amsterdam during the period reveal that, despite the ongoing war, the mohair trade did not halt. For instance, in 1704 Pieter Apostol Pietersz complained about the poor quality of ten bales of mohair yarn he had bought from Pieter Ermen.<sup>10</sup> On another occasion, a fire that had damaged the Dutch ship *De Stad Livorno*<sup>11</sup> on its way to Amsterdam led to a series of claims between merchants. Pieter Eyghals claimed 1,050 rix dollars and a certain Lespaul claimed 2,415 rix dollars from Hagia Apostol di Giorgio, who had loaded the *De Stad Livorno* at Izmir with 40 bales of mohair yarn and accompanied the merchandise to Amsterdam.<sup>12</sup> Two more Armenian merchants, namely Nasareth van Leeuwen and Hogia Brinett, had loaded their mohair yarn in the same ship and accompanied their merchandise to Amsterdam. The latter was bringing nine bales of yarn, weighing 690 *okkas* in total, to Jacob van Laar. Because Van Laar died before Hogia Brinett arrived in Amsterdam, the yarn was brought to Cornelis van Laar. Because of the fire damage, the yarn yielded only 6  $\frac{7}{8}$  Dutch schillings<sup>13</sup> per pound.<sup>14</sup>

It was probably the *De Stad Livorno* accident that led to a long dispute between merchants in Izmir.<sup>15</sup> Since the dispute gives us some clues about

<sup>7</sup> In 1707 Michiel Verdonk complained about Dirk Wittenoom, who had agreed to sell a pack of mohair yarn to him but then sold it to Abraham Tak, who was a broker in the city. GA 5075, 7214/1213, 09.12.1707.

<sup>8</sup> GA 5075, 7157/605–611, 17.02.1703.

<sup>9</sup> In 1707 Johannes Boelema and Jacob Altherr in Amsterdam formed a partnership to engage in whale fishing and mohair yarn trade. GA 5075, 5771B/287, 13.10.1707.

<sup>10</sup> GA 5075, 4201/553, 11.06.1704.

<sup>11</sup> It was apparently burned, though not entirely, just after its arrival in Amsterdam. GA 5075, 6682/218–221, 23.02.1707.

<sup>12</sup> GA 5075, 6033/621, 24.12.1706. See also notarial deed nos. 463, 643 and 651 on the same issue.

<sup>13</sup> One Dutch schilling was equal to 6 *stuivers*. H. Enno van Gelder, *De Nederlandse Munten* (Utrecht, 1970), 237, 269.

<sup>14</sup> GA 5075, 6682/218–221, 23.02.1707. See also notarial deed nos. 266–268 and 303–305 on the same issue. The same fire also damaged goods consigned from Izmir to Panaiotis di Jossif, a Greek merchant in Amsterdam. GA 5075, 4208/1643, 30.12.1706; GA 5075, 4211/299, 29.09.1707.

<sup>15</sup> The Dutch ship *De Stad Livorno* departed on 10 July 1706 from Izmir (RGP 34, 389). Although the relevant imperial orders do not mention any ship names, the first relevant imperial order was issued on evâsıt-ı C.Âhir 1120/27.08–06.09.1708 and mentions that the claimants had brought their yarn to Izmir or loaded them onto the ship twenty-seven months ago (around June 1706) BOA ED 22/1, 187/689.



the Ottoman merchants' ability to manipulate the Porte, it is useful to examine the details of the case. Like many other merchants, Çalapverdi had brought 1,880 *okkas* of mohair yarn worth of 9,400 piasters from Ankara to Izmir and consigned the load to Amsterdam. When the consignment was lost en route, Çalapverdi turned to the court in Izmir, claiming that he had sold the yarn to Mosi, a Jewish dragoman serving the Dutch consulate in Izmir, and demanding that Mosi pay him the money. The case was heard at the imperial divan, where the Rumeli Kazaskeri Mahmud decided that the claim was unjust. The verdict was based on an *i'lâm* submitted by Mehmed Said, the qadi of Izmir; Mustafa, customs officer; and Ali, *damga emîni*; all of whom, based on impartial witnesses, reported that Çalapverdi had boarded the same ship and accompanied the merchandise to Amsterdam. As the case was settled at the imperial court, the Porte issued an order to the qadi of Izmir, forbidding any further claim and judicial process against Mosi.<sup>16</sup> However, Çalapverdi did not give up easily. More than one year after the imperial order had been issued, the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul was obliged to apply to the Porte for another order because Çalapverdi, together with his alleged partner Nicola, continued to molest Mosi. The Porte clarified again that the Rumeli Kazaskeri had already decided the issue and that no juridical action could be taken against Mosi.<sup>17</sup> Following the second order, Çalapverdi and Nicola began to mistreat the Dutch merchant Fremaux and a Jewish broker called Abraham, necessitating the Porte's intervention once more.<sup>18</sup> Despite the Porte's repeated refusals and orders, Çalapverdi and Nicola were able to secure an order from the Porte commanding Mosi's deportation to Istanbul if he refused to pay the claim, which had by that time increased to 10,800 piasters. Nevertheless, with the intervention of the Dutch ambassador, the Porte issued a further order, commanding officials to disregard the previous order and to act in accordance with the earlier ones.<sup>19</sup> Only one month later, the Porte issued one more order on the issue, clarifying that even if the claimants were able to procure a new order to the contrary, no juridical action should ever be taken on the case!<sup>20</sup>

In sum, the available documents reveal that Çalapverdi and Nicola were able to harass a Dutch dragoman (Mosi), a Dutch merchant (Fremaux),

<sup>16</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 187/689, evâsıt-ı C.Âhir 1120/27.08–06.09.1708.

<sup>17</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 190/704, evâhir-i Şevval 1121/23.12–01.01.1710.

<sup>18</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 192/717, evâhir-i Receb 1122/14–24.09.1710.

<sup>19</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 193/723, 26 Şevval 1122/18.12.1710.

<sup>20</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 194/726, evâil-i Zilhicce 1122/21–30.01.1711.

and the Dutch consular authorities for more than five years from the occurrence of the incident (June 1706) until the last imperial order (issued January 1711). It is important to note that after both the local court and the Porte had concluded that their claim was ungrounded, Çalapverdi and Nicola were still able to obtain an imperial decree ordering Mosi's deportation to Istanbul if he refused to pay the claim. This undoubtedly indicates the extensive ability of these Ottoman merchants to manipulate the Porte's decisions in their favor. If not for their interpersonal relations with certain officials at the Porte, what could have given these merchants such substantial influence? Furthermore, did the chaos they were able to create at the Porte have any implications at the local level in Izmir? If it did, we can assume that they took advantage of the chaotic situation for their own benefit. The fact that throughout the five years one order on the subject was closely followed several times by other orders indicates that Çalapverdi and Nicola were indeed able to trouble the Dutch dragoman and merchant considerably, apparently also relying on their access to local centers of power.

During the eighteenth century, Ottoman participation in Ottoman-Dutch trade was not limited to Armenian merchants, but also involved Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Just as the Armenians dominated the mohair trade, the Greeks dominated the cotton trade. From about the mid-eighteenth century onward, trade in cotton began to dominate Dutch trade with the Levant, thus making Greek merchants increasingly important in the Ottoman-Dutch trade. There was a crucial difference, however, between the earlier inroads the Armenian mohair traders made into Dutch trading territory and the later infiltration of the Greeks. The Armenian activities remained at a level tolerable by the Dutch, while the Greek activities resembled a veritable invasion and provoked a furious reaction from Dutch merchants. This difference stems from the different merchandise with which the Armenian and Greek merchants were associated. While mohair yarn had been one of the most important goods exported to the Netherlands before the middle of the eighteenth century, the extent of its dominance in Ottoman-Dutch trade never attained the level cotton did during the second half of the eighteenth century.

The eighteenth century witnessed a worldwide increase in the trade of cotton, with ramifications for intercontinental trade between the Indian Ocean and Europe, as well as for trade between the Levant and Europe.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Halil İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1993), 274–275.

This trend is firmly established by Ülker and Frangakis's statistical data on English and French trade with the Levant.<sup>22</sup> Frangakis has also shown the preponderance of cotton in the trade between Izmir and Europe during the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>23</sup> A look at the cargo lists of Dutch ships that departed from Izmir to Amsterdam during the second half of the eighteenth century confirms the dominant role of cotton. These cargo lists also illustrate the Greek mercantile association with cotton and that of the Armenians with mohair. This is not to say that there was a definitive division between the activities of these two merchant communities, since some of the Armenian merchants seem to have entered the cotton trade by applying their earlier experience in mohair trading to the newly-proliferating cotton trade. Similarly, Greek merchants seem to have included mohair products in their consignments when that inclusion was deemed profitable. The same sources also reveal that the role of Jewish merchants in Ottoman-Dutch trade remained limited in the second half of the eighteenth century when compared with those of the Armenians and the Greeks.<sup>24</sup>

Although the Armenians had been the Ottoman pioneers in Dutch trade, the Greeks took over the Armenian lead during the second half of the eighteenth century, apparently because the merchandise they traded in had become more dominant than that traded by the Armenians. The simplest form of Greek participation in Dutch trade with the Levant took the form of partnerships between Dutch and Greek merchants in Izmir. The potential benefits of such associations were clear. The Ottoman merchant's expertise in the local market and products, local connections, and access to the hinterland were thus combined with the Dutchman's capitulatory privileges and his connections with the Netherlands and other European business centers, with the potential for unprecedented profits. It is quite interesting to observe that such associations were formed relatively late and seem to have remained limited in number. For the Ottoman merchants, it was probably preferable to use their local connections for their own advantage, rather than sharing their profits with the Dutch, since they could also reap the advantages of the capitulations on their own if

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<sup>22</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir"; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 314–325.

<sup>23</sup> Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "The Trade of Cotton and Cloth in Izmir: From the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century to the Early Nineteenth Century," in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, eds. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, 1991), 97–111.

<sup>24</sup> For examples of cargo lists of Dutch ships that navigated between Izmir and Amsterdam, see RGP 95, 715–763; RGP 120, 1428–1466; NA 1.02.20, 912.

they adopted the protection of one or another European nation. Despite the relatively liberal trade policies the Dutch pursued in the Levant, in general they were not very receptive toward the Ottoman merchants.

Nevertheless, such partnerships did occur. The earliest example of such an association was probably formed during the ambassadorship of Cornelis Calkoen (1726–44), when Belcamp & Clement, a Dutch firm in Izmir, formed an association with Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif.<sup>25</sup> This partnership shares certain features with other such partnerships. First, the Di Jossifs were Dutch protégés,<sup>26</sup> and Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif already had business correspondents in Amsterdam and Leiden,<sup>27</sup> before Panaiotis obtained his first *berat* as a dragoman of the Dutch consulate in Izmir. The relevant entries in the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri* also reveal that Begler did not have a *berat* when Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif was trading with the Netherlands in 1730.<sup>28</sup> From this information we cannot conclude definitively that Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif's business relations with the Netherlands predated their entrance into foreign protection; they could still have been protégés of another nation, or even Dutch protégés as *hizmetkârs*.<sup>29</sup> It is still, however, striking that we cannot establish from the sources whether they were under foreign protection in 1730, when they were doing considerable business with the Netherlands.<sup>30</sup>

After the establishment of the partnership of Belcamp, Begler & Clement, Begler seems to have become integrated further into the Dutch

<sup>25</sup> Although Bosscha-Erdbrink wrote that "During Calkoen's embassy the Izmir firm of Belcamp & Begler was associated with the Greek house of Panaiotis di Jossif" (Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 199), this must be a mistake, since the earlier firm of the Greek partners bears the name Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif. During subsequent years, the association bore the name Belcamp, Begler & Clement. RGP 95, 256.

<sup>26</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 251/1012, 22 Zilkade 1143/29.05.1731.

<sup>27</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, 03.06.1730, Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif to Daniel van Eys.

<sup>28</sup> From the content of the relevant entry (BOA ED 22/1, 251/1012), it is clear that Panaiotis obtained his first dragoman *berat* on 29 May 1731. An investigation of the entries in ED 22/1 concerning the *berats* of Dutch protégés revealed that between 1143/1730 and 1152/1740 no *berat* was issued for Begler, despite the fact that all Dutch *berats* were renewed during the period.

<sup>29</sup> Every Ottoman protégé of European nations was authorized to employ *hizmetkâr* (servants), who also fell under the protection system. Although the holders of *berats* were mentioned in documents, the *hizmetkârs* were not. On the protection system in general, and the *hizmetkârs* in particular, see Van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, 63–112.

<sup>30</sup> In their letter to Daniel van Eys, Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif declined Jan van Sanen's request for a joint venture in Dutch cloth, arguing that this would provoke the jealousy of other business correspondents with whom they did considerable business. GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, 03.06.1730, Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif to Daniel van Eys.

trading network, as well as into the Dutch community in Izmir. For instance, in 1748 the firm received a procuration from an Amsterdam merchant to collect some money from Constantin & Demetrio Papa Christo in Izmir.<sup>31</sup> On another occasion, a consortium comprising more than one dozen Amsterdam merchants invested some f 40,000 in goods that they consigned to the firm.<sup>32</sup> When Mattheus di Ouan, an Armenian merchant in Amsterdam, went bankrupt and fled the city,<sup>33</sup> Belcamp, Begler & Clement received procurations from a number of his Dutch creditors in Amsterdam laying claims to his goods in Izmir.<sup>34</sup> The name of the firm also appeared under petitions submitted to the DLH by Dutch merchants.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, Begler was Philip Clement's witness when he married Anetta Chasseau in the presence of the Dutch consul.<sup>36</sup> There was, however, a limit to this integration. For example, Begler di Jossif was forbidden to take the national oath the Dutch merchants in the Levant had to swear annually. The Dutch consul in Izmir opposed the idea of allowing Begler to take the oath and argued that if this Greek merchant was allowed to do so, he would also want to participate in the meeting of the Dutch community of Izmir and claim "national" support when he was subjected to *avantias*.<sup>37</sup>

The firm Belcamp, Begler & Clement must have been liquidated before 1755. During that year, Begler di Jossif was trading independently and went bankrupt with a debt of LD 80,000–90,000.<sup>38</sup> The bankruptcy reveals that Begler had a connection—on which, until then, the sources are silent—that was probably far more important for his business career than his Dutch connections. An imperial order issued after the bankruptcy condemned Karaosmanoğlu Elhac Mustafa, who blocked the departure of five Dutch ships from Izmir, demanding the restitution of the 60 bales of cotton he had entrusted to Begler before the latter fled.<sup>39</sup> Although we lack sufficient data to testify that there was a structural relationship between

<sup>31</sup> GA 5075, 11316/18, 10.09.1748.

<sup>32</sup> GA 5075, 11338/9, 11343/51, 04.05.1752.

<sup>33</sup> On Matheus di Ouan and his bankruptcy see RGP 95, 204, 259–260, 267–268, 329, 403.

<sup>34</sup> GA 5075, 11342/17, 18, 19, 05.04.1753, The same Dutch merchants also empowered John Tamez in Moscow to collect their claims from Arituin de Nezatereth in Moscow, who owed di Ouan some goods.

<sup>35</sup> NA 01.03.01, 138, 19.08.1749, Dutch nation in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>36</sup> NA 01.03.01, 138, 30.09.1749, Daniel Alexander de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>37</sup> NA 01.03.01, 138, 15.08.1749, Daniel Alexander de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>38</sup> NA 1.02.20, 169/251–252; 166/705, 17.07.1755, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>39</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 337/1464, evâhir-i Zilhicce 1168/27.09–06.10.1755.

the Karaosmanoğlu<sup>40</sup> and the Ottoman merchants who traded with the Netherlands, the relationship between Begler and Elhac Mustafa indicates that this was something more than incidental, since the relationship between the two was disclosed only after Begler went bankrupt, still owing 60 cotton bales to Elhac Mustafa. If Elhac Mustafa had not blocked the departure of the Dutch ships from Izmir, we might have overlooked the connection between the two parties completely.

Nevertheless, it is known that the Karaosmanoğlu, due to their influence in the cotton market of western Anatolia, had close relations with the European community in Izmir as well. Therefore the European sources were likely to report the developments with regard to this *a'yân* family of eighteenth-century western Anatolia. For instance after Karaosmanoğlu Elhac Mustafa was executed in 1755, Elbert de Hochepped, the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul at the time, reported that he controlled, as sole owner, cotton and other local products in western Anatolia.<sup>41</sup> The Karaosmanoğlu's importance in Izmir's economy was not limited to their role in the production and marketing of local products. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Karaosmanoğlu also owned the greatest part of the camels traveling between Izmir and its hinterland and from Izmir to Persia.<sup>42</sup> Another of the Karaosmanoğlu's influence on Izmir's economy was exerted through their many properties, which housed numerous Europeans.<sup>43</sup> Following a fire on 6 August 1763, which devastated Frank Street in particular, the Dutch consul in Izmir reported that one tenth of the burned buildings—the Dutch consulate being among them—belonged to a certain Karaosmanoğlu, who put forward considerable provisions for the reconstruction of these buildings.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>40</sup> The Karaosmanoğlu family was the most influential *a'yân* family of western Anatolia. On the family, see Nagata, *Tarihî Âyanlar*.

<sup>41</sup> NA, 1.02.20, 169/256–257; NA, 1.02.20, 166/713–714, 03.01.1756, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH. "Drie agtereen volgende daagen, is alhier public gexposeert geweest het hooft van CaraOsman Zadeh, die soo te Smirne als binnen de daaromtrent leggende plaatsen sig so seer heeft doen ontsien, en bykans den eenigste besitter was van de catoenen, en andere aldaar synde producten, door het monopolie waarvan hy onnoemelijke schatten heeft vergadert, dewelke nevens alle syne verdere goederen thans ten voordeele van den Groote Heer syn geconfisqueert."

<sup>42</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 117.

<sup>43</sup> Nagata, *Tarihî Âyanlar*, 28–29.

<sup>44</sup> RGP 95, 484–486, 16.11.1763, D. J. de Hochepped to the sg. "De klijne huysjes in de straat ende eenige anderen, die capitaalen hebben, sijn reets weer ver gevordert in het herbouwen, het eene meerder, hat andere minder. Mijn hysheer, zoon van eene zeekeer Caraosmanolu, aen welke wel omtrent 1/10 gedeelte van de affgebrande ruinen toekomt, doet ons seer onaengename propositien, hy laat ons meester om onse huysen naar onse smaak op te bouwen op onse eyge kosten, alsoo hy seyde geen geld te hebben, egter met

It appears that the European communities in Izmir had, generally, good relations with the Karaosmanoğlu and were likely to speak positively of them. Europeans in the city strove for the favor of the Karaosmanoğlu and other local notables by presenting them with money and gifts. The English community, for instance, gave money to Osman Ağa, Derviş Efendi, and Mustafa Efendi between 1721 and 1726. This was probably because the Europeans recognized that the Karaosmanoğlu were the main power maintaining security and stability in and around Izmir.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, the Karaosmanoğlu and the European consuls visited or encountered each other socially. In 1771, when a contagious disease swept through Izmir, the Dutch consul in the town fled to his summer house, where a Karaosmanoğlu visited him twice.<sup>46</sup> It is also known that the French consul Peyssonnel visited the Karaosmanoğlu of his time quite frequently.<sup>47</sup> The favorable disposition of the European communities toward the Karaosmanoğlu went so far that on several occasions the European consuls and ambassadors lobbied on the family's behalf at the Porte. For example, during the conflict between Ayvaz Ağa and the Karaosmanoğlu in 1772, the European consuls in the city begged their ambassadors to intervene in the matter in favor of the Karaosmanoğlu. Again, in 1796, when disorder broke out in the city, the Russian consul in Izmir informed his ambassador that it would be a good idea to entrust the city's government to the Karaosmanoğlu, as they would restore order in the city. Other European consuls in Izmir took the same initiative. On 8 April 1797 Hacı Hüseyin Karaosmanoğlu entered the city upon the orders of the Porte and restored order, to the relief of the Europeans of Izmir. The English community also presented a substantial gift to Hüseyin Karaosmanoğlu in 1809 for his protection of the English merchants in the absence of their consul.<sup>48</sup> Thus it seems that the Karaosmanoğlu had close contacts and business relations with European

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die conditie, dat de helfft, dat verbouwd wierde, soude blyven voor jedik van de bouwer off huurder en de andere helft soude hy aen de huur laeten aftrekken en voor beneficie van die permissie wil hy de jaerelykse huur verhoogen, yder na proportie; als van mijn huys, dat Ld. 1000 heeft betaeld, wil hy maer hebben Ld. 1500."

<sup>45</sup> Ülker, "Rise of Izmir," 282.

<sup>46</sup> When the Russians destroyed the Ottoman fleet near Çeşme in July 1770, Ottoman authorities sequestered a Dutch ship to sink it at the entrance of the harbor of Izmir to prevent the entrance of Russian ships. On the occasion of a Karaosmanoğlu's visit to the Dutch consul, the latter seized the opportunity to ask the Karaosmanoğlu when the indemnity for the Dutch ship was to be paid. The Karaosmanoğlu replied that it was not the right time to arrange the issue since disease had paralyzed the economy of the city. RGP 120, 157, 18.06.1771, D. J. de Hochepied to the SG.

<sup>47</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 37, 116.

<sup>48</sup> Nagata, *Tarihî Ayânlar*, 47; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 39, 61–64, 116.



as well as local merchants due especially to the cotton trade, which seems to have been a common field of activity among the Karaosmanoğlus, the local merchants, the European merchants in general, and the Dutch in particular.

After touching briefly on the Karaosmanoğlus and their relations with European and local merchants, we can proceed to investigate the partnerships between the two groups. While the partnership of Belcamp, Begler & Clement ended in the mid-1750s, that decade and the following one witnessed the formation of several other partnerships between Dutch and local merchants, at least until 1769, when such partnerships were prohibited.<sup>49</sup> One of these partnerships was created between Jacob de Vogel<sup>50</sup> and Manuel Kiriaco in 1760.<sup>51</sup> A different type of partnership between Dutch and Ottoman merchants was realized in 1768 when Uberveld & Tak in Amsterdam formed a partnership with the Greek Antonio Zingrilara.<sup>52</sup> We are also informed about another partnership—or, at least, the intention of forming such a partnership—between a certain Beaune from Amsterdam and Maglas di Carabeth.<sup>53</sup> In fact, this latter case incited reactions that reveal the extent to which the Dutch consular authorities and merchants were opposed to such partnerships. Thus it is not surprising that such partnerships numbered too few to justify Nanninga's exaggerated claim that they helped bring about the total ruin of Dutch merchants in the Levant.<sup>54</sup> According to a Dutch consular report, in 1766 there was only one partnership between an Ottoman and Dutch merchant, that of Panaiotis & De Vogel.<sup>55</sup>

The formation of partnerships between local and European merchants in the Levant was not limited to Izmir. We have already seen the partnership between Jan Pieter Panchaud and Series in Ankara, which was formed in the early 1750s.<sup>56</sup> Another example of a partnership was formed at the end of 1759 in Salonica by two Dutch merchants, Nieuhoff and Michault, and a local Greek named Pandazi, who was a Swedish protégé.

<sup>49</sup> Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 131. He gives the year erroneously, as 1669.

<sup>50</sup> Jacob de Vogel was born in Rotterdam and was unrelated to the De Vogel family of Amsterdam; the latter had a relative in Izmir and was also related to Thomas de Vogel Junior.

<sup>51</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/117–119, 18.03.1760, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>52</sup> Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 124.

<sup>53</sup> RGP 115, 45, 17.06.1766, Consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>54</sup> Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 129–131.

<sup>55</sup> RGP 115, 45n1, 3.07.1766, D. J. de Hochepped to Dedel. The names are spelled Panagotien De Voogel (sic.).

<sup>56</sup> Schmidt, *Joys of Philology*, 2:317.



It is quite interesting to see that the partnership was established when the Dutch merchants had just arrived in the city, which suggests that they were unfamiliar with the business environment of Salonica and needed the expertise and connections of a local Greek.<sup>57</sup> It is little wonder that this partnership became a familiar name with the Amsterdam merchants. About a year and a half after the establishment of the partnership, Hendrik Momma, a prominent cloth manufacturer in Amsterdam, sent procuration to Massé di Carabeth & Sons in Izmir to collect some money owed him by Nieuhoff, Michault & Pandazi.<sup>58</sup>

While partnerships between Dutch and local merchants in Izmir were of minor importance as a form of Ottoman participation in the Dutch Levant trade, business transactions between Dutch merchants in the Netherlands and local merchants in Izmir were much more important to that participation in terms of sheer volume. These transactions also represented a more advanced form of Ottoman participation in trade between the two countries. At the beginning of this chapter we saw that by the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, several Armenian merchants from Izmir were already consigning their goods to Dutch merchants in Amsterdam. In the course of the eighteenth century and especially during the second half of it, an increasing number of Amsterdam and Izmir merchants entered into such transactions.

The commercial activities of the Amsterdam firm Thomas de Vogel & Zoon reveal that the possibility of doing business directly with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam was utilized extensively by Ottoman merchants in Izmir. The records of Thomas de Vogel & Zoon constitute the only surviving archival material from an eighteenth-century Amsterdam firm engaged in extensive commercial activities with the Levant. However, the commercial activities of this firm were not limited to the Levant. A quick look at the account books of Thomas de Vogel & Zoon reveals that it also imported animal skins from Havana, Buenos Aires, and Brazil; camlets, indigo, cochineal, mimosa, saffron, and gold from Qadiz; sugar from Bayonne (America); coffee from Martinique, Surinam, and Marseille; ash from Ieper and Danzig; textiles (*lywaaten*) from Gent; and considerable amounts of wool and oil from Seville. The firm also purchased sizable quantities of pepper from the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company) auctions. Among its exports, a few that catch

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<sup>57</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/97–99, 18.12.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>58</sup> GA 5075, 10522/671, 05.06.1761.

the eye include guns (*snaphaan*) to Lisbon; mohair yarn and cotton to Brussels; textiles to Qadiz; and iron wire to Sevilla. From Izmir, among other items, it imported mohair and its products, galls, silk, scammony, figs, raisins, and dimits. In return, it consigned woolen textiles, pepper, nails, tin, indigo, shots, gunpowder, pistols, lead, and porcelain tea and coffee cups.<sup>59</sup> Despite this wide variety in the firm's commercial activities, Levantine trade, especially trade with Izmir, remained an important area of activity for the firm. The firm had both Dutch and foreign business correspondents for its Levant activities, located mainly in Izmir and including a considerable number of Ottoman merchants (see table 1).

Table 1. Thomas de Vogel's business correspondents in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the eighteenth century, as they appear in the records of his firm.

Abraham de Jacob Arditti	Izm	Jan van Kerchem Willemsz	Alp
Abraham de Mozeh	Izm	Jean Fornezy	Izm
Adarui & De Botton	Izm	Joseph Magula	Izm
Adarui Hemzy & Co.	Izm	Joseph Coen Hemzy	Izm
Ambrosio Mavrogordato	Izm	Joseph Isaac & Jacob	Izm
Andrea Magrini & Co.	Ist	Kicer di Carabet Magar Oglie	Izm
Apostolo Demasticg	Izm	Leytstar & Stantie	Ank
Asmund Palm	Ist	Liebergen & Heirmans	Alp
Bartholo Cardamici & Co.	Izm	Louis Stechman	Izm
Belcamp, Clement & Van Sanen	Izm	Magrini, Bornman & Co.	Ist
Belcamp, Meyer & Van Kerchem	Ist	Manuel Carabeth di Panaiotis & Co.	Izm
Bongaard & Panchaud	Ist	Meyer & Van den Oudermeulen	Ist
Bongaard, Panchaud & Series	Ist	Missir di Eghia	Izm
Bornman & Co.	Ist	Moise (Moses) Cariglio & Carillo	Izm
Caldana & Boissin	Sal	Moise Sonsino & Co.	Ist
Caszdour di Jasigioglu	Izm	Moses S'Forno & Co.	Izm
Chasseaud & Co.	Ist	Muracht di Parisch	Izm
Chavese & Fernandez Diaz	Izm	Muyssard & De la Fontaine	Izm
Christiaan Hebbe Junior, Palm & Hibbe	Izm	Panchaud & Series	Ist
Clement & Van Sanen	Izm	Ploegstert & Van Lennep	Izm
Cornelis van der Oudermeulen	Ist	Raphael Cardamici & Co.	Izm, Ist
Daniel Fremaux, Cassaing & Hopker	Izm	S'Forno & Mozeh (Moses) & Izaac Angel	Izm

<sup>59</sup> GA 332, 79; 80.

Table 1 (*cont.*)

David & Jacob Mordoh	Izm	Isaac & Moise de Samuel Angel	Ist
David Barchi e Siglio	Izm	Isaac de Samuel Angel	Ist
David di Jacob Fernandez Diaz	Izm	Israel Benbeniste	Izm
David Meynard & Soon & Co.	Ist	Israel Benbeniste & Co.	Izm
David van Lennep	Izm	Izaac & Jacob Calomiti	Izm
David van Lennep & Enslie	Izm	Izaac Arditti & Haim Coen Hemzy	Izm
David van Lennep & Knipping & Enslie	Izm	Izaac Calomiti	Izm
David van Lennep & Co.	Izm	Jacob Isaac Salinas	Izm
Estieu & Boustain	Ist	Jan Rysner	Ist
Falcon & Arditti	Izm	Jan Hendrik Meyer & Co.	Ist
Flechon Frères & Majastre	Izm	Jan Batt. Chasseaud	Ist
François Majastre	Ank	Jan Carel des Bordes & Co.	Ist
Fratelli Abullafia	Izm	Jan Daniel Schaber	Ist
Frederik Hubsch & Co.	Ist	Jan Heemskerk	Alp
Gabriel Fernandez Diaz	Izm	Jan Heemskerk, Maseyck & Co.	Alp
Gad Conigliano & Co.	Ist	Jan van Kerchem & Heemskerk	Alp
Gasiadour di Petros	Izm	Salomon Ardarie	Izm
Gebroeders de Vogel	Izm	Samuel Fernandez Diaz & Co.	Izm
Gebroeders van Kerchem	Alp	Samuel Fernandez Diaz	Izm
Gerzon Abraham & Co.	Izm	Selomoh Saul & Broeders	Izm
Gerzon Saul & Co.	Izm	Selomoh Saul Hermano	Izm
Giacomo & Daniel Fremaux	Izm	Sonsino Abullafia	Izm
Guerin & Co.	Izm	Stephano Abro & Resdages de Aharon & Co.	Izm
Haim & Eliah Coen Hemzy	Izm	Thomas de Vogel Junior	Izm
Haim Coen Hemzy	Izm	Thomaso di Serpos	Ist
Haim Coen Hemzy & Co.	Izm	Tricon Frères & Co.	Izm
Haim Izaac & Jozeph Arayas	Izm	Vassalo Foresti	Ist
Hubsch & Timoni	Ist		

Izm: Izmir, Ist: Istanbul, Sal: Salonica, Alp: Aleppo

Source: GA 332, 4/19–23; 33–40.

Business transactions between the De Vogel firm and Ottoman merchants in Izmir were, however, of a different character than those between De Vogel and Dutch merchants in Izmir. The transactions between De Vogel and Dutch merchants included joint ventures<sup>60</sup> as well as independent/

<sup>60</sup> These were joint ventures in the form of commenda and their derivatives, in the sense that they were venture-based profit-loss sharing partnerships.

individual consignments on the initiative of one party. This was especially true for David van Lennep, who was De Vogel's main business correspondent in Izmir. In joint ventures, De Vogel and his Dutch correspondent in Izmir took a 2 percent or 2.5 percent commission into account for their service in handling the consignments. In independent/individual consignments, the party that had not invested in the venture and was not to receive any profit from it received a commission for his services. The characteristics of the transactions between De Vogel and the Ottoman merchants in Izmir differed because they comprised almost exclusively independent/individual consignments by the Ottoman merchants. In this commission trade, as it was called, the Ottoman merchants were the investors; De Vogel took the role of "factor," earning a commission for receiving, handling, and selling the merchandise, and consigning the returns to Izmir. In this framework, the patron-client relations were quite different than what the attribution of *comprado*ship to the Ottoman merchants would suggest. It is clear that the Ottoman merchants were the patrons in this context, while their Dutch correspondents in Amsterdam were the clients. This feature becomes especially clear when one sees that De Vogel was very careful to secure the satisfaction of his Ottoman correspondents.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> GA 332, 39/114, 11.09.1764, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior. "Wy twyfelen niet of D: Hr: Ambrosio zal wel genoeg neemen in onse directie & hoopen wy zyn E[dele] comissie zullen mogen behouden wat Cardamici aangaat die hebben wy gemeld zyn E[dele] ordre die ons geeft tot inkoop van eenige goederen niet konne volbrengen of wy moeten zyn E[dele] remissie hebben dat naar alle gedagten hem niet zal aanstaan & daarom wy hem wel zullen kwyt raaken & moogelyk dan deeze Sr. Ambrosio meede wel sleepen wat Ue[dele] daaromtrent konne doen gelieve Ue[dele] tot ons voordeel te verrigten." GA 332, 39/646, 24.05.1765, Thomas de Vogel to Gasaidoor Di Petros, "... sien UE[dele] aan onsen consignatie afgelaaden heb in t'schip de Hester Galey Cap[tein] Hendrik Douwes 6 Baalen stam het is ons seer aangenaam door de recomandatie van onsen Zoon & Broeder het geluk moogen hebben UE[dele] gunstige sendingen te ontf[angen] wy zullen tragten door eenen eerlyke bedieningen UE[dele] genoeg te geeven neemende UE[dele] interests als Eygen ter harten wy hoopen deezen proef neemingen UE[dele] daarblyken van zal geeven & animo tot de continuatie..." GA 332, 41/609, 22.12.1767, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior, "Wy bekoomen onder het schryven deeze UE[dele] aangenaame van 31 October waarby sien hetgeen UE[dele] ons gelieven te melden aangaande de vriend Hemzy wy schryven syn E[dele] direct & UE[dele] konne hem verseekeren wy syn E interest als voor Eygensullen waarneemen & niet uyt het oog verliesen de vriendschap dien ons bewyst met de consignatie vansyn E[dele] goederen & aan UE[dele] persoon, laat syn E[dele] maar gerust weesen niemand hem beeter sal konnen bedienen & het aan ons niet sal manqueeren maar aan de tyds omstanden zo die niet voordeeligh willen meede werken wy neemen alles wat UE[dele] diesaangaande melden wel adnotem & sulle alles veel mogelyk bevorderen..."

One of the sons of Thomas de Vogel, Thomas de Vogel Jr., went to Izmir to arrange such commissions for his father in Amsterdam.<sup>62</sup>

The fact that the transactions between the Ottoman merchants in Izmir and De Vogel in Amsterdam remained almost exclusively limited to independent/individual consignments reveals a lack of trust between the parties. The extensive correspondence between the De Vogel father and son is testament to this, as the pair frequently made arrangements for safety and security. On one occasion, for example, De Vogel sent goods and a letter addressed to Falcon Arditti to his son and not to the addressee, since he did not know whether Arditti was a trustworthy person or not.<sup>63</sup> The pair was also careful not to make any consignments to the Ottoman merchants until they had loaded their consignments to Amsterdam. De Vogel warned his son to control the goods consigned by the Ottoman merchants to ensure that the Ottomans did not receive more valuable goods in return.<sup>64</sup> In short, De Vogel tried very hard to remain a debtor instead of a creditor in his trade with the Ottoman merchants in Izmir.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>62</sup> GA 332, 39/368, 22.01.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "... sien UE[dele] daar Herabeth ook een Armeen is coopman had geobtineerd & moogelyk nog meerder zouden kennen procureeren om ons sendingen te doen..." GA 332, 40/645, 23.05.1766, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "Wy sien de consignatie van 89 balen stamme dat is een goede commissie..."

<sup>63</sup> GA 332, 41/201, 19.12.1766, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior, "... also wy dese liedens niet kennen, so versoeke sig daarop exact te informeeren deselve senden on met Cap[tein] Cristens, 4 doozen scamonea is 3 tweede & 1 eerste qualitydt samen 160 ok- twe vaten Storax Ro[?]ss 60 netto latende daarop verseecken f 600 en ordonneeren ons ter retouren te zenden eenige droogeryen so per Cap[tein] Andriesen verrigten als UE[dele] kan beoogen by de brief & reck[ening] dewyl nu dit meer als de helft surpassseerd de gedaane assurantie op de goederen in Cap[tein] Cristens & veel differentie in de scamonea is dese persone ons onbekend blyve so senden onder UE[dele] adresso alles open, dan de brief hun te behandigen & anders dien terug te houden dewyl het connossemt: in blanco geindosseerd onder UE[dele] couvert ook sal volgen alles op dat wy seculer mogen gaan."

<sup>64</sup> GA 332, 40/61, 23.08.1765, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior, "Weegens de goedere voor rekening A gezonde zien hetgeen UE[dele] meld en hoe dese vriend daar syn misnoegen ons heeft getoont, dog dat is niet alsom in toekomstende voorsigtiger te weesen, moestende syn E[dele] geen goederen aanneemen als die eerst Examineerende of die by de Eygenaars ook te hoog werd geeximeerd want dat is doorgaans zo & wy hebbe dat by conitnatie zo ondervonden, maar dan moest de permissie om daar op te trekken zo groot niet gegeven werden want dat is de grootste risico die men loopt & waarmeede men schaade zouden leyden die wel voor ons niet kan wesen om dat wy de H[ee]r Stechman alleen maar kenne en die volgens UE[dele] advys voor goed & suffisant houden."

<sup>65</sup> GA 332, 41/143, 24.10.1766, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior, "Wegens de opgegeeven assurantie op ordre van de H[ee]r Hemzy is alles verrigt en wy schryven syn E[dele] daar over, de vriend meld ons dese Fratelli Abulaffia op onse trattes soude doen op reek[ening] van goederen die ons is sendende UE[dele] gelieven ons eens te melden of

There seem to have been a few exceptional Ottomans whom De Vogel trusted more than others, such as Haim Coen Hemzy and Missir di Eghia. Although Hemzy proved to be a trustworthy correspondent,<sup>66</sup> De Vogel later accused Missir di Eghia of swindling him.<sup>67</sup>

Ironically, less than one year after De Vogel praised Hemzy as a trustworthy business correspondent, he began taking strict precautions against him as well. In 1768, De Vogel learned that an Armenian firm in Izmir, Massé di Carabeth & Sons, went bankrupt still owing LD 10,000 to Hemzy. De Vogel was clearly afraid that Hemzy's bankruptcy might result from this credit. Therefore, De Vogel preferred to send goods and letters addressed to Hemzy not directly, but through David van Lennep, whom De Vogel expected to make arrangements to prevent any losses in case Hemzy went bankrupt.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, De Vogel wrote that he hoped Hemzy would not

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wy sonder gevaar van schaade dese vrienden en andere die syn E[dele] ons recomandeert mogen aanneemen en hunn trattes honoreeren, wy versoeken Ue daarop een wakker oog gelieve te hoduen en ons U[dele] sentimenten daarover te melden want wy moeten daaromtrent secuur gaan en in geen gevaar komen om merder te favoriseeren als de goederen waardig zyn . . ."

<sup>66</sup> GA 332, 41/274, 24.03.1767, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior, "... & dat wy de H[ee]r Hemzy niet geannimeerd hebben tot sendinge & also van syn E[edele] wynig sullen krygen is natuurlyk, wy wenste niet of hadde so gedaan, want daardoor verliese wy wel de provisie, maar hebbende syn E[edele] ook van schaade geprenevieerd, dat wy oordeele eerlyke correspondenten hun pligt is..." GA 332, 41/627-628 and RGP 120, 1232, 14.01.1768, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior, "...Dit heeft geen betrekking op de vriend H[emzy], welkes trattes wij altijd prompt zulle honnoreeren; wij versoeken Zijn E[dele] te verseekeren, wij hem zeere estimeeren..."

<sup>67</sup> GA 332, 39/248, 20.11.1764, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "Weegens de saak van Missir is voor ons hard want als UE[dele] de papiere daarvan inhande hebben en alles eens naargaat wat hy ons geschreeven heeft, en wat in deeze correspondentie is gepasseert zo sullen UE[dele] Klaar konne sien hy als een schelm ons heeft behandelt dat ymand ongelukkig werd is yts dat yder een kan overkoomen, maar dat men syn vrienden schryft van goederen te sullen senden & daarop versoekt in avanso retour te doen of op komt te trekken en men weet die nooyt sal senden, dat is by ons een werk van bedrygers daar wy hem voor houden en wy denke UE[dele] dat meeden sal doen." In another letter De Vogel clarified that Missir Di Eghia owed him more than f 50,000. GA 332, 35/513, 27.01.1758, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep.

<sup>68</sup> Since Thomas de Vogel Junior was now on his way to the Netherlands, Van Lennep was expected to arrange the issue for De Vogel: "... alsmeede een brief voor De Hr Hemzy die UE gelieve aan zyn E te overhandigen sullende daarmede continueeren tot dat wy positief weeten zyn E zaaken in ordre zyn blyvende zo god gebeden zy te verleenen, gelieven de UE zig het komt met zyn E te verstaan & ingevall van eenige onverhoopt naadelige omstanden so gelieve UE dusdanige messures te neemen tot preservatie van ons interest als UE zulks raadsaam oordeelen dat wy volkoomen aan UE overlaaten dog wenschen dese onse vriend in ordre sal blyven en zig kunnen maintainen en de schade die hy by Masse lydt weder zal herwinnen." GA 332, 42/58, 07.07.1768, Leonard Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep.

suffer much damage, being a subject of the Porte and therefore, like the "Turks," being entitled to preferential payment.<sup>69</sup>

Although he carried out considerable trade with Ottoman merchants in Izmir and actively solicited commissions from them, in his letters to his son Thomas de Vogel frequently expressed animosity toward the Ottoman merchants and their participation in Ottoman-Dutch trade.<sup>70</sup> De Vogel went so far as to criticize even his fellow Amsterdam merchants who traded with Ottoman merchants in Izmir. He especially complained about the behavior of the cloth producers in Amsterdam and accused them of being the mainstay of the Ottoman merchants.<sup>71</sup>

One of these cloth producers, whose name appears frequently in De Vogel's letters, as well as in notarial records as a creditor of Ottoman merchants, was Hendrik Momma. In 1757, together with more than a dozen of other Amsterdam merchants, Hendrik Momma appeared before the notary as a creditor of Jesaias d'Arituin & Son and Homero & Murat d'Isay.<sup>72</sup> Two years later, along with two other Amsterdam cloth producers, Momma laid claim on Izmir merchants Aretun & Daniel Gatergioglu and Malcas di Carabeth, who owed money to the deceased Mattheus di Ouan, a debtor of the Amsterdam cloth producers.<sup>73</sup> The Salonica firm of Nieuhoff, Michault & Pandazi was also a debtor of Momma, who had empowered Massé di Carabeth & Sons to collect his money.<sup>74</sup> Two years later, Momma was obliged to empower another merchant in Izmir to

<sup>69</sup> GA 332, 42/83–84, 04.08.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensleie.

<sup>70</sup> GA 332, 38/714, 12.06.1764, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior. "... maar eenige Grieken hebben nog wat ingang by sommige vrienden wy houden een oog in 't zeil ..." GA 332, 39/181, 19.10.1764, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior. "... dat de Grieken doen wat zy willen het zy welstyten was die natie weg het zouden wel beeter gaan ..."

<sup>71</sup> GA 332, 38/396, 23.12.1763, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensleie. "... hadden wy de Grieken hier niet wy zoude wel beter negotie hebben maar die bederven alles omdat niets konne bewaaren & nu de beleeninge zo niet meer konne gedaan werden als voorheen zo verkoopen bu a tout pris om hun geldt te hebben om hun wisselbr[ieven] te betalen wy denke deze directie met de tyd eenige zal doen exclipseeren zoals diverse geeclipseert zyn & als zy eens alle wegwaaren zoude wel beeter negotie hebben dat moet door den tyd koomen maar de assistentie die by de eenige Hollanders laaken fabriquers & andre hebben houde hunn staande de tyd kan alles doen veranderen & ten goede doen loopen daarom god om gebeden zy."

<sup>72</sup> GA 5075, 10286/1090–1091, 11.12.1757. The other names mentioned in the notarial deed are Calkoen van Kerchem, Wed. A. Luder & Soon, Serkis Jasigioglu, Nicolaa de Roos, Louis Schumacher, Wynand Cappenberg, Wed. Van Speeck & Marcus, Willielmus Buihhglt, Wed. J. V. Dulm, Franc. Willem Westerhoud, Agustinus van Hoeff, Martin Möller, Jacobuys Janby, Fred. Cristian Sobbe.

<sup>73</sup> GA 5075, 10288/321, 12.04.1759. The other two cloth producers were Jan van Horsten & Zoon and Hermanus Bosch.

<sup>74</sup> GA 5075, 10522/671, 05.06.1761.



collect his money, this time from Massé di Carabeth & Sons!<sup>75</sup> Two Mavrogordatos also appear on the list of Momma's contacts in Izmir: Ambrosio Mavrogordato & Co.,<sup>76</sup> and Gio Mavrogordato, Gio Anastasi & Co.<sup>77</sup>

The available data from notarial archives thus confirm De Vogel's allegations of cooperation between cloth producers in Amsterdam and Ottoman merchants. However, De Vogel had other reasons to complain about Momma, whose mercantile network and reputation reached as far as Saint Petersburg, Astrakhan,<sup>78</sup> Moscow, and Persia.<sup>79</sup> On one occasion, Haim Coen Hemzy consigned cotton yarn simultaneously to De Vogel and Momma. As the latter was able to sell the yarn for a higher price than De Vogel, the difference led to a discussion between De Vogel and Hemzy. The problem was finally settled when De Vogel agreed to account for the yarn at a higher price than he had previously indicated.<sup>80</sup> In a later letter, De Vogel argued that the problem was caused by the different standards by which the quality of cotton yarn was evaluated in Izmir and Amsterdam. According to him, thinness was the major determinant in Izmir, while in Amsterdam the yarn's suitability for bleaching and dying was valued more.<sup>81</sup> De Vogel's criticism of the cloth producers of Amsterdam was at least partially provoked by their competition for Ottoman contacts and business correspondents, in which the cloth producers could offer more marketable returns than De Vogel.

As noted before, De Vogel also criticized other Dutch merchants with Ottoman business correspondents. One of these merchants was Hendrik de Bok in Rotterdam, who traded with the Ottoman merchants on a much greater scale than De Vogel. We are informed about the Ottoman business correspondents of De Bok through the records of De Vogel, since the latter

<sup>75</sup> GA 5075, 10535/948, 07.07.1763.

<sup>76</sup> GA 5075, 12412/832, 06.07.1773.

<sup>77</sup> GA 5075, 12459/629, 03.09.1781. Fifty bales of cotton, which Gio Mavrogordato, Gio Anastasi & Co. in Izmir had consigned to Hendrik Momma with the Dutch ship *De vrouw Elisabeth* steered by Hendrick Buck, was captured by the English warship *Antiqua* under the command of Robert Barton in 1780 and brought to Plymouth. The consignment was insured by a number of Amsterdam insurers who paid the damage.

<sup>78</sup> GA 5075, 10274/702, 06.11.1755.

<sup>79</sup> GA 332, 38/583, 06.04.1764, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>80</sup> GA 332, 39/435, 22.02.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>81</sup> GA 332, 40/183, 08.10.1765, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle. "Wat Ue[dele] weegens de differentie in de verkoop der cattoenen gaaren van d' Hr Momma & van ons gelieven te melden kan zeer wel weesen want men calculeert costly de waarde van t' gaaren naar de fynte & hier werden die soorten welken voor de bleek of voor de verf dienstig zyn het meest geexlimeert..."



handled the consignments arriving in Amsterdam from Izmir on De Bok's account. On one occasion, Michel Curmusi & Co. consigned 44 bales of cotton to De Bok and Manuel K. di Panaiotis consigned 120 bales to De Bok.<sup>82</sup> On another occasion, De Vogel mentions Gio Mavrogordato, Gio Anastasi & Co. as the consigners to De Bok of 44 bales of cotton.<sup>83</sup> Missir di Eghia, who was accused of having swindled De Vogel,<sup>84</sup> and Haim Coen Hemzy also maintained business relations with De Bok.<sup>85</sup> Another name mentioned in the same order is the firm of Falcon & Arditti in Izmir.<sup>86</sup>

This, then, is some of the background information to consider in relation to De Vogel's criticism of De Bok. In 1768, De Vogel spoke of "*Griekse liefhebbers*" (Greek lovers) when he complained about Dutch merchants in the Netherlands who traded—on a larger scale than his own firm—with the Greeks of Izmir.<sup>87</sup> De Vogel complained specifically about De Bok because the latter employed Greek merchants in Amsterdam to handle his consignments arriving in Amsterdam; this was a job for which De Bok had previously employed De Vogel. De Vogel expected or maybe even hoped that the bankruptcy of Greek merchants would teach De Bok and some other Dutch merchants a lesson and reveal the "real nature of the Greeks."<sup>88</sup>

Competition between Dutch merchants and textile producers gave the Ottoman merchants further opportunities in the Dutch business arena, thus expanding their commercial activities more deeply into the Dutch trading network. It is clear that this multidimensional competition provoked animosity among Dutch merchants, who were already opposed to Ottoman mercantile gains on their territory. This opposition is clearly stated in the correspondence of De Vogel, who frequently expressed his wish that the Ottoman merchants be expelled completely from Ottoman-Dutch trade.<sup>89</sup> He felt that the Greek merchants, especially, traded in a

<sup>82</sup> GA 332, 81/44, 1765.

<sup>83</sup> GA 332, 80/430, 1765.

<sup>84</sup> GA 332, 35/513, 27.01.1758, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep.

<sup>85</sup> GA 332, 39/142, 21.06.1764, Thomas de Vogel to L. Stechman.

<sup>86</sup> GA 5075, 15234/178, 05.04.1771.

<sup>87</sup> GA 332, 41/705, 24.03.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>88</sup> GA 332, 42/119, 06.09.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>89</sup> GA 332, 42/176, 04.11.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle, "... wenschen de liedens van hier zig intoekomende zodanig voor onse nationaale huizen zullen interesseeren dat de vreemde & andere liedens van 't land daar niet mogte graaken, de ondervindinge heeft hun inwaarheid daartoe reden gegeven & wy zyn ook van gedagten het eenigzins in aanmerkinge zal koomen ..."

very risky manner, and that the insurers did not want to insure their goods. De Vogel believed that the Greek merchants' bankruptcy was inevitable.<sup>90</sup> Although certain bankruptcies did occur in due time, the Ottoman merchants' invasion of Ottoman-Dutch trade had not slowed by the end of the eighteenth century.

How did the Ottoman merchants maintain their position and even expand their activities under these circumstances? The answer to this question is found in the letters of De Vogel: He wrote that Ottoman merchants in Izmir were preferred by the Amsterdam merchants because their commission rates were lower and they were able to handle consignments at lower costs than could Dutch merchants in Izmir.<sup>91</sup>

If the less expensive services and lower commission rates of the Ottoman merchants were one reason for continued Ottoman success, another reason was the readiness on the part of the Dutch merchants to allow the Ottomans to use their names and reap the fiscal advantages of both the Dutch capitulations and the Dutch fiscal regulations. The correspondence between De Vogel and his son reveals that they brought higher commission rates into account in return for passing the consignments of the Ottoman merchants under the De Vogel name so that the merchandise was taxed according to the regulations concerning the Dutch merchants. It is striking that in such cases the additional commission did not exceed ½ percent, which suggests that the advantage of passing the goods under Dutch names was not in fact considerable.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> GA 332, 42/196, 06.12.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië, "... Wee-gens deese lieden die hunne corespondentie nog met de vreemdelingen houden & daarvan goede consignatie bekoomen moeten zelf toesien, daarzyn hun reck soveel gevallen voorgekomen dat niet onkundig konnen zyn van de risico welke deselve loopen & moogelyk niet als met schade zig zullen van affhouden wy bemerken deese vreemdelingen aan hun scheepen veel schaade sullen leyden & onse assuradeurs hebben daarop niet willen teekenen zoodat de schaden op hun hoofd zal meden koomen & hun zwaar zal vallen, wy staan verwondert hoe dat nog aflaaders zyn te rencontreeren voor't schip van Cap: van Zon, want dit zullen onse assuradeurs so wy denken niet beteekenen & zullen zy de risico moeten loopen ..."

<sup>91</sup> GA 332, 42/81, 04.08.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië, "... aan-gaande de toestand der negotie en het crediet dat onse Hollandse huysen aan de leedens van het land a costly geeven waaromtrent wy UE ten regarde van eenige huysen geen ongelyk konnen geeven en hebben wy op die voet alhier teegens die geene welke dus handelen geraizonnit maar dan geeft men ons tot antwoord wy hebben met de nation-ale huysen onse corespondentie gehad dog ons by continuatie nadelig bevonden, want hunne onkosten en provisie zyn merkelyk hooger en beneme ons de voordeelen waar-mede ons voor een enkele weyze meede te vreedden zouden stellen want het kan altoos niet eeven voordelig gaan, en wat zal men daar tegen zeggen."

<sup>92</sup> GA 332, 39/32, 24.07.1764, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "... voor de heer Hemzy is besorgd zoals hem melden wy hebben ½ Pct. extra makelaardy in de reck[ening]

Moreover, the whole process of transporting mohair yarn from Ankara to Izmir and from there to the Amsterdam market required a wide range of business practices, deals, and payments, making it a very complex process. This complexity and the diversity of the expenses left considerable room for merchants with more experience and the ability to trade in a more efficient and profitable way than those with less experience. We understand here why De Vogel found the low consignment rates of the Ottoman merchants significant. Mohair yarn consignments that were handled at every stage by Dutch merchants were burdened with a total 8 to 8.5 percent commission (4 percent in Ankara, 2–2.5 percent in Izmir, and 2 percent in Amsterdam).<sup>93</sup> The importance of this rate becomes clearer when we compare it with the rates of other expenses. Our investigation on mohair yarn consignments received, handled, and sold by De Vogel between 1764 and 1767 reveals the significance of commission rates when compared to other expenses.<sup>94</sup> All the expenses (excluding the commissions) incurred for mohair yarn consignments in three cities (Ankara, Izmir, and Amsterdam) remained around 15 to 16 percent of the value of the merchandise, while the commission received by the correspondents was 8 to 8.5 percent. This indicates the importance of the commission rates as a factor influencing the cost of mohair yarn consignments arriving in Amsterdam. This certainly clarifies De Vogel's statements about the higher commission rates of Dutch correspondents in the Levant being a factor in Amsterdam merchants' preference for trading with Izmir Ottoman merchants. Another striking finding concerns the relative stability of expenses made in Amsterdam when compared with the fluctuation of expenses in Izmir. This indicates that the entrepreneurial skills and connections of individual merchants could matter a great deal in determining the cost of mohair yarn consignments, especially in Izmir. Unfortunately, the available data does not enable us to make a comparison between Ottoman and Dutch merchants. This is because the merchants were only obliged to give detailed information about the purchase prices and expenses of the consignments when more than one of the correspondents

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van de gaaren belast & in de inkoopende regten soveel faveur gedaan als wy selfs genieten sullende vrienden tragte genoeg te doen..."

<sup>93</sup> The same amount of commission was not brought into account for all consignments at all stages. For example, if a Dutch firm in Izmir invested individually in a certain consignment, there was no sense in bringing any commission into account at all. However, since consignments usually concerned more than one partner, the merchants handling the consignment in Ankara, Izmir, and Amsterdam did bring commission into account.

<sup>94</sup> This investigation was based on mohair yarn consignments recorded in GA 332, 79; 80.

had invested in the consignment. For example, when the consignment concerned a joint venture of the correspondents in Izmir and in Amsterdam, the Izmir partner had to inform the Amsterdam partner (De Vogel) about the expenses in detail. When the Amsterdam firm acted only as a commissioner and did not invest in the consignment, the correspondent in Izmir (and/or Ankara) remained the only investor and therefore did not need to inform De Vogel about the price and expenses in Izmir, expecting De Vogel to arrange the most profitable sale possible. We have already mentioned that the trade between the Ottoman merchants in Izmir and De Vogel consisted almost exclusively of commission trade. Therefore, the Ottoman merchants did not generally inform De Vogel about such details, even the price of the goods.

The commission rate was not as important in the cotton trade as it was in the case of mohair yarn. But it still remained at a total of 4–4.5 percent, while other expenses amounted to approximately 20 percent. The relative importance of the commission rate for cotton consignments is more apparent in Izmir, where it was 2–2.5 percent, while the other expenses were approximately 8 percent. The commission rates for red cotton yarn, for Izmir, were again 2–2.5 percent, while the remaining expenses amounted only to 4–5 percent. For white cotton yarn consignments, the latter rate seems to have been around 6 percent. Unfortunately, due to the reasons explained earlier, the available data does not enable us to compare consignments of the Ottoman merchants with those of the Dutch merchants. It seems not unreasonable to assume that Dutch merchants' higher commission rates would also have some impact on cotton consignments.

Nevertheless, all these data reveal that commission rates and other expenses did indeed have the potential to greatly impact the competition between Ottoman and Dutch merchants. If we are to believe the allegations of De Vogel—in the absence of more objective data—the Ottoman merchants did effectively exploit this potential. This was not the only factor, however. It is apparent that expertise and access to better goods for lower prices would also have an important impact on the competitiveness of all merchants.

Although it is difficult to establish objectively whether the Ottoman merchants or the Dutch merchants in Izmir enjoyed more advantages in this respect, the correspondence of De Vogel with his business contacts in Izmir suggests that the Ottoman merchants indeed had access to better goods with lower prices. In 1757, Thomas de Vogel wrote to his business partners in Izmir, stating that the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam could not compete with the Greek merchants because the Greeks in Amsterdam

were served better than the Dutch by their Greek correspondents in Izmir.<sup>95</sup> A full decade later, De Vogel still felt the same way.<sup>96</sup> Although De Vogel sometimes expressed satisfaction with goods he received from his Dutch correspondents in Izmir,<sup>97</sup> he was more likely to complain about their poor quality.<sup>98</sup> While De Vogel readily expressed dissatisfaction with the services of his Dutch business correspondents in Izmir, the Dutch merchants in Izmir, for their part, expressed dissatisfaction about the services of the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam. On one occasion, they even told De Vogel that the merchants of Izmir were more satisfied with the services of Alexander di Massé than with that of the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam.<sup>99</sup> Di Massé was an "Ottoman-Armenian" in Amsterdam who

<sup>95</sup> GA 332, 35/292–295, 07.10.1757, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep. Partly published in RGP 95, 377; GA 332, 35/288, 14.10.1757, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep, Knipping & Enslie in Izmir.

<sup>96</sup> GA 332, 40/380, 07.01.1766, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie, "... alhier konne de lieden by de Grieken niet beeter als by ons bediend werden maar a costly segge sy veel beter met in & verkoopen werden behandeld als by de nationale huizen wat redenen daarvan zyn & op welke wyze deese behandeling geschiet weeten wy niet & is ons onbekent." GA 332, 41/478, 04.09.1767, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie, "Wy hebben daarover meermaale gelargeerd & wy konne daardog geen redress door bekoomen maar moeten considereeren als andere huysen so van Grieken & diverse meerder die hunn negotie alleen op UE quartieren bepaalen sodanige bedienigen ontmoeten als wy van UE rencontreeren dat dan considerable schaadens moeten lyden & van de eersten genoemde diverse so alhier als a costly het niet sulle konnen goet maken, wat die natie heeft op de catoen & d:o garens door getast & sal considerable schade opvallen de tyd sal alles openbaren..."

<sup>97</sup> GA 332, 38/395, 23.12.1763, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie, "[fruits]... nu hebben eenige provideeringe van Ue & van d' Hr: Clement gesien door de naame van de laastgenoemde die op Sept cassie was geplakt; deeze twee qualiteiten waaren circa met wynig differentie & te preffereeren boven dien van de Grieken dog dewyl verneemen den inkoop hoog & tot LD 4 5/6 gedaan is zo zal de reek: op de pryzen zoals verkogt zyn niet voordeelich rendeeren."

<sup>98</sup> GA 332, 39/547, 05.04.1765, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep & Enslie, "... vinden int' generaal de Grieken beeter qualityd & bedieninge ontmoeten want Stati Forna heeft een party a 26 stv verkogt daaronder 2 baalen waaren die zeedert a 30 stv zyn verkogt want waaren zo moy als dien oyt gesien zyn ... zyn de pryzen der inkoop hoog die moet men sig onderwerpen maar dat de qualityd niet voldoende naar de beschryvinge werd bevinden is een seer onwenschelyken saak..."

<sup>99</sup> GA 332, 39/723, 05.07.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "Wy bedancke de vrienden voor het geen ons gelieven toe te voegen & aan ons te doen consigneeren maar zodat by anderen beeter & tot voldoeninge van hun oogmerk konne rencontreeren zo is niet meer als billyk de vrienden zig daar adresseren & wy zullen dat met genoegen aansien, want geen faveur pretendeeren daar by hunn naadeel beoogen, de negotie moet vry wezen & wy zullen eger vigileeren om het huys dienst te doen, de vrienden die UE aanhaalen betuygen alle van't huys van Massé seer contento zyn & beeter als van alle anderen Hollandsche Huyzen & konnen wy niet daarvan afftrekken..."

had extensive business connections among his extended family and other Izmir merchants.

This complaint marks another dimension of the Ottoman merchants' penetration of Ottoman-Dutch trade, revealing that in the absence of monopoly regulations to protect the Dutch merchants against competition from Ottoman merchants, the Dutch merchants in Izmir, as well as those in Amsterdam, were vulnerable to the inroads of their non-Muslim Ottoman competitors.

Our investigation of the participation of Ottoman merchants based in Izmir in Ottoman-Dutch trade reveals that these merchants were not well integrated into the community of Dutch traders in the Levant and continued to form distinct merchant communities. As we have seen, Begler was forbidden to swear the Dutch national oath despite the fact that he was a Dutch protégé and seems to have been a member of the Dutch trading community for a long time. More importantly, the dealings between the Dutch merchants in the Netherlands and the Ottoman merchants in Izmir remained quite different from those between the Dutch merchants in the Netherlands and the Dutch merchants in Izmir. It was probably the absence of trust between the two merchant communities that prevented them from investing in joint ventures. Consequently, their dealings were, as a whole, limited to commission trade, as illustrated by the business relations of De Vogel. This underlines the fact that there was a clear demarcation between Dutch nationals and outsiders, whether or not the outsiders were Dutch protégés.

Relations between these merchant communities was characterized by antagonism that stemmed from commercial rivalry and probably gained further momentum from xenophobia, as reflected in the correspondence of De Vogel. De Vogel's correspondence also reveals that the Ottoman merchants' expertise in certain goods, the access they enjoyed to better quality for lower prices, as well as their ability to handle consignments more efficiently, apparently because of their local connections, placed these merchants at an advantage vis-à-vis their Dutch competitors. The fact that Armenian merchants were primarily successful in the mohair trade arena while the Greek merchants enjoyed prominence primarily in the cotton trade shows that the crucial factor enabling the Ottoman merchants to gain prominence in international trade was not their relationship to foreign capital or their access to foreign protection, but rather their expertise in the trade of certain goods, an expertise that stemmed from their conventional roles in the local economy of northwest Anatolia.

The investigation into the handling of consignments of the main goods exported from the Ottoman Empire to the Netherlands shows that the multiplicity and diversity of these factors left considerable room for the entrepreneurial skills of individual merchants to cut costs and increase profits. The limited fiscal advantages of being a Dutch national, which stemmed from the Dutch capitulatory privileges and meant a 0.5 percent extra commission, stood in sharp contrast with the high commission rates the Dutch business correspondents routinely sought when they handled consignments. Although we see De Vogel complaining about these high commission rates, no attempt seems to have been made to adjust this institutionalized practice to pave the way for a more flexible and efficient pricing system. Though these commission rates were probably the mainstay of Dutch merchants in the Levant, the high rates proved destructive for the Dutch when the Ottoman merchants undercut them and gained ground as trading partners with their countrymen in the Netherlands.



## CHAPTER SIX

### OTTOMAN MERCHANTS IN AMSTERDAM

Ottoman merchants were not content to remain in Izmir as their participation in the Dutch side of Ottoman-Dutch trade continued to expand. While some Ottoman merchants in Izmir were infiltrating the Dutch trading network by conducting independent transactions with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam or forming partnerships with Dutch merchants in Izmir, other Ottoman merchants began to trade on a more sophisticated level by traveling to Amsterdam themselves, even settling in the city. In this chapter, we will focus on the commercial activities of the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam and try to understand the characteristics of their activities there. Here we argue again that the Ottoman merchants' on-the-ground connections within the Ottoman Empire constituted the crucial factor enabling them to maintain and even expand their activities in Amsterdam. One clue to the importance of their local Ottoman connections is again their reliance on trade of the commodity in which their community specialized within the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this chapter, we see that Greek merchants in Amsterdam focused their activities primarily on the cotton trade, while the Armenians continued to rely on the trade of mohair yarn. The Ottoman merchants did take advantage of a range of other opportunities in Amsterdam. They set out to conquer the mohair yarn trade of Leiden, maintained extensive commercial correspondence with their compatriots in the ports of the Russian Empire and elsewhere, and invested in Dutch shipping to the Mediterranean and in real estate in Amsterdam. Despite these diverse activities, however, Ottoman merchants still focused the bulk of their activity in trading goods in which they excelled. This focus meant such a competitive edge for the Ottoman merchants that, in the course of the eighteenth century, they were able to effectively push their Dutch competitors out of Ottoman-Dutch trade.

Moreover, even after settling in Amsterdam and living there for decades, the Ottoman merchants seem to have remained loyal to their familial ties in Izmir. This feature is especially apparent when we investigate their testaments and their marriages in this chapter.

To clarify all these points, we rely extensively on the notarial deeds of the Ottoman merchants and the information De Vogel gives on their

activities in Amsterdam. It is difficult to draw a coherent picture from the sparse information on the subject that can be culled from the records. Therefore, we will arrange the available information according to theme, and also try to reconstruct the activities of certain merchants on the basis of this information. In sum, we aim to illuminate various features of Ottoman merchants' presence in Amsterdam, particularly those aspects that are important to the role they played in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic.

The Armenian presence in Amsterdam dates back to the seventeenth century, thus preceding that of the Greeks, who were first seen in Amsterdam during the eighteenth century. Tournefourt visited Asia Minor in the beginning of the eighteenth century and noted that Armenian merchants already had a longstanding reputation for trade to the metropolises of western Europe. Tournefourt noted that though the Armenians did not control all trade with the Levant, they were nevertheless daring merchants that be found in the main cities of Europe and traveling as far from the distant interior of Persia as Livorno, England, and the Netherlands.<sup>1</sup> Even before Tournefourt wrote of their widespread presence, we know that Armenians were also found in Marseille, though they later disappear from there, probably because of Colbert's monopolization of French Levant trade. Jean Chardin noted that as early as the seventeenth century, Armenian merchants and their merchandise were transported on Dutch vessels throughout western Europe.<sup>2</sup>

It is clear that this early stage of Armenian mercantile activities in Amsterdam, which dates to the beginning of the seventeenth century, was mainly based on the trade of Persian silks, and was carried out by Armenians from Persia. Not much later, Armenians from Asia Minor joined the Persian Armenians in Amsterdam. Especially during the second half of the seventeenth century, an increasing number of Armenian merchants from the Levant showed up in Amsterdam, but their number remained less than that of the Armenians from Persia until the eighteenth century. Notarial deeds of varying natures, such as bills of exchange protests, loading contracts, inheritance settlements, business agreements, and so forth reveal that in 1668, a total of at least 66 Armenians were present in Amsterdam. This number fell to 26 in 1687 and increased to more than 50 during the

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<sup>1</sup> Tournefourt, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant*, 2:158.

<sup>2</sup> Jean Chardin, *Voyages du Chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres lieux de l'Orient* (Amsterdam, 1735), 1:6.

first decade of the eighteenth century. From this time onward, Levantine Armenians apparently accounted for the rising numbers of the Armenian community in Amsterdam, which reached an absolute peak in 1715.<sup>3</sup> After that date, the number of Armenians who left traces in notarial archives in Amsterdam decreased steadily to 45 between 1740 and 1750 and to 5 in 1810.<sup>4</sup> Their declining population notwithstanding, the Armenian community of Amsterdam reached the zenith of their material power in the mid-eighteenth century, despite the fact that they numbered less than in 1715.<sup>5</sup> The available data reveal that, at times, the size of the Armenian community in Amsterdam was comparable to, if not greater than, those of most of the individual European nations located at the ports of the Levant.

Unlike their Persian fellows, Armenians from “Turkey” were mainly engaged in the trade of mohair products. This is not to say that there was a strict division between the occupations of Persian and Levantine Armenians, since some Persian Armenians were also active in the trade of mohair yarn and other products, and Levantine Armenians also dealt in silk, though this seems to be a secondary activity for them.<sup>6</sup> The diversity characteristic of Armenian activities in the seventeenth-century Netherlands is illustrated by the activities of Louwijs d’Celebi, the co-founder and director, along with two Amsterdam merchants, of a cotton printery established in Amersfoort in 1678. This printery was the first in the Netherlands that aimed to print cotton using “Eastern-Indian” techniques, and therefore required the knowledge and experience of Louwijs d’Celebi.<sup>7</sup> Although d’Celebi and others branched out of the conventional Armenian spheres of enterprise, the mohair yarn trade remained the major

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<sup>3</sup> In this year, 71 different Armenian merchants appeared at the notaries of Amsterdam. René Bekius and Wout Ultee, “De armeense Kolonie in Amsterdam 1600–1800,” *De Gids* 148 (May 1985), 217. See also René Bekius, “A Global Enterprise,” 206–235. I am indebted to René Bekius for providing me with a draft of this article before its publication.

<sup>4</sup> Van Rooy, “Armenian Merchant Habits,” 347; Bekius and Ultee, “De armeense Kolonie,” 217.

<sup>5</sup> Silvio van Rooy, “Johannes de Minas: Armeens Priester te Amsterdam 1734–1768,” *Ons Amsterdam: Maandblad gewijd aan de hoofdstad des lands* 19 (1967), 52.

<sup>6</sup> Silvio van Rooy’s card index, based mainly on notarial records about Armenian activities in Amsterdam, gives a clear indication of this. GA 1053.

<sup>7</sup> Willem Johannes Smit, *De Katoendrukkerij in Nederland tot 1813* (Rotterdam, 1928), 59; G. H. Rodenburg and G. W. Bijlsma, *Van Vlissingen & Co’s Gedenkboek 1846–1946* (Helmond, Netherlands, 1948), 6.

occupation of Levantine Armenians in Amsterdam. This is reflected in the notarial archives of Amsterdam.<sup>8</sup>

In 1714, the Armenian community of Amsterdam set a milestone in their presence in the city when they converted a warehouse at Kromboomsloot into an Armenian church. Johannes de Minas from Amasya served as priest of the church for thirty-four years from 1734 to 1768, suggesting again the Levantine Armenian dominance within the community in this period. The church maintained a priest until 1806 but stopped functioning soon afterward, when the Armenian population ebbed completely.<sup>9</sup>

While the Armenian presence in Amsterdam spanned several centuries, the Greek presence there appears to be a novelty of the eighteenth century. Just as the Levantine Armenians depended on trade in mohair-related merchandise, Greek mercantile activities were dependent on the cotton trade. From about the mid-eighteenth century on, as the cotton trade dominated Dutch trade with the Levant, Greek merchants became more and more visible in Amsterdam. There was a crucial difference however. It seems that the earlier Armenian trade to Amsterdam remained at a level tolerated by Dutch merchants, while the Greek activities led to furious opposition from Dutch merchants.

Although the Greek merchants' invasion of Ottoman-Dutch trade came some time after the Armenian commercial activities had reached their zenith, the commercial activities of both of the communities shared certain characteristics. One of these characteristics was the Ottoman merchants' reliance on their "own" commercial network, comprising merchants with the same ethno-religious affiliations; this reliance continued, even after they had settled in Amsterdam. The notarial acts kept in the municipal archives of Amsterdam provide us numerous examples of such intra-communal reliance. In 1710, for instance, Joseph d'Egbel, an

<sup>8</sup> For example in 1655, Rachel Armenio, an Armenian merchant in Amsterdam, sold 14 bales of mohair yarn for 13 Dutch schillings per pound to Hendrick & Lenert Jacobz Popta (GA 5075, 1987a/69, 30.04.1655). In 1672, Olerli de Algas testified in the presence of the notary on behalf of Badba Petro Balthasar about the 21 bales of mohair yarn that Sultan de Petrus in Izmir had passed to his son, Hodsja Ohannes (Van Rooy, "Armenian Merchant Habits," 352).

<sup>9</sup> Van Rooy, "Johannes de Minas," 52–56; N. de Roever, "De Armenische Kolonie," *Uit Onze Oude Amstelstad: Schetsen en Tafareelen...*, Amsterdam 3 (1891), 1–19. After the church was abandoned, there was a long dispute (1834–74) among several institutions over the ownership of the building. In 1989, new Armenian immigrants regained the building and turned it into a church again. See René Bekius and Wout Ultee, *Over Armeense Graven in de Oude Kerk te Amsterdam 1661–1808: Tevens een beknopte geschiedenis van de Armeense Kerk te Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 2008), 80–96.

Armenian merchant in Amsterdam, appeared before the notary, along with his Armenian translator Pieter Aved and declared that he wished to empower the Armenian Serhigs di Giorie in Izmir to act as his proxy.<sup>10</sup> In 1743, in a similar fashion, Jacob van Jozef de Mattos, a Jewish merchant in Amsterdam, empowered Nunes & Da Costa in Izmir to procure documents and information on two rings and three diamonds that the former had consigned to Hananel S'forno in Izmir.<sup>11</sup> In 1783, Demetrio & Nicola Bachatori & Co. in Izmir empowered Stephano d'Isay, a Greek merchant in Amsterdam, to collect f6,139 from the Dutch merchant Gerard Staats & Zoon.<sup>12</sup>

However, the borders between different communities were not as firm as it would appear from these examples. In the previous chapter, we have shown that Ottoman merchants in Izmir did maintain business relations with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam. Although it is not possible to trace the comparative importance of their trade with these Dutch correspondents, we have some evidence indicating that the Ottoman merchants in Izmir who traded with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam also traded with their own compatriots there. For instance, in 1768 Manuel Kiriaco di Panaiotis & Co., a Greek trading house in Izmir, consigned to De Vogel three bales of mohair yarn of the same quality as yarn he had consigned on an earlier occasion to Stati Thoma, a Greek merchant in Amsterdam.<sup>13</sup>

It is clear that the establishment of an Ottoman merchant presence in Amsterdam created new opportunities both for Ottoman merchants in Izmir and for those who had moved to Amsterdam. Merchants in Izmir began to trade with merchants in Amsterdam from their own community and with Dutch merchants there, while those who moved to Amsterdam explored the new opportunities the city offered them. A certain degree of integration into the economic life of Amsterdam was inevitable, since it was there that they had to sell the goods they brought or received from the Levant. The goods they purchased in Amsterdam to consign to the Levant were also of crucial importance to the social and economic assets of the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam. These Ottoman interactions with the local merchants and producers of Amsterdam ensured that they joined the latter in a shared commercial milieu, with its specific business practices. An indication of such a development was recorded by one of

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<sup>10</sup> GA 5075, 7499/611, 06.06.1710.

<sup>11</sup> GA 5075, 8964/706, 16.08.1743.

<sup>12</sup> GA 5075, 10655/359, 27.06.1783.

<sup>13</sup> GA 332, 42/180, 11.09.1768, Leonard Thomas de Vogel to Manuel K. di Panaiotis & Co.

Amsterdam's notaries upon the request of Leonard Lups, a Dutch merchant in the city. Upon Lups' request, the Armenian merchants Mattheus di Ouan, Alexander di Massé, and Johannes d'Isaac, and the Dutch textile producers Hendrik Buttleman, Abraham Beaune, Hendrik Alderts, and Pieter Overberg & Co. declared in the presence of the notary that no compensation was charged by cloth producers for filling holes caused by rodent worms or insects in their textiles.<sup>14</sup>

Once the Ottoman merchants had settled in Amsterdam, they did not limit their activities to the city, but set out to conquer the markets of other Dutch cities as well. Because of its substantial demand for mohair yarn and its export of woolen textiles to the Levant,<sup>15</sup> Leiden was an immediate target. It is clear that Leiden's extensive relations with the Levant date back to the seventeenth century. During the eighteenth century, several merchants and trading houses in the city, such as Hugo Cauw,<sup>16</sup> Jacob Arollenvaux,<sup>17</sup> and the Van Eys firm, held extensive business relations with the Levant. More interestingly, Van Kerchem, a Leiden-based merchant, was a partner in the Istanbul-based firm Belcamp, Meyer & Van Kerchem.<sup>18</sup>

Leiden's important role in Dutch Levant trade is also reflected in De Vogel's frequent references to the city in his correspondence. In 1758, Dirk Knipping, a partner of David van Lennep, Knipping & Enslie, one of the Dutch trading houses in Izmir, was relieved of his partnership by David van Lennep because he married a local Greek woman. When Knipping set out to the Netherlands to arrange new business correspondents, De Vogel, acting on behalf of Van Lennep, hastened to inform the Leiden merchants about Knipping's marriage so as to prevent those merchants from doing business with him. Although the ship on which Dirk Knipping had embarked arrived quite quickly in Amsterdam, it was then kept under quarantine; this gave De Vogel plenty of time to spread the gossip throughout the merchant community of Leiden.<sup>19</sup>

The spreading of gossip was not De Vogel's only pursuit in Leiden. Mohair yarn consignments from Izmir often compelled De Vogel to contact Leiden merchants. He often alerted his correspondents in Izmir that

<sup>14</sup> GA 5075, 11335/40, 22.11.1751.

<sup>15</sup> De La Court, *Welvaren van Leiden*, 52, 95, 123.

<sup>16</sup> RGP 95, 235–236, 03.06.1751, Meyer & Co. to Hugo Cauw & Zoon in Leyden.

<sup>17</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 14, 1 September 1735, Daniel van Eys to Rolland & Ploegstert.

<sup>18</sup> GA 5075, 8959/591, 07.06.1742.

<sup>19</sup> GA 332, 36/112, 23.06.1758, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep.

he had sent samples of mohair yarn to Leiden in search of customers.<sup>20</sup> We see that De Vogel's dealings in mohair yarn in Leiden were strained by the competition from Levantine consignments sent directly to the merchants there. On one occasion, Louis Stechman, one of De Vogel's correspondents in Izmir, complained about De Vogel's conduct in regard to one of his mohair yarn consignments and ordered him to leave the job to Hugo Cauw in Leiden.<sup>21</sup> De Vogel was confident about his own handling of the consignment and argued that the yarn was not good enough to yield the amount Stechman expected, but he nevertheless passed the yarn on to Cauw; he wrote to Stechman that they would see whether Cauw would be able to perform a wonder!<sup>22</sup> Only a month later, De Vogel informed Stechman that Cauw had rejected the yarn and sent it back to Amsterdam.<sup>23</sup>

For the merchants engaged in the Levant trade, Leiden was a mohair market. As De Vogel put it: "In Leiden, there is no opportunity, except for mohair yarn."<sup>24</sup> De Vogel's activities in the city became more and more difficult to sustain in the face of growing competition. In 1768, De Vogel complained that he could no longer sell mohair yarn in Leiden because his main customer there had purchased 112 bales of yarn from another merchant.<sup>25</sup> There is no doubt that this growing competition came mainly from Armenian merchants, who had established viable connections with the city as early as 1656.<sup>26</sup> In 1765, Thomas de Vogel wrote extensively to his son in Izmir about the activities of Armenian merchants. He claimed that he himself had secured the highest prices for the mohair yarn consignments of Dutch merchants, and Cauw in Leiden had secured the highest prices for the consignments of Armenian merchants. De Vogel expressed astonishment over the ease with which the Armenians seemed to find customers for their goods, while De Vogel had to try very hard to arrange a reasonable deal. He alleged that Armenian merchants could sell their yarn as soon as customers saw it, while such an easy deal was never to be achieved by Dutch merchants. De Vogel expressed again his conviction

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<sup>20</sup> GA 332, 38/242, 07.10.1763, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle; GA 332, 39/19, 06.07.1764, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep & Ensle; GA 332, 39/64, 07.08.1764, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep & Ensle; GA 332, 39/88, 23.08.1764, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>21</sup> GA 332, 40/4, 19.07.1765, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>22</sup> GA 332, 40/244, 05.11.1765, Thomas de Vogel to L. Stechmann.

<sup>23</sup> GA 332, 40/326, 12.12.1765, Thomas de Vogel to L. Stechmann.

<sup>24</sup> GA 332, 40/272, 22.11.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "... want tot Leyden buyten de stammen geen occasie is..."

<sup>25</sup> GA 332, 41/699, 18.03.1768, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior.

<sup>26</sup> Bekius, "A Global Enterprise," 206–235.



that the advantage of the Armenians emanated from the more effective service they received from their business correspondents in Izmir.<sup>27</sup> De Vogel's emphasis on the Armenian merchants' correspondents in Izmir shows his recognition of the superiority of those merchants' local connections in western Anatolia, which enabled them to access and consign higher-quality mohair yarn and apparently pay less for it.

Like the Armenians, Greek merchants also seem to have established business connections with Leiden merchants and textile producers. The records of the Van Eys firm, a Leiden textile producer with business relations in the Levant, reveal that by 1730 Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif, a Greek commercial house in Izmir, had established commercial ties with the Leiden firm. The Greek house seems to have been interested in the woolen cloth produced by the Van Eys firm.<sup>28</sup> The remaining correspondents of the Van Eys firm in Izmir constituted mostly Dutch merchants, and to a lesser extent, merchants from other European nations. These business correspondents would purchase woolen cloth from Van Eys, primarily in exchange for mohair yarn. At certain times, however, the Dutch market became saturated with mohair yarn and Daniel van Eys would discourage his correspondents in Izmir from consigning mohair yarn to him.<sup>29</sup>

The growing competition from Ottoman merchants was but one of the factors threatening the Dutch position in the mohair trade. After it peaked at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch market for mohair yarn entered a continuous decline. Since growing competition between merchants accompanied this decline, the market frequently became saturated with mohair yarn, bringing the sales of De Vogel, as well as Cauw, to a standstill. Even in such times, the Ottoman merchants were able to exploit the limited opportunities available.<sup>30</sup> During the second half of the eighteenth century, Dutch mohair yarn purchases had a negligible impact on prices in the Levant. Demand from other purchasers, such as France and England, meant that mohair yarn prices increased steadily even while the demand in Leiden declined. When the prices in Izmir and Ankara fell temporarily, the business correspondents of De Vogel considered this an

<sup>27</sup> GA 332, 39/338, 03.01.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>28</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 1a, 03.06.1730, Panaiotis & Begler di Jossif to Daniel van Eys.

<sup>29</sup> GL Firma Van Eys, 14, 27.09.1735, Daniel van Eys to Rolland & Ploegstert.

<sup>30</sup> GA 332, 39/744, 05.07.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior, "... Cauw die gaarn wat wilde verkoopen kan geen baal aan de man brengen Stati Thoma heeft iets verkogt zo men zegd zeer goedkoop, god geeven wat leeven in deese negotie sal koomen en wy den vrienden prompten & voordeligen mogen bedienen dat aan ons niet sal mankeeren maar daar moet meerder aftrek koomen of is niet te continueeren voor de vrienden ..."

opportunity to invest in the yarn. De Vogel discouraged this hasty venture, arguing that low prices in the Levant did not ensure a profitable sale. He wrote that the prices in Leiden were determined by the amount of yarn that arrived in the city and the demand for it, not by conditions in the Levant.<sup>31</sup>

Despite these other challenges for Dutch mohair traders, the “Armenian factor” was clearly the greatest threat to Dutch traders in mohair yarn. The expansion of Armenian activities to Leiden also bore immediate consequences for Dutch cloth trade<sup>32</sup> to the Levant, since the city was such an important center for cloth production. The Armenian merchants who established connections within the business circles of the city began to purchase cloth from local producers and consign it to ports in the Levant. We will examine the affairs of a certain Armenian merchant, Mattheus di Ouan, in detail to understand the operation networks of such merchants.

Di Ouan was born in Persia and had been living in Amsterdam for twelve years when he disappeared from the city in 1753, leaving behind a number of creditors. His creditors applied to the Dutch States General, asking that the Dutch ambassador in Saint Petersburg and the consul in Izmir be ordered to assist them to sequester goods belonging to Di Ouan. The claimants were Amsterdam merchants and cloth producers Leonard Lups & Zoon, Willem Straalman, David Rutger Junior, and Hendrik Buttelman, as well as three merchants and cloth dyers from Leiden, namely Willem Kinkee, Cornelis Isacq van den Bogaard, and Willem and Matheus van Noort. They claimed that Di Ouan owed them f45,608 for cloth he had purchased in Amsterdam and Leiden. Because Di Ouan had consigned the cloth to Saint Petersburg, Astrakhan, and Izmir, the claimants hoped that the goods could be sequestered on their arrival and returned to them. The Dutch States General responded by ordering its representatives in Moscow and Izmir to sequester the goods belonging to Di Ouan on their arrival and also to lay claim to the credits the individual merchants at these places owed to Di Ouan.<sup>33</sup> A few days before the States General’s resolution, the creditors installed John Tamez in Moscow and Belcamp, Begler & Clement in Izmir as their proxies.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> GA 332, 41/547, 23.10.1767, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie.

<sup>32</sup> For the role of Armenian merchants in the Dutch textile trade in general, see Bekius, “A Global Enterprise,” 206–235.

<sup>33</sup> NA 1.01.03–3517 (microfilm 4283), 10.04.1753, resolution of the SG.

<sup>34</sup> GA 5075, 11342/17, 18, 19, 05.04.1753.

Three months later, the Dutch consul in Izmir informed the States General that he had discovered that Malcas di Carabeth and Aretun & Daniel Gatergioglu owed Di Ouan money. The consul was not optimistic about any restitution because these merchants were liable not to European, but to Ottoman law—which, allegedly, did not recognize European laws and documents.<sup>35</sup> Quite interestingly, two years later, the same Armenian merchants in Izmir were mentioned as possible debtors of Matheus Iwanoff Schoelwioskoy, an Armenian merchant in Moscow, who also owed a considerable amount to the Amsterdam merchants and textile producers Jan van Horst & Zoon, Hermanus Bosch, Hendrik Momma, and Willem Straalman. According to a notarial act, Schoelwioskoy agreed that he owed the Amsterdam textile producers a considerable amount and accepted that his belongings in Amsterdam, Saint Petersburg, and Astrakhan, as well as what Malcas di Carabeth and Aretun & Daniel Gatergioglu owed him in Izmir be seized for his creditors.<sup>36</sup>

However disastrous Di Ouan's disappearance might have been for his creditors, it provides the historian with a glimpse into the vast commercial network to which he belonged, stretching from Amsterdam to Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Astrakhan, and Izmir. Several pieces of information from different sources reveal that Ottoman merchants of different ethno-religious affiliations all relied on such networks in their commercial activities in Amsterdam. Alexander di Massé, a member of the Armenian community of Amsterdam born around 1733 in "Turkey,"<sup>37</sup> appeared before the notary on 21 February 1785 and appointed Makar Artem Godabaschoff in Saint Petersburg as his proxy to collect his money from Ivan Gregorich Gotschemaloff in that city.<sup>38</sup>

It was not only Armenian merchants who utilized their wider commercial networks. The Porte's Greek subjects residing in Amsterdam appear to have relied extensively on the Greek trading diaspora. The notarial archives of Amsterdam boast a number of entries related to bill of exchange traffic among Greek merchants residing in different European cities. Several examples of such entries concern Stephano d'Isay, mentioned as the bill's holder on four bills of exchange drawn in Moscow in 1772. Three of these bills were drawn on a Dutchman, while one of them was drawn on

<sup>35</sup> RGP 95, 259–260, 30.06.1753, D. A. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>36</sup> GA 5075, 10274/702, 06.11.1755.

<sup>37</sup> GA 1053, 7.

<sup>38</sup> GA 5075, 16521/170, 21.02.1785.

Anastasi Leontari, another Greek merchant in Amsterdam.<sup>39</sup> In 1788–89 a number of Amsterdam merchants protested against d'Isay, who was not able to pay the bills of exchange that were drawn on him primarily by his correspondents in Saint Petersburg.<sup>40</sup> It is interesting to observe that despite the fact that his correspondents in Saint Petersburg were exclusively Greek, not a single Greek is mentioned among d'Isay's business correspondents in London. In 1783, d'Isay appointed Edward Harthals as his proxy to collect money from a number of bankrupted London merchants and insurers.<sup>41</sup>

The prominence of Russian trade centers in the commercial activities of Ottoman merchants is illustrated by the contacts of more Greek and Armenian merchants.<sup>42</sup> One fairly complex commercial transaction and its accompanying bills of exchange reveal the extent to which trade carried out between Izmir and Amsterdam was related to the trade carried out by Greeks through the Russian Empire. In 1793, Nicolas Marcella appeared before the notary in Amsterdam to testify with documents obtained from the chancery of the Venetian consulate in Izmir that he had the authority to act as proxy on behalf of Giovanni Perachi & Co. and Curmusi Perachi & Co. in Izmir. Then he declared that he empowered Kuck & Van Kaman in Saint Petersburg to act on his behalf concerning 13,000 rubles owed by Attanasio Gunaropulo in Saint Petersburg to Giovanni Perachi & Co. and Curmusi Perachi & Co. The debt stemmed from a consignment of 203 boxes of soap the merchants in Izmir had sent to Attanasio Gunaropulo on a Venetian ship. Marcella stated that his proxy should collect 13,000 rubles from Attanasio Gunaropulo if the latter had not consigned the orders of the merchants in Izmir and had not paid the bill of exchange worth 3,000 rubles that had been drawn on him by the Izmir merchants.

<sup>39</sup> GA 5075, 10868/302, 09.02.1773.

<sup>40</sup> First, Christoph Kuck & Co. in Amsterdam demanded the payment of 6,500 rubles drawn on d'Isay by H. Attanasio Gunaropulo & Johannes Emanuel & Co. in Saint Petersburg (GA 5075, 15820/1121, 30.06.1788). A week later came the protest of Goddert Cappel & Zonen. He demanded the payment of 1,000 rubles drawn on d'Isay, again from Saint Petersburg (GA 5075, 15821/1162, 07.07.1788). In the ensuing year, at least three more bills of exchange, drawn by merchants from Saint Petersburg on d'Isay, were noted in the notarial records (GA 5075, 15821/1191, 10.07.1788; 15821/1257, 23.07.1788; 15641/674, 802, 06.10.1789).

<sup>41</sup> GA 5075, 10654/255–260, 311, 13.05.1783. The debtors mentioned in the notarial acts include John Fletcher, Christopher Croft, John Walter, James Woodbridge, Thomas Parkinson, John Liotard, John Rodolph Bartenschlag, and John Edm. Browne.

<sup>42</sup> In 1736 Janakie de Jacob in Izmir (drawer), Alawerdi di Getzeonis in Moscow (payee), Satur di Petros (holder), and Pieter Aved (drawee) in Amsterdam were mentioned in the same bill of exchange (GA 5075, 8060/53, 57, 02.11.1736).

Marcella also stated that his proxy in Saint Petersburg should draw 10,000 rubles on Giovanni Mosconissioti in Taganrog—on the northern shores of the Black Sea—due, apparently, to another commercial transaction.<sup>43</sup> In addition to the Russian trade centers, the related documents make a few references to Vienna and the Greek merchants there.<sup>44</sup>

The importance of various Mediterranean ports for the expanded commercial activities of the Ottoman merchants, especially the Greeks, has already been rightly assessed by various scholars. Traian Stoianovich gives a clear picture of an eighteenth-century increase in Greek mercantile activities in the Balkans and Balkan Mediterranean ports.<sup>45</sup> We are also familiar with Greek mercantile activities in the eastern Mediterranean and especially in Italian ports through the works of Elena Frangakis.<sup>46</sup> The same author has also shown that Greek merchants were especially able to expand their activities to all parts of the Mediterranean during the armed conflicts between European powers in the eighteenth century.<sup>47</sup> Daniel Crecelius has revealed that these phenomena also had a parallel in the southern Mediterranean ports, in the activities of Greek Catholics.<sup>48</sup> There is no doubt that Greek merchants in Amsterdam were not isolated from these developments and that they maintained contacts with Greek merchants in these places. More importantly, the available evidence reveals that at least some of them appear to have settled in Italian ports before eventually moving to Amsterdam.<sup>49</sup> According to a letter written in 1753 by the Dutch ambassador in Vienna, Trieste, especially, was of crucial importance for the increasing activities of not only of Ottoman Greeks, but also of the Turks. The ambassador explained that Ottoman merchants were not only supplying Macedonian wool to that area, but had begun bringing huge amounts of cotton, part of which was used in Trieste, and

<sup>43</sup> GA 5075, 15884/2003, 17.08.1793.

<sup>44</sup> In 1780 Demetrios Kourmoules & Co. in Amsterdam empowered G. G. Schuller & Co. in Vienna to collect an outstanding debt from Eustratio Petrocochino & Co. in the same city (GA 5075, 10896/424, 31.08.1780).

<sup>45</sup> Stoianovich, "Conquering Balkan," 234–313.

<sup>46</sup> See Frangakis-Syrett, "Greek Mercantile Activities," 73–86.

<sup>47</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 93–95, 108–109, 171–173.

<sup>48</sup> Daniel Crecelius, "The Attempt by the Greek Catholics to Control Egypt's Trade with Europe in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane*, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi (Zagwan, 1988), 3:121–132.

<sup>49</sup> Van den Boogert, "Ottoman Greeks," 129–147. The connections of Demetrios Kourmoules, especially, in the eastern Mediterranean are striking. I am indebted to Maurits van den Boogert for providing me with a draft of this article before its publication. See also Kafadar, "Death in Venice," 191–218.

part of which was consigned further to Berlin, Hamburg, and Switzerland.<sup>50</sup> By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the Armenian Catholic residents of Trieste profited from this trade considerably; it flourished as a result of the Napoleonic wars, which had paralyzed traffic in the Mediterranean.<sup>51</sup>

It is clear that Amsterdam was a suitable place for the Ottoman merchants to maintain relations with their wider commercial networks and to diversify their economic activities. However, it is of crucial importance to emphasize that the Levant trade was by far the most important economic activity for these merchants; their other investments were mainly in related sectors, such as Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean. It is not surprising that the latter attracted investment by the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam, as Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean was vital to the Ottoman-Dutch trade in general and thus for the commercial activities of the Ottoman merchants.

According to the available sources, Ottoman merchants initially became interested in Dutch shipping during the first half of the eighteenth century, when they began to charter Dutch ships for voyages between Ottoman and Dutch ports. As De Vogel held shares in a number of ships and kept their accounts, his records accord us a glimpse at this earliest Ottoman interest in Dutch shipping. According to the relevant entries, Caldana & Boissin in Salonica, Stephano Abro & Resdages De Aharon & Co., Casiadir Jasigioglu in Izmir, Thomaso di Serpos, and Andrea Magrini & Co. in Istanbul were some of the Ottoman customers of these ships.<sup>52</sup> De Vogel was certainly not the only Dutch shipowner who rented his ships to Ottoman merchants. For instance, the Dutch ship *De Alida Gally* was chartered by Antonio Zingrilara & Co. in 1751.<sup>53</sup> In 1763, Stati Thoma in Amsterdam and Gio Mavrogordato and Gio Anastasi in Izmir contracted with Claas Ploeger, co-owner of the Dutch ship *De Vigilantie*, to charter that ship for a trip to Izmir.<sup>54</sup>

Ottoman merchants' interest in Dutch shipping in the first half of the eighteenth century gave way to Ottoman investment in the shares of Dutch ships in the second half of the century. The Armenian Alexander di Massé was one of the Ottoman merchants who held considerable shares

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<sup>50</sup> RGP 95, 264–266, 10.10.1753, Burmania to the DLH.

<sup>51</sup> RGP 115, ix–xi.

<sup>52</sup> GA 332, 4, 19, 20, 22, 23.

<sup>53</sup> GA 5075, 10792/618, 08.06.1751.

<sup>54</sup> GA 5075, 10803/654, 31.05.1763.

in Dutch ships. A notarial act in 1762 reveals that at that time Di Massé held  $\frac{3}{4}$  shares of the Dutch ship *De Vyf Broeders*. The remaining  $\frac{1}{4}$  share of the ship belonged to another Armenian, namely Petrus di Babgian.<sup>55</sup> In 1763 and 1764, Di Massé sold a number of his shares in Dutch ships and recorded the transactions at the notary in Amsterdam. The first transaction relates to his  $\frac{1}{16}$  share in *De Vrouwe Johanna*, which he sold for f600 to Arachiel di Paulo.<sup>56</sup> Six months later, Di Massé sold his  $\frac{1}{8}$  share in *De Vrouwe Margaretha* to Govert Lups for f1,500.<sup>57</sup> In this period, Di Massé also sold his  $\frac{13}{32}$  share of *S'Gregory*, which was bought by Wynand Cappenbergh, for f4,000.<sup>58</sup> Other merchants were also buying and trading; in 1791, the Greek firm Stephano d'Isay & Co. purchased *De Elisabeth Aletta Emerentia* from Denijs Ten Tije for f11,800.<sup>59</sup>

For the Ottoman merchants, investing in the shares of Dutch ships or chartering them for voyages to the Levant were not the only options for participating in shipping between the Levant and Amsterdam. The Ottoman merchants could and did charter foreign ships for voyages between Amsterdam and Levant ports. As with the Ottoman merchants' other moves, De Vogel observed these arrangements closely. In 1768, when the first examples of Ottoman-chartered foreign ships were about to launch their first voyages, De Vogel wrote to David van Lennep & Enslie in Izmir that he expected that these ships of "strangers" would run huge losses and that in fact insurers had not been willing to insure their voyages.<sup>60</sup> Especially during the 1770s, the Ottoman merchants chartered a number of French and English ships to carry their goods from Izmir to Amsterdam. The Dutch authorities responded to these developments immediately by introducing additional taxes on Levantine goods brought to Amsterdam by foreign ships.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the fact that Ottoman merchants did invest in Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean, this remained secondary to their investments in Ottoman-Dutch trade, which was the determinant of their presence in Amsterdam. As De Vogel pointed out in one of his letters to Van Lennep in Izmir, the Greek merchants in Amsterdam were exclusively dependent

<sup>55</sup> GA 5075, 13012/190, 09.12.1762.

<sup>56</sup> GA 5075, 13014/187, 22.08.1763.

<sup>57</sup> GA 5075, 13015/14, 09.02.1764.

<sup>58</sup> GA 5075, 10815/529, 29.05.1764.

<sup>59</sup> GA 5075, 15860/1484, 05.10.1791.

<sup>60</sup> GA 332, 42/196, 06.12.1768.

<sup>61</sup> NA 1.02.22, 113/32, 21.05.1770, resolution of the SG.



on their trade with the Levant, and in particular on the trade with Izmir.<sup>62</sup> De Vogel's observations are supported by information in notarial acts concerning the Greeks' new undertakings in Amsterdam. For instance, Papa Kirios Paisios, a Greek monk at the monastery of Iviron on Mount Athos, acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of Papa Kirios Abacum, a deputy official of the same monastery, declared in the presence of the notary that in 1716 he and Papa Kirios Abacum agreed to form a partnership with Nicolas Kokkinos to trade with Izmir and Ankara. According to the agreement, Papa Kirios Paisios and Papa Kirios Abacum would provide f7,200 and Nicolas Kokkinos would provide f2,800 toward the partnership. The capital was invested and administered by Nicolas Kokkinos until 1723, when the partnership was liquidated. By the end of the partnership, Papa Kirios Paisios and Papa Kirios Abacum received, for their part, a bill of exchange worth f8,705 drawn on Leonard Lups by Nicolas Kokkinos.<sup>63</sup>

Although the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam achieved a certain degree of integration into the city and its economic life, this integration had its limits. A few of these merchants became citizens, but the number of those who did or were able to do so remained limited. Among the Armenians with roots in the Ottoman Empire who gained Amsterdam citizenship, we know of Alexander di Massé,<sup>64</sup> Serkis Celik<sup>65</sup> and Aretun di Gazar (Gatergioglu), at least.<sup>66</sup> From among the Greeks of Amsterdam, Antonio Zingrilara is the best-known example of a naturalized Amsterdammer, along with Demetrios Kourmoules. Unwillingness on the part of the Dutch authorities to accord citizenship to Ottoman merchants must have been an important factor in the failure of several other Ottoman merchants to attain citizen status. In 1761, Leonardo Metaxa of Izmir applied to the Dutch States General for recognition as a Dutch merchant, but his request was rejected.<sup>67</sup> A few months later, the Greek merchant Leone Amiro, who had been living in Amsterdam, left the city without paying his creditors. Leone Amiro's escape, which was later followed by that of Antonio Zingrilara, was exploited by Dutch opponents of Ottoman merchant integration into Dutch trading circles, who argued that these developments revealed the necessity of relying exclusively on Dutch

<sup>62</sup> GA 332, 41/478, 04.09.1767, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie.

<sup>63</sup> GA 5075, 6144/581, 12.07.1723.

<sup>64</sup> GA 1053, 7, Alexander di Massé.

<sup>65</sup> GA 1053, 3, Serkis Celik.

<sup>66</sup> GA 1053, 4, Aretun di Gazar (Gatergioglu).

<sup>67</sup> RGP 95, 450–451, 11.12.1761, the DLH to the SG.

merchants for trade with the Levant.<sup>68</sup> During the early 1760s these developments resulted in a Dutch policy aimed at preventing Ottoman merchants from attaining a status equal (i.e., citizenship) to the Dutch merchants.<sup>69</sup>

Of course, not all Ottoman merchants who showed up in Amsterdam intended to stay there for a long time. My impression, based on the sparse information available on the travel habits of the Dutch merchants in the Levant and of the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam, is that Amsterdam's Ottoman merchants were far more mobile than their Dutch counterparts in the Levant. They traveled frequently between Levantine ports and Amsterdam, while the Dutch merchants in the Levant seem to have traveled less often to the Netherlands. Several examples in the notarial records of Amsterdam and the letters of De Vogel reveal that many Ottoman merchants came to Amsterdam casually, accompanying their consignments, or to arrange some business, and then returned to Izmir. Such was the case of Arachiel di Ovannes, who went from Izmir to Amsterdam in 1722 on business for Simon di Ovannes in Izmir.<sup>70</sup> In 1723, the Greek merchant Nicolas Kokkinos came to Amsterdam to liquidate his partnership with Papa Kirios Paisios and Papa Kirios Abacum.<sup>71</sup> In 1725, the Armenian merchant Avetik di David purchased some textiles in Amsterdam. Before he embarked for Izmir, he lent power of proxy to Stephan di David, who was to collect the damages from the insurers if anything happened to the textiles on the way to Izmir.<sup>72</sup> A similar notarial deed concerns Makartom di Jacob's empowerment of Pieter Aved, who was to leave for Izmir with certain goods he had purchased on behalf of Izmir-based Pieter & Stephano Abro.<sup>73</sup> The Greek and Armenian merchants who remained in Amsterdam and settled there utilized the services of these more mobile merchants to arrange the former's business affairs in Izmir. We read, for example, of Stephan di Johannes in Amsterdam empowering Mechitar di David, who was to leave for Izmir, to collect money from his debtors there.<sup>74</sup> In 1766,

<sup>68</sup> RGP 95, 452–453, 26.01.1762, the DLH to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

<sup>69</sup> It is clear that some merchants, like Demetrios Kourmoules, were able to become citizens of Amsterdam even after the mid-1760s (RGP 115, 403–404, 03.09.1787, D. J. de Hochepeid to the DLH), but their numbers must have remained very low.

<sup>70</sup> GA 5075, 6136/1721, 13.04.1722.

<sup>71</sup> GA 5075, 6144/581, 12.07.1723.

<sup>72</sup> GA 5075, 8611/1057, 16.08.1725.

<sup>73</sup> GA 5075, 8617/1014, 22.07.1726.

<sup>74</sup> GA 5075, 8618/1144, 10.08.1726.

Serkis Jasigioglu empowered Casiadir Jasigioglu to collect money belonging to the former from his debtors in Izmir and Istanbul.<sup>75</sup>

De Vogel sometimes wrote to his contacts in Izmir about various Ottoman merchants' arrival in Amsterdam. In 1758, he informed David van Lennep about the arrival of Murat di Paerisch, whom he promised to assist during Di Paerisch's stay in Amsterdam.<sup>76</sup> In 1764, a Greek merchant named Hadgi Ras arrived in Amsterdam from Izmir. David van Lennep in Izmir, who had an outstanding account with Hadgi Ras, asked De Vogel to fix the issue by paying him f691 and obtaining a bill of payment in the presence of the notary. Van Lennep was trying to avoid a legal dispute with Hadgi Ras at the Ottoman court in Izmir, and therefore hoped that De Vogel would be able to settle the dispute in this way. Hadgi Ras, however, proved very confident that he could gain a better settlement at the Ottoman court in Izmir, and therefore rejected De Vogel's request.<sup>77</sup> More than one and a half years after his arrival in Amsterdam, Hadgi Ras sold 80 bales of mohair yarn and left for Izmir, where he planned to handle his difference with Van Lennep.<sup>78</sup>

Although mobility was an important feature characterizing the non-Muslim Ottoman merchant communities of Amsterdam, a number of them did settle in the city and even died and were buried there.<sup>79</sup> However, even the Ottoman merchants who stayed for long periods in Amsterdam kept their home ties and remained extensively if not totally dependent on their trade with the Levant for their livelihood. Their affiliations with their places of origin are traceable in their commercial activities in Amsterdam, as well as in their testimonies recorded by the city's notaries. Some individual examples enable us to elaborate more on these points.

A few scholars who have researched individual Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam have provided us with detailed information on certain Ottoman merchants. B. J. Slot has published a detailed article on the famous Greek intellectual Adamantios Korais's commercial activities in Amsterdam.<sup>80</sup> Antonio Zingrilara and Demetrios Kourmoules have especially attracted scholars' attention because of the extensive extant

<sup>75</sup> GA 5075, 10827/547, 05.05.1766.

<sup>76</sup> GA 332, 36/247, 22.08.1758; 36/491, 21.11.1758.

<sup>77</sup> GA 332, 38/560, 23.03.1764.

<sup>78</sup> GA 332, 40/21, 01.08.1765.

<sup>79</sup> On the Armenian merchants who died and were buried in Amsterdam, see Bekius and Ultee, *Over Armeense Graven*.

<sup>80</sup> B. J. Slot, "Commercial Activities of Korais in Amsterdam," *O Eranistis*, 16 (1980): 55–139.

documentation on the troubles they caused for Dutch merchants and authorities.<sup>81</sup> There are other Ottoman merchants who were much more prominent than Zingrilara and Kourmoules at that time but whose lives are not documented to the same extent. Nevertheless, some of these other merchants—such as Alexander di Massé, Stati Thoma, and Stephano d'Isay—who owed their fame to their commercial activities alone, left sufficient traces to give us an idea of their business careers in Amsterdam.

The Armenian Alexander di Massé, a citizen of Amsterdam, was born around 1733, probably in Ağrı. It appears that Di Massé arrived in Amsterdam before 1746 and died there in 1803. Di Massé was affiliated with the Armenian church and spoke both Armenian and Dutch.<sup>82</sup> He was married to Marie Anne Watrin, who had a daughter, Manaschan Narces, from her earlier marriage to Ignace Narces.<sup>83</sup>

The earliest information on the commercial activities of Alexander di Massé in Amsterdam relates to the consignment of 38 bales of mohair yarn that he received from Moses di Stephan and Massé Magakia in Izmir. Acting on behalf of the consigners in Izmir, Bogos di Ouan (in Amsterdam at the end of 1746) received f6,743 from Alexander di Massé for one third of the returns of the consignment.<sup>84</sup> Before Di Ouan went back to Izmir, he left Johannes di Aretun and Aretun di Gazar as his sureties for the possible claims of Di Massé.<sup>85</sup> Di Massé's commercial activities were not limited to the mohair yarn trade. He also dealt in carpets and fruits, which he received from Izmir, and some other merchandise that he received from Venice. Some of the business correspondents of Alexander di Massé include George Christoph Kropftgansz and Hendrik van der Velden in Rotterdam, Gerrit Frederiks on the island of Ameland, Giochim & Fratelli di Marco in Venice, the Armenian Stephan di Gogigan in London,<sup>86</sup> and Makar Artem Godabaschoff and Ivan Gregorich Gotschemaloff in Saint Petersburg.<sup>87</sup>

Thanks to a shipping accident that damaged some merchandise belonging to Di Massé, we have more details about his commercial activities. In

<sup>81</sup> Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 121–124; Van den Boogert, "Ottoman Greeks," 129–147.

<sup>82</sup> GA 1053, 7, Alexander di Massé.

<sup>83</sup> GA 5075, 19256/5, 20.08.1799.

<sup>84</sup> GA 5075, 10238/964, 08.12.1746.

<sup>85</sup> GA 5075, 10389/2206, 06.12.1746.

<sup>86</sup> GA 5075, 10245/852, 20.09.1748; 8997/689, 08.07.1751; 10263/15, 09.01.1753; 10263/168, 26.03.1753.

<sup>87</sup> GA 5075, 16521/170, 21.02.1785.

1753, the Dutch ship *De Levantsche Post* ran ashore on Ameland, an island in the northern Netherlands. Along with other goods, the ship was carrying 150 boxes of figs, consigned from Izmir to Alexander di Massé. The merchandise was insured by the Armenian Stephan di Gogignan in London for a value of £1,530, at a 3 percent premium rate.<sup>88</sup> When news of the accident arrived in Amsterdam, Di Massé empowered Gerrit Frederiks on Ameland to take care of his goods.<sup>89</sup> The damage caused by the accident must have been dramatic, since Di Massé received only f37 for his goods. Having received this amount, Di Massé turned to the insurer for the damage.<sup>90</sup> However, Stephan di Gogignan seems not to have paid the damage easily, as we read that Di Massé empowered Pieter Blaquiére and Thomas & John Furly to collect his money from the Armenian insurer.<sup>91</sup>

The fact that Di Massé had had his goods insured in London brings De Vogel's letters to mind. As we mentioned earlier, in 1768 De Vogel claimed that Amsterdam insurers were not willing to insure voyages chartered by Ottoman merchants on foreign ships.<sup>92</sup> Di Massé's preference of the insurers in London might reflect either such Dutch unwillingness to insure his goods or possibly lower insurance rates in London. However, most importantly, the Ottoman merchants were in no sense dependent on the insurers in Amsterdam and were free to contract with insurers elsewhere if they wished. For Di Massé, who had considerable interest in shipping and held shares in Dutch ships, this must have been a very useful alternative.

The social capital of Di Massé was also remarkable and is evident in the records of the notaries of Amsterdam. He was apparently considered knowledgeable in matters concerning the Levant trade and was therefore consulted about commercial usages.<sup>93</sup> He was appointed by a number of testators from the Armenian community as executor of their testaments. This was the case with Elisabeth Bogos, who died in 1751, leaving her house on the Dijkstraat to the Armenian church.<sup>94</sup> The Armenian priest Johannes di Minas, who died in 1768,<sup>95</sup> as well as Arachiel di Paulo, who

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<sup>88</sup> GA 5075, 10263/168, 26.03.1753.

<sup>89</sup> GA 5075, 10263/15, 09.01.1753.

<sup>90</sup> GA 5075, 10263/168, 26.03.1753.

<sup>91</sup> GA 5075, 10753/226, 28.02.1754.

<sup>92</sup> GA 332, 42/196, 06.12.1768.

<sup>93</sup> GA 5075, 11335/40, 22.11.1751.

<sup>94</sup> GA 5075, 10951/376, 08.11.1751.

<sup>95</sup> GA 5075, 13021/34, 22.03.1768.

died in 1773,<sup>96</sup> also entrusted the execution of their wills to Alexander di Massé. On one occasion, we see Di Massé staying as surety for Jan Aubert, the captain of the *Persian Galley*<sup>97</sup> and on another occasion, his paying the Armenian priest Daniel Mgriek's funeral expenses.<sup>98</sup>

As Alexander di Massé was one of De Vogel's primary competitors, De Vogel kept close tabs on Di Massé's commercial activities, sharing his observations occasionally with his business correspondents in the Levant. From De Vogel's observations, we understand that the high point and subsequent decline of Di Massé's business affairs occurred in the mid-1760s. In 1765, De Vogel expressed his annoyance with the merchants in Izmir who were content with the services Alexander di Massé offered in Amsterdam; De Vogel wrote that he doubted whether this satisfaction would last forever.<sup>99</sup> In a later letter to his son in Izmir, De Vogel expressed his interest in the goods Di Massé had received from business correspondents in Izmir.<sup>100</sup> In a later letter, he informed his son that Di Massé had received word that the Dutch ship *Snelle Gally* had had an accident on its way from Istanbul to Amsterdam.<sup>101</sup>

It is remarkable that Di Massé received word about the accident of the Dutch ship earlier than De Vogel did. However, we know that Di Massé held considerable shares in Dutch ships navigating to the Levant. On one occasion, he and his brothers, Isaie di Massé in Izmir and Nicola Massé in Istanbul, were harshly criticized by the Dutch ambassador at the Porte because the captain of one of the ships under their administration failed to provide an adequate cargo list for his voyage from Amsterdam to Istanbul. Isaie di Massé, an honorary dragoman of the Dutch consulate in Izmir, attempted to soothe the Dutch ambassador with valuable presents, but these were rejected by the ambassador. The ambassador told Isaie that he would accept no more such ships unless their captains provided valid cargo lists.<sup>102</sup> This incident spurred an extensive discussion among Dutch authorities about the proper form and use of Dutch cargo lists, which they

<sup>96</sup> GA 5075, 15691/856, 16.10.1773; 15691/858, 18.10.1773; 15691/860, 19.10.1773; 15692/60, 68, 27.01.1774.

<sup>97</sup> GA 5075, 10277/476, 27.07.1756.

<sup>98</sup> GA 5075, 15718/519, 30.04.1779.

<sup>99</sup> GA 332, 39/723, 05.07.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior; 39/744, 05.07.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>100</sup> GA 332, 40/270, 22.11.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior; 40/647, 23.05.1766, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>101</sup> GA 332, 40/395, 20.01.1766, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>102</sup> RGP 115, 13, 11.10.1765, Dedel to Isaie di Massé.

felt were very important to the proper levying of consular dues.<sup>103</sup> About one year later, another Dutch ship managed by the Di Massé brothers caused another more serious problem with the Dutch diplomatic representative at the Porte. This time, their ship was chartered in Istanbul by an Algerian, Ahmed Hoca, with the condition that he could load the goods on the ship's way to Algiers. The Algerian took advantage of this privilege and loaded the ship with cannons and bombs, which was unacceptable for the Dutch ambassador. It cost the Dutch ambassador considerable effort to unload the ship and to avoid an *avania*.<sup>104</sup>

Alexander di Massé seems to have done quite well until the mid-1760s. The first signs we see in the sources that the family faced rising difficulties are some bills of exchange drawn by Massé di Carabeth & Sons on Alexander di Massé. Massé di Carabeth & Sons was one of the main business partners of Alexander di Massé, and the firm was run by his brother, Isaie di Massé. The firm also had commercial ties to a number of other cloth producers and merchants in Amsterdam.<sup>105</sup> As Alexander di Massé did not honor the obligations drawn on him by his brother, holders of bills of exchanges in Amsterdam began to raise protests against him.<sup>106</sup> An agreement Alexander di Massé made with one of his creditors in Amsterdam reveals the growing financial difficulties with which he was struggling in 1768. It appears that between 1753 and 1764 he had borrowed f25,974 from Nicolaas van Staphorst, and stored 43 bales of mohair yarn as surety in the warehouse of the creditor. According to the initial agreement, the interest rate Di Massé paid to his creditor was 4.5 percent, including the rent for the warehouse. When the agreed date of payment arrived (23 March 1768), Massé had paid part of his debt, but was apparently having financial difficulties, and therefore agreed to pay the remaining f18,939 in instalments of f500 every six months. According to the same agreement, no more interest was to be brought into account for the remaining amount.<sup>107</sup>

The crisis which had hit Alexander di Massé had a much bigger impact on his brother in Izmir. The bills of exchange that Alexander di Massé had refused to pay were returned to Izmir and their holders requested

<sup>103</sup> RGP 115, 32–34, 24.12.1765, the DLH to Dedel.

<sup>104</sup> RGP 115, 54–55, 15.11.1766, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>105</sup> GA 5075, 10288/321, 12.04.1759; 10522/671, 05.06.1761; 10535/948, 07.07.1763; 13587/1091, 19.08.1763; 10840/686, 22.07.1768; 10840/713, 29.07.1768; GA 332, 38/583, 06.04.1764, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>106</sup> GA 5075, 10555/182, 18.02.1766; 10556/300, 25.03.1766.

<sup>107</sup> GA 5075, 12872/186, 23.03.1768.



that Isaie pay his debts. As Isaie was unable to pay, his European creditors went to the Dutch consul, asking for his intervention since Isaie di Massé was a Dutch protégé. The consul told Isaie that he must pay his debts within twenty-four hours, or give a security for them. Isaie countered that he needed fifteen days to examine his books to come up with a solution. The European creditors refused this request and argued that if Isaie failed to provide security, his belongings should be sealed and his account books examined. The consul did not dare to move in that direction, since Isaie was only a protégé, not a Dutch national. He feared that such a move might provoke the Ottoman authorities to intervene with a heavy *avania* on the Dutch nation. Moreover, Isaie's local creditors did not agree with the swift actions suggested by the European creditors. During a meeting of all creditors (47 locals, including Turks, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and 7 Europeans) the local creditors argued that Isaie be given fifteen days to examine his books. Not only did the local creditors outnumber the Europeans, but they also threatened the latter by saying that they would apply to "Turkish justice" and hold the European creditors responsible for all prior developments, including the bankruptcy of Isaie. Consequently, the consul and the European creditors had no choice but to accord the fifteen-day period to Isaie.<sup>108</sup> It is remarkable that a brother of the Dey of Algiers was among Di Massé's creditors from the Algerian community of Izmir.<sup>109</sup>

After the examination of his accounts, Isaie's bankruptcy was inevitable. Much to the European creditors' chagrin, Isaie appeared to owe some money to the *mîrî* (imperial treasury), which led to the sequestration of all of his goods. The customs officer of Izmir inspected Dutch ships on arrival and sequestered all goods addressed to Isaie, regardless of whether these goods indeed belonged to him. De Weiler, then Dutch charge d'affaires and later Dutch ambassador in Istanbul, related to the DLH that goods belonging to Dutch merchants in Amsterdam had also been sequestered by the customs officer just because they were addressed to Isaie or to his firm, Massé di Carabeth & Sons. The charge d'affaires explained that he would do everything he could about these goods, but could offer little hope to Di Massé's European creditors, who would receive little for their losses because the *mîrî* and the local creditors were to be satisfied before

<sup>108</sup> RGP 115, 99–100, 18.05.1768, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>109</sup> RGP 115, 108–109, 18.07.1768, D. J. de Hochepped to Fagel.

foreign creditors.<sup>110</sup> An entry in the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri* reveals that the Dutch charge d'affaires arranged the release of these goods by convincing the Porte that they belonged, not to Isaie, but to the Dutch consulate in Izmir. Isaie and the captain of the Dutch ship that brought the goods to Izmir had sworn in the presence of the customs officer in Izmir that this was indeed the case.<sup>111</sup>

However, the difference between local and European creditors caused the Dutch consul considerable trouble. After his bankruptcy became clear, Isaie paid his debt to the *mîrî* and then reached an agreement with his local creditors that he would pay 25 percent of each debt within six months. Meanwhile, the Dutch consul arrested Isaie in the interests of European creditors, but his local creditors went to the consul and demanded his release so that he would be able to meet his obligations to them. The Dutch consul refused to comply and argued that Isaie was a Dutch protégé, which meant that the Dutch consul was responsible for arranging a settlement that included the European creditors. Three French creditors, especially, opposed Isaie's release and demanded a settlement in accordance with European usages. The consul said that he could not release Isaie unless the French creditors consented, so the local creditors went to the French consul and asked him to convince the French creditors on Isaie's release. The French consul asked for some time to reflect on the issue, but the locals insisted on his immediate release. They went again to the Dutch consul and told him that they wanted to bring Isaie to the local court. Meanwhile, the French creditors agreed to Isaie's release when two Armenian merchants stood surety to guarantee that Isaie would not run away. The Dutch ambassador had no choice but to release Isaie to avoid being embarrassed by the local court.<sup>112</sup>

After his release, Isaie informed his creditors in Izmir that a ship belonging to him and his brother in Amsterdam was about to arrive in Izmir. The ship had in fact departed recently from Izmir to Amsterdam without its first mate, who was injured accidentally by the second mate. The bankruptcy of Massé di Carabeth & Sons occurred when Cornelis Evertze, the first mate, was recovering in Izmir. Upon the bankruptcy, Evertze apparently ordered in a letter to Leghorn that the second mate of the ship return again to Izmir. The Dutch consul considered preventing the return

<sup>110</sup> RGP 115, 103, 15.06.1768, De Weiler to the DLH. De Weiler was Dutch charge d'affaires (1768–75) and ambassador (1775–76) at the Porte.

<sup>111</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 404/1748, evâhîr-i Muharrem 1182/6–16.06.1768.

<sup>112</sup> RGP 115, 108–109, 18.07.1768, D. J. de Hochepped to Fagel.

of the ship to keep the goods from local creditors, but abandoned the idea because of the risk involved, especially when local creditors had already been informed that the ship was on its way back to Izmir.<sup>113</sup> After the ship arrived in Izmir, Isaie, having received the related documents from his brother in Amsterdam, pawned the ship for LD 8,000 under the condition that the ship was to embark shortly for Amsterdam.<sup>114</sup>

Alexander di Massé's financial difficulties in Amsterdam did not escape the attention of De Vogel, who called him an honest man. In March 1768 De Vogel informed his correspondents in Izmir that Alexander di Massé was unable to meet his obligations.<sup>115</sup> He blamed the situation on the adventurous and risky manner in which Ottoman merchants traded. De Vogel also related that according to the rumors, the debts which Di Massé could not pay amounted to about f30,000.<sup>116</sup> On 11 April 1768, De Vogel wrote to Hendrik de Bok in Rotterdam about the issue, saying that Di Massé was very slow with his payments. De Vogel expressed comfort in the fact that neither he nor De Bok had any outstanding credits to Di Massé. Nevertheless, he regretted Di Massé's situation because he had known him to be an honest man.<sup>117</sup>

Though De Vogel used rather diplomatic language in his letters to De Bok, he wrote to Van Lennep that the bankruptcy did not surprise him at all. According to him, the manner in which Alexander di Massé managed his trade made this result inevitable. Nevertheless, he expressed his regrets about the demise of the business of a man whom he had known as a good person. In discussing Alexander di Massé's situation, De Vogel's main fear concerned the other merchants who had considerable credits to Alexander di Massé in Amsterdam and Isaie di Massé in Izmir. He feared that the bankruptcies of some of Di Massés' creditors in both Izmir and Amsterdam were to follow.<sup>118</sup> Beyond these considerations, De Vogel also feared that the bankruptcy would affect the whole trade severely, especially after the goods—including considerable amounts of mohair yarn—belonging to Alexander di Massé were auctioned in Amsterdam. According to De Vogel, all these problems were to be blamed on the

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> RGP 115, 110, 18.08.1768, D. J. de Hochepped to De Weiler.

<sup>115</sup> GA 332, 41/707, 25.03.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>116</sup> GA 332, 41/725, 14.04.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>117</sup> RGP 120, 1237, 11.04.1768, Thomas de Vogel to Hendrik de Bok.

<sup>118</sup> RGP 120, 1239, 21.06.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep.

Ottoman merchants and could be overcome by the Dutch seizing control of the trade from them.<sup>119</sup>

Fortunately for De Vogel, none of his direct business correspondents had lost anything in the Di Massés' demise, except for Hemzy in Izmir.<sup>120</sup> The fact that Hemzy had lost money made De Vogel nervous that Hemzy's bankruptcy might follow. Therefore he addressed consignments intended for Hemzy not directly to him but to Van Lennep, who was to take necessary measures to protect De Vogel from losses.<sup>121</sup>

Meanwhile, the growing panic among his creditors and their accumulating demands must have reduced Alexander di Massé's net worth considerably. On 4 August 1768, De Vogel related that he had seen Alexander at the exchange a week earlier; after that, he retired.<sup>122</sup> Two months later, De Vogel referred to Di Massé as a poor man who had lost all his belongings to pay a chain of bills of exchanges and to meet his other obligations. Now his creditors visited him to demand he pay his outstanding debts to them.<sup>123</sup> On 3 March 1769 De Vogel repeated that Alexander di Massé had by then become a poor man who maintained himself with very little money and did not leave his house.<sup>124</sup>

His willingness to satisfy his creditors during his financial crisis might have ruined Alexander di Massé's finances at the time, but it apparently sustained his reputation as an honest merchant. This must have been very important for his further business career, and it is clear that he did not give up public life completely. By 1779, he appears in the sources as a do-gooder with enough money to offer to pay the funeral expenses of Daniel Mgriek, the Armenian priest of Amsterdam.<sup>125</sup> In 1784, a merchant from Izmir named Caspar di Carabeth traveled for a short time to Amsterdam and empowered the Volcker brothers there to act on his behalf to lay claim on Alexander di Massé.<sup>126</sup> It is not clear whether this claim stemmed from Di Massé's crisis in the 1760s, or came about through a

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<sup>119</sup> GA 332, 42/56, 05.07.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië; GA 332, 42/81, 04.08.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië.

<sup>120</sup> GA 332, 42/43, 21.06.1768, Leonard Thomas de Vogel to Bongaard Panchaud & Series.

<sup>121</sup> GA 332, 42/48, 21.06.1768, Leonard Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep; GA 332, 42/58, 07.07.1768, Leonard Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep; GA 332, 42/83–84, 04.08.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië.

<sup>122</sup> GA 332, 42/83, 04.08.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië.

<sup>123</sup> GA 332, 42/153, 07.10.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië.

<sup>124</sup> GA 332, 42/273, 03.03.1769, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslië.

<sup>125</sup> GA 5075, 15718/519, 30.04.1779.

<sup>126</sup> GA 5075, 15778/2359, 13.12.1784.

more recent difference. What is clear is that when he died on 26 May 1803, Alexander di Massé was no longer a poor man. According to the notarial archives, his inheritance included, among other things, two houses—one at the Kalkmarkt and the other at Weesperpoort; furniture and diamonds worth f15,150; sundries and drugs worth f2,055; a considerable amount of debentures and coupons; f2,154 in cash; and the huge amount f103,247 in outstanding debts owed him. The only merchandise included in the inheritance were some *dimitis* (cotton cloths originating in the Levant) and red cotton yarn,<sup>127</sup> indicating that he had continued to trade with Izmir until his last days.

Alexander di Massé was one of the last members of Amsterdam's Armenian community, which was obsolete by the beginning of the nineteenth century. This short overview of his business career reveals that his commercial activities in Amsterdam depended a great deal on his connections in Izmir, and that he specialized in the traditionally Armenian-run mohair trade. We have also seen that he invested in Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean and employed these ships for voyages that again reflected his numerous connections in the Levant. The fact that his inheritance included cotton products, not mohair, indicates that he applied the inter-personal trading network and experiences from trading mohair to the cotton trade, which, by then, had replaced the former commodity as the main export item from the Levant to the Netherlands. All these features show that Di Massé's immigration to the Netherlands and adoption of Amsterdam citizenship are emblematic of his entrepreneurship, not of any estrangement from his home country.

As the Levantine Armenians' commercial activities and presence in Amsterdam depended on mohair trade from the Levant to Amsterdam, their numbers there dwindled as this trade waned in the course of the eighteenth century. But Greek merchants who arrived in Amsterdam much later than the Armenians continued to dominate trade between Izmir and Amsterdam after the Armenians had faded from the Amsterdam trading scene. One of the more important Greek merchants in Amsterdam was Stati Thoma. The earliest indication of Stati Thoma's presence in Amsterdam is a contract recorded in 1763 in the notarial archives whereby Stati Thoma, Gio Mavrogordato, and Gio Anastasi chartered the Dutch ship *De Vigilantie* for a return voyage to Izmir and the Gulf of Patras. During the

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<sup>127</sup> GA 5075, 17921/1024, 09.07.1803.

contract signing, Thoma was assisted by a translator, namely Stephano d'Isay, so we can assume that he was a newcomer at the time.<sup>128</sup>

During the subsequent years, Stati Thoma became one of Amsterdam's most important Greek merchants. His commercial moves were closely observed by De Vogel, due especially to his successful consignments. De Vogel envied the quality of the cotton and cotton yarn that Thoma received from Izmir. In 1765, De Vogel wrote to his correspondents in Izmir:

We realize that in general the Greeks receive better quality [goods] and service because Stati Thoma has sold a party [of cotton yarn] for 26 *stuivers* [per lb]. The party also included two bales, which were sold for 30 *stuivers* because they were of such a quality that has not been seen here before . . . These two bales cost him LD 98. Our fine bales cost us LD 82 and yield 22 *stuivers* at best.<sup>129</sup>

De Vogel paid special attention to the red cotton yarn that Stati Thoma received from his correspondents in Izmir. After one of his correspondents in Izmir informed De Vogel about a red cotton yarn consignment, De Vogel commented that he would be able to sell it promptly, provided that its color was as lively as the yarn Stati Thoma had been receiving. If not, De Vogel continued, it would take some time to sell the yarn.<sup>130</sup> De Vogel's obsession with high-quality red cotton yarn only grew with time; thanks to the activities of the Greek merchants, the yarn purchasers of Amsterdam had plenty of options to purchase better quality. Stati Thoma, especially, seems to have been able to provide purchasers with very high quality cotton yarn. On one occasion, De Vogel related that Stati Thoma also arranged the dyeing of the yarn to appeal to purchasers' tastes. Consequently, according to De Vogel, Thoma was able to arrange prompt and profitable sales.<sup>131</sup> Thoma's success was not limited to red cotton yarn. In his letters of 1765, De Vogel mentions several times that Thoma was successful in arranging profitable and prompt sales for his white as well as

<sup>128</sup> GA 5075, 10803/654, 31.05.1763.

<sup>129</sup> GA 332, 39/547, 05.04.1765, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep & Enslie, "... vinden int' generaal de Grieken beeter qualityd & bedieninge ontmoeten want Stati Thoma heeft een party a 26 stv verkogt daaronder 2 baalen waaren die zeedert a 30 stv zyn verkogt want waaren zo moy als dien oyt gesien zyn & het oostindien zeer naby koomende & die 2 baalen kosten hem LD 98 wat differentie is dat by LD 82 zoals onsen fynen baalen kosten & die op sig selfs moogelyks maar 22 st zouden gelden..." The same reflections were also directed to T. de Vogel Junior in Izmir. GA 332, 39/541, 05.04.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>130</sup> RGP 120, 1190, 23.08.1765, De Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie.

<sup>131</sup> GA 332, 40/207, 22.10.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

red cotton yarn because of the high quality of the goods he received. In this period, high quality cotton yarn seems to have yielded profits, while low quality yarn did not. De Vogel writes to his contacts asking for high quality cotton yarn so that he can arrange sales as profitable as Stati Thoma's.<sup>132</sup>

Due to his unparalleled success in the cotton yarn trade, Stati Thoma's sales set the benchmark for the cotton yarn trade in Amsterdam. In 1766, De Vogel justified one of his bad sales with the argument that even Stati Thoma could not sell the yarn for a higher price.<sup>133</sup> Thoma's influence in the cotton yarn market of Amsterdam was such that whenever he decided to sell his goods by auction, prices immediately fell considerably, meaning that his competitors could not arrange profitable sales.<sup>134</sup> This was because Thoma always received considerable amounts of yarn, even when he was not able to sell at high prices. In February 1767, De Vogel noted that although Thoma's recent sales had not been very favorable, three-quarters of the cargo of Captain Carstens's ship had been addressed to him again.<sup>135</sup>

In addition to his cotton yarn trading, Thoma also imported mohair yarn and dried fruits to Amsterdam and exported Dutch woolen textiles to Izmir.<sup>136</sup> The mohair yarn trade also appears to have been an important field of activity for him. In 1765, De Vogel noted that Thoma received 24 bales of high quality mohair yarn from Ambrosio Mavrogordato in Izmir.<sup>137</sup> One year later, Thoma had auctioned off his mohair yarn, leading to a decrease in prices.<sup>138</sup> About one week later, Thoma auctioned off another 42 bales of mohair yarn, leaving De Vogel without hope of profitable sales.<sup>139</sup> De Vogel had no choice but to ask his correspondents in Izmir to consign him the same quality mohair yarn they were consigning to Stati Thoma. In 1768, De Vogel wrote to Manuel K. di Panaiotis & Co. in

<sup>132</sup> RGP 120, 1195, 5.11.1765, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle; GA 332, 40/267, 22.11.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>133</sup> GA 332, 40/581, 22.04.1766, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>134</sup> RGP 120, 1211–1212, 1215, 22.08.1766, 29.08.1766, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle; GA 332, 41/142, 24.10.1766, Thomas de Vogel to Thomas de Vogel Junior.

<sup>135</sup> RGP 120, 1220, 6.02.1767, De Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>136</sup> GA 332, 40/583, 22.04.1766, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>137</sup> GA 332, 39/368, 22.01.1765, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

<sup>138</sup> GA 332, 40/574, 17.04.1766, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle.

<sup>139</sup> GA 332, 40/625, 06.05.1766, Thomas de Vogel to Louis Stechmann; GA 332, 40/734, 07.08.1766, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.



Izmir that he was awaiting mohair yarn of a quality on par with the yarn Panaiotis had previously sent to Stati Thoma.<sup>140</sup>

Along with cotton and mohair yarn, Thoma also imported raisins and dried figs from Izmir. In his letters to his business correspondents, De Vogel mentions Thoma's dried fruit sale prices.<sup>141</sup> From a notarial act, we learn that some hundred boxes of figs, which Stati Thoma had sold to Antony van Overloop & Zoonen through the mediation of the broker Arnoldus van Wijenburg, made its way to the hands of J. Veijdt & Co. in Antwerp.<sup>142</sup>

Unfortunately, we do not know much about Stati Thoma's wider commercial network.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear that through his business success the Greek merchant held an important role in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic. His successful career stood in sharp contrast to that of Antonio Zingrilara, who represented a stereotype of the "corrupt Greek merchants" who spoiled Ottoman-Dutch trade during the second half of the eighteenth century.

Another Greek merchant who acquired an important role in trade between the Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic was Stephano d'Isay. The date of d'Isay's arrival in Amsterdam is not clear. Neither do we know whether he was related to Mireck d'Isay, who appears to have been in Amsterdam in 1757.<sup>144</sup> What becomes clear from a ship chartering contract in the notarial archives is that by 1763 Stephano d'Isay was already able to speak Dutch well enough to act as translator for the Greek contractors in the case at hand.<sup>145</sup> In 1775, d'Isay's name appears along with that of Adamantios Corais among the (mostly Dutch) petitioners demanding an increase in the extra tax levied on goods transported to the Netherlands on foreign ships.<sup>146</sup> As this petition was intended to protect Dutch shipping from foreign competition, we might conclude that by then d'Isay had at least some interest in Dutch shipping in the Levant. The notarial archives of Amsterdam provide us with concrete evidence of such

<sup>140</sup> GA 332, 42/180, 11.09.1768, Leonard Thomas de Vogel to Manuel K. di Panaiotis & Co.

<sup>141</sup> GA 332, 39/510, 22.03.1765, Thomas de Vogel to D. van Lennep; RGP 120, 1234, 2.03.1768, De Vogel to Hendrik de Bok.

<sup>142</sup> GA 5075, 10820/395, 19.04.1765.

<sup>143</sup> It is clear that he had a number of business correspondents in Izmir, including Ambrosio Mavrogordato. Hendrik de Bok in Rotterdam (RGP 120, 1237, 11.04.1768, De Vogel to Hendrik de Bok) and Richard Brouw and William Dunan in London (GA 5075, 10852/544, 13.06.1770) appear to have also been among his correspondents.

<sup>144</sup> GA 5075, 10769/635, 01.07.1757; 10769/678, 15.07.1757; 10286/1090, 11.12.1757.

<sup>145</sup> GA 5075, 10803/654, 31.05.1763.

<sup>146</sup> RGP 115, 221, d. 1775.

a direct interest, but only for later periods. In 1791 the firm of Van Heijnen & Ten Tije had sold *De Elisabeth Aletta Emerentia* to Stephano d'Isay & Co. for fl1,800.<sup>147</sup>

D'Isay's efforts to promote Dutch shipping in the Levant and his own interests in that area were not limited to simply signing petitions. In January 1776, along with Hendrik Tak and Jan Darnaud Davids, d'Isay presented a concept to the DLH advising the directors to increase the tariff value of cotton from a nominal LD 8 to a more or less real value of LD 32 to ensure that the previously introduced 5 percent extra duty on goods arriving with foreign ships to Amsterdam would have the desired effect.<sup>148</sup> At a time when the Dutch authorities were considering new initiatives to prevent Greek merchants from chartering English and French ships to transport their goods from the Levant to Amsterdam, d'Isay himself seems to have preferred the services of Dutch ships. In 1776, a Dutch ship steered by Captain Jan Pieter Janse was loaded in Patras with a considerable amount of goods,<sup>149</sup> all of which were addressed to Stephano d'Isay. This particular voyage encountered some problems; the captain refused to pay consular dues to the authorities in Izmir, arguing that he had paid the dues to the Dutch consul in Patras—despite the fact that the DLH had not appointed a consul at that port.<sup>150</sup> Moreover, in Amsterdam, d'Isay refused to pay 5 percent of the freightage<sup>151</sup> in tax to the Dutch authorities, arguing that the relevant regulations prescribed that the 5 percent freightage was to be levied on ships arriving from places falling under the definition “Izmir, Istanbul, Iskenderun or other places in the Levant.” According to d'Isay, Patras did not fall under this definition because Peloponnesus belonged, not to the Ottoman Empire, but to the Venetians when this tax was introduced.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>147</sup> GA 5075, 15860/1484, 05.10.1791.

<sup>148</sup> RGP 115, 222, 31.01.1776, meeting of the DLH.

<sup>149</sup> The Dutch authorities could not get coherent information about the cargo. It probably included some 700 *kantars* of dried fruits, 34 bales of silk, 24 bales of sponges, and some other goods; see RGP 115, 224, 19.03.1776, the DLH to C. G. N. Schutz.

<sup>150</sup> Although Des Bordes, the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul, had appointed Nicolo Paul as the Dutch consul to Patras and had provided him with a *berat* (O. Schutte, *Reperatorium Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in het buitenland 1584–1810* ('s-Gravenhage, 1976), 329) the home authorities were not informed about this appointment.

<sup>151</sup> One of the oldest taxes levied on the ships arriving from the Levant to Amsterdam was calculated on the basis of freightage and was extracted as 5 percent of it. See chapter 4.

<sup>152</sup> D'Isay must have confused the dates, since the tax was introduced in 1671 (RGP 34, 79, 25.07.1671, resolution of the SG) when Peloponnesus was under Ottoman rule.

Therefore, d'Isay saw no reason why this duty should be levied on his ship arriving from Patras. D'Isay's claims were rejected by the DLH.<sup>153</sup>

During the subsequent years, d'Isay's name appears under a number of petitions that the merchants in Amsterdam submitted to the Dutch authorities on issues relating to the Levant trade. In 1778, along with a number of other Amsterdam merchants (both Greek and Dutch) he signed a petition protesting the far-reaching actions taken by the Dutch States General on the quarantine to be implemented on the ships coming from Istanbul to Amsterdam.<sup>154</sup> In 1781, we see d'Isay's name under a petition demanding temporary suspension of the 5 percent extra discriminatory tax extracted from goods arriving in Amsterdam on foreign ships. Because of the ongoing Anglo-Dutch war (1780–84), Dutch ships could not navigate between the Levant and Amsterdam and therefore it was necessary for all merchants to use foreign vessels. The request was approved speedily by the Dutch States General, who suspended the tax temporarily.<sup>155</sup> In April 1793, d'Isay, again along with a number of other merchants, signed a petition requesting that the States General suspend the embargo on shipping to southern Europe that had been introduced during the war with France. This request, as well, was approved by the States General, which also sent warships to guard the trade convoy on its way to the Levant.<sup>156</sup>

All this may give the impression that d'Isay was completely integrated into the business circles of Amsterdam, and that his interests were fully compatible with those of the Dutch. When we closely examine the initiatives d'Isay supported, however, we see that these initiatives were all related to Dutch shipping in the Levant. Therefore, beyond showing that d'Isay had great interest in Dutch shipping, the fact that he signed all these petitions does not necessarily mean that his interests were aligned with those of the Dutch merchants in other areas. In fact, another petition that d'Isay and eight other Greek merchants in Amsterdam signed reveals that, in general, d'Isay's interests were far from identical with those of Dutch merchants. The petition concerned a demand by the Greek merchants of Amsterdam that they be exempted from local taxes in Amsterdam under the pretext that they were subjects of the Grand Signior. Along with the other Greek merchants in Amsterdam, d'Isay claimed that the privileges accorded to the Dutch merchants in the Ottoman dominions should also

<sup>153</sup> RGP 115, 224, 19.03.1776, the DLH to C. G. N. Schutz.

<sup>154</sup> RGP 115, 263–265, 09.1778, Amsterdam merchants to the DLH.

<sup>155</sup> RGP 115, 324–325, 09.1781, Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchants to the SG.

<sup>156</sup> RGP 115, 517–19, 525, 13.04.1793, Amsterdam merchants to the SG.

be accorded to Ottoman subjects in Amsterdam.<sup>157</sup> In the next chapter, I investigate this petition and the related diplomatic manoeuvring that ensued; at this point we will not go into the details of its implications.

After the death of Stephano d'Isay in 1815, the name of another Stephano d'Isay, probably his nephew, continues to appear in Dutch documents. By 1820, we see him as the main proponent of a new initiative addressing the problems of Dutch Levant trade and offering some solutions. This time d'Isay and the other (Greek and Dutch) merchants in Amsterdam suggested that all Levantine goods arriving in the Netherlands on Dutch vessels should be taxed on an equal basis without regard to whether the ship was coming from "Turkish" ports, the islands around them, or from other Mediterranean ports. The merchants wanted goods arriving in Amsterdam on foreign ships to be subjected to an additional 5 percent duty, calculated on the basis of the real value of the goods. The merchants also advised authorities that goods originating from the Levant be subjected to the same extra 5 percent tax regardless of whether they arrived on Dutch or foreign bottoms if they were not brought to Amsterdam directly from Mediterranean ports. Neither the Dutch authorities nor the directors of Levant trade in Rotterdam and Middelburg welcomed these suggestions, however.<sup>158</sup>

One year later, in 1821, d'Isay faced an immediate crisis when the Greek war of independence broke out. The harsh Ottoman response to the Greek rebellion made the Greeks and their belongings in the empire very vulnerable. Under these circumstances, Stephano d'Isay, Anton Curtovich, and Stephanos Paleologo in Amsterdam submitted a petition to the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs and demanded the protection of Sean Xeno in Istanbul against the oppression of the Porte. They had lent huge amounts of money to Sean Xeno, and were afraid that his ruin by the Porte would cause them huge losses as well. It is interesting to see that the petitioners presented themselves explicitly as residents of the Netherlands (*Nederlandsche ingezetenen*), but not as citizens (*burger, poorter*). More interestingly, they based their request not on their own legal position but on the claim that Sean Xeno in Istanbul had always behaved like a Dutchman and had been considered to be one! Therefore the petitioners hoped that the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul would do everything possible to

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<sup>157</sup> RGP 115, 688–692, 19.07.1803, reflections of the burgomasters of Amsterdam enclosed to the letter of the DLH to François Testa.

<sup>158</sup> RGP 120, 1009–1017, 29.07.1820.

protect Xeno from molestation by the Sublime Porte.<sup>159</sup> But the situation in Istanbul and Izmir proved to be worse than the Amsterdam merchants had thought. The Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul had already obtained imperial orders from the Porte that would protect Dutch merchants from any damages related to persecution of the Greeks, but he had no hope that the order would have any effect. Moreover, the debtor Sean Xeno and his brother had already fled Istanbul and Izmir, respectively.<sup>160</sup>

Whether d'Isay really had any outstanding credits to Sean Xeno or not, he must have had other reasons to be nervous about the fate of his fellow Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. It goes without saying that, like the other Greek merchants in Amsterdam, the most crucial commercial connections enabling his uncle d'Isay to carry out his trade in Amsterdam, were the Greeks in Izmir. Some of the elder d'Isay's correspondents in Izmir included E. Mavrogordato & Diamandi Pelrici, Gio Michele, Fratelli Ralli & Zingrilara,<sup>161</sup> Demetrio & Nicola Bachatori & Co.,<sup>162</sup> Manoli d'Isay, Giovanni Parembli & Avierino Brothers, Riso Chaciali, Filippo Cappari,<sup>163</sup> Giovanni Metaxa, Nicolo Moraitini, Nicolo Petrici & Antonio Bachatori, Georgio Pittaco,<sup>164</sup> Paulo d'Isay,<sup>165</sup> and Petro Cochino & Rodocanachi.<sup>166</sup> Given this extensive association with the Greeks of Izmir, it is not surprising that d'Isay was predominantly engaged in trade of cotton and cotton yarn,<sup>167</sup> with mohair yarn<sup>168</sup> appearing to have been of secondary importance for his commercial activities.

Beyond Izmir, d'Isay also had a number of business correspondents in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and London. Some of his business correspondents in Russia were Anastasi Leontari in Moscow,<sup>169</sup> H. Attanasio

<sup>159</sup> RGP 120, 1048, 28.05.1821, St. d'Isay, A. Curtovich and St. Paleologo, merchants in Amsterdam to the Dutch minister of foreign affairs.

<sup>160</sup> RGP 120, 1050, 10.07.1821, Gaspard Testa to the DLH.

<sup>161</sup> RGP 115, 417, 30.10.1787, cargo list of *Pieter Jansen Lerwig*.

<sup>162</sup> GA 5075, 10655/359, 27.06.1783.

<sup>163</sup> NA 1.02.20, 912, December 1802, cargo list of *Archipelagus*.

<sup>164</sup> NA 1.02.20, 912, 25.05.1802, cargo list of *De Drie Gezusters*.

<sup>165</sup> NA 1.02.20, 912, 11.05.1802, cargo list of *De Jonge Ypeus*.

<sup>166</sup> NA 1.02.20, 912, 16.07.1802, cargo list of *Archipelagus*.

<sup>167</sup> NA 1.02.20, 912, 25.05.1802, cargo list of *De Drie Gezusters*; NA 1.02.20, 912, 16.07.1802, cargo list of *Archipelagus*.

<sup>168</sup> RGP 115, 417, 30.10.1787, cargo list of *Pieter Jansen Lerwig*. RGP 120, 1363, 1796, cargo list of *De Minerva*. For a list of the goods he consigned from Amsterdam to Izmir, see RGP 120, 1361, 1793, cargo list of *De Jufrouw Catharina en Susanna*.

<sup>169</sup> GA 5075, 10868/302, 09.02.1773.

Gunaropulo & Johannes Emanuel & Co.,<sup>170</sup> Zahn & Co., Anton Kuck & Co.,<sup>171</sup> Andreas Seiler Sohn & Co.,<sup>172</sup> Claus Hinrich Wolff,<sup>173</sup> and the Blandow brothers<sup>174</sup> in Saint Petersburg. We established these connections by means of documents on bills of exchange transactions; it is impossible to obtain more details about d'Isay's relations with his correspondents in Russia. D'Isay's connections in London are less mysterious; his correspondents there, such as John Fletcher, Christopher Croft, John Walter, James Woodbridge, Thomas Parkinson, John Liotard, John Rodolph Bartenschlag, and John Edm. Browne, were all insurers of his consignments.<sup>175</sup>

On 10 October 1815, two days before his death, Stephano d'Isay had his testament recorded. When we consider that he served as translator for Greek merchants for the aforementioned notarial act in 1763, we can assume that he was at least in his late sixties when he died. His Dutch wife, Geeretry van Houten, had died before him, as had all three of their sons-in-law and one of their daughters, Theresia d'Isay. Theresia and her husband, Anastasi Tomasachi, left behind their son George Tomasachi. Catharina d'Isay was by then the widow of Philippe Hendrik van Swinden, while Susanna d'Isay was widowed by Nicolas Marcella, the first Ottoman consul in Amsterdam.<sup>176</sup> Marcella died in his home on the Keyzersgracht near the Molenpad on 24 March 1814. By then, he ran his business together with his wife's nephew, George Tomasachi, under the name Tomasachi, Marcella & Company.<sup>177</sup> Stephano d'Isay's lifetime mercantile successes were also reflected by the neighborhood where he and his family resided. Before his death, d'Isay resided in one of the better neighborhoods of Amsterdam, at Herengracht 462, near the Wolvenstraat. Catharina d'Isay lived at 462 with her father, while Susanna d'Isay and George Tomasachi resided in another house on the Herengracht, near the Oude Spiegelstraat.<sup>178</sup>

Despite more than five decades of presence in Amsterdam (since at least 1763), during which d'Isay had become a considerably wealthy man, his connections with Izmir, his dependence on trade with that city, and

<sup>170</sup> GA 5075, 15820/1121, 30.06.1788.

<sup>171</sup> GA 5075, 15821/1162, 07.07.1788.

<sup>172</sup> GA 5075, 15821/1191, 10.07.1788.

<sup>173</sup> GA 5075, 15821/1257, 23.07.1788.

<sup>174</sup> GA 5075, 15641/674, 802, 06.10.1789.

<sup>175</sup> GA 5075, 10654/255–260, 311, 13.05.1783.

<sup>176</sup> GA 5075, 19487/93; 19488/658, 10.10.1815.

<sup>177</sup> GA 5075, 19487/568, 11.10.1814.

<sup>178</sup> GA 5075, 19488/147, 28.02.1816.

his devotion to his relatives there were not weakened. This is underlined by his testament in the notarial archives in Amsterdam. Stephano d'Isay left 3,000 guilders to each of his nephews—Paolo, George, and Stephano d'Isay—and 2,000 guilders to his niece Catharina d'Isay, all of whom lived in Izmir.<sup>179</sup>

In this respect, Stephano d'Isay was certainly not an exception. His daughter Theresia d'Isay and her husband Anastasi Tomasachi still maintained two houses and a shop in Izmir when they recorded their testaments at the notary in Amsterdam in 1791. They had decided to leave these estates, along with f 20,000, to Anastasi's brother, Gio Tomasachi, who resided in Venice at that time.<sup>180</sup> We see another example of these merchants bequeathing their belongings to family back home in the case of the Armenian merchant Avet di Jeremias, who had his will recorded in Amsterdam in 1748. Jeremias left f 45,000 to the three children of his brother, Jeremias di Eliazar, in Istanbul. The four children of one of his sisters in Istanbul were to receive a total of f18,000, and two of his sisters, also living in Istanbul, were to receive 50 golden ducats per year.<sup>181</sup>

All these examples reveal the Ottoman merchants' strong orientation toward their places of origin. We can also deduce this orientation from the marriage patterns of Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam. Although Stephano d'Isay had married a Dutchwoman, only one of his three daughters married a Dutchman. The remaining two daughters had both married prominent members of the Greek community of Amsterdam. This feature becomes more significant when we consider that for these merchants living abroad there were very limited opportunities to find a spouse within their own ethno-religious communities. The marriage between Arachiel di Jesaias Savalan, an Armenian merchant in Amsterdam, and Maria di Gabriel, an Armenian woman from Izmir, reflects both this difficulty and the Ottoman merchants' loyalty to their roots in Anatolia.

In September 1784, Maria di Gabriel traveled to Amsterdam to marry Arachiel di Jesaias Savalan. The pairing was arranged by Arachiel's brother, Johannes di Jesaias Savalan, in Izmir. Maria accepted Johannes's request that she marry his brother in Amsterdam, embarked on a ship, and arrived in Amsterdam. Maria was a widow, however, and the Dutch authorities demanded substantial evidence to prove a woman's marital status before

<sup>179</sup> GA 5075, 19487/93, 568, 11.10.1814; 19488/658, 10.10.1815.

<sup>180</sup> GA 5075, 15853/437, 14.03.1791.

<sup>181</sup> GA 5075, 9420/13498, 17.08.1748.



approving the marriage. To this end, a number of people appeared before the notary to testify that Maria was indeed a widow. Caspar di Carabeth, an Armenian from Izmir who had traveled to Amsterdam on the same ship as Maria, as well as the Danish captain of the ship both testified that Maria did not leave Izmir clandestinely, but that she was attended by the Izmir Armenian community and priest. According to the testimonies of Maria and her witnesses, she had married Johannes di Malachia in 1770, but he died in Diyarbakir in 1778 during a journey. News of her husband's death had been conveyed to Maria through a written declaration prepared by three Armenian priests in Diyarbakir. It was claimed that the Armenian community of Izmir was aware of these developments. Moreover, the witnesses also testified that Maria had obtained permission from the "Turkish" and Armenian judges in Izmir to leave the city and to marry Savalan. As the judges in Izmir would not grant such permission unless they were positive that her husband had indeed died, there was no reason to doubt that this was indeed the case. To strengthen her account, Maria also gave the burgomasters of Amsterdam some official documents from Izmir.<sup>182</sup>

Not everyone in the Ottoman mercantile community in Amsterdam restricted themselves to marrying within their own circle in Amsterdam or bringing spouses from their places of origin. Stephano d'Isay and one of his daughters were two examples of those who chose the alternative of inter-marrying with the Dutch. However, it is clear that the members of the Armenian and the Greek communities of Amsterdam were more likely to marry within their own ethno-religious communities. This preference paralleled, on the social-emotional plane, these communities' business reliance on trade with their places of origin, and their specialization in certain merchandise from those places. Indeed, on the political-diplomatic plane, it is telling that at the end of the eighteenth century the Greek merchants of Amsterdam claimed fiscal privileges from the Dutch authorities under the pretext that they were genuine subjects of the Ottoman sultan. These developments and their implications will be extensively studied in the last chapter of this book.

There is no doubt that the Greek and Armenian communities in Amsterdam in the period under discussion differed with regard to specific characteristics. These specificities remain outside the scope of this study, however, since our focus is on the features they shared as Ottoman

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<sup>182</sup> GA 5075, 15775/1670, 07.09.1784.

merchants operating outside the boundaries of the empire. Based on the information presented above, it is possible to discern certain common, general characteristics, some of which are already obvious. It has already been established that both Ottoman Greek and Ottoman Armenian merchants continued to depend exclusively on trade with their places of origin, even after residing for decades in the Netherlands. This dependence was furthered by their reliance on the same trades with which they were associated in Anatolia. Even when these merchants set out to exploit new business opportunities in the Netherlands, their business trajectories followed a pattern reflecting this dependence. When their activities expanded geographically beyond Amsterdam, their first target was Leiden, which had long been connected to the Dutch Levant trade through its consumption of mohair yarn and its supply of woolen textiles to the Levant. Similarly, Armenian and Greek investments in Dutch shipping remained within the confinements of their homeward orientation, and thus exclusively concerned Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean.

Intra-communal dependence remained an important characteristic of both the Greek and the Armenian merchant communities even after decades of residence in Amsterdam. The names of these merchants' business correspondents in the Levant and elsewhere, their frequent journeys home, and their marriages within their own ethno-religious communities all attest to their reliance on their own communities for business and social succor. Because of each community's involvement in its respective specialty trade at all levels, community cohesion enabled the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam to buy high quality goods at lower prices than their competitors outside the community.

The correspondence of De Vogel reveals that relations between the Dutch and Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam were often openly antagonistic. Although a certain degree of cooperation did occur between Ottoman merchants in Izmir and Dutch merchants in Amsterdam, the Dutch resentment of the Ottoman participation in Ottoman-Dutch trade was clear. This animosity toward Ottoman merchants also carried over to Dutch merchants and consular authorities in the Levant, who began working against the Ottoman merchants in concert with Dutch merchants in the Netherlands. The efforts of this coalition resulted in new administrative measures preventing the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam from acquiring citizenship in the city. In this way the Dutch may have helped the Ottoman merchants to maintain their distinct communal identities and prevented them from assimilating completely into Dutch business circles.

PART THREE

ACCOMMODATING THE “UNUSUAL”:  
ADJUSTMENTS IN DUTCH AND OTTOMAN POLICIES



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE TRANSFORMATION OF DUTCH TRADE POLICIES IN THE LEVANT: FROM FREE TRADE TO “FAINT” PROTECTIONISM

In the previous chapters we have shown that the expansion of the commercial activities of the Ottoman merchants to Amsterdam did not necessarily result from their cooperation with Dutch merchants. The competition characterizing relations between Ottoman and Dutch merchants in Izmir and Amsterdam reveals that this expansion did not stem from cooperation between the two groups, but was achieved by the former in spite of the latter's efforts. It seems that certain groups, such as the textile producers of Amsterdam, were on good terms with Ottoman merchants overall, but the crucial factor that enabled the Ottoman merchants to effectively oust their Dutch competitors from the Levant trade were the Ottomans' connections in the Levant. These connections translated to lower commission rates, lower expenses for consignments, and higher-quality Levantine goods.

Among the elements still absent from the emerging picture are the attitudes of both Ottoman and Dutch authorities toward the expansion of Ottoman mercantile activity into the Dutch realm. Since these attitudes were manifested in the form of resolutions and policies, we will look at how these evolved during the course of the eighteenth century. In this chapter, we investigate the evolution of Dutch policies that relate to the growing participation of Ottoman merchants in Dutch trade with the Levant. Several questions drive our investigation: how did the Dutch authorities respond to this phenomenon; were they receptive or hostile to the activities of Ottoman merchants; which factors and considerations shaped their policies; what factored into the parameters of their decisions and policies; and how did these decisions and policies play out in relation to the actual activities of the Ottoman merchants?

The commercial successes of Ottoman merchants seem not to have pleased the Dutch merchants and authorities; this should not be surprising, as these successes were achieved through the marginalization of Dutch merchants. The declining role of Dutch merchants in Dutch trade with the Levant during the eighteenth century can be seen clearly in the cargo lists of Dutch ships navigating between the Dutch and Ottoman

ports. These lists included the names of the loaders and addressees of the cargo, so it is easy to discern a dramatic decrease in Dutch trading activity. The decreasing role of Dutch merchants and the increasing participation of Ottoman merchants was of great concern to Dutch merchants and authorities, who searched for ways to prevent the ruin of Dutch merchants and their competitors' domination of trade. These considerations constituted the motives that stimulated the formation of a "faint" Dutch protectionism<sup>1</sup> in the eighteenth-century Levantine trade.

Within the context of Dutch trade with the Levant, it was not easy to devise and implement measures to protect Dutch merchants against competition with the Ottoman merchants. The rather diverse interest orientations among the Dutchmen with interests—direct or indirect—in Dutch economic activities in the Levant made it difficult for the Dutch authorities to implement such markedly protectionist policies. In the context of the eighteenth-century Dutch Levantine trade, it is difficult to speak about interest groups with clearly-defined boundaries. Instead, we encounter various, often contradictory, interest orientations that the actors in Dutch Levant trade had to keep in balance. One principal example of such contradictory orientations is that of the interest of Dutch shipping in the Levant versus the interest of trade. For example, in most cases, a regulation introduced to promote Dutch shipping in the Levant would have an adverse impact on trade. This was the case when authorities, in order to promote Dutch shipping in the Levant, introduced punitive taxes on goods carried by foreign ships. Such a regulation had an adverse effect on trade both by burdening it with the punitive tax and by limiting traders' transportation alternatives. We cannot identify shipowners and merchants as the two interest groups in this instance of conflicting interests, however. On the contrary, in most cases the owners of Dutch ships navigating to Izmir were the same merchants who loaded these ships with their merchandise! The Dutch authorities had to take all interest orientations into consideration when crafting new policies.

Like the merchant shipowners, most, if not all, Dutch actors in the Ottoman-Dutch trade were associated with more than one of these often contradictory interest orientations. Even when Ottoman mercantile activity was limited to the consignment of goods from Izmir to Dutch busi-

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<sup>1</sup> Here we use the term "protectionism" to mean the protection of Dutch merchants from the competition of Ottoman merchants, rather than its conventional meaning, the protection of a certain industry against the competition of other nations.

ness correspondents in Amsterdam, the Dutch found themselves pulled in different directions by various interests. There is no doubt that engaging with Ottoman business correspondents in Izmir opened opportunities for the Dutch merchants of Amsterdam without threatening their position in the Dutch Levant trade. Many Dutch merchants in Amsterdam, however, had close business associates among the Dutch merchants in Izmir, who were in many cases blood relatives. As the Ottoman merchants' consignment of goods to Amsterdam correspondents threatened the position of Izmir's Dutch merchants, the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam faced a dilemma. On the one hand, there were prospects of trading profitably with Ottoman merchants in Izmir, and on the other, there was a risk of leaving their Dutch business associates in Izmir vulnerable to competition from the Ottoman merchants.

There were other contradicting interest orientations as well. For the Dutch active in the Amsterdam Levant trade, textile production and trade were the most important interest orientations.<sup>2</sup> With respect to textile production, it was important to market as great a quantity of textiles as possible in the Levant, regardless of their traders' nationalities. But Dutch merchants knew very well that they could not profit from this trade unless they were the ones who controlled it. Here again, we cannot speak of a clash of interest between distinct interest groups because there was not a strict division between the textile producers and the Levant merchants. In many cases, actors in the Dutch Levant trade were textile producers-*cum*-merchants who were simultaneously concerned with the profits of their textile production and their trading activities.

Another distinct interest orientation within the business circles of Amsterdam related to the purchasers of products originating in the Levant. The principal exports of Izmir to Amsterdam and important materials for the related industries in the Netherlands included raw silk, mohair yarn, cotton, and cotton yarn. From the perspective of the Dutch purchasers of these goods, there was no reason to complain about competition between Dutch merchants and Ottoman merchants, as they were competing to offer them lower prices. De Vogel's complaints about decreasing cotton prices in Amsterdam—which he attributed to the activities of the Greek

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<sup>2</sup> GA 332, 38/396, 23.12.1763, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Ensle, in which De Vogel complains about the support that Ottoman merchants received from the textile producers of Amsterdam.



merchants—would find no sympathy among cotton purchasers in the city.<sup>3</sup>

Although Dutch merchants in the Levant seem to have been more monolithic in terms of their interest orientations, there was in fact some potential for friction between merchant communities located in different Ottoman ports. For example, upon the demand of the Dutch merchants and ambassador in Istanbul in 1749, the DLH suspended consular dues on cash and jewels that were brought to the Levant by overland routes.<sup>4</sup> This decision did not impress the Dutch community of Izmir, since they did not expect any positive effect for Dutch trade with Izmir, “where no cash and jewels arrived overland, but by sea.”<sup>5</sup>

Consular dues on cash and jewels were only part of a wider debate related to the activities of the Ottoman merchants. It is important to examine the details of this debate, since they enable us to understand the difference between the attitudes of the Dutch merchants in Istanbul and those in Izmir. The regulations of 1676, the “constitution” of Dutch trading communities in the Ottoman Empire, prescribed that all Dutchmen in the Levant had to take the national oath every year in the presence of the ambassador, or of a consul in case of residence outside Istanbul.<sup>6</sup> In 1748, just at the beginning of his service as the Dutch ambassador to the Porte, Elbert de Hochepped requested the Dutch residents in Istanbul take their annual oaths. The Istanbul Dutch community refused, however, to take the oath, making it clear that they would continue to refuse unless the authorities changed certain regulations concerning consular dues. The Dutch merchants in Istanbul were primarily concerned with the consular dues extracted from Dutch merchants when they transported their goods on foreign ships. When the Dutch merchants loaded their goods on foreign ships, they had to pay consular dues to the consul of the nation to which the ship belonged. This was a right which the sultan had accorded to all capitulatory nations. However, the Dutch regulations had authorized Dutch consuls in the Levant to levy a 1 percent additional consular due on the goods belonging to Dutch merchants when they used foreign vessels—this was a punitive tax to encourage Dutch merchants to use Dutch ships. The Dutch merchants noted that in the case of overland trade in cash and jewels, no nation other than the Dutch paid consular dues.

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<sup>3</sup> GA 332, 41/705, 24.03.1768, Thomas de Vogel to David van Lennep & Enslie.

<sup>4</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/8, 20.06.1749, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>5</sup> NA 01.03.01 138, 05.08.1749, A. van den Sanden to the DLH.

<sup>6</sup> RGP 34, 208–217, 13.03.1676.

The Dutch merchants' outcry led to the suspension of consular dues on cash and jewels brought to the Levant overland, but this still did not satisfy the Dutch merchants in Istanbul. They were convinced that as long as their goods arriving in the Levant on foreign bottoms were not freed from the 1 percent extra Dutch consular dues they would be unable to compete with foreigners. Moreover, they requested that Dutch protégés be obliged to take the national oath, whereby they would be bound to declare their goods properly when the consular dues were to be paid. According to the Dutch merchants in Istanbul, they had to declare their goods properly because they had promised to do so when they took the national oath. But the Ottoman merchants could make false declarations and pay less, because they were not bound by an oath like the Dutch merchants.<sup>7</sup> The frustration of the Dutch merchants in Istanbul was so strong that they even threatened the DLH that they would seek the protection of another nation to avoid the 1 percent additional consular due.<sup>8</sup>

On receiving the petition of the Dutch community of Istanbul, the DLH asked the ambassador for his opinion about introducing an obligatory national oath for protégés.<sup>9</sup> In his response, the ambassador explained that the protégés in Istanbul were free to take the oath, while the protégés in Izmir and elsewhere were obliged to do so. Moreover, since the protégés in Istanbul did not have to take the national oath, they were not liable for the extra consular dues levied on goods arriving at Istanbul on foreign vessels. Therefore, the ambassador advised the DLH to compel Dutch protégés in Istanbul to take the oath and thus become liable to the tax.<sup>10</sup> On the advice of the ambassador, the DLH decided to maintain the extra consular dues on goods carried on foreign vessels, but exempted cash and jewels brought to the Levant overland. Moreover, they indicated that both Dutch nationals and protégés should take the national oath immediately.<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile, the Dutch community in Izmir came to the DLH with a very different perspective on the national oath and Dutch protégés in Izmir. The Dutch nation in Izmir argued that the protégés had never before taken the national oath, and opposed the idea that they should be obliged to do

<sup>7</sup> RGP 95, 211–213, 11.03.1748; NA 1.02.20, 169/8–12; NA 1.02.20, 165/44–45, 11.03.1748, *Representatie van de Nederlandse natie, tot Galata en Pera van Constantinopolen geetabiliseert, aangaande de nationale belasting haar opgelegd*.

<sup>8</sup> RGP 95, 225–226; NA 1.02.20, 169/87–89; 165/263–264, 05.01.1750, *Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH*.

<sup>9</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/3, 19.07.1748, *the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped*.

<sup>10</sup> NA 1.02.20, 169/33–42; 165/100–108, 04.09.1748, *Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH*.

<sup>11</sup> RGP 95, 222–223, 20.06.1749, *the DLH to Jan Hendrik Meyer, treasurer in Istanbul*.

so. They explained that if the protégés took the national oath they would also attend national meetings and claim all rights reserved to the Dutch nationals. As a result, when the Ottoman authorities served an *avania* on the protégés, they could consider it a “national *avania*,” and could ask the Dutch community as a whole to contribute to the fees, which otherwise would not concern the Dutch merchants.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, if the protégés were allowed to take the national oath, they could claim that the consular dues corresponding to their goods should be levied on the same scale as the Dutch merchants. This was unacceptable for the Dutch merchants in Izmir.<sup>13</sup> More importantly, among the Dutch protégés there was only one merchant who traded with the Netherlands,<sup>14</sup> namely Begler di Jossif, the Greek partner of Belcamp & Clement.<sup>15</sup> Finally, in June 1750, the directors altered their decisions and informed the ambassador that they canceled the extra consular dues on goods transported on foreign vessels. Moreover, much to the satisfaction of the Dutch nation in Izmir, the directors decided that Dutch protégés should not be obliged to take the national oath.<sup>16</sup>

On the question of whether the protégés should be obliged to take the national oath or not, the difference between the Dutch nation in Izmir and the Dutch nation in Istanbul is quite significant. This difference should be attributed to the different character of trade at these two ports. For the capital, import trade was far more important than export, while in Izmir imports and exports were equally important. Although some goods, like a limited amount of mohair yarn from Ankara, made its way to Istanbul for further consignment to Europe, the capital city remained essentially a consumer of European goods. Therefore, Dutch merchants in Istanbul did not have much to fear as long as they were trading under the same conditions as the other European and Ottoman merchants. Izmir, however, was both an important market for European goods and an important supplier of huge quantities of local goods, such as mohair yarn and cotton, to Europe. Therefore, while the main concern of the Dutch merchants in Istanbul was import competition with other European nations, in Izmir the situation was quite different. The Dutch merchants in Izmir had to take into consideration competition both on the import and export sides.

<sup>12</sup> NA 01.03.01, 138, 15.08.1749, Daniel Alexander de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>13</sup> NA 01.03.01, 138, 27.08.1749, board in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>14</sup> RGP 95, 230, 12.06.1750, consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>15</sup> NA 01.03.01, 138, 15.08.1749, Daniel Alexander de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>16</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/13, 19.06.1750, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped; NA 1.02.20, 169/104–108; 165/308–311, 03.08.1750, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

It might initially have been the other European merchants and commodities that had to be taken into account concerning the imports. But as for exports, the Dutch merchants were already under pressure from Ottoman merchants who controlled trade in the local commodities and had made their way to Amsterdam. It was natural that once the Ottoman merchants gained control over Izmir's exports to the Netherlands, they did not limit their commercial activity to exports, but also became substantial competitors with the Dutch in the import trade as well.

There was another difference between the Dutch trading contexts of Istanbul and Izmir. The documentation available to us on the debate over consular dues and the national oath gives the impression that the refusal to take the national oath was initiated by Dutch merchants in Istanbul, who demanded that they be freed from punitive consular dues when they shipped their goods on foreign vessels. The participation of Dutch merchants in Izmir in the debate seems to have been only a matter of solidarity with the community in Istanbul. This is not surprising because the records on Dutch shipping to Istanbul and Izmir reveal that considerably fewer Dutch ships visited Istanbul than arrived at Izmir. This means that in comparison to Izmir, the Dutch merchants in Istanbul had many fewer opportunities to consign their goods on Dutch ships and were therefore much more vulnerable to the punitive consular due.

In conclusion, although the Dutch trading community in the Levant seems to have been of a relatively homogenous nature in terms of interest orientations, there was nevertheless potential for friction between geographically separate communities. We have already seen that the Dutch Levant trade community in Amsterdam comprised conflicting and oppositional interest orientations. If a certain aspect of the activities of the Ottoman merchants was harmful for a certain interest orientation, the same aspect would be favorable for another interest orientation. Therefore, it is clear that the evolution of Dutch trade policies in the face of the growing competition from Ottoman merchants, especially in the eighteenth century, was a complex process that accommodated a great diversity of interests. This is part of the explanation for the Dutch inability to prevent the Ottoman takeover of Dutch Levant trade, despite repeated complaints and warnings on the part of Dutch merchants.

The earliest alert about the activities of the Ottoman merchants in the Dutch Levant trade was sounded in 1729 by Cornelis Calkoen,<sup>17</sup> Dutch

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<sup>17</sup> On Cornelis Calkoen and Ottoman-Dutch relations during his ambassadorship, see Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*.

ambassador at the Porte from 1726 to 1744, who wrote to Fagel, the secretary of the Dutch SG, that he regretted that the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek subjects of the Porte had a large share in Dutch trade with the Levant.<sup>18</sup> On 18 July 1731, the treasurer of the Dutch community of Izmir informed the DLH that the “foreign” merchants who loaded their wares on Dutch ships were likely to declare their goods worth 25 percent less than their real amount; and he considered this to be harmful for the treasury. The initial response of the DLH was to arrange a meeting with shipowners, warn them about the issue, and demand their cooperation in overcoming the problem.<sup>19</sup>

These earliest references seem to indicate that the attitudes of Dutch authorities in the Levant would not be very receptive toward Ottoman merchants’ participation in Dutch trade with the Levant. These first correspondences also contain one of the most oft-repeated strategies employed by Dutch merchants to solicit assistance from authorities against the Ottoman merchants. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Dutch merchants and authorities in the Levant repeatedly brought allegations of fraudulence on the part of “foreigners” to the home authorities to convince them to take action against the Ottoman merchants.

As the Ottoman merchants’ share in the trade between Izmir and Amsterdam increased toward the middle of the eighteenth century, it was particularly the Dutch merchants in Izmir who reiterated their complaints more frequently. The merchants, supported by their consuls or ambassadors, or both, demanded the total expulsion of “foreigners” from “their” trade, and the monopolization of Dutch Levant trade for Dutch nationals. The most elaborate form of this proposal was developed by Elbert de Hochepped—Dutch ambassador to the Porte between 1746 and 1763—who presented his project to the secretary of the SG in a memorandum in 1754. In the memorandum, De Hochepped related his ideas about how to resuscitate Dutch trade with the Levant, which had been ailing since the beginning of the century. De Hochepped also analyzed the causes of the difficulties that Dutch traders faced in the Levant and offered solutions to these problems. According to De Hochepped, the main problem of the Netherlands’ trade with the Levant was the participation in it of foreign, especially Greek, Armenian, and Jewish merchants. It is therefore not

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<sup>18</sup> RGP 95, 24.

<sup>19</sup> RGP 95, 32–33 and 37–38. During the DLH meeting on 10 October 1731, one of the shipowners (Meng) suggested that the best solution would be to appoint a sworn person to the customs house of Izmir to control the goods loaded on Dutch ships.

surprising that his solution was essentially the establishment of a Dutch company with a monopoly over Dutch trade with the Levant.<sup>20</sup> Along with the main report, De Hochepped also wrote a secret report in which he criticized the DLH and claimed that some of the directors were engaged in direct trade with foreigners in Izmir.<sup>21</sup> De Hochepped knew this might garner the wrath of the DLH and therefore addressed his memorandum not to the directors, but to the secretary of the Dutch SG.

The ambassador's efforts in support of the merchants' demands for monopolization did not ensure, however, that home authorities would acquiesce. The directors found De Hochepped's suggestions impracticable. They also disagreed with the ambassador's concerns about the participation of foreign traders in Dutch trade with the Levant. According to the DLH, this participation was natural and normal—just as with Dutch trade with Spain, in which consignment of Spanish goods to the Netherlands and processing of Dutch merchants' consignments to Spain were carried out by foreigners. Therefore, the directors argued that the participation of foreigners in Dutch trade with the Levant ought to be further stimulated, since it was good for Dutch trade and shipping. The directors also argued that if Dutch authorities prevented foreign merchants from trading with Amsterdam, these merchants would not stop trading, only relocate their activities to Italy, Hamburg, or Flanders. Moreover, in response to the ambassador's advice to follow the French example and introduce monopoly regulations, the directors countered that the French case was irrelevant, because the Dutch Republic was a free republic owing its existence partly to the activities of foreign merchants. As for the ambassador's criticism regarding certain directors' having consigned shipments to foreign traders in Izmir, the directors stated that though they were not aware of any among them doing so, they nevertheless saw no problem if anyone had. Finally, the directors pointed to recently failed Dutch firms in Izmir and Istanbul, and suggested that their bankruptcies had caused considerable losses to Amsterdam merchants. The directors were convinced that the Dutch firms in Izmir and Istanbul were victims of their own incompetence.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> RGP 95, 277–321, *Memorie Raakende de Verbetering van de Commercie der Hollanders in de Levant en de Navigatie in de Middellandsche Zee*.

<sup>21</sup> RGP 95, 318. *Secreete reflectie op de teegenswoordige administratie der ed. Achth. Heren directeuren der Levantschen Handel en Navigatie in de Middellandsche Zee*.

<sup>22</sup> RGP 95, 322–336, 26.11.1754, the DLH to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

Despite this seeming defense of free trade, the directors did not turn deaf ears to the plight of Dutch merchants in Izmir. In the 1750s, several developments that we will study below gave the Dutch nation in Izmir the opportunity to press for their cause and oblige the directors to make some concessions. Moreover, the expansion of the activities of the Ottoman merchants to Amsterdam had begun to threaten the interests of Dutch merchants in Amsterdam too. As the interests of these merchants were represented at the DLH as well, it was logical that in due time the allegations of the Dutch nation in Izmir would find more sympathy among the directors.

The Armenian and Greek communities' participation in Dutch trade with the Levant was also brought to the fore when several failed merchants escaped from Amsterdam, leaving scandals and creditors in disarray. In 1753, the Armenian Mattheus di Ouan fled Amsterdam with a considerable amount of unpaid debt. Following the disappearance of Di Ouan, the SG sent an express order to the ambassador and asked him to sequester goods belonging to Di Ouan when they were found under the Armenian merchants in Izmir. Upon receipt of the SG's request, the ambassador applied to the Porte and procured an imperial order to that end. The order was addressed to the qadi of Izmir, and stated that the qadi must ensure that the Armenian merchants in Izmir declared whether they held any goods or other belongings of Di Ouan. Despite the order of the Porte and the endeavors of the Dutch ambassador and the consul in Izmir, there was little hope of securing anything for the creditors, since it all depended on the goodwill and helpful efforts of Ottoman authorities such as the qadi and the customs official in Izmir.<sup>23</sup>

Nine years later, in 1761, the Greek Leone Amiro fled Amsterdam after having purchased some cloth on credit; he had already consigned the cloth to his correspondents in the Levant. This time, the Dutch authorities acted promptly and the SG ordered the Dutch ambassador at the Porte to secure the interests of the Dutch creditors. Having received the order, the ambassador found that Stephano Vlasto in Istanbul and Chiot Stamata Cicinia in Izmir were the main business correspondents of Amiro. The ambassador guessed that Amiro had consigned the cloths to his correspondent in Izmir. Therefore, he ordered the Dutch consul in Izmir to be vigilant about the issue and to sequester the cloths on their arrival. Amiro's flight again provoked a flurry of protests against the Ottoman

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<sup>23</sup> RGP 95, 267–268, 16.12.1753, Elbert de Hochepped to D. A. de Hochepped.



merchants,<sup>24</sup> compelling the DLH to give an account of their management to the burgomasters of Amsterdam. The directors explained to the burgomasters that there was little hope for the creditors and admitted that the last incident revealed that in the Levant trade it was better to depend on Dutch nationals than on "foreigners." However, they also explained that an investigation of cargo lists of Dutch ships revealed that Dutch merchants in the Levant were most likely to trade with the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam, while the Greeks and the Armenians in the Levant preferred to trade with their compatriots in Amsterdam. Nevertheless, to remedy the situation, the directors explained, they had already prepared a new tariff for consular dues that was awaiting the approval of the SG. The tariff, as the directors explained, gave Dutch nationals adequate advantage over their foreign competitors.<sup>25</sup>

The escapes of Di Ouan and Leone Amiro revealed that the Dutch authorities could do little or nothing when foreign merchants escaped from Amsterdam without paying their debts. The limited jurisdiction of the Dutch consular authorities in the Levant and their dependence on the goodwill of Ottoman authorities for the prosecution of these "foreigners" seem to have played an important role in convincing the Dutch authorities that it would be better to rely on Dutch merchants for their trade with the Levant. Moreover, these two flights and accompanying developments must have turned some other people in Amsterdam against the Ottoman merchants, thus winning Dutch merchants in Izmir new allies in their struggle.

To develop and to implement a policy aimed at the protection of national merchants against foreigners, however, the line between the nationals and the foreigners had to be clarified first. We have seen that a number of Ottoman merchants had already become citizens of Amsterdam. There is no doubt that as long as the foreigners could become citizens of one or another Dutch city, a policy to protect nationals against the competition of foreigners could not achieve anything. This aspect of the relevant Dutch policies had been developed in 1759–60 as a consequence of the speculative behavior of a Greek merchant, Antonio Zingrilara. Zingrilara's actions and the Dutch responses show that Dutch authorities had become increasingly careful to maintain and implement the division between Dutch nationals and foreigners in the Levant.

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<sup>24</sup> RGP 95, 449–450, 17.11.1761, Elbert de Hochepeid to the SG.

<sup>25</sup> RGP 95, 452–453, 26.01.1762, the DLH to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

Zingrilara was a Greek native of Izmir who had established himself in Amsterdam and married a Dutchwoman there, but was still trading with his relatives in Izmir in the 1750s. On 3 April 1759, he was able to obtain a resolution from the SG ordering the Dutch consul in Izmir to treat him as a Dutch national regarding the payment of consular dues. This occurred even before Zingrilara bought his citizenship in Amsterdam on 19 September 1760. The resolution of 3 April had far-reaching consequences because Zingrilara had linked his firm with some other Greek firms in Izmir (Chrisojanni, Curmusi and Vidali), who then claimed the same privileges as Zingrilara. The Dutch nation in Izmir was deeply concerned about the developments and demanded, in vain, the abolishment of the resolution.<sup>26</sup> Although the SG did not withdraw its resolution, it assured the DLH that it would not grant similar resolutions to other Ottoman merchants. Zingrilara continued to annoy the Dutch nation in Izmir after he left Amsterdam for Izmir in 1767. That was the year the DLH decided that since Zingrilara had abandoned his wife, left Amsterdam for Izmir, married a Greek subject of the sultan, adopted the Greek Orthodox religion, and dressed himself in an oriental fashion, he had become a subject of the Porte and therefore lost the citizenship of Amsterdam and the privileges accorded to him by the SG. Zingrilara did not give up easily and replied that the SG was the only authority that could withdraw the rights it had granted. Consequently on 14 August 1767, the SG took a new decision and withdrew the resolution of 3 April 1759. However, the case was not over, since Zingrilara allegedly had considerable influence at the Porte and had obtained an imperial order to sequester all Dutch merchandise in Izmir under the pretense that his ex-wife in Amsterdam had sequestered his merchandise there.<sup>27</sup>

The controversy prompted by the SG's resolution in 1759 granting Zingrilara the same rights as Dutch nationals ensured that the SG became more vigilant about granting comparable demands by other foreigners. In 1761, Leonardo Metaxa, another Greek merchant, applied to the SG for Dutch protection. Unlike Zingrilara's earlier application, this time the SG asked the opinion of the DLH. The DLH's response was clear. The SG's admission of Zingrilara as equal to Dutch merchants and the subsequent opposition of the Dutch merchants in Izmir were still fresh in the minds of the directors. They explained to the SG that treating Ottoman merchants as

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<sup>26</sup> RGP 95, 400–401, 24.07.1760, the DLH to the SG.

<sup>27</sup> Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 121ff.

equal to Dutch merchants would have disastrous consequences for Dutch merchants in the Levant. Moreover, the directors argued that the Ottoman government was not ready to recognize the protection of its subjects by foreign diplomats residing in its dominions.<sup>28</sup> Thus it became clear that after decades of controversy, the Dutch merchants in Izmir had convinced the DLH of the harmful consequences of the activities of Ottoman merchants. However, the DLH's changing attitude should be attributed not to the directors' empathy with the Dutch merchants in Izmir, but rather to the fact that Ottoman merchants had become viable competitors of Dutch merchants in Amsterdam. Nevertheless even after beginning to address the results of Ottoman competition with Dutch merchants, the directors did not comply with all the demands of the Dutch nation in Izmir, devising, rather, partial measures to curb Ottoman mercantile activity and protect Dutch nationals from their competition.

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<sup>28</sup> RGP 95, 450–451, 11.12.1761, the DLH to the SG. This resolution by no means brought an end to the SG's resolutions that accorded certain Ottoman merchants the same privileges as Dutch merchants. On 16 March 1774, Johannis Brink and Crull Morré in Amsterdam were able to obtain a resolution from the SG whereby the Greek Demetrio Fronimo in Istanbul was granted Dutch protection. According to the resolution, Fronimo was to enjoy all the privileges of a Dutch merchant. The Dutch ambassador to the Porte opposed the SG's resolution, arguing that Fronimo was a subject of the sultan, not a Dutch national, despite the fact that the ambassador had earlier obtained a *berat* for him. The ambassador explained that while *berat* holders did enjoy certain privileges, they should nevertheless be considered subjects of the sultan. Moreover, if the intention of the SG was to accord Fronimo the right to pay the consular dues on the same terms as the Dutch merchants, this move could empower the other holders of Dutch *berats* to claim the same rights, thereby harming Dutch nationals in the Levant (RGP 115, 183–184, 17.05.1774, De Weiler to the SG). These objections on the part of the ambassador were supported by the Dutch consul (RGP 115, 185–186, 03.06.1774, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH) and treasurer (RGP 115, 186, 03.06.1774, C. G. N. Schutz to the DLH) in Izmir, as well as by the DLH (RGP 115, 188–190, 04.08.1774, the DLH to the SG). These initiatives convinced the SG to withdraw its resolution (RGP 115, 190n1, 08.08.1774, resolution of the SG). Two years later, Johannes Brink arrived in Izmir and applied to the consul for Dutch protection under the pretense that he had become a citizen of Amsterdam during his stay there. The consul in Izmir and the secretary of the Dutch embassy in Istanbul refused to approve his request, pointing out that he was born in Zagora and was a subject of the Porte by birth (RGP 115, 233, 04.11.1776, Tor to Fagel). The conduct of the consul and the secretary in this case was also supported by the DLH in a letter to the burgomasters of Amsterdam (RGP 115, 235, 10.01.1777). On Johannes Brink, see also Maurits van den Boogert, "Ottoman Greeks," 129–147. In 1787, Kourmoules obtained citizenship in Amsterdam and claimed Dutch protection and the accompanying rights in Izmir. The Dutch consul in Izmir opposed the idea, arguing that the Porte did not recognize the protection of any of its subjects by foreign consuls (RGP 115, 403, 03.09.1787, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH). In turn, the directors wrote to Kourmoules that Amsterdam citizenship did not exempt him from his obligation of loyalty to the sultan (RGP 115, 404n1, 21.12.1787, the DLH to Kourmoules).

The earliest step toward providing Dutch nationals with a competitive edge over Ottoman merchants had already been taken, well before this controversy. The Dutch had been utilizing the consular dues to this end; Dutch consular dues were calculated to provide certain advantages to Dutch merchants against their foreign competitors. First, when the consular dues were calculated, the merchandise belonging to “foreigners” was, on the whole, assessed at higher values than that belonging to Dutch merchants. For this purpose, the Dutch authorities in the Levant used discriminatory tariffs, which indicated the nominal values of goods separately for Dutch merchants and “foreigners.”<sup>29</sup> It is not clear when the use of these discriminatory tariffs was introduced, but it appears that they were in practice throughout the eighteenth century. It is difficult to assess the exact amount of protection that these differentiated price assessments of Dutch and foreign goods afforded Dutch trade as a whole, since the tariff rate varied according to the type of goods, and the shares of different goods in trade as a whole were not equal.<sup>30</sup> In this chapter, however, while examining the tariff arranged in 1762, we will try to give an idea about this rate. The Dutch merchants also enjoyed another advantage, beyond the discrepancy in assessment price. After the total consular dues for a specific consignment were calculated, the Dutch merchants enjoyed a 6 percent reduction. This reduction did not apply to foreigners. Until October 1761 another element, namely the *agio*, influenced the final amount of consular dues that both the Dutch and the foreign merchants had to pay. However, the *agio* was aimed not at providing an advantage to the Dutch merchants, but rather at compensating for the debased coins in wide circulation in the Levant. After the amount of consular dues was calculated, an *agio* of 3.33 percent was added to the total amount for both the Dutch and non-Dutch merchants.

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<sup>29</sup> Although until 1752 the value of mohair yarn belonging to “foreign” merchants was assessed at a lower price (2 LD per *okka*) than the mohair yarn belonging to Dutch merchants (2 ¼ LD per *okka*), it is clear that these discriminatory tariffs were meant to provide protection to Dutch merchants, since mohair yarn was the only item that was assessed at a lower price for “foreigners.” NA 1.02.20, 184/19, 21.09.1751, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>30</sup> Although it is possible to prepare an index to indicate the share of different goods in the whole trade and calculate the total discrepancy according to share, value, and the rate of discrepancy for each good for a limited period, we cannot accommodate the changes that took place in the shares of goods in the whole trade, such as the decrease of the importance of mohair yarn and the increase of that of cotton.

The rate of the advantage of the Dutch merchants in this system can be calculated as follows:<sup>31</sup>

For the Dutch merchants:

10,000	assessed value of goods
200	consular dues (2 percent of the assessed value)
<u>- 12</u>	reduction (6 percent of the consular dues)

188

<u>+ 6.26</u>	<i>agio</i> (3.33 percent of 188)
194.26	to be paid in consular dues

For "foreigners":

10,000	assessed value of goods
200	consular dues (2 percent of the assessed value)
<u>+ 6.66</u>	<i>agio</i> (3.33 percent of 200 consular dues)
206.66	to be paid in consular dues

Thus it is clear that the goods belonging to Dutch merchants were burdened with 0.124 percent<sup>32</sup> less in consular dues than goods belonging to foreigners, while the rate fell to 0.12 percent<sup>33</sup> after the *agio* was suspended in 1761. This did not, then, amount to a considerable benefit, though it was another advantage that Dutch merchants enjoyed, beyond that provided them by the higher assessment of goods belonging to foreign merchants.

The Dutch community in Izmir was clearly not satisfied with such a small advantage. In 1752, this dissatisfaction created a stir when the Dutch nation in Izmir argued that the regulations concerning consular dues in fact placed foreigners in a more advantageous position than Dutch merchants. When the DLH was informed about the complaints, they asked the nation in Izmir why "foreigners" were in a more advantageous position. In turn the nation repeated the decades-old claim that foreign merchants declared the amount and quality of their goods as less than their real amount and quality, and thus paid lower consular dues than did Dutch nationals, who were bound to declare their goods properly under oath. Among other things, the Dutch nation in Izmir alleged that "foreigners" declared the weights of bales of cotton yarn as 2 to 3 *kantars* to Dutch

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Uytgaande manifest, ende daerop geformeerde Consulaat Rekening van't Schip de Sta: Maria, Capt: Reyser Hoogetreed, direct per Amsterdam. Weegens de rechten Zo hetzelfde hierin(?) uytgaen heeft gerendeert als te weeten. Smirne 22 February 1748, NA 1.03.01, 138.

<sup>32</sup>  $206.66 - 194.26 = 12.4$  for 10,000 = 0.124 percent.

<sup>33</sup>  $200 - 188 = 12$  for 10,000 = 0.12 percent.

consular authorities, while the same bales weighed 6, 7, and even 8 *kantars* at the Turkish customs house. These under-declarations provided “foreigners” with an important advantage over the Dutch merchants. If the directors continued to ignore these facts, the Izmir community threatened, not only would Dutch trade with the Levant fall completely into the hands of the foreigners, but the treasury of the DLH would also dwindle to nothing. Ironically, the solution the Dutch nation in Izmir suggested was to free Dutch nationals from declaring their wares under oath. Alternatively, they demanded the adjustment of consular dues so that the nationals would pay 1 percent and foreigners would pay 2 percent, *ad valorem*.<sup>34</sup>

The continuous complaints of the Dutch nation in Izmir convinced the DLH to introduce new measures protecting Dutch merchants from the inroads of the Ottoman merchants. In 1755, the directors wrote to the ambassador in Istanbul that they had deliberated over the demands of the Dutch in Izmir, but decided that they would not take action until the conclusion of the ongoing war with Algiers (1755–57).<sup>35</sup>

Until that time, the DLH tried to appease the Dutch nation in Izmir with some minor adjustments. In 1751, the DLH had already decided to reduce the rate of consular dues on jewels and coins from 1 percent to 0.5 percent at all Levant ports in that period of three years.<sup>36</sup> In 1755, other adjustments followed. This time, the DLH reduced some marginal goods’ tariff prices for Dutch merchants and ordered the treasurer in Istanbul to adjust the tariff in Istanbul to that of Izmir.<sup>37</sup> However, these small adjustments were not sufficient to satisfy the Dutch merchants in the Levant. In a letter dated 3 February 1759, the Dutch community of Istanbul complained about the difficulties of collecting consular dues in Istanbul and blamed the DLH for favoring the Dutch community in Izmir above the

<sup>34</sup> RGP 95, 247–249, 18.10.1752. Dutch consul and merchants in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>35</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184, 20.06.1755, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped. On Dutch relations with Ottoman North Africa, see A. H. de Groot, “Ottoman North Africa and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 39 (1985): 131–147.

<sup>36</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/19, 21.09.1751, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped. On the demands of the Dutch nation in Istanbul, the DLH had already exempted jewels and coins, brought to the Levant overland from all consular dues until 1 April 1752. NA 1.02.20, 184–188, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped, 20.6.1749. This time, the DLH reduced the consular dues levied on all jewels and coins, without regard to whether they were transported overland or by ship.

<sup>37</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped, 20.06.1755, NA 1.02.20, 184, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped, 18.03.1755; NA 1.02.20, 168/124–126, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH, 01.08.1755; NA 1.02.20, 184, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped, 07.05.1756 and RGP 95, 339, Consul en Assessors in Smirna to the DLH 1 August 1755.

Istanbul community. Their argument was based on the fact that the rate of the *maintien van den tariff* was 0.1 percent ad valorem in Izmir, but 0.25 percent in Istanbul. Therefore, they demanded the reduction of the rate to the same level as in Izmir. Moreover, the merchants also demanded the suspension of the 3.33 percent *agio*.<sup>38</sup> The DLH responded positively to the request to suspend the *agio* in Istanbul. The directors explained that this *agio* had been introduced to compensate for losses stemming from payment of consular dues in debased coins. During recent years, Dutch authorities in the Levant accepted only pure *zolotas* for consular dues, so that there was no longer any reason to maintain the payment.<sup>39</sup> It is important to note that with this resolution the DLH only suspended the *agio* for Istanbul, while in Izmir the matter was not addressed until the *agio* incited a dispute between the Dutch treasurer in Izmir and French merchants who had loaded their wares in Dutch ships. On 9 July 1762 the DLH wrote to the ambassador in Istanbul that they had decided to suspend the *agio* in Izmir as well, provided that the consular dues there were paid only in *zolotas*.<sup>40</sup> Despite these adjustments, the DLH refused to reduce the rate of the *maintien van den tariff* from 0.25 percent to 0.1 percent in Istanbul.<sup>41</sup>

While the directors were making these piecemeal adjustments, they were also preparing a new tariff for consular dues. The recalculation of this tariff was primarily aimed at providing the Dutch merchants in the Levant with a competitive edge over Ottoman merchants. Until the introduction of the new tariff in 1762, Dutch consular authorities in the Levant essentially calculated consular dues according to a very old tariff that had been prepared in 1675.<sup>42</sup> It is clear, however, that in the ensuing years the tariff had in practice been adjusted considerably. The differentiated assessment of the value of goods according to the nationality of the merchants was itself an innovation that had not been prescribed by the regulations of 1675. This was most likely because the earlier tariff was prepared with an

<sup>38</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/24–26, 03.02.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>39</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184, 20.6.1760, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>40</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184, 9.7.1762, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>41</sup> "dat verders het ¼ percento van de waarde der goederen tot maintain en vindinge der kosten van het Toltarief op 27 Juny 1742 op voorstelling der Nederlandsche natie tot constantinopolen geintroduceert sal blyven stand houden hebben wy naar rype deliberatie gevonden in het gedaane versoeck der Natie ten Eynde het selve ¼ percent op een per mille mogte werden gereduceert, niet te kunnen treden." NA 1.02.20, 184, 20.6.1760, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>42</sup> RGP 95, 417–418, 10.09.1761, the DLH to the SG.



eye to the activities of Dutch merchants alone, without taking into consideration the possibility of the extensive participation of foreigners in Dutch trade with the Levant. Since its introduction in 1675, several adjustments had also been made in the assessing of prices of various goods, which led to some significant contradictions. Therefore, the introduction of the new tariff in 1762 was meant to both update the aged tariff and to remove the discrepancies and contradictions created by a century of small *de facto* adjustments. An anachronism left in the old tariff concerned the assessment price of mohair yarn. According to the old tariff, the consular dues levied on mohair yarn were calculated on the basis of an assessment price of 2 LD per *okka* for “foreigners” and 2 ¼ LD per *okka* for the Dutch. This meant that the Dutch merchants had to pay more consular dues for their mohair yarn exports than did the foreigners! In 1752, under the heavy protests of Dutch merchants in Izmir, the directors reduced the assessment price of mohair yarn for the Dutch merchants to 1 ½ LD.<sup>43</sup> Although we do not have any direct evidence to explain the reason for lower consular dues for foreign merchants’ mohair exports in the old tariff, we may assume that this was introduced at the end of the seventeenth or at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the Dutch textile industry’s appetite for mohair yarn reached its zenith. Growing demand at home may have induced Dutch authorities to provide favorable terms to foreigners to consign their mohair yarn shipments to the Netherlands. If this was the case, it indicates the intrinsic recognition on the part of Dutch authorities of the Ottoman merchants’ control over the trade of this commodity.

It appears that by July 1761 the DLH had prepared a draft version of a new tariff, based mainly on the tariff used in Izmir. The new tariff covered all goods that entered the scope of Dutch trade in all ports of the Levant. It was arranged in alphabetical order<sup>44</sup> and indicated the prices of 385 import (to the Levant) and 136 export items, in two separate columns: one for Dutch nationals and the other for foreigners. Since the old tariff indicated some goods’ assessment prices as higher for Dutch nationals, the directors had decided to undo this “*erreur der penne*” with the new

<sup>43</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/19, 21.09.1751, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>44</sup> The earlier tariffs were arranged according to measurements with which the amount of goods were measured. Moreover, instead of indicating the assessment prices for nationals and foreigners in one tariff, there were two separate tariffs for each. These tariffs differed from each other not only with respect to their assessment prices but also concerning the items they included.

tariff.<sup>45</sup> During their general meeting on 5 August 1761, the directors deliberated on the new tariff and agreed to send it to the SG for approval. Two days later, the tariff was sent to the SG with a letter explaining the need to replace the outdated tariff of 1675 and requesting the approval of the new one. The directors also requested authorization to prepare new tariffs or to make adjustments in the existing tariff whenever they deemed necessary. Although the tariff was ratified by the SG on 27 April 1762, the directors were explicitly deprived of the authority to prepare new tariffs or to make tariff adjustments.<sup>46</sup> Soon after its approval, the DLH sent the new tariff to the Dutch consular authorities in the Levant and ordered them to apply it carefully and to inform the DLH about price fluctuations so that they could arrange the required adjustments.<sup>47</sup>

It is clear that the main purpose of the directors in introducing the new tariff was to provide Dutch merchants with a solid advantage over the foreigners in Dutch trade with the Levant. The directors mentioned this intention in their letter to the burgomasters of Amsterdam on the occasion of the flight of Leone Amiro. In their letter, the directors argued that the Amiro's flight showed that in Dutch trade with the Levant the Dutch should rely exclusively on Dutch merchants. It was to that end, the directors explained, that they had prepared the new tariff they now presented to the SG.<sup>48</sup>

The advantage provided to the Dutch merchants under the new tariff, however, did not succeed in satisfying the Dutch trading communities in the Levant. It is difficult to give an exact figure of the overall advantage the new tariff provided to Dutch merchants, however, it is possible to calculate this figure for individual goods, to give an idea about the overall figure.

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<sup>45</sup> RGP 95, 411–413, 22.07.1761, Vergaderinge Directeuren Amsterdam.

<sup>46</sup> The fact that the changes made in the tariff on 07.07.1766 were approved by the SG suggests that the authority on the issue remained at the SG. RGP 95, 417–418, 10.09.1761, the DLH to the SG. NA 1.02.20, 184, 09.07.1762, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped. NA 1.02.20, 184, 17.07.1762, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped. NA 1.02.20, 184, 22.09.1762, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>47</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184, 22.06.1762, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

<sup>48</sup> RGP 95, 452–453, 26.01.1762, the DLH to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

Table 2. Rate of protection provided by means of differentiated price assessment in the tariff of 1762<sup>49</sup>

Item	Amount	APF	CDF	APD	CDD	ABF (%)
<b>Imports</b>						
Cochineal	per <i>okka</i>	15	0.3	12	0.24	0.4
Dutch woolen cloth	per piece	125	2.5	80	1.6	0.72
English Londrines	per piece	50	1	50	1	0
French Londrines	per piece	100	2	80	1.6	0.4
Secondes						
Londrines Nims	per piece	70	1.4	60	1.2	0.28
Paper, French, ordinary	per bale	12	0.24	10	0.2	0.33
Pistols	per pair	6	0.12	4	0.08	0.66
Powdered sugar	per <i>kantar</i>	18	0.36	15	0.3	0.33
<b>Exports</b>						
Camlets of 56 pikes	per piece	10	0.2	7	0.14	0.6
Camlets of 24 pikes	per piece	4	0.08	2	0.04	1
Cotton	per <i>kantar</i>	8	0.16	6	0.12	0.5
Cotton yarn	per <i>kantar</i>	20	0.4	18	0.36	0.2
Gallnuts	per <i>kantar</i>	10	0.2	8	0.16	0.4
Scammonea	per <i>okka</i>	5	0.1	3	0.06	0.8
Mohair yarn	per <i>okka</i>	2	0.04	1.5	0.03	0.5
Silk, Serbaffy	per <i>batman</i>	40	0.8	33	0.66	0.35
Silk, Ardassina	per <i>batman</i>	25	0.5	22	0.44	0.24
Silk, Ardasse	per <i>batman</i>	20	0.4	18	0.36	0.2
Cash	percent	1		0.25		0.75

APF = Assessment price for foreigners under the tariff.

CDF = Amount of consular dues for foreigners in LDS = 2 percent of APF.

APD = Assessment price for the Dutch under the tariff.

CDD = Amount of consular dues for the Dutch in LDS = 2 percent of APD.

ABF = Additional burden for foreigners.  $AB = [(CDF - CDD) \cdot 100] \div APF$ .

The last column of table 2 indicates the additional burden rate that the higher price assessment lent the goods belonging to foreign merchants. It is important to note that we have calculated this rate based on a "hypothetical real price," that is, the assessment price indicated in the tariff for the foreigners. It is apparent that the rate calculated in the last column would decrease when the real price of the goods increased above the

<sup>49</sup> RGP 95, 418–448. On 7 July 1766, the SG reduced the assessment price of some goods; this did not account to a considerable change in general. See *ibid*.

assessment price for foreigners, and the rate would increase when the real price decreased below the same assessment price. When we take into consideration that such tariffs were in general likely to indicate assessment prices as lower than their real prices, we can conclude that the real protection provided by the differentiated price assessment of the tariff of 1762 was less than the figure indicated in the table. As we can see from the table, even when we consider the assessment prices for foreigners as real prices, the advantage provided to Dutch merchants by differentiated price assessments in the tariff of 1762 was not considerable. We should also mention that most goods indicated in the tariff were assessed equally for the Dutch and foreigners. As we can see from the table, the goods that amounted to the greatest portion of Dutch trade with the Levant were assessed at higher prices for the foreigners.

So the question arises: what does this table suggest, beyond the fact that the advantage Dutch merchants gained through the new tariff was not as much as one might expect? For instance, are the differences between the rates of dues for different goods suggestive? On the one hand, perhaps it is possible to consider the relatively high rate of the additional burden on Dutch woolen cloth as an indication of the confidence (on the part of the directors) about the Dutch merchants' control over the trade of this item. On the other hand, it is possible that the relatively low rate of the additional burden on different kinds of silks could be recognition, in this case, of the control of "foreigners" over these goods. In other words, could it be that the directors kept the rate low for silk because its trade was extensively controlled by Armenian merchants, and the directors were afraid of losing the transport of these goods, or the good itself, to other trade partners of the Ottoman Empire? It is difficult to speculate on these questions based on the available data. However, we should keep these possibilities in mind, at least as restraints that might have shaped the approach of the directors.

Whatever the directors' intentions, the introduction of differentiated price assessments had far more ramifications than just protecting Dutch merchants from competition from Ottoman merchants. This practice meant that the Dutch became the only European nation in the Levant that used consular dues not only as a source of revenue to finance consular establishments, but also to implement trade policy. For the English and the French, consular dues were exclusively a means of providing revenues for their consular authorities in the Levant and the relevant institutions at home. Therefore, the English Levant Company preferred to adjust the rates of consular dues according to fluctuations in the volume

of trade. For example, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, this rate was similar to that of the Dutch: 2 percent for all imported and exported goods and 1 percent for coins. In the early 1710s, these fees were doubled and rose as high as 10 percent in 1747 and 1761, then decreased to 7 percent in 1775. Since these increases proved insufficient to cover consular expenses, additional dues were introduced on goods arriving at Levant ports. After the end of the War of Austrian Succession (20 November 1748, Aix-la-Chapelle treaty) these levies tended to decrease, but they began to increase again when the Seven Years' War (1756–63) commenced. The dues charged in London followed a similar pattern. There is no doubt that wars and naval conflicts in the Mediterranean and Europe determined fluctuations in trade volume as well as the rates of dues levied on English Levant trade.<sup>50</sup> However, for the Dutch, consular dues had a dual function; on the one hand they were a source of revenue for the relevant institutions, and on the other they were a tool for maintaining a discriminatory trade policy against the Ottoman merchants. Therefore the Dutch strove to keep the rates of these levies as stable as possible, trying to accumulate revenue when trade boomed so that they would have enough to cover expenses when the volume of trade declined.

Despite the introduction of the new tariff, dissatisfaction on the part of the Dutch merchants and authorities in the Levant about the activities of the Ottoman merchants grew steadily during the 1760s. The Dutch merchants alleged even more frequently that Ottoman merchants committed fraudulence and evaded the consular dues by declaring their goods as much less than their actual amount. As we have already seen, this accusation was by no means new. As early as 1747, the Dutch nation in Izmir had related the same allegations to the DLH and argued that fraudulence was concentrated especially in the trade of mohair yarn and cotton.<sup>51</sup> Two years later, the treasurer of the Dutch community in Izmir alleged that Ottoman merchants declared only half of their wares, thus paying correspondingly low consular dues.<sup>52</sup>

For the Dutch nation in Izmir the problem was urgent. They were outraged by the fact that Dutch merchants were bound to declare their goods

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<sup>50</sup> Wood, *History*, 208–209; Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 47–48; Ülker, “Rise of Izmir,” 205–206.

<sup>51</sup> NA 01.03.01 52, 19.12.1747, the DLH to the consul, treasurer, and assessors in Smirna.

<sup>52</sup> NA 01.03.01 138, 16.01.1749, A. van den Sanden to the DLH. The same allegations were repeated by the entire Dutch community in Izmir in 1752 as well. RGP 95, 247–248, 18.10.1752, Dutch consul and merchants in Izmir to the DLH.

properly under oath while the foreign merchants were not bound to oath and were thus free to declare their wares as less than their real amount. To solve the problem, the Dutch community in Izmir advised the DLH to install an inspector in the customs house of Izmir to weigh the goods loaded and unloaded from Dutch ships. According to them, it was not realistic to expect the treasurer to inspect the cargoes of the Dutch ships properly, since the treasurer was fully occupied by his job. Therefore, the community insisted on the appointment of a separate person, whose yearly salary would amount to LD 600.<sup>53</sup> The directors appear to have been reluctant to comply with the request because of this extra expense, and wrote instead to the treasurers in Izmir and Istanbul, telling them to keep close tabs on the cargoes of Dutch ships by visiting the customs house intermittently.<sup>54</sup>

The Dutch community in Izmir did not give up easily. To convince the DLH of the extent of the fraudulence committed by Ottoman merchants, they caught one merchant who had declared some boxes of fruits in the ship of captain Daniel de Vos; these turned out to be boxes of scammony.<sup>55</sup> This incident seems to have convinced the directors to finally take action on the allegations of widespread fraudulence. The directors requested more detailed information about the allegations, such as the areas of goods in which the fraudulence was concentrated.<sup>56</sup> Abraham van den Bogaerd, the treasurer of the Dutch consulate in Izmir, responded with an extensive letter explaining the Ottoman merchants' growing share in Dutch trade with the Levant, repeating the allegations, and suggesting that fraudulence could be prevented only by installing an inspector in the customs house of Izmir. Regarding the Ottoman merchants' growing share in Dutch trade with Izmir, the treasurer provided data on Dutch shipping during the previous six months. According to the data, within six months 21 incoming and outgoing ship manifests revealed that the Dutch merchants' imports (to Izmir) amounted to LD 181,913 and their exports to LD 74,525, while the imports of foreigners amounted to LD 214,407, with foreign exports at LD 155,347. These figures meant that the foreigners' trade volume exceeded that of the Dutch by LD 113,316. The treasurer also pointed out that this was the difference according to the official records,

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<sup>53</sup> RGP 95, 233–234, 16.12.1750, Dutch nation in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>54</sup> RGP 95, 236, 25.08.1751, extraordinary meeting of the DLH; NA 1.02.20, 184/19, 21.09.1751, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped. Also in RGP 95, 236, 21.09.1751.

<sup>55</sup> RGP 95, 247–248, 18.10.1752, Dutch consul and merchants in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>56</sup> NA 1.02.20, 184/26, 17.4.1753, the DLH to Elbert de Hochepped.

so the volume of the trade of the foreigners had to be increased by 25, 30 or as much as 40 percent to account for their fraudulence in declaring goods. Therefore, the appointment of an inspector to the customs house of Izmir would also be very profitable for the treasury of the DLH.<sup>57</sup>

Despite Van den Bogaerd's letter and his urging of the appointment of an inspector to the customs house of Izmir, the directors did not take any action until 1765. Meanwhile, the disquiet within the Dutch community of Izmir was growing. In 1763, when new assessors were appointed, the allegations of fraudulence were again brought to the agenda. This time, one of the newly-appointed assessors, namely Pieter van Sanen, refused to take the oath prescribed by the regulations for the assessors. He argued that if he took the oath he would not be able to remain loyal to it, since the oath included a promise that he would ensure that consular dues were paid properly. According to Van Sanen, due to the well-known fraudulence on the part of the Ottoman merchants, it would be impossible for him to fulfil this promise. Nevertheless, the Dutch consul in Izmir was able to convince Van Sanen to swear the oath on the condition that the consul would report Van Sanen's objections to the directors.<sup>58</sup> The long-sought resolution finally came on 30 October 1765. With this resolution, the directors appointed Dirk Knipping as inspector to the customs house of Izmir for the trial period of one year. The directors discovered at the end of that period that the appointment of the inspector was fruitful and they decided to maintain the inspector post permanently.<sup>59</sup>

The appointment of an inspector to the customs house of Izmir would not seem, at first glance, to be a discriminatory measure against the Ottoman merchants. But when we take into consideration that the Dutch nation in Izmir, prior to the resolution of the DLH, had gone to great lengths to secure the appointment to curb perceived fraudulence on the part of the Ottoman merchants, it becomes clear that the inspector's job was to concern himself primarily with the activities of the Ottoman merchants. This was also revealed by the correspondence between the DLH and the Dutch diplomatic representatives in Izmir and Istanbul. The

<sup>57</sup> RGP 95, 275–276, 15.06.1754, Abraham van den Bogaerd to the DLH.

<sup>58</sup> RGP 95, 480, 17.02.1763, Notulen Weegens Installeeren Der Assessooren.

<sup>59</sup> Nanninga, "De Nederlandsche," 129–132. It is clear that the appointment of the inspector did not bring a definitive end to the fraudulence. In 1775, some Greek merchants were suspected of loading 40 bales of mohair yarn in a Dutch ship at night after its captain had submitted its cargo list under oath to the Dutch consul in Izmir (RGP 115, 203–204, 18.04.1775, C. G. N. Schutz to the DLH; RGP 115, 207–208, 04.07.1775, the DLH to D. J. de Hochepped).



appointment should therefore be considered a precaution intended to implement consular dues that favored Dutch merchants more effectively. In this sense, it reflects the Dutch authorities' growing sensitivity to the activities of the Ottoman merchants. Once such considerations attained this central role in shaping Dutch policies, it is not surprising that similar measures were taken in subsequent years.

The next step toward implementing a more exclusive trade policy in favor of Dutch merchants was taken in 1769, when the Dutch SG forbade business associations between Ottoman merchants and Dutch merchants.<sup>60</sup> This step was taken to prevent Ottoman merchants from avoiding the differentiated price assessment by associating themselves with either Dutch merchants or with Ottoman merchants who had attained citizenship in Amsterdam. This aspect of the prohibition on business associations becomes especially clear when we consider the SG's resolution in context. In their 1766 letter to the DLH, the Dutch community of Izmir expressed unease about the rumors regarding a business association between Maglas di Carabeth in Izmir and a certain Beaune in Amsterdam. From the cargo list of a Dutch ship that had arrived in Izmir from Amsterdam the nation learned that some goods were consigned to the address of Maglas di Carabeth & Beaune. As it was rumored that Beaune too, was to move to Izmir, the nation feared that he would claim Dutch protection for himself and his partner on his arrival. The nation clarified that if Beaune were to claim Dutch protection only for himself, there was no reason to refuse it. But if he were to claim it for the association, his demand should be refused because Maglas di Carabeth was not a Dutch national.<sup>61</sup> Soon afterward, the Dutch consul in Izmir explained to the ambassador the dangers of associations between locals and Dutch merchants and informed him that De Vogel's association with the Greek Panaiotis had been the only example of such associations. The consul feared that if the number of such associations increased, no distinction would remain between nationals and foreigners.<sup>62</sup> In September 1766, the Dutch ambassador at the Porte wrote to the secretary of the Dutch SG on the issue, supporting the view of the Dutch nation of Izmir and demanding approval in advance for the nation's decision to deprive the association of Maglas di Carabeth and Beaune of Dutch protection.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> NA 1.02.22 115/95, 16.01.1769, resolution of the SG.

<sup>61</sup> RGP 115, 44–45, 17.06.1766, consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>62</sup> RGP 115, 45n1, 03.07.1766, D. J. de Hochepped to Van Dedel.

<sup>63</sup> RGP 115, 49, 05.09.1766, Van Dedel to Fagel.

The debate on business partnerships between Dutch merchants and Ottoman merchants was accompanied by another relevant debate, instigated by Christiaan Rodemüller, a Dutchman who had been in the service of an English factor in Izmir. Christiaan Rodemüller applied to the Dutch consulate in Izmir to be considered a Dutch merchant, take the national oath, and pay the consular dues accordingly. The consul declined the request with the rationale that Rodemüller was not an independent merchant, but an employee of an English commercial house.<sup>64</sup> The decision of the consul was approved by the DLH, who clarified that only Dutch nationals who traded under their own names and on their own rights without an association with a foreigner should be allowed to take the national oath and pay the consular dues accordingly.<sup>65</sup>

The problem did not come to an end as easily as the nation of Izmir and the directors wished. Rodemüller, having left the service of the English commercial house, applied again to the consul to take the national oath but decided not to do so when he realized that the Dutch consular authorities in Izmir had added some clauses to the oath. With the additional clauses, Rodemüller was expected to promise that he would not accept commissions from the subjects of the Porte or from other foreigners. The directors advised the Dutch consul not to deprive Rodemüller of Dutch protection under the pretext that he refused to swear the additional clauses, because the original oath had been approved by the Dutch SG, while the additional clauses had not. More importantly, the DLH wrote that it was not the right moment to request the approval of the additional clauses from the SG because, when the DLH had recently requested that Antonio Zingrilara be deprived of Dutch protection, a number of merchants had advised the SG that such decisions might favor Dutch merchants in Izmir, but did not help the general interests of Dutch trade with the Levant.<sup>66</sup> These merchants, led by Uberveld & Tak, argued that the Dutch merchants in Amsterdam preferred to consign their textiles to Ottoman merchants rather than Dutch merchants because the former brought lower expenses into account for consigning the returns.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>64</sup> RGP 115, 44–45, 17.06.1766, consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>65</sup> RGP 115, 53, 14.11.1766, meeting of the Dutch consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir; RGP 115, 60, 24.03.1767, the DLH to consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir.

<sup>66</sup> RGP 115, 85–86 and 86n1, 22.03.1768, the DLH to D. J. de Hochepped.

<sup>67</sup> RGP 115, 112–113, 20.09.1768, the DLH to consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir; 22.09.1766, the DLH to the SG.

These remarkable arguments seem to have kept the directors from applying to the SG for the approval of the additional clauses of the oath. In September 1768, however, the conjuncture of two events gave the DLH the opportunity to take action. First, the Armenian Massé di Carabeth & Sons in Izmir went bankrupt, and second, a number of foreign ships chartered by Ottoman merchants departed at one time from Izmir to Amsterdam. The first incident caused considerable losses to Dutch merchants and the second development posed an immediate threat to the interests of Dutch shipping in the Levant. These incidents once more provoked the wrath of Dutch merchants and authorities against the activities of the Ottoman merchants, and encouraged the DLH to apply to the SG for the approval of the additional clauses to the national oath.<sup>68</sup> The SG did approve the request of the directors on 16 January 1769 to ban associations between Dutch merchants and foreigners, and to forbid Dutch merchants from accepting commissions from foreigners.<sup>69</sup>

All these precautions had some effect as long as Ottoman merchants were obliged to load their goods on Dutch vessels, because in the Levant the Dutch authorities' jurisdiction encompassed only Dutch nationals, Dutch protégés (in part), and ships carrying the Dutch flag. Thus, Ottoman merchants could easily avoid Dutch consular dues with their differentiated price assessments and the prosecution of the Dutch inspector at the customs house simply by chartering foreign ships to consign their goods to Amsterdam. Ottoman merchants' use of foreign ships between Izmir and Amsterdam to bypass the newly-introduced discriminatory Dutch regulations seems to have been a post-1762 innovation. In 1766, four years after the introduction of the new tariff, the Dutch community of Izmir informed the DLH that the "foreigners" had loaded an English ship that was about to depart for Amsterdam. The community expressed their fear that if the directors did not take action, more merchants would take recourse in the practice.<sup>70</sup> According to the nation, the solution was to exempt all merchandise transported on Dutch vessels to and from the Levant from all taxes that were collected in the Netherlands. The solution was based on the logic that the Dutch ships should be favored over foreign ships, and that the import of Levantine goods to the Netherlands had to be stimulated because the import of cotton to England had already been

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> NA 1.02.22, 115/95, 16.01.1769, resolution of the SG.

<sup>70</sup> RGP 115, 44–45, 17.07.1766, consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

freed from taxes. More importantly, Prussia, having established its own Levant Company, had introduced new taxes on Levantine goods transported through their territories to other places in Germany. This new duty meant that merchants preferred to consign their goods to Germany, not through the Netherlands, but over Leghorn, where the dues were now lower.<sup>71</sup>

Once the Ottoman merchants discovered that they could avoid Dutch consular dues by using foreign ships, they began to use this alternative more frequently. In 1768, the Dutch nation in Izmir was furious when they discovered that Ottoman merchants, mainly the Greeks, had chartered four foreign ships to load their goods to Amsterdam. The nation wrote to the DLH of the English and French cases and explained that in comparable situations these nations levied an extra duty of 20 percent on goods arriving on foreign vessels to their ports. The nation demanded the introduction of comparable precautions to prevent the ruin of both Dutch shipping and Dutch merchants in the Levant.<sup>72</sup> Alarmed by the information they received from Izmir, the directors informed the SG about the developments and requested the introduction of a duty of 2 percent in Amsterdam on goods transported to and from the Levant on foreign ships. This levy was meant to compensate for the consular dues that the foreign merchants avoided paying by loading their goods on foreign ships, and therefore it was to be calculated on the basis of the tariff used in the Levant.<sup>73</sup>

The news also alarmed the directors of Levantine trade in Rotterdam, who applied to the burgomasters of the city. The Rotterdam board favored much stronger precautions and demanded the introduction of a 20 percent *ad valorem* duty on all goods arriving in the Netherlands from the Levant or departing from the Netherlands to the Levant on foreign ships. In addition, they argued that foreign ships should be subjected to the payment of 5 percent of their freightage, as this was also levied on Dutch ships.<sup>74</sup> The idea of providing Dutch shipping with the Levant with a more substantial advantage over foreign ships also found supporters among the directors in Amsterdam. The DLH wrote in September 1768 to the burgo-

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<sup>71</sup> RGP 115, 46–47, 19.08.1766, consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>72</sup> RGP 115, 93–96, 15.04.1768, consul, treasurer, and assessors in Izmir to the DLH.

<sup>73</sup> RGP 115, 103–105, 23.06.1768, the DLH to the SG.

<sup>74</sup> RGP 115, 107, 15.07.1768, the directors in Rotterdam to the burgomasters of Rotterdam.

masters of Amsterdam that they would prefer the introduction of a duty of 20 percent if this was not in contradiction with any of the agreements between the Dutch Republic and foreign nations.<sup>75</sup> However, the DLH later abandoned this request and returned to the idea of a duty of 2 percent in Amsterdam to compensate for the consular dues in the Levant. The DLH was also in favor of introducing an additional tax on foreign ships, amounting to 5 percent of their freightage.<sup>76</sup> The SG readily accepted the DLH's request and introduced these taxes with its resolution on 13 January 1769.<sup>77</sup>

The directors in Rotterdam were not satisfied with the remedy, however. They were especially frustrated by the fact that the directors in Amsterdam had chosen to advise the SG to introduce a duty of 2 percent, despite having agreed with the boards of Rotterdam and Hoorn that they would petition the SG for the introduction of a duty of 20 percent. The directors in Rotterdam argued that a duty of 2 percent was too low to promote the use of Dutch ships for voyages between the Levant and the Netherlands.<sup>78</sup> The directors of Levant trade of the various cities settled their differences on the issue during a meeting on 27 September 1769, in which they decided on an extra duty of 5 percent on all goods arriving from the Levant to the Netherlands on foreign ships.<sup>79</sup> As some rumors indicated that the Greek merchants in Izmir had chartered a Venetian ship for a voyage to Amsterdam,<sup>80</sup> the directors acted promptly to bring their request to the attention of the SG. The SG, in turn, readily approved the request in May 1770 and introduced the extra duty of 5 percent on all goods arriving from the Levant to the Netherlands on foreign ships.<sup>81</sup>

The extraordinarily quick action of the DLH and the Rotterdam directors, as well as the prompt resolutions of the SG, reveal that these institutions were much more sensitive to the interests of Dutch shipping in the Levant than to the interests of the Dutch merchants in Izmir. For the Dutch merchants in Izmir it took years or even decades to convince the

<sup>75</sup> RGP 115, 110–11, 06.09.1768, the DLH to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

<sup>76</sup> RGP 115, 118–120, 17.11.1768, the DLH to Pensionaris van Berckel.

<sup>77</sup> RGP 115, 125–127, 19.01.1769, the directors in Rotterdam to the burgomasters of Rotterdam.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> RGP 115, 136–137, 27.09.1769, extraordinary meeting of the directors in Amsterdam with outside members.

<sup>80</sup> RGP 115, 140, 03.04.1770, D. J. de Hochepeid to the DLH.

<sup>81</sup> NA 1.02.22, 113/32, 1.04.1776, resolution of the SG.

home authorities to introduce precautionary measures to protect them from competing Ottoman merchants, as we saw with the introduction of the new tariff and the appointment of the inspector to the customs house of Izmir. A single threat endangering the interests of Dutch shipping in the Levant seems to have been enough, however, to trigger a series of initiatives and decisions culminating in the introduction of new taxes to remedy the situation. This difference shows that a larger and more powerful group of actors were more concerned with the interests of Dutch shipping in the Levant than with the interests of Dutch merchants in Izmir. After considerable complaints and endeavors, the Dutch nation in Izmir was able to secure only minor protections of its interests, while Dutch shipping in the Levant was provided with a generous 5 percent duty soon after a danger to it emerged.

The additional tax prevented the Ottoman merchants from using foreign ships only for a while. Five years later, in February 1775, the treasurer of the Dutch consulate in Izmir announced (furiously) that the Greek merchants had (again) chartered a French ship for a voyage to Amsterdam.<sup>82</sup> Soon afterward, two chartered English ships were on their way to Amsterdam.<sup>83</sup> It was clear that within five years, the additional tax of 5 percent had lost its power to dissuade them, due to the increased prices of the main Levantine goods—cotton and mohair yarn. The additional tax was being calculated on the basis of the tariff of 1762 while real prices had increased considerably in the ensuing years. The tariff indicated the price of cotton—which constituted two-thirds of the cargoes—as LD 8 per *kantar*, while the purchase price had risen to about LD 37 in Izmir. Under these circumstances, a 5 percent duty amounted to a much smaller percentage in relation to the real prices. Therefore the DLH decided that the situation merited an increase in the tariff price of cotton from LD 8 per *kantar* to LD 24, and that of mohair yarn from LD 2 per *okka* to LD 6, so that the extra duty would dissuade the Ottoman merchants from using foreign vessels. After deliberating with the directors in Rotterdam, the DLH submitted their request to the SG, demanding an immediate resolution so that the foreign ships that were then on their way to Amsterdam could

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<sup>82</sup> RGP 115, 199, 15.02.1775, C. G. N. Schutz to the DLH; RGP 115, 207, 04.07.1775, the DLH to D. J. de Hochepped.

<sup>83</sup> RGP 115, 217, 22.11.1775, C. G. N. Schutz to the DLH; RGP 115, 220–221, 1775, Rotterdam merchants to the directors in Rotterdam.

be taxed accordingly.<sup>84</sup> The SG responded immediately and approved the adjustments in the tariff of 1762 on 1 April 1776.<sup>85</sup>

This adjustment seems to have proved sufficient, since in the available records the Dutch merchants and authorities in the Levant cease to complain about foreign ships chartered by Greek merchants, with the exception of two English ships, one of which departed from Egypt loaded with rice in 1777,<sup>86</sup> and the other from Izmir loaded with cotton in 1787.<sup>87</sup> In both instances, the DLH assured the Dutch authorities in the Levant that the extra duty would be implemented vigorously on these ships. Nevertheless, the last incident provoked the merchants and shipowners in Dordrecht and Schiedam to press for a total ban on voyages by foreign ships between the Levant and the Netherlands.<sup>88</sup> This request was refused, however, by the DLH, which considered these voyages to be isolated instances that therefore did not require additional precautions.<sup>89</sup>

Although the extra duty on foreign ships had saved Dutch shipping in the Levant from the competition of foreign ships, it constituted a setback for Dutch trade with the Levant, especially during wars that paralyzed Dutch shipping in the region. On such occasions, merchants demanded and always received a temporary suspension of the tax so that they could continue their trade using neutral ships. This was the case during the Anglo-Dutch war from 1780 to 1784,<sup>90</sup> during the Napoleonic wars from 1795 to 1814,<sup>91</sup> and in 1794, for some individual ships due to the Dutch conflict with Algeria.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>84</sup> RGP 115, 220–227, 1775, Rotterdam merchants to the directors in Rotterdam; 24.01.1776, meeting DLH; 31.01.1776, meeting of the DLH; 06.03.1776, meeting of the DLH; 13.03.1776, the DLH to the directors in Rotterdam; 19.03.1776, the DLH to C. G. N. Schutz; 29.03.1776, the DLH to the SG.

<sup>85</sup> NA 1.02.22, 113/32, 1.04.1776, resolution of the SG.

<sup>86</sup> RGP 115, 243–244 and 243n2, 23.09.1777, the DLH to N. van Maseyk and the DLH to Panchaud.

<sup>87</sup> RGP 115, 396, 22.06.1787, the DLH to D. J. de Hochepeid.

<sup>88</sup> RGP 115, 396–399, 07.07.1787, the directors in Rotterdam to the DLH.

<sup>89</sup> RGP 115, 400–401, 12.07.1787, the DLH to the directors in Rotterdam.

<sup>90</sup> RGP 115, 324–326 and n1, 7.09.1781, Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchants to the SG; RGP 115, 364–365 and n1, 15.07.1784, the DLH to the directors in Rotterdam; RGP 115, 379–380 and n1, 23.12.1785, the DLH to the SG.

<sup>91</sup> RGP 115, 551 and n2, 23.05.1795, the DLH to Joost van Poot, Director in Leiden; RGP 120, 813–815, 27.06.1814, B. Ortt to A. W. C. van Nagel and 11.07.1814, royal decree. Although the extra duty was re-introduced in 1802 after the peace of Amiens, it was suspended again soon afterward. See RGP 115, 663–664 and 664n1, 03.11.1802, extraordinary meeting of the DLH with the outside members; RGP 115, 694, 17.09.1803, Jac. de Hochepeid to the DLH.

<sup>92</sup> RGP 115, 537–537 and 537n1, 10.01.1794, the DLH to the SG.



After the preparation of the tariff of 1762, the appointment of an inspector to the customs house in Izmir, the adoption of a stricter definition of national merchants, and the introduction of the extra duty on foreign ships, Dutch protectionism in the Levant attained its ultimate form and become more or less watertight. The only practice that could undermine this protectionism was name-lending. Name-lending was a well-known phenomenon in the Levant, used previously in the context of trade with nations that excluded foreigners from their trade with the Levant. The English Levant Company's repeated orders forbidding the consignment of outsiders' goods under the names of English factors imply that the English factors in the Levant did indeed lend their names to outsiders, especially to Armenian merchants, at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Company levied a fine of 20 percent ad valorem on goods passed under the names of factors when it was discovered that they belonged to outsiders.<sup>93</sup>

In the eighteenth-century Levant, name-lending was not practiced exclusively to undermine monopoly regulations. Ottoman taxes too were continuously undermined by means of the practice. According to the Ottoman regulations, Ottoman merchants had to pay 5 percent customs dues for their imports and exports, while the European merchants paid 3 percent as spelled out in their capitulations. Therefore Ottoman merchants preferred to pass their goods under foreign names to avoid the higher rate. A few entries in the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri* show that the Ottoman customs officials were aware of the practice and on some occasions attempted to tax goods belonging, in name, to Dutch merchants in accordance with the regulations concerning Ottoman subjects. On such occasions, the Ottoman tax collectors claimed openly that the goods belonged, not to Dutch, but to Ottoman merchants.<sup>94</sup>

After the introduction of the tariff of 1762 and the measures that followed, savvy merchants began to undermine the Dutch taxes on Levant trade through name-lending. For example, in 1764, we see Thomas de Vogel in Amsterdam bringing a 0.5 percent extra commission into account for the consignments of the Ottoman merchants in return for passing their goods under his own name.<sup>95</sup> It is quite understandable that not much evidence on such practices has survived to date. Despite this lack of

<sup>93</sup> Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance*, 88.

<sup>94</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 218/863, evâhir-i Z.Hicce 1130/14–23.11.1718; 224/890, evâhir-i Muharrem 1133/21.11–01.12.1720; 268/1087, evâil-i R.Âhîr 1147/31.08–09.09.1734.

<sup>95</sup> GA 332, 39/32, 24.07.1764, Thomas de Vogel to T. de Vogel Junior.

evidence, however, we can assume that name-lending was a widespread practice among Ottoman merchants and Dutch merchants alike to avoid both Dutch consular dues and Ottoman customs dues.

Despite this, the DLH seem to have been shocked when the Greek merchant Manuel K. di Panaiotis in Izmir informed them that his Dutch ex-business partner, Jacob de Vogel, had been passing the goods of the Ottoman merchants through customs under his (De Vogel's) name.<sup>96</sup> De Vogel himself admitted that he did accept commissions from Ottoman merchants and argued that this was not prohibited by any of the regulations. A meeting on the issue in Izmir revealed that many Dutch merchants in Izmir shared De Vogel's view, while the others argued that consignments from other cities like Bursa and Ankara could be accepted on commission, but that current regulations prohibited accepting commissions from foreign merchants in Izmir. The Dutch treasurer in Izmir, who apparently sympathized with De Vogel, argued that the practice was not detrimental to the treasury of the DLH since the Dutch merchants had to declare their goods properly under oath. It is clear that the treasurer was trying to save De Vogel—whom he described as an honest man—from the anger of the DLH, but he nevertheless highlights some risks that went hand in hand with the practice of name-lending. He explained to the directors that the practice undermined mainly the Grand Signior's customs dues, which were lower for European merchants. The treasurer expressed his fear that if the Ottoman authorities discovered that the Dutch were defrauding them of their customs dues, this would have disastrous consequences.<sup>97</sup>

The directors were not convinced by the arguments of De Vogel and the explanations of the treasurer. They argued that De Vogel was distorting the national oath and that the SG had introduced explicit clauses into the oath prohibiting passing foreigners' commissions through customs under Dutch names. Nevertheless, after taking into consideration the doubts of the merchants in Izmir, the DLH decided to petition the SG for a clarification of the relevant clauses.<sup>98</sup> At the insistence of the DLH, a second meeting was arranged in Izmir, where De Vogel was heard by the Dutch consul, treasurer, and assessors there. During the meeting, De Vogel argued again that the adjustment made in the national oath in 1769

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<sup>96</sup> RGP 115, 200–201, 21.03.1775, the DLH to C. G. N. Schutz.

<sup>97</sup> RGP 115, 204–205, 18.05.1775, C. G. N. Schutz to the DLH.

<sup>98</sup> RGP 115, 200–201, 19.09.1775, the DLH to D. J. de Hochepeid.

was meant to prevent associations between Dutch and foreign merchants, and that accepting commissions from local merchants was a widespread phenomenon which had been practiced, not clandestinely, but openly by other Dutch merchants as well. The meeting's deliberations showed that there were indeed differing views on the meaning of the adjustment made in the national oath in 1769.<sup>99</sup>

However, the directors were determined to stop the practice of name-lending and addressed the issue again to the SG. In their letter, the directors outlined the dangers of accepting commissions from the Ottoman merchants to pass them under Dutch names to evade Ottoman customs regulations, which had the potential to provoke a heavy *avania*.<sup>100</sup> The SG responded to the directors by officially forbidding name-lending on 3 April 1776,<sup>101</sup> and later clarified that the prohibition was not intended to prevent the Dutch merchants in Izmir from accepting commissions from Ottoman merchants in inland towns, but to prevent the evasion of Dutch consular dues and Ottoman customs dues by passing the goods of foreigners through customs under Dutch names.<sup>102</sup> Despite all this and the explicit resolution of the SG, it seems that Dutch merchants continued to load the goods of Ottoman subjects under their own names. Sometimes they paid the Dutch consular dues properly according to the regulations concerning "foreigners" but evaded the Ottoman customs dues by paying 3 percent instead of the ordinary 5 percent. The Dutch consul in Izmir was afraid that this practice would lead to a national *avania* and advised the SG to rule that if such practices indeed provoked an *avania*, only those who lent their names should be liable to the payment of it, not the entire national community.<sup>103</sup> This was approved by the SG with the support of the directors and the burgomasters of Amsterdam.<sup>104</sup> Meanwhile, the Dutch merchants who lent their names to subjects of the sultan in Izmir were warned by the consular authorities that they would be individually accountable for the consequences.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>99</sup> RGP 115, 218–219, 18.12.1775, meeting of the consul, treasurer, and the assessors in Izmir.

<sup>100</sup> RGP 115, 227–228, 29.03.1776, the DLH to the SG.

<sup>101</sup> NA 1.02.22 115/122–125, 03.04.1776, resolution of the SG.

<sup>102</sup> NA 1.02.22 115/126–127, 14.10.1776, resolution of the SG.

<sup>103</sup> RGP 115, 240–242, 9.08.1777, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>104</sup> RGP 115, 244 and n3, 01.09.1777, extraordinary meeting of the DLH with the outside members; RGP 115, 260–263 and 263n1, August 1778, the DLH to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

<sup>105</sup> RGP 115, 254, 14.04.1778, extract from the registers of the chancery of the Dutch consulate in Izmir.

Despite the extensive emphasis on Ottoman customs dues, it is clear that name-lending as practiced among Dutch and Ottoman merchants was also aimed at avoiding Dutch consular dues and other levies, which in the course of the eighteenth century, increasingly discriminated against Ottoman merchants. The new measures introduced in the eighteenth century were part of the "protective" trend in Dutch trade policies pursued in the Levant in the latter part of the eighteenth century. In this respect, the Dutch constituted an exception among the three major European trade partners of the Ottomans. In the course of the same century, the English and French moved away from monopoly regulations, toward more liberal trade policies.<sup>106</sup>

This exceptionality was mainly the result of the comparatively liberal Dutch trade policies pursued in the Levant up until the middle of the eighteenth century. These liberal trade policies left Dutch merchants vulnerable to competition from Ottoman merchants and consequently led to their demands for exclusionary trade. Although the DLH seemed initially to be an advocate of free trade, as seen in its response to the controversies in 1762,<sup>107</sup> we have seen that they later supported precautionary measures to curb the activities of the Ottoman merchants in Dutch Levant trade.

Despite these developments and the noisy opposition of the Dutch merchants to their Ottoman competitors, we do find in the records individual Dutch advocates of free trade, especially at the end of the eighteenth century. This line of sentiment was especially pronounced in the 1790s, after the Dutch nation in Izmir initiated a new campaign to convince the authorities to monopolize Dutch trade with the Levant.<sup>108</sup> The request of the nation of Izmir was heavily criticized by the DLH, who argued that such a monopoly would not limit only the trade of the Greeks but also the freedom of trade of Dutch citizens. The DLH also explained that if Ottoman merchants were banned from Dutch trade with the Levant, they could easily relocate their activities elsewhere. More importantly, the directors pointed out that recent imperial orders that Ottoman merchants had obtained from the Porte showed that the merchants were in a

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<sup>106</sup> On the French case, see Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul: From Imperial to Peripheralized Capital," in *The Ottoman City between East and West*, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (Cambridge, 1999), 192–194. On the English case, see Wood, *History*, 151–160; Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 55–57, 136–138, 152–157; Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 112–114.

<sup>107</sup> RGP 95, 472–474, 28.10.1762, the directors to the burgomasters of Amsterdam.

<sup>108</sup> RGP 115, 564–569, 01.10.1796, merchants in Izmir to the national meeting.

position to manipulate the Porte in their own favor and against Dutch interests. Considering this extensive influence at the Porte and the fragility of the European establishments in the empire, the directors feared that a monopoly would strike a heavy blow to the Dutch presence in the Levant.<sup>109</sup> In a later letter to the Dutch ambassador to the Porte, Van Marselis, the secretary of the DLH, wrote: "We have to accord the Greeks the freedom of trade like the nationals! . . . The nationals have spoiled the trade with the Levant. We have to ensure that the Greeks will not pass by our country. Exactly the contrary, we should entice them to us."<sup>110</sup> According to Van Marselis, the only exception to this freedom had to be Dutch shipping in the Levant.<sup>111</sup> Van Dedem was by then the Dutch ambassador at the Porte. Unlike Elbert de Hochepped, Van Dedem was in favor of liberal trade policies, and he lent a sympathetic ear to the reflections of the secretary of the DLH.<sup>112</sup> Despite the favorable disposition of the ambassador and the rigorously pro-liberal trade stance of the secretary, the Dutch consul and community in Izmir had their own agenda and continued to hinder the activities of the Ottoman merchants.<sup>113</sup> The arbitrary practices of the Dutch merchants of Izmir were criticized by the DLH in a letter addressed to the ambassador in October 1802. The DLH complained about the behavior of the Dutch nation in Izmir and argued that it would be much better for Dutch trade with the Levant if the community in Izmir could adopt more moderate sentiments toward the Ottoman merchants. According to the directors, under the conditions of the time, the active participation of the Ottoman merchants in Ottoman-Dutch trade was indispensable.<sup>114</sup> The last reflections, expressed on behalf of the DLH as a whole, clearly indicate that the secretary Van Marselis was not the only person at the DLH in favor of free trade. However, the presence of certain individuals and groups favoring free trade in the Levant did not push Dutch trade policies in the Levant in a more liberal direction, but only ensured that the excessive demands of the Dutch in Izmir were countered and that a "faint Dutch protectionism" remained intact as it had been shaped in the 1760s and 1770s.

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<sup>109</sup> RGP 115, 590–592, 26.10.1797, the DLH to the national meeting.

<sup>110</sup> RGP 115, 604–605, 20.03.1798, Van Marselis to Van Dedem.

<sup>111</sup> RGP 115, 610, 19.06.1798, Van Marselis to Van Dedem.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> RGP 115, 661–662, 05.10.1802, Van Marselis to Van Dedem.

<sup>114</sup> RGP 115, 662–663, 19.10.1802, the DLH to Van Dedem.

The investigation of the evolution of Dutch Levant trade policies in the eighteenth century shows that Ottoman merchants could not depend on the cooperation of Dutch authorities while they were expanding their activities to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, despite the insistent endeavors of the Dutch nation in Izmir, the Dutch failed to instate effective measures to protect their merchants from competition with Ottoman merchants. Around the middle of the eighteenth century, the diversity of interest orientations associated with the Dutch Levant trade seems to have been the main reason such measures were not implemented, while at the end of the century, competition with alternative trade centers, such as Leghorn and Hamburg, prevented the development of more exclusive trade policies. Under these circumstances, the Dutch authorities leveraged Dutch consular dues in the Levant as a kind of foreign trade policy tool to enhance the position of Dutch merchants relative to Ottoman merchants. The Ottoman merchants, however, displayed a great deal of flexibility, forcing the Dutch authorities to take additional measures against them, such as effectuating the difference between protégés and nationals, and introducing additional taxes to prevent the Ottoman merchants from using foreign ships for voyages between Amsterdam and the Levant. These measures and the animosity of the Dutch merchants in Izmir toward the Ottoman merchants were sufficient to prevent the Ottoman merchants from becoming fully integrated into the Dutch trading community. It is therefore not surprising that by the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman merchants, by now almost exclusively Greek, rediscovered their "Ottoman-ness," claimed recognition from the Dutch authorities as such, and demanded the same privileges for themselves in the Netherlands that Dutch merchants enjoyed in the dominions of the sultan. Since the ensuing developments were indicative of the Ottoman central administration's changing attitude toward the activities of the Ottoman merchants, we will analyze them in the next chapter of this study.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### OTTOMAN POLITY: FROM DECISION MAKING TO POLICY MAKING

The Ottomans' lack of interest in establishing protectionist policies to promote industry has been attested frequently in the relevant literature. In addition to Mehmet Genç's conceptualizations on the subject,<sup>1</sup> several works on certain Ottoman industries have also confirmed this feature of Ottoman administration.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, it has been argued that the Ottoman state did not offer any support or incentives to its merchant subjects engaged in international trade. For instance, Edhem Eldem argues that especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, non-Muslim Ottoman merchants had become alienated from the Ottoman state due to lack of support for their activities, aligning themselves instead with western merchants and trade interests by obtaining *berats*:

... it seems that the local forces of trade had effectively been neutralized. The choice they appeared to have made was different from the conflictual and antagonistic position they had successfully sustained during the first half of the century. Unable to find the backing they had previously enjoyed in their struggle against outsiders, and realizing that the latter were now in a position to reap the advantages of a growing political leverage vis-à-vis the Porte, they were gradually forced into a collaboration with their former rivals and competitors. By acquiring the status of protégés which granted them a form of extraterritoriality in their own country, or by a self-imposed exile to one of the major European cities willing to accept them—Vienna, Amsterdam, Leghorn—they were in fact expressing their frustration at the loss of effective support from the Ottoman state, and seeking alternative ways of securing a future for their commercial ventures. This gradual “divorce” between the Ottoman state and its would-be bourgeoisie was a rift of a social and economic nature, but it also implied a political shift in allegiances of the utmost importance for the future of the Empire.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 43–67.

<sup>2</sup> See for example Murat Çizakça's works on Bursa silk industry Murat Çizakça, “A Short History of the Bursa Silk Industry (1500–1900),” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 23 (1980): 142–152 and Murat Çizakça, “Price History,” 533–550. Benjamin Braude, “International Competition and Domestic Cloth in the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1650: A Study in Undevelopment,” *Review* 2/3 (Winter 1979): 448–451.

<sup>3</sup> Eldem, “Istanbul,” 194.



In the following section, we will focus on certain developments related to Ottoman-Dutch trade and argue that relations between the Porte and the non-Muslim merchant elite of the empire cannot in fact be described as a linear process of alienation; indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Porte became more likely to lend support to its merchant subjects than it had been during the earlier period. To illustrate this point, I focus on several issues in particular: the implementation of Ottoman taxes with regard to European and Ottoman merchants; Ottoman intervention in the implementation of European (Dutch) consular dues; relations between the Porte and Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam; and the appointment of the first Ottoman consul to the Netherlands.

The rather vague capitulatory articles that exempted European merchants from certain taxes have led some historians to believe that European merchants did not pay any taxes beyond the 3 percent customs dues, whether they purchased their goods at the conventional centers of international trade of the empire or in the interior. Therefore, the argument follows, the European merchants had an automatic advantage over local merchants.<sup>4</sup> These notions seem to prevail despite the presence of some clear evidence suggesting that when the European merchants went to the interior they ceded their capitulatory privileges and became liable to all taxes.<sup>5</sup>

Both of these generalizations are flawed by the fact that they ignore changes and adjustments in both the Ottoman fiscal system and in the privileges accorded each European nation. Together with this dynamism of the Ottoman fiscal system and the capitulatory privileges, the inconsistent character of diverse local taxes—which varied according to time, place, and merchandise—makes such generalizations problematic. In any case, in the light of available evidence, it is possible to suggest that European merchants were subject to all Ottoman taxes except those from which they were exempted by means of specific articles in their capitulations, by orders from the Porte, or by special agreement with local customs officials.

We have already seen that the European merchants in Ankara had to pay the stamp tax (*damga vergisi*) for their mohair yarn exports and that they were exempted from the *çıkar bâcı* by specific articles in their

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Kütükoğlu, "Tanzimat Devrinde," 92.

<sup>5</sup> See Bruce Masters on a letter written by the English consul in Aleppo in 1750. Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance*, 88.

capitulations (English) or by specific orders from the Porte (Dutch). It is clear that the English were the first, in 1675, to insert a clause into their capitulations that exempted them from the tax.<sup>6</sup> Afterward, during the 1680s, other European nations obtained exemptions from the tax by means of imperial orders based on the relevant articles of the English capitulations.<sup>7</sup>

Many other imperial orders recorded in the *düvel-i ecnebiye defterleri* that were issued to solve specific disputes on taxation might seem to support the notion that European traders were exempted from all local taxes. However, the historian needs to be very careful and should not accept these orders at face value, since such orders were as vague as the capitulatory articles and were more likely to produce further disputes than solutions.<sup>8</sup> Either due to lack of information or for other reasons, the Porte seems to have intentionally avoided giving details about local taxes in these orders, although such taxes were nevertheless to be levied on goods purchased or sold by European merchants. In such instances, the Porte indicates that Dutch merchants had to pay local taxes with approximate expressions such as *resm-i gümrük vesâir âdet ve kânun üzere resm-i âdiyyelerin tamamen eda*.<sup>9</sup>

An imperial order issued in 1704 upon the request of—quite interestingly—the Dutch merchants who visited Izmir (*İzmir iskelesine gelip giden Netherlande tüccarı*) is a case in point. After quoting the capitulatory article on taxation, the merchants alleged that the *kahve emîni* (intendant of coffee) had illegally extracted a *resm-i mîrî* of 5 *para* per *okka* of coffee they purchased in Izmir. The Porte, having consulted the Dutch capitulations, condemned the behavior of the *kahve emîni*.<sup>10</sup> It is not surprising that this order was followed by another order, nine months later. This time, upon the request of the Dutch ambassador, the Porte ordered the customs officer not to extract excessive dues from the coffee exported

<sup>6</sup> Mübahat Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisâdî Münâsebetleri* (Ankara, 1974), 1:31.

<sup>7</sup> RGP 34, 279, 330, 3.12.1708, D. J. de Hochepped to the SG.

<sup>8</sup> During the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Porte seemed to issue orders based on the allegations of European ambassadors without consulting either the relevant departments at the Porte or the local officials. After a rather extensive study on the *Felemenk Ahidnâme Defteri* (ED 22/1), my impression is that over time—and particularly by the last decades of the eighteenth century—the Porte had begun to consult relevant departments and officials more frequently before issuing an order. Such orders became increasingly explicit and more informative about the fiscal practices concerning a dispute.

<sup>9</sup> This was the case, for example, with an order issued in 1748 regarding Dutch merchants from Izmir who purchased beeswax in and around Edirne. BOA ED 22/1, 315/1350, evâil-i Şaban 1161/05.08–27.07.1748.

<sup>10</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 162/569, evâhir-i Zilhicce 1115/25.04–05.05.1704.

by Dutch merchants after they paid the 3 percent customs dues and the corresponding *resm-i mîrî*.<sup>11</sup> Two months later, the Porte was obliged to condemn the behavior of the qadi of Izmir, who had allegedly prevented Dutch merchants in the town from exporting coffee from Izmir by arguing that its export was prohibited. Without offering any details, the Porte ordered the qadi to respect the Dutch capitulations and act accordingly.<sup>12</sup> Two months later, a more obscure order on the issue followed. This time the ambassador complained again about the unlawful taxation of the customs official and demanded the situation be redressed. The Porte in its turn ordered the qadi of Izmir to act in accordance with the “earlier” order without indicating whether the *resm-i mîrî* was to be levied or not. Although the order does not explicitly clarify whether this “earlier” order referred to the one that prohibited or the one that enforced the *resm-i mîrî*, it is quite clear that it referred to the latter because it explains that the “earlier” order was based on the capitulations as well as on a report (*i'lâm*) of the *başdefterdâr* (chief finance minister) of the time, who had reported that the Porte should act to prevent some prevalent practices among merchants and local customs officers that were detrimental for the treasury.<sup>13</sup>

Although the last order concerning the dispute did mention some practices on the part of the merchants and the local customs official, it does not give any details about them. Another order issued in 1709 upon the demand of the customs officer, Mustafa, is clearer. It appears that the customs officer complained about the behavior of Dutch merchants who brought merchandise such as cloth, cloves, cinnamon, sugar, tin, lead, and other goods to Istanbul and Izmir, and paid their customs dues according to an informal tariff which indicated the value of these goods as much lower than their real value. Due to the discrepancy between the real value and the nominal tariff value of the goods, the customs dues had decreased to as low as 2 percent, causing considerable loss to the treasury. The customs officer demanded that the situation be redressed, and the Porte in

<sup>11</sup> “...Nederlande tâcirleri alıp vilâyetlerine götürdükleri kahvenin muayyen olan resm-i mîrîsini ve Ahidnâme-i hümayûn mûcibince yüzde üç akçe gümrüğünü verdiklerinden sonra ziyâde gümrük talep olunmayıp...” BOA ED 22/1, 167/591, 27 Ramazan 1116/23.01.1705. Although this order was addressed to the customs officer of Istanbul, there is no doubt that it also concerned Izmir’s customs officers, since they were his subordinates.

<sup>12</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 171/611, 13 Z.Kade 1116/09.03.1705.

<sup>13</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 172/618, evâil-i Safer 1117/25.05–03.06.1705.

turn ordered that the merchants pay 3 percent customs dues, as indicated in their capitulations.<sup>14</sup>

It is clear that the customs officers and the merchants in Izmir used some kind of tariffs among themselves to facilitate their daily transactions. As these tariffs were not issued centrally, local authorities were free to make adjustments in the tariff prices of goods as long as the final levy did not exceed the rate of the customs due that was fixed by the capitulations. In 1734, however, the Dutch were able to obtain the earliest Ottoman tariff that was valid for all Ottoman ports.<sup>15</sup> Thereafter, the tariff prices of most goods gained an official character. In 1759, the Dutch ambassador noted that the Porte had increased the customs due for tobacco exports from Salonica, Durazzo, and other places by 12 aspers per *okka*, supposedly to favor a tobacco factory established in Istanbul by a subject of the Grand Signior. The ambassador reported that this move of the Porte would be most harmful for the Venetians, Neopolitans, and French, who had an important share in that trade.<sup>16</sup>

Another local tax that the Dutch merchants apparently did pay was the *resm-i mîzân* (scale tax) for silk purchases. In 1760, the Dutch merchants who purchased silk from Volos and paid the corresponding customs dues and the *resm-i mîzân* there were forced to pay the dues again when they wanted to load their goods to other ships in Izmir.<sup>17</sup> Upon the request of the Dutch ambassador, the Porte issued an order in June 1760 warning the qadi of Izmir not to levy customs dues and the *resm-i mîzân* on silk purchased by Dutch merchants in Volos if the corresponding taxes had already been paid in Volos. The Porte also ordered the reimbursement of the taxes that had been extracted twice.<sup>18</sup> Another order, issued one year later, reveals that the customs official and the *mîzân emîni* (scale tax collector) in Izmir had not yet paid the money back.<sup>19</sup>

Some three months later, another complaint submitted by the Dutch ambassador produced another imperial order that reveals a different aspect of local taxes. This time, the Dutch ambassador reported to the Porte that the *mîzân emîni* of Izmir wanted to extract the *resm-i mîzân* from Dutch

<sup>14</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 188/697, evâhir-i Z.Hicce 1120, 02–12.03.1709.

<sup>15</sup> The earlier tariffs were arranged for certain ports and were exclusively valid at the specific port for which they were prepared. See Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 179–180 and 292–301.

<sup>16</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/77–79, 18.09.1759, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>17</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/145–148, 04.07.1760, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>18</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 362/1583, evâil-i Z.Kade 1173/15–25.06.1760.

<sup>19</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 372/1619, evâil-i Z.Kâde 1174/04–14.06.1761.

merchants who had imported cochineal to the town.<sup>20</sup> In its order, the Porte clarified that the *resm-i mîzân* for imported cochineal in Izmir was to be paid by local purchasers and not by Dutch sellers.<sup>21</sup> This particular case reveals that the European merchants' exemption from some taxes did not always mean that their goods were not taxed at all. On the contrary, local authorities could still turn to the purchasers of these goods and levy the tax on goods imported by European merchants. Another imperial order, issued two months later, also clarified that the French exemption from the *resm-i mîzân* was granted under the same conditions—that local purchasers of cochineal had to pay the corresponding tax.<sup>22</sup> This later order was instigated again by the Dutch ambassador, who complained that, after the earlier order, the scale tax collector of Izmir had obliged European merchants to store their cochineal in a certain storehouse to prevent them from evading the tax by selling the cochineal clandestinely. In his letter to Dutch authorities, the ambassador admitted that European as well as local traders evaded their fiscal obligations in this way. Allegedly, to procure the last order securing the goods' removal to the merchants' warehouses, the ambassador had assured the *re'is efendi* and the holder of the relevant tax farm (*mültezim*) in Istanbul that he would warn the Dutch merchants in Izmir against such malpractices. The ambassador also noted that the Ottoman authorities were quite insistent on levying the *resm-i mîzân* and the customs dues on the (European) sellers elsewhere in the empire, including Istanbul.<sup>23</sup>

The available data suggest that, in fact, the goods imported by European merchants were in no sense exempt from local weight taxes. On 16 December 1768, the Dutch charge d'affaires wrote to the DLH that local tax collectors had attempted to collect the scale tax (*resm-i kantar*) from European merchants for goods that they imported or exported, despite the fact that local merchants had already paid these taxes—either before they sold the goods to European merchants, or after they purchased the goods from European merchants. The European ambassadors at the Porte decided to make the issue a general cause and agreed that the English minister should take the first initiative since the English capitulations were deemed to be the most advantageous on the issues of taxation.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> RGP 95, 449; NA 1.02.20, 167/292–297, 17.09.1761, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>21</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 373/1622, evâhîr-i Muharrem 1175/21–31.08.176.

<sup>22</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 373/1627, evâhîr-i R.Evvel 1175/19–29.10.1761.

<sup>23</sup> NA 1.02.20, 167/339–341, 17.02.1762, Elbert de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>24</sup> RGP 115, 120, 16.12.1768, De Weiler to the DLH.

Meanwhile, the Dutch charge d'affaires also submitted a petition to the Porte, demanding an order to prevent the *mîrî kantarcıs* (scale tax collectors) in Izmir from extracting the tax (*resm-i kantar*) twice from Dutch merchants. The fairly extensive order of the Porte provides us with insight into the taxation of Europeans in the Ottoman regions, and therefore requires some attention here. In response to the demand of the Dutch charge d'affaires, the Porte consulted the relevant registers, along with the Dutch capitulations. According to these records, there were two weigh houses in the city, the *kantar-ı kebîr* (large scale) and *kantar-ı sağır* (small scale), which were farmed out for a yearly payment (*mal*) of 4,000 piasters. The order explained that upon the arrival of a European ship, the scale tax officials were accustomed to place night guards on board to ensure that all liable goods were weighed by official scales. The order also clarified that according to another regulation, the goods subject to weighing in Izmir could only be sold in the presence of the scale officials. However, as the goods imported by European merchants were already weighed on their arrival, the officials were ordered not to intervene by levying the tax again when the European merchants wanted to sell their goods.<sup>25</sup>

A similar dispute in Aleppo in 1782 reveals that this practice was not limited to Izmir. This time, the *mütesellim* of Aleppo was accused of having fined the Dutch dragoman in the city for transporting a certain amount of coffee from one warehouse to another without weighing it. The order from the Porte clarified that since the relevant customs dues and other taxes had already been paid for the coffee, the Dutch dragoman did not need to weigh it again and therefore the *mütesellim* must reimburse him the fine.<sup>26</sup>

The case of *resm-i mîzân* for cochineal in Izmir reveals that if the European merchants were exempted from certain local taxes this does not mean that the goods they imported or exported from the empire were totally exempt from the taxes in question. An imperial order addressed to the qadi and *voyvoda* of Galata in December 1779 enables us to elaborate more on this point. The order was issued upon the request of the Dutch ambassador, who reported that the intendant of “municipal” taxes of Galata (*iẖtisâb-ı Galata mukâta‘ası emîni*) had demanded *resm-i muhdes* (innovated tax) from the “Dutch merchant” Cardamici<sup>27</sup> for the barrels of

<sup>25</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 404/1751, evâhir-i Şaban 1182/30.12.1768–08.01.1769.

<sup>26</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 437/1898, evâhir-i Muharrem 1196/5–15.01.1782.

<sup>27</sup> Cardamici was a local Greek, apparently under Dutch protection. He had business relations with the De Vogels in Amsterdam.

caviar Cardamici had imported to the capital. The Porte appears to have first consulted the Dutch capitulations and then looked at other relevant regulations, which revealed that Russian traders had faced similar problems when they imported caviar to the capital.<sup>28</sup> In the earlier Russian case, the Porte had issued an order<sup>29</sup> based on an investigation<sup>30</sup> of the relevant regulations of the tax farm. These regulations indicated that the tax farm did have the authority to levy a certain amount<sup>31</sup> of tax on caviar brought to Galata. The Porte explained that suspending the tax would cause a loss to the treasury and levying it on the European merchants would be contrary to the capitulations. Therefore, it was decided that the tax should be extracted from the buyers of these goods just as was practiced by the cotton yarn tax farm (*rişte-i penbe mukâta'ası*). A marginal note on this order indicates that a notification (*ilmühaber kaimesi*) was sent to the relevant finance department (*haremeyn muhâsebesi*) to inform the officials about the order. Thus this particular dispute resulted in a readjustment of the relevant regulations<sup>32</sup> without suspension of the levy.

Although it might seem a complicated practice to levy various taxes when they were sold to local merchants rather than at the customs house, this must have been considered a minor impediment for the tax collectors, except that evasion rates may have been higher. After all, the Ottoman taxation system was rife with such practices, as exemplified by the stamp tax on mohair yarn, which was collected in Izmir and not in Ankara. Likewise, customs dues for goods purchased by European merchants at places around Izmir—including Lesbos, Edremit, Kuşadası, and Chios—were paid in Izmir and not at their origin. Such practices did in fact result in several disputes, especially when the European merchants were obliged to pay the customs dues at the place of origin and the custom officer in Izmir levied the tax again.<sup>33</sup> A kind of receipt of payment, called *edâ tezkîresi*, was used to prevent double taxation in such cases. An

<sup>28</sup> According to the order, the revenues of the *ihtisâb-ı Galata mukâta'ası* had been part of the revenues of *Galata voyvodalıǵı*. The revenues of the *Galata voyvodalıǵı* were reserved for the *waqf* (pious foundation) of the Sultan Ahmed mosque, under the administration of *haremeyn evkafi*. Later, as the order clarifies, the *mukâta'a* was farmed out to certain individuals.

<sup>29</sup> The order concerning the Russian case appears to have been issued on evâhir-i Şevval 1193/31.10–9.11.1779.

<sup>30</sup> *Başdefterdâr* Esseyid Elhac Mustafa appears to have informed the Porte with a report.

<sup>31</sup> Eight aspers on each barrel of caviar weighing nine to ten *kantars*.

<sup>32</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 431/1860, evâil-i Z.Hicce 1193/10–20.12.1779.

<sup>33</sup> See for example BOA ED 22/1, 233/927, evâil-i Ramazan 1136/24.05–02.06.1724.



imperial order issued in 1713 shows that these receipts of payments were also used to prevent evasion. The order was prompted when the ambassador complained to the Porte that the customs official of Izmir had extracted customs dues from European merchants as they transported Persian and Georgian silk to their ships. At a certain point in time it was decided that the 5 percent export due for silk originating from Persia and Georgia was to be paid upon its arrival by those who brought it to Izmir. Having obtained their receipt of payment (*edâ tezkîresi*) these merchants then transferred the document and the silk together to the European purchasers. This regulation was apparently aimed at preventing European merchants from clandestinely loading silk on board before the customs dues were paid.<sup>34</sup> Whatever the intention of this particular regulation, it is clear that it entailed a division of labor between European merchants and the merchants who brought the goods to Izmir from the East. It also reveals again that in many instances the taxes on goods purchased by European merchants for export had already been levied before the goods arrived in Izmir or were purchased by European merchants. This was apparently not always the case, however. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the customs officer of Istanbul attempted to introduce a similar practice for mohair yarn brought to Istanbul from Ankara by European merchants. But the Porte turned down this attempt, ordering the customs officer to register the amount of mohair yarn and its owner upon the arrival, and to collect the tax when it was carried on board.<sup>35</sup>

At this stage it is useful to examine the position of the customs official (*gümrük emîni*) who was situated at the point where the capitulatory privileges of the European nations met other Ottoman fiscal regulations. In letters and reports written by European consuls and ambassadors, we have frequent descriptions of the arbitrary actions and malpractices of Ottoman customs officials. There is no doubt that these accusations were also frequently mentioned in the imperial orders issued upon the complaints by the Europeans. We should keep in mind, however, that many actions taken by customs officials—actions that Europeans thought of as extortion—were, at least sometimes, only routine practices in accordance with Ottoman fiscal regulations. Therefore some of the disputes between Europeans and Ottoman customs officials should be attributed to the fact that customs officials were bound to all Ottoman fiscal regulations, while

<sup>34</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 201/764, 4 R.Evvel 1125/31.03.1713.

<sup>35</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 149/523, evâhir-i R.Evvel 1114/14–24.08.1702.

the Europeans saw the actions of the customs officials exclusively from the perspective of their capitulations, the small portion of Ottoman fiscal regulations that they knew. De Weiler's<sup>36</sup> remarks on the imperial orders Europeans received from the Porte and the behavior of customs officials give us some clues about the problem:

Although the Porte never issues imperial orders which contradict the capitulations directly, the *tefterdar* [sic. *defterdâr*] does give contrary orders to the customs officials who succeed in eluding the imperial orders, because these imperial orders are mostly arranged ambiguously so that they appear to support the capitulations while at the same time they [imperial orders] can be interpreted in favor of the customs officials.<sup>37</sup>

Another tax levied on goods traded by European merchants was the *resm-i bid'at*. In Izmir, this tax also concerned the cotton trade, and was paid by local as well as by Dutch merchants. Most of the invoices sent by Dutch merchants in Izmir to their correspondents in Amsterdam did not indicate the payment of the *bid'at*.<sup>38</sup> However, two invoices sent by Clement & Van Sanen<sup>39</sup> and one sent by Manuel K. di Panaiotis & Co., all addressed to Thomas de Vogel & Zoon in Amsterdam, show that the *resm-i bid'at* constituted one of the components of the purchase price of cotton in Izmir.

In April 1784, the Dutch consul in Izmir was alarmed by the news that Russians and subjects of the Habsburg Empire and Toscana were to be exempted from the *bid'at*; this would leave the Dutch, English, and the French at a disadvantage. To show that the *bid'at* was not a marginal due, the consul listed a number of items with the amount of *bid'at* levied on them. According to the consul, the *bid'at* amounted to LD 7 ¼ per 100 *okkas* of American coffee beans (more than 10 percent of the good's value), LD 12 ½ per 100 *okkas* of mocha, LD ⅓ per *okka* of cochineal exported from Izmir, LD 14 ½ per cargo of mohair yarn (1 to 2 percent of its value), LD ⅓ per *okka* of silk, 30 *paras* per *kantar* of cotton yarn, 15 *paras* per *kantar* of cotton, 3 *paras* per *okka* of wax (about 4 percent of the value), LD ¼ per *kantar* of silk fluff (about 8 to 10 percent of its value). The consul also reflected that this considerable advantage would encourage the Dutch

<sup>36</sup> Dutch charge d'affaires (1768–75) and ambassador (1775–76) at the Porte.

<sup>37</sup> RGP 115, 91, 02.04.1768, De Weiler to the DLH.

<sup>38</sup> On "*bidaatregt*" see Didericus Warnerus Canneman, "De Batavorum Mercatura Levantica," 210.

<sup>39</sup> GA 332, 78/208, 255; 82/38.

protégés to adopt Habsburg or Russian protection.<sup>40</sup> It soon became clear that there was no cause for alarm, as the relevant taxes were still to be levied on inland traders who traded with these merchants.<sup>41</sup>

Indeed, it did not matter whether the *bid'at* was levied on European traders or the inland traders who traded with them, as long as the goods were taxed. Therefore, European nations made arrangements with the *bid'atçı* (the collector of the *bid'at*) to pay an annual lump sum for the *bid'at* of specific goods. In 1738, the French were able to arrange the removal of the *bid'at* tax from coffee they imported to Istanbul through a one-time payment of 2,500 piasters.<sup>42</sup> The European merchants in Izmir made a similar arrangement for their cotton purchases, but ran into trouble when the *bid'atçı*, on an order from the Porte, increased the *bid'at* on cotton from 34  $\frac{1}{3}$  *paras* per bale to 120–126 *paras*, and attempted to impose the new rate on cotton that the European traders had already bought. The dispute led to the sequestration of all cotton in the warehouses of the European merchants in the city.<sup>43</sup> The Dutch, English, and French ambassadors petitioned the Porte immediately and received an imperial order clarifying that the new rate could be imposed only on new purchases, not on cotton that had been purchased before the rate was changed.<sup>44</sup>

There is also some evidence that reveals that European industrial activities in Ottoman dominions were taxed at the same rate as those of the local producers. As early as the first half of the eighteenth century, a French entrepreneur established a spinning wheel for silk thread in Coronea (Peloponnese) that was subjected to local fiscal regulations.<sup>45</sup> In 1710, Paul Maashoek, a Dutch merchant residing in Acre (Palestine), sent ships to Damiette and Rashid in order to sell soap that he had produced in his own factory in Acre. As the local customs officials levied excessive taxes on his soap, he demanded that he should instead be taxed at the same rate as the local soap producers.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>40</sup> RGP 115, 360–361, 17.04.1784, D. J. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>41</sup> RGP 115, 370, 10.12.1784, Kroll to Fagel.

<sup>42</sup> Eldem, "Istanbul," 190–191.

<sup>43</sup> RGP 115, 505–508, 30.10.1792, 05.12.1792, merchants in Izmir to D. J. de Hochepped.

<sup>44</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 478/2132, evâsıt-ı C.Evvel 1207/24.12.1792–03.01.1793; BOA CH, 2133, evâsıt-ı Safer 1207/ 27.09–07.10.1792.

<sup>45</sup> Kütükoğlu, "Tanzimat Devrinde," 105.

<sup>46</sup> On this particular case, and on Paul Maashoek in general, see İsmail Hakkı Kadı and Jan Schmidt, "Paul Maashoek: Dutch Merchant and Adventurer in Palestine (1669–1711)," *Eurasian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2005): 1–17.

It is clear that both local taxes and the European nations' liability to them changed over the course of the eighteenth century. The late 1720s, especially, witnessed various fiscal innovations that were not welcomed by the Europeans. In the beginning of 1728 the Porte introduced a due of 3 *paras* per *okka* of wax; this affected mainly the French and Venetians, as they had the most interest in the wax trade. This innovation provoked the protest of the French, Venetian, English, and Dutch ambassadors in Istanbul, but the Porte did not make any concessions.<sup>47</sup> At the end of 1728, the Porte introduced another tax on all cloth imports, amounting to a few *stuivers* per pike.<sup>48</sup> Two other taxes, one of 4 *stuivers* per *okka* of silk and another on cotton, followed.<sup>49</sup> The Porte again used the strategy of collecting these taxes, not from European merchants, but from the inland traders who purchased imported cloth. The Dutch ambassador wrote that regardless of who paid the tax, it was the European cloth that was thereby burdened. In earlier comparable instances, the Porte had employed the same strategy: first it collected taxes from local merchants, then it later levied them on Europeans upon the arrival of the goods. This time again, all European ambassadors joined together to oppose the imposition and sent their dragomans to the Porte to arrange an audience with the grand vizier.<sup>50</sup> When the English ambassador was able to bring the issue to the attention of the grand vizier, the latter responded that he would suspend the tax if the European ambassadors could testify that it was contrary to the capitulations.<sup>51</sup>

The Dutch ambassador readily called all these new taxes "impositions and *avantias*," although, as he told his French colleague and the home authorities, he knew very well that they were not contrary to the capitulations since they were collected from inland traders. According to the Dutch ambassador, the tax introduced on wax could be considered to be contrary to the capitulations, since the relevant regulations obliged the inland traders to sell their wax in the presence of tax collectors or to notify tax collectors of their sales and pay the corresponding tax immediately. Therefore, he agreed, along with the other ambassadors, to a wax boycott,

<sup>47</sup> RGP 95, 13n4, 02.04.1728, Calkoen to Fagel. For a more detailed account on the developments regarding the new taxes during 1720s see Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 146–148.

<sup>48</sup> RGP 95, 13–16, 18.09.1728, 14.10.1728, Calkoen to Fagel.

<sup>49</sup> RGP 95, 16–18 and 16n1, 11.12.1728, 14.10.1728, 17.02.1729, Calkoen to Fagel.

<sup>50</sup> RGP 95, 13–16, 18.09.1728, 14.10.1728, Calkoen to Fagel.

<sup>51</sup> RGP 95, 16–18 and 16 n1, 11.12.1728, 14.10.1728, 17.02.1729, Calkoen to Fagel.

while he reported to the home authorities that the Dutch did not have any interest in the commodity and that he did not expect that the boycott would have any effect since local demand for the product was immense.<sup>52</sup>

The Patrona Halil rebellion (1730), which ushered in a new government, suspended all new taxes on cloth, wax, cotton, yarn, and silk, thus bringing a prompt end to the complaints of the Dutch ambassador. But the ambassador predicted that similar taxes might be re-introduced, and he therefore informed the home authorities that it was advisable to obtain an imperial order or a new capitulatory article clarifying that no new taxes could be introduced on goods imported from or exported to the “Christenrijk.”<sup>53</sup> The ambassador’s predictions came true in 1734, when a new tax of two aspers per *okka* of cotton yarn was introduced in İskenderun.<sup>54</sup>

With regard to tax exemptions for the Europeans, it was the particular taxes explicitly mentioned in one or another *ahidnâme* that were not levied on European merchants. One example of these is the *kassâbiye*, which is indicative of the impact of the dynamism of the Ottoman fiscal system on the comparative fiscal burdens of local merchants and European merchants. As it was considered an innovation (*bid’at*), European merchants were exempted from the *kassâbiye* by specific articles in their capitulations. However, one should nevertheless be cautious before concluding that the goods traded by the Europeans were in no way subject to the tax, since it might be the case that it was levied on the inland traders anyway. Bruce Masters notes that in Aleppo local merchants were subject to the *müzâyaka*—as the *kassâbiye* was called there—while European merchants were exempted from it.<sup>55</sup>

Within the context of the impact of fiscal innovations and adjustments in the capitulations on the comparative positions of local and European merchants, the *masdâriye* also merits some attention. In 1754, the Dutch ambassador reported to the DLH that he had obtained a very favorable order for Aleppo, an order similar to the one exempting the French from the *masdâriye*. What De Hocchepied had in fact obtained was nothing

<sup>52</sup> RGP 95, 17–18, 17.02.1729, Calkoen to Fagel.

<sup>53</sup> RGP 95, 29, 14.11.1730, Calkoen to the SG.

<sup>54</sup> RGP 95, 29n4, 21.12.1734, D. A. de Hocchepied to the SG; RGP 95, 63, 31.01.1735, Van Liebergen to the DLH.

<sup>55</sup> Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance*, 138. This is also confirmed by an imperial order that condemned the *muhasıl* of Aleppo, who demanded taxes such as *kassâbiye*, *reft*, *bâc*, and *yasakkulu* from Dutch merchants when they brought silk from Persia, Indian commodities from Basra, and coffee and other commodities from their home countries. BOA ED 22/1, 250/1007, evâil-i Z.Kade 1143/08–18.05.1731.

more than a prohibition on levying customs dues twice on Dutch merchants in Aleppo.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, to make the insignificance of his own "victory" less disappointing, he noted that De Villeneuve had spent 40,000 to 50,000 piasters to obtain that exemption.<sup>57</sup> This in fact reveals the extraordinary nature of the French achievement in convincing the Porte to exempt French merchants from the *masdâriye*. We must remember that this achievement was the result of a very successful French mediation between the Porte and the Habsburgs, a mediation that secured Belgrade for the Ottoman Empire.<sup>58</sup> The exemption from the *masdâriye* was such an extraordinary privilege that each European nation had to wait for a special occasion to obtain it. For the Russians, this opportunity came after the Turco-Russian war of 1768–74, which proved to be ruinous for the Ottoman Empire. The Russians secured the exemption only after the ensuing conflicts were settled with the convention of Aynalıkavak in 1779.<sup>59</sup> The English were able to secure the exemption on 21 May 1784 because of their assistance and mediation in the aftermath of Crimea's occupation by Russians.<sup>60</sup> As the Dutch did not have such leverage, they only obtained the exemption with the assistance of the Russian ambassador, in 1819.<sup>61</sup>

For the Ottomans the extraordinary choice to exempt individual European nations from the *masdâriye* probably lay more in the fact that the *masdâriye* opened up local taxes to capitulatory bargains than in the importance of the tax as a source of revenue. For the Europeans, it is clear that the impact of this exemption on the comparative competitive position

<sup>56</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 332/1433, evâil-i Safer 1167/28.11–7.12.1753.

<sup>57</sup> NA 1.02.20, 168/55–56, 02.01.1754, Elbert de Hoche to the DLH. About one month later, Haanwinckel, De Hoche's secret business associate and the Dutch consul in Aleppo, noted that the order exempted the Dutch from *cassatie* (probably *kassâbiye*) and the *paşalık*, which amounted to about 2.5 percent of the value of goods. According to Haanwinckel, the English were placed at an advantage relative to the Dutch and the French, as they had been exempted from these taxes. RGP 95, 269–271, 26.01.1754, Haanwinckel to the DLH.

<sup>58</sup> On this mission, see Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717–1740* (London, 1966).

<sup>59</sup> RGP 115, 269, 4.05.1779, Van Haaften to the DLH.

<sup>60</sup> RGP 115, 361–362, 25.05.1784, Kroll to Fagel.

<sup>61</sup> RGP 120, 978–981, 10.05.1819, 25.05.1819, Gaspard Testa to the DLH and RGP 120, 1000–1001, 7.10.1819, the DLH to Gaspard Testa. After the Russians obtained the right to navigate in the Black Sea in 1774, they helped minor European powers obtain the same right to make use of those nations' merchant marines in the Black Sea, where Russian shipping was not widespread during the period. See Kemal Beydilli, "Karadeniz'in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve 'Mîrî Ticâret' Teşebbüsü," *Belleten* 55, no. 214 (Aralık 1991): 687–755.

of each nation was the most important issue.<sup>62</sup> The tax itself amounted to a nominal 1.5 percent of the value of a limited number of goods, and half of it was collected from the inland traders anyway.<sup>63</sup> More important is the fact that the tax was limited to the capital and did not concern Izmir.<sup>64</sup> As the Ottoman merchants who traded with the Netherlands were based mainly in Izmir, not in Istanbul, this development must have had little impact on their position with regard to their Dutch competitors.

If the exemption of French merchants from the *masdârîye* did not mark a crucial point regarding the activities of the Ottoman merchants, it did with regard to the interpretation of the Dutch capitulations. We have already seen that by means of a specific article in their capitulations, the Dutch enjoyed all privileges accorded to their English and French counterparts. After 1740, however, the repeated Dutch demands regarding exemption from the *masdârîye*, which they based on the same article, were universally refused by the Porte. Judging from the implementation of Dutch capitulations before that date, one gets the impression that differences between the capitulations accorded to different European nations did not matter as much in the eyes of the Porte before 1740 as they did afterward.

In these earlier decades of the century, the European powers had little leverage on the Porte and, consequently, fewer avenues to oppose the Porte's decisions. A general boycott of trade was readily pronounced but not easily implemented. Leaving aside the question of whether or not such a boycott would have any effect on the Porte, it would seem that discord between the ambassadors was more likely than an agreement on such a boycott. It is also clear that in the course of the eighteenth century, the changing balance of power between the Porte and the European powers was accompanied by a shift in the tactics and demands of the European nations toward imperialist intervention in the sovereignty of the Porte. The extravagance of these demands is excellently illustrated by the response by Van Dedem (Dutch ambassador at the Porte, 1785–1808) to his countrymen in 1792. Unable to satisfy them with tax exemptions,

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<sup>62</sup> RGP 95, 130–131, 12.06.1740, Calkoen to the DLH; RGP 95, 140, 31.10.1740, Calkoen to Fagel.

<sup>63</sup> On *masdârîye*, see Canneman, "De Batavorum Mercatura Levantica," 213 and Bosscha-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 144–146 based on RGP 34, 357–361, 1.05.1714, Jacobus Colyer to the SG.

<sup>64</sup> Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz*, 1:119. This point is also confirmed by several letters written by Dutch authorities in the Levant. See RGP 34, 359, 1.05.1714, Jacobus Colyer to the SG; RGP 120, 925, 10.05.1817, Gaspard Testa to the DLH.



Van Dedem wrote that he could not do anything about the Porte's decision to increase the rate of *bid'at*, since it had the right to impose taxes upon its subjects, like every sovereign ruler.<sup>65</sup>

For students of eighteenth-century Ottoman economic history and Ottoman-European economic relations, it may seem that the European merchants enjoyed a considerable fiscal advantage over Ottoman merchants engaged in international trade. The fact that the European merchants paid 3 percent customs dues while the Ottoman merchants, officially, at least, paid 5 percent seems to prove this fiscal advantage. It is important to explain that any European fiscal advantage did not go much beyond this nominal 2 percent, since local taxes were levied on the goods of European merchants as well. The examination of Ottoman fiscal practices in relation to European mercantile activities in the empire reveals clearly that the Ottoman authorities were likely to levy local taxes on European merchants directly and also to undermine the Europeans' apparent tax exemption by levying the same tax on their inland trade partners. Certain taxes, such as the *bâc-ı ihrâc*, constituted marginal exceptions to the rule and were explicitly mentioned in the capitulations. The capitulations did not constitute an obstacle for the Porte in its pursuance of these tactics in taxation, as the new taxes introduced in 1728 revealed. The grand vizier, however, promised to suspend the new taxes if the European ambassadors could testify that they were contrary to the capitulations.

So far we have seen that the implementation of Ottoman taxes did not favor European merchants as much as it would at first appear from the literature. It is now clear that the Ottoman administration levied most domestic taxes on goods traded by European merchants as well, which fact ensured that the Europeans did not enjoy a remarkable advantage over the Ottoman merchants. This is not to say that the Porte adopted a policy aimed at supporting the Ottoman merchants in their international trade. The Porte was probably more concerned with its fiscal revenue and, as Mehmet Genç has stated, was not willing to accord the European merchants a more advantageous status than local merchants with regard to domestic trade.<sup>66</sup> Nevertheless, the consequence of this is clear: Ottoman fiscal regulations did not greatly impede the progress of Ottoman merchants when they began to expand their trade beyond the boundaries of the empire.

<sup>65</sup> RGP 115, 508n1, 31.12.1792, Van Dedem to D. J. de Hochepeid.

<sup>66</sup> Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 200.

While the Porte's fiscal policies did not provide European merchants a competitive edge against the Ottoman merchants, they also did not favor the latter. In fact, from the perspective of Ottoman fiscal policies we cannot speak of any Ottoman administrative support for Ottoman merchants' commercial ventures beyond the boundaries of the empire. The earliest signs of an emerging policy favoring the international trade activities of Ottoman merchants were conveyed through other aspects of Ottoman statecraft. We have mentioned several cases in which Ottoman merchants were influential enough to manipulate the Ottoman administration's decisions in their favor through their interpersonal connections at the Porte. In the absence of a clearly defined policy to support Ottoman international trade, these favorable decisions remained incidental, intermittent, and ad hoc; they were easily reversed with, for instance, the interventions of Dutch diplomatic representatives at the Porte. More importantly, these decisions did not concern the general interests of Ottoman international traders, but rather the individual interests of a specific merchant. In the long term, however, the Ottoman merchants' influence at the Porte had the potential to evolve into policies that consistently favored their international ventures.

The Ottoman administration's intervention in the implementation of Dutch consular dues and its appointment of an Ottoman consul to the Netherlands show how the earlier ad hoc decisions of the Porte evolved into consistent policies. The same developments also reveal that the Porte's support for Ottoman merchants cannot be interpreted as individual favors granted from above by an oriental despot, but rather a policy that gathered momentum from below through the Ottoman merchants' influence at the Porte. These developments also serve as examples of free interpretations of capitulatory articles, which also, on occasion, were interpreted in quite different ways. Finally, they reveal the extent to which the capitulatory system was not intended to address the international trade of Ottoman subjects, rather the capitulations were based on a presupposed division of labor between local and European merchants.

We have already explained extensively that, by means of specific articles in the capitulations, the Porte authorized European ambassadors and consuls to levy consular dues on goods imported and exported by ships carrying their flags. According to these articles, the amount of the dues was to be determined by the capitulatory nations, without any intervention from Ottoman authorities. The relevant article of the Dutch capitulations reads as follows:

...and whether they are Dutch or not, the merchants should pay consular dues to the [Dutch] ambassador and consul, for merchandise liable to customs dues which they load on Dutch ships for conveying or bringing from wherever to wherever it may be, in accordance with the regulations of the Dutch States General. No one should interfere.<sup>67</sup>

It is highly probable that when the Porte had formulated this article for the Dutch capitulations, as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, it did not have its own subjects in mind when it stated that all merchants using Dutch ships were liable to Dutch consular dues. While this assumption did reflect the presupposed division of labor between the local and European merchants, it certainly did not reflect the reality of the eighteenth-century Dutch Levant trade. Nevertheless, we see that for the greatest part of the eighteenth century, whenever the Dutch ambassador submitted petitions quoting this particular article and alleging that the Ottoman merchants evaded Dutch consular dues, the Porte ordered that the consular dues had to be paid in accordance with the capitulations.

It seems that the earlier conflicts between Dutch consular authorities and local merchants on consular dues took place at ports on the south-eastern Adriatic and Ionian sea coasts. Such earlier conflicts occurred in the ports and towns of Yanina (Yanya), Sayiadhas/Sagiada (Sayâde), and Durazzo (Draç). In these peripheral areas of the empire, the Dutch vice consuls found it more difficult to implement their consular authority. It was again their local connections that enabled local merchants to counter the authority of the consuls and oblige the latter to take recourse to the Porte's intervention. As early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch ambassador submitted a petition that began with the relevant article of the Dutch capitulations and continued to explain that some local merchants who made use of Dutch vessels in Durazzo, Yanina, and Sayiadhas refused to pay Dutch consular dues by conspiring with local powerful people. It appears that the ambassador had obtained an earlier imperial order commanding the qadis in the region to comply with the capitulations and to ensure that these merchants paid the consular dues properly. This time, the Porte reiterated its previous order and commanded local authorities to dispatch offending merchants to the imperial

<sup>67</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 8/12, "ve tüccâr tâifesi Nederlandelü olsun gayrı her kim olursa olsun Netherlande gemilerine tahmîl edüp getürdükleri ve alıp gittükleri her nereden olursa olsun gümrük alınagelen meta'lardan elçilik ve konsolosluk hakkını Netherlande iştâdi ceneral-leri vaz' ettikleri âdet üzre elçiye ve konsoloslarına vireler kimesne mâni' olmaya." For the similar article in the capitulations of 1612, see De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 238 and 252.

divan if they did not comply.<sup>68</sup> Two more orders, issued in 1705, reveal that the local merchants in the region had still not conceded to the authority of the Dutch vice consul.<sup>69</sup>

In 1715, a quarrel between the Dutch and French consuls in the region was brought to the attention of the Porte by a petition submitted directly by the Dutch consul.<sup>70</sup> The consul explained that because of the absence of dockyards on the coast of Sayiadhas, the Dutch ships used to anchor about fifteen miles from the town, from which point goods were carried by skiff to the shore. Allegedly, the French consul attempted to collect the consular dues of such goods for himself by arguing that according to the French capitulations and certain imperial orders, the consular dues of goods transported with local ships from abroad were to be collected by French consuls.<sup>71</sup> Without clarifying whether the French consul indeed bore such an authority, the Porte condemned his interference with goods carried by Dutch ships.

It seems that this single order was enough to convince the French consul not to interfere with the affairs of Dutch shipping. But local merchants appear much more resistant, as we see that at least two more orders were issued in the following years condemning local merchants for avoiding the payment of Dutch consular dues.<sup>72</sup> In 1745, the Dutch consul in Patras went to Venice for a period of time and left the English consul there in charge of his affairs. The local merchants refused to pay consular dues to this deputy consul, so the Dutch ambassador turned to the Porte again and alleged that according to age-old usages and the Dutch capitulations, goods transported by Dutch ships were liable to Dutch consular dues. As with the earlier cases, the Porte again issued an order commanding merchants to comply with the capitulations.<sup>73</sup>

As the relevant cases reveal, in the course of the eighteenth century it was understood that local traders who transported their goods with European ships paid the corresponding consular dues according to the

<sup>68</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 128/456, evâil-i Şaban 1111/22–31.01.1700. I am indebted to Prof. İdris Bostan for clarifying the Ottoman-Turkish pronunciation of Sayâde.

<sup>69</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 172/616, evâhir-i Muharrem 1117/14–24.05.1705; 174/625, evâil-i C.Âhir 1117/20–30.09.1705.

<sup>70</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 205/790, 8 C.Âhir 1127/11.06.1715.

<sup>71</sup> "... bâ'zı zimmîler kendi gemileriyle harbî vilâyetten alıp getürdükleri metâ'm konso-loluk ve baylaç hakları bize âid olmak üzere ahidnâmemizde mastûr ve yedimizde emrimiz dahî vardır deyu."

<sup>72</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 206/800, 18 R.Evvel 1128/12.03.1716; 214/844, evâil-i Safer 1130/04–14.01.1718.

<sup>73</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 305/1301, evâsıt-ı C.Âhir 1158/10–20.07.1745.

regulations of the nation to which the ship belonged. By the end of the century, however, a petition submitted to the Porte by the Ottoman merchants brought an abrupt end to this clear understanding. Ironically, this occurred in the context of the repeated petitions of the Dutch community in Izmir to the Dutch authorities for the introduction of double consular dues on "foreigners" using Dutch vessels. The acting Dutch consul in Izmir suggested the imposition on foreigners of an additional due of 0.1 percent for the maintenance of the fire engine that was apparently used for the consulate.<sup>74</sup> The sentences written by the consul on 30 November 1796, soon after he learned of the initiatives of the Ottoman merchants, were full of hatred and anger. "Greeks, the greedy Greeks," he wrote, "not having been satisfied with the sufferance of our brave Dutch commercial houses here, they are now seeking to smash their families and the whole establishment into the ground." The consul suggested that the introduction of double consular dues and the additional imposition was now inevitable, because the Greek merchants were lobbying the Porte to revoke consular dues on the subjects of the sultan altogether.<sup>75</sup>

On 30 December 1796, the imperial order that angered De Hochepped so much arrived in Izmir and was read in the presence of the European consuls in the city. The next day the Dutch consul related to the ambassador the succeeding events in a letter full of emotion and accusations against the Greeks. He alleged that soon after the imperial order was read, he objected to it on the basis of the relevant articles in the Dutch capitulations. After the qadi scrutinized the Dutch, as well as the English and the French capitulations, he decided that despite the imperial order, the subjects of the sultan would remain liable to consular dues. The consul rightly predicted that the Greeks would not give up easily and that they might try to obtain new orders from the Porte.<sup>76</sup>

On 29 December, one day before the first order had been read out at the local court, a new petition had been submitted by the Ottoman merchants in Istanbul to the attention of the grand vizier. A careful reading of the petition reveals the amazing details of the strategy adopted by these merchants to win the Porte over to their cause. The petitioners described themselves as poor non-Muslim merchant subjects of Istanbul<sup>77</sup> and

<sup>74</sup> RGP 115, 563, 30.09.1796, the DLH to Jac. de Hochepped.

<sup>75</sup> RGP 115, 571, 30.11.1796, Jac. de Hochepped to the DLH.

<sup>76</sup> RGP 115, 572–573, 31.12.1796, Jac. de Hochepped to Van Dedem.

<sup>77</sup> "... Âsitane-i sa'âdette sâkin ve mütemekkin ehl-i zimmet reaya tüccarı fukarasından olup."

explained that the Dutch, Venetian, and Ragusan consuls now imposed consular dues upon them when they used European (*müiste'men*) ships to transport their goods from Istanbul to European (*frenğıstan*) coasts, from European coasts to Istanbul, and from Izmir, Peloponnesus, and Cyprus to Istanbul. The petitioners suggested that this had never before been the case, and that these consuls had never before brought even the smallest levy upon their goods. Consequently—thanks to the sultan—they had been living in prosperity, until these consuls—contrary to the capitulations and the will of the sultan—started to forcibly extract considerable amounts of goods from them, under the guise of consular dues, when they used European ships to transport their goods from Istanbul to elsewhere and from the provinces of other countries to Istanbul. All these malpractices had led to considerable deterioration of their affairs, and left them in a very miserable state. In conclusion, they demanded from the sultan's mercy an imperial order which, in accordance with the capitulations, would outlaw the impositions of these consuls.<sup>78</sup>

It is clear that the petitioners were quite familiar with the traditionalist orientation of the Porte and therefore did not forget to add a traditional flavor to their petition by claiming, contrary to the truth, that the consular dues had never been levied on them before. More interestingly, they listed the Dutch, Venetian, and Ragusan consuls but avoided mentioning their English, French, Russian, and Austrian counterparts, probably because they knew very well that the leverage of these larger powers could potentially counter their endeavors at the Porte.

On reading this petition, the Porte consulted the relevant capitulations of these nations. Ironically, the article that had been interpreted for so long as confirmation of the Dutch consuls' right to levy consular dues on local merchants was noted on the margin of the petition, together with relevant articles from the capitulations of the other nations. Having taken notice of the petition and the relevant articles, the grand vizier decided that these articles did not explicitly mention that the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the sultan were liable to consular dues. The Porte wrote imperial orders to Izmir, Peloponnesus, and Cyprus condemning the intervention of the European consuls. When the order arrived in Izmir on 1 February 1797, the Dutch consul was again furious and tried to convince the local authorities of its illegality, but to no avail.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>78</sup> BOA CH, 5165, 28 C.Âhir 1211/29.12.1796.

<sup>79</sup> RGP 115, 575, 15.02.1797, Jac. de Hochepped to the DLH.

Either the first order or another one issued between the two orders concerned Danish activities in the region and prohibited Danish consuls from collecting consular dues from Ottoman merchants. Since the Dutch consul in Izmir was at the same time the Danish vice consul, it was again his job to convince the Porte to revoke the order. Apparently, the Porte did pay lip service to Dutch claims, but also advised the Dutch ambassador not to interfere with Danish affairs. When the ambassador requested an imperial order to secure Dutch interests concerning consular dues, he was told to wait until the *beylikçi* had prepared the relevant report to the grand vizier. If the rumors were true, while the ambassador was waiting for the order, the Greek merchants secured the support of the *beylikçi* by paying him 6,000 piasters, and effected the second order revoking the Dutch, Venetian, and Ragusan consular dues. This time, the Dutch ambassador turned to his French colleague for support, as the Dutch Republic, by now the Batavian Republic, had been drawn into the orbit of France after Napoleon's invasion in 1795. The French ambassador was initially not very cooperative and alleged that he was not authorized by his home authorities to intervene, but later agreed to support the Dutch initiative with a memorandum. The memorandum submitted by the French ambassador, however, was returned by the Porte's dragoman because of its excessive language and was accepted only after some improvements were made in this respect. While relating these developments to the home authorities, the Dutch ambassador wrote that the Porte considered the Batavian Republic nothing more than a colony of France.<sup>80</sup>

While the Dutch ambassador was waiting for results concerning the consular dues, he received a very different memorandum from the Porte.<sup>81</sup> The memorandum started with a list of individuals and firms that were described as the Grand Signior's genuine subjects and merchants in Amsterdam. This included the names of the following individuals and firms: Yanni Mavrogordato, Yorgi Pitcipio & Co., Dimitrio Schilizi & Co., Tomasachi & Co., Frères Schilizi & Co., Frères Marcella, and Michail Paterachi. Following these names, the memorandum explained that the Porte had come to learn that its subjects residing in Amsterdam were obliged to pay taxes, impositions, and other contributions toward the expenses of the ongoing wars in Europe against their will, as if they were regular

<sup>80</sup> RGP 115, 576–577, 25.02.1797, 10.03.1797, Van Dedem to the secretary of the commission of foreign affairs.

<sup>81</sup> For an alternative analysis of the developments investigated in the following section, see Van den Boogert, "Ottoman Greeks," 129–147.



Batavian subjects. Having taken notice of this information, the memorandum states, the Porte requested the ambassador to write his home authorities and ensure that the Porte's subjects be exempt from ordinary and extraordinary taxes, just as were the Batavian subjects residing in Ottoman domains. The memorandum also demanded the reimbursement of the taxes that had been collected to date from the Porte's subjects in Amsterdam. If the republic did not comply with this request and did not accord the Porte's subjects all privileges and rights that the Dutch enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte would consider the Batavian subjects in its domains liable to all taxes paid by its own subjects.<sup>82</sup>

The Dutch ambassador had no choice but to accept the memorandum and let the Porte know that he would write to the home authorities on the subject. After having assured the Porte of this, he argued that the claims were ill-founded because the Greeks in Holland were neither travelers nor foreigners, but proper Dutch citizens who had bought this status and taken the oath of citizenship by promising to comply with the laws of the republic. Therefore, the capitulations were not relevant in this case and what the Greeks in Holland had done (petitioning the Ottoman government for intervention) could be considered a crime. The ambassador argued that if a subject of the Batavian Republic left Dutch protection to adopt the Porte's protection, the Porte would likewise consider him its own subject and tax him in accordance with its own regulations.<sup>83</sup>

This initiative on the part of the Greeks of Amsterdam pushed the issue of consular dues to secondary importance for a while. The Dutch commission of foreign affairs asked the DLH their opinion on the memorandum and found the directors ambivalent. They suggested that the question was a legal one, and accordingly limited their analysis to the legal aspect of the issue. They did not agree with Van Dedem's claim that the Greeks of Amsterdam were Dutch citizens, but wondered, to what extent can foreigners (those residing in a country other than their own) be obliged to pay local taxes and contributions? The directors clarified that the information they had gathered in no way allowed them to speak with the same confidence as the ambassador about the Dutch citizenship of the Greek merchants in Amsterdam. They examined two alternative situations for the sake of argument. In the first instance, a foreigner came to Holland

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<sup>82</sup> RGP 115, 582–583, 24.05.1797, Van Dedem to the DLH, 03.05.1797, Porte's memorandum to Van Dedem.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

with his capital, purchased estates, engaged in trade, and revealed his intention to settle there; in the second, a foreigner came temporarily to Holland only to carry out trade. The directors suggested that in the first case one might consider levying taxes at a rate corresponding to the foreigner's belongings, but that in the second case it was illogical to do so and one must take the Porte's argument for reciprocity into account.<sup>84</sup>

In November 1797, while the Dutch authorities were trying to find a solution to the question of the taxation of "foreigners," the Porte sent another memorandum to the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul. The memorandum, signed by Constantin Ypsilanti, the chief dragoman of the divan, answered the reflections of Van Dedem and clarified that the Greek merchants in Holland, especially those mentioned in the memorandum, were in Holland only to do business and had never had the intention to settle there, rather they wished to return home as soon as their business allowed. This was declared by their families and also proved by the fact that their families still resided in Ottoman dominions. They could therefore not be considered residents of the republic, only as the subjects of the empire, not liable to Dutch local taxes<sup>85</sup> or impositions, since Dutch merchants in Ottoman dominions were not liable to Ottoman impositions. The Porte did concede that those who had adopted Dutch citizenship and sworn loyalty to the republic should be considered accordingly and were not included in the Porte's claims.<sup>86</sup> The Porte also reiterated its demand for the restitution of the taxes levied on the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam. The directors could not do much about this demand, since restitution was far beyond their authority; they addressed the question of reimbursement to their government.<sup>87</sup>

Meanwhile, the issue of consular dues still troubled the Dutch consular authorities, especially in Izmir, where Greek merchants refused to pay them. In response, the Dutch ambassador ordered the consul not to unload ships before the loaders paid their dues properly. The Greeks, being informed of this decision, threatened to unload the ships by force, with the help of the local court, and to dispatch the consul to Istanbul

<sup>84</sup> RGP 115, 588–590, 26.10.1797, the DLH to the commission of foreign affairs.

<sup>85</sup> In this context, local taxes are different from the local taxes that we have mentioned within the context of the Ottoman fiscal system. These local taxes were not trade-related, but were municipal taxes and extraordinary impositions to contribute to war expenses.

<sup>86</sup> NA 1.02.20, 889, 13–24.11.1797, Constantin Ypsilanti to Van Dedem.

<sup>87</sup> RGP 115, 603, 20.03.1798, the DLH to Van Dedem.

to be tried and removed from office.<sup>88</sup> The tension grew but the Dutch ambassador could not do anything for six months, by which time the Austrian ambassador took the initiative. By then, the latter was expecting the arrival of some Austrian ships, from which he wanted to collect consular dues.<sup>89</sup>

The imperial order issued on this occasion is sound evidence of the Porte's growing interest in and support for the international mercantile activities of its subjects, even though it finally accorded certain European consuls the right to levy consular dues on Ottoman subjects.<sup>90</sup> Ironically but not surprisingly, the Dutch ambassador based his claim to consular dues on the same article of the Dutch capitulation as the Ottoman merchants. It was up to the Porte to sort out the background of the problem and the relevant imperial orders that had been issued previously. First, the Porte discovered that there had not been any controversy on the issue of consular dues until recently. Therefore, the Porte wondered at the reasons behind the recent controversy and found that during recent years the subjects of the Porte had been consigning and receiving an increasing number of goods from Europe. As the European consuls were used to levy consular dues on European merchants who loaded their goods in ships carrying their respective flags, the consuls demanded the same dues from Ottoman merchants who had shown a desire and interest in trade with Europe. The Porte was also informed that the consuls even attempted to levy excessive taxes (*ziyade akçe talebiyle*) in some places when Ottoman merchants used European ships to import and export goods from Istanbul and Izmir. These developments, reportedly, had resulted in the current controversy between Ottoman merchants and European consuls. The Porte then consulted the relevant capitulations and found that some of them confined the consuls' right to levy consular dues exclusively to European merchants, while other capitulations accorded the right without any restrictions. It had been reported, however, that all European consuls had been levying the dues on Ottoman merchants without respect to the specific articles and restrictions in their own capitulations. The Ottoman merchants were unaware that some capitulations did not grant the right to levy consular dues on non-Europeans, and therefore had been paying what the consuls demanded from them regardless of whether it was

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<sup>88</sup> RGP 115, 596–597, 15.12.1797, Jac. de Hochepped to the DLH; RGP 115, 603–604, 20.03.1798, the DLH to Jac. de Hochepped.

<sup>89</sup> RGP 115, 609–610, 09.06.1798, Van Dedem to the DLH.

<sup>90</sup> BOA ED 22/1, 493/2199, evâhir-i Muharrem 1213/4–14.07.1798.

merited by the capitulations. The Porte clarified that these were the main considerations for two earlier orders it had issued upon the request of the Ottoman merchants. Therefore, these earlier orders were not meant to be a general prohibition on levying consular dues on Ottoman subjects, but rather to prevent those consuls who were forbidden in their capitulations from doing so. As these orders were interpreted as a general prohibition, they only served to increase the general controversy. The issue therefore required clearly-defined regulations, the provision of which was the purpose of this specific order.

The decision was clear; the consuls whose capitulations included direct clauses (*nassan ve delaleten*) according the right to levy dues without reservation, such as the French, English, Austrian, and Dutch, were still authorized to levy consular dues on Ottoman merchants. Conversely, the consuls whose capitulations did not include direct clauses should not demand consular dues from Ottoman merchants. The order further clarified that none of the European consuls were authorized to levy these dues on goods which were consigned from the abode of Islam to the abode of Islam; the dues only applied if merchandise was sent or received from *frengistan* (European countries). The Porte emphasized, however, that even in the latter case, European consuls must levy the due in accordance with the tariffs; it was not acceptable that they levy excessive consular dues on Ottoman merchants.<sup>91</sup>

Soon after the order was issued, the news of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt reached Istanbul. The news was of crucial importance for Ottoman-Dutch relations because the Netherlands had been an ally of France since Napoleon's armies invaded it, and therefore the Porte's diplomatic reprisal for the invasion of Egypt was also directed at the Dutch presence in the empire, though it took some time. On 16 January 1799 the Porte declared war on the Batavian Republic<sup>92</sup> and ordered the confiscation of the *berats* accorded the Dutch consular establishment there. From the beginning of February 1799 on, several *i'lâms* from the qadis of various Ottoman localities were sent to Istanbul. Most of these reports declared that all the *berats* previously accorded to the Dutch were sequestered following the recent order.<sup>93</sup> While Dutch citizens were obliged to adopt the consular

<sup>91</sup> On the Austrian and Ragusan side of the controversy, see Ali İhsan Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayrı-Müslimler: Kapitülasyonlar-Beratlı Tüccarlar Avrupa ve Hayriye Tüccarları (1750-1839)* (Ankara, 1983), 67-68.

<sup>92</sup> RGP 115, 619, 31.01.1799, Jac. de Hochepied to the DLH.

<sup>93</sup> BOA CH, 264, 1140, 1246, 1309, 1666, 1791, 8746.

protection of other nations,<sup>94</sup> Dutch protégés simply received their *cizye kağıdı* (bill of payment of poll tax). The Porte also issued an imperial order to prevent the molestation of these ex-Dutch protégés, who had lost their previous status.<sup>95</sup> In the end of September, the Dutch ambassador had to leave Istanbul for Bucharest; he returned only on 20 January 1802, after the war was over.<sup>96</sup> Given that Dutch merchants were spared from the harsh treatment the French faced, and the Dutch ambassador was allowed to remain in Ottoman territories, we can conclude that the Dutch enjoyed special treatment from the Porte during the crisis.

These developments obscured the effect of the last imperial order on consular dues, as well as the response to it of the parties involved. Although the Dutch ambassador had celebrated the order in his letter to the directors, there was an important adverse element to the success: the Porte had begun to meddle in the manner in which Dutch consular dues were levied, by warning that it would not accept them levying excessive dues on its subjects. This point could be interpreted as contrary to the relevant article of the Dutch capitulations. Moreover, an *i'lâm* received by the Dutch consul in September 1802 from the qadi of Izmir reveals that Ottoman merchants found a new route to continue their struggle against Dutch consular dues.<sup>97</sup> This time, the Ottoman merchants refused to pay the *dragomanie* (*şerbetlik*), which was a minor due reserved for the dragomans of the consulate (it had been a component of the consular dues).<sup>98</sup> The controversy ended in 1804 after the DLH suspended the *dragomanie* altogether.<sup>99</sup>

While the question of consular dues had been more or less settled before the Dutch ambassador went into exile, the controversy over the liability of Ottoman merchants to local taxes and impositions in Amsterdam was not yet solved. In 1802, the Greek merchants<sup>100</sup> in Amsterdam refused to pay municipal taxes, based on the memorandum that Ypsilanti had submitted to the ambassador in November 1797. Meanwhile, the

<sup>94</sup> RGP 115, 619, 31.01.1799, Jac. de Hochepied to the DLH.

<sup>95</sup> BOA CH, 1309, 15 Şevval 1213/22.03.1799.

<sup>96</sup> RGP 115, 628 and 648, 25.09.1799 and 25.01.1802, Van Dedem to the DLH.

<sup>97</sup> NA 1.02.20, 1092/32, 5 C.Evvel 1217/03.09.1802.

<sup>98</sup> For detailed information on the *dragomanie*, see RGP 115, 667–670, 31.12.1802, Jac. de Hochepied to Van Dedem.

<sup>99</sup> RGP 120, 902–903, 30.08.1816, the DLH to J. Goldberg.

<sup>100</sup> The group that was opposed to paying the municipal taxes comprised N. Marcella, G. Picipio, S. Schillizzi, Anton Curtovich, Dem. Schillizzi, Nic. Argenti, W. Paterachie, Steph. d'Isay, and A. Tomasachi.

Dutch ambassador in Istanbul tried to persuade the Porte to accord the Dutch the right of free navigation and trade in the Black Sea, a privilege which had been officially accorded to the Dutch with the capitulations of 1612.<sup>101</sup> In December 1802, the Dutch ambassador received a memorandum from the Porte, whereby the Dutch were granted free passage to the Black Sea to visit Russian ports,<sup>102</sup> but only with several conditions. In return, the Porte expected that the Dutch would grant Ottoman merchants and ships most-favored nation status, so that they could enjoy the most favorable privileges upon their arrival at Dutch ports. Moreover, the Dutch were also expected to accord future Ottoman consuls and other subjects of the Porte in the Netherlands the same privileges that the Porte had accorded to the Dutch consuls and nationals in its dominions. The Porte also expected the Dutch to facilitate and assist with the activities of Ottoman consuls and subjects in the Netherlands.<sup>103</sup>

While this negotiation was going on in Istanbul, the claims of the Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam were brought to the attention of the burgomasters, who concluded that the Greek merchants in the city were liable to local taxes in any case.<sup>104</sup> The burgomasters argued that the conclusions that Greek merchants in Amsterdam had drawn from Ypsilanti's memorandum of November 1797 were totally ungrounded, and the Dutch ambassador gave the corresponding answer to the Porte. The burgomasters could not understand the discrepancy claimed in the memorandum. In his memorandum, Ypsilanti demanded that Greek merchants in Amsterdam who had not become Dutch citizens should enjoy the same privileges that Dutch citizens enjoyed in Ottoman dominions, meaning, they should be exempt from all impositions and be assisted and protected. The burgomasters, however, considered Van Dedem's response—that these merchants were obliged to pay taxes and contributions at an equal rate to the other residents of the Batavian Republic—to be adequate. As the Porte had neither replied to the ambassador nor mentioned the issue again, the burgomasters thought that the Porte had been convinced. Nevertheless, the burgomasters wanted to reflect further on the controversy. Against

<sup>101</sup> See the relevant article of the Dutch capitulations of 1612 in De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 245.

<sup>102</sup> RGP 115, 672, 11.01.1803, Van Dedem to the DLH.

<sup>103</sup> NA 2.01.08, 184, 16.08.1804, the DLH to the secretary of foreign affairs. For the Ottoman side of the deliberations concerning Dutch demands for free passage to the Black Sea, see Beydilli, "Karadeniz'in Kapallığı," 687–755.

<sup>104</sup> RGP 115, 688–692, 19.07.1803, reflections of the burgomasters of Amsterdam to the DLH to François Testa.

Ypsilanti's argument that the Greeks in question had never had the intention to establish themselves in the Netherlands, the burgomasters argued that notwithstanding that their families and friends still lived in Ottoman dominions, these Greeks showed no intention of returning to their fatherland. On the contrary, they had purchased houses where they resided; they married Dutch women; and they had joined the Protestant church. Some of them had been living in Amsterdam for twenty to as many as fifty years, even after having earned their fortunes. Consequently, the burgomasters wondered what other indications were needed to convince the Porte that these Greeks were residents of the republic. The burgomasters agreed with the memorandum of Ypsilanti, that the Greeks who had adopted the citizenship of the republic must be considered as such. Therefore, again the Greeks could not justifiably base their claims on Ypsilanti's memorandum.

In fact, most of the arguments of the burgomasters, that the Greeks of Amsterdam were residents of the city and therefore liable to the local taxes, could also be argued for many Dutchmen who resided in the empire, had married local women, and bought houses. With the exception of Van Dedem, in his initial letter, none of the Dutch authorities explicitly claimed that the Greeks of Amsterdam had simply adopted Dutch citizenship. The burgomasters, instead, chose a rather careful diplomatic rhetoric, suggesting that even if one accepted that these Greeks had not adopted Dutch citizenship explicitly, they had done so implicitly by entering arrangements, such as participating in official meetings, or obtaining Turkish passports for their ships, for which one needed to declare under oath that all the partners of the ship were Dutchmen.

The claims of the Greeks in Amsterdam were not exclusively based on the memorandum, however. On 30 March 1799, upon the suspension of diplomatic relations between the republic and the empire, the Dutch government had made a decision whereby the subjects of the Porte in Amsterdam and their belongings were placed under the "special safeguard of the nation."<sup>105</sup> This decision was a gesture from the republic to the empire that had spared Dutch citizens in Ottoman dominions from the brutal fate of the French after Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. The burgomasters dismissed the 30 March document too, arguing that it was not meant to accord the Greeks privileges above the other residents of the republic. At this point, one realizes immediately the contradictions and

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<sup>105</sup> RGP 115, 621, 30.03.1799, resolution.



weaknesses which characterize the document. It might be the case that it did not accord the Greeks of Amsterdam privileges above the other residents, but it was certainly a recognition of the existence of the sultan's subjects in the republic.

The burgomasters of Amsterdam dispatched their reflections to François Testa, the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul, together with the views of the DLH, who argued that they had plenty of reasons to subject the Greeks of Amsterdam to the local taxes of the republic. According to them, the Greeks of Amsterdam were only nominally subjects of the Porte. Moreover, in contrast to the Ottoman policies, the constitution of the republic did not permit any accordance of special privileges to foreigners. As the English and the French residing in the Netherlands had never had any privileges above the Dutch nationals, the Greeks of Amsterdam could not claim such privileges. As the directors thought that the Porte's insistence was due to misinformation from the Greeks of Amsterdam, they advised Testa to explain matters properly to the Porte so that the Porte would "not be swept away by the nonsense of their reasoning!"<sup>106</sup>

Although the Dutch authorities prepared themselves for a possible demand from the Porte to exempt its subjects from local taxes in Amsterdam, there is no evidence that the Porte brought this issue to the agenda after the diplomatic relations recovered. Nevertheless, one may assume that the Porte was at least informed that the Greek merchants in Amsterdam refused to pay local taxes there. It soon became clear that neither the Porte nor the Greek merchants in Amsterdam had been idle. In May 1804, Callimachi, the new chief dragoman of the Porte, let the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul know that the Porte had decided to appoint Nicolas Marcella, one of the Greek merchants in Amsterdam, as the Ottoman *şehbender* to the Netherlands. The Dutch were still soliciting full freedom of trade in the Black Sea, including the Ottoman ports, and the Dutch charge d'affaires was informed that the new consul would receive the Porte's instructions on Dutch demands concerning the Black Sea, and Ottoman demands concerning their subjects' exemption from local taxes in the Netherlands. The charge d'affaires was also requested to write a letter of recommendation to his home authorities to ensure the recognition of Marcella in that capacity.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>106</sup> RGP 115, 688, 19.07.1803, the DLH to François Testa.

<sup>107</sup> RGP 115, 703, 10.04.1804, François Testa to the DLH.

Soon after Callimachi informed the Dutch charge d'affaires about the appointment, Marcella received the relevant documents from the Porte. These documents comprised his letter of appointment (*fermân*)<sup>108</sup> and his instructions (*buyruldu*).<sup>109</sup> Marcella's instructions were drawn by the Ottoman admiralty and gave an outline of his authority and duties in the capacity of Ottoman consul in the Netherlands, but referred neither to Dutch demands regarding free trade in the Black Sea, nor to Ottoman demands concerning the fiscal exemptions and privileges of Ottoman merchants in the Netherlands. According to his instructions, Marcella was expected to submit his *exequatur* to the Dutch authorities and to lend protection and assistance to Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, visitors, captains, crewmen, and other Ottoman subjects who visited Dutch ports. He was authorized to appoint deputies to different Dutch ports to ensure that the subjects of the sultan who arrived at these places were protected and assisted properly, and that they could enjoy their lawful privileges. Marcella was also expected to inform the Porte about relevant developments in the Netherlands. In return for his service, Marcella was authorized to collect consular dues in accordance with regulations and usages. According to his instructions, Marcella also had the authority to punish non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in the Netherlands when they behaved improperly, but when a Muslim subject committed an improper action, Marcella had to dispatch the person to Ottoman dominions for punishment.

On 13 August 1804, the Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs received a letter from the Ottoman Grand Vizier Kör Yusuf Paşa (grand vizier from 1798 to 1805), officially informing the department about the appointment of the consul. The Ottoman grand vizier pointed out that the Ottoman sultan was favorably disposed toward improving the friendly relations and trade between the two countries, and also underlined the notion that the subjects of the sultan had been showing interest in trading with Europe. According to the grand vizier, the agreements (*ahidnâme*) between the two countries required the appointment of an official to assist the Ottoman merchants, visitors, and other individuals who visited the Netherlands.

<sup>108</sup> Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 6890, evâhir-i Muharrem 1219/1–10 May 1804; Jan Schmidt, *Catalogue of Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden University and other Collections in the Netherlands* (Leiden, 2000), 2:340–341. BOA, Şehbenderlik Defterleri, ½ includes an entry noting that a letter of appointment was accorded to Nicolas Marcella. The entry is not dated but the previous entry bears the date evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1219/21 April–1 May 1804.

<sup>109</sup> Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 6890, Safer 1219/May–June 1804.

Therefore the sultan had decided to appoint his obedient subject Nicolas Marcella in the capacity of *şehbender*. In his letter, the grand vizier requested that the Dutch authorities respect Marcella like the consuls of other nations and treat him as equal to them. The grand vizier also expected the Dutch authorities to hear the petitions of Marcella and to help him to carry out his mission.<sup>110</sup>

There is some evidence that the interpersonal connections of Marcella played an important role in his appointment as the Ottoman *şehbender* to the Netherlands. This point becomes clear when one scrutinizes his career prior to his appointment as consul. Marcella was born on 6 December 1767 in Izmir and lived for a while in Patmos. It seems that Marcella worked as an interpreter and afterward entered the service of Prince Nikolaos Petrou Mavrogenis, who later became Prince of Wallachia (1786–89).<sup>111</sup> It was probably this acquaintance which brought Marcella into contact with the Porte's dragoman circles, which occupied an important place in the Ottoman central administration. Marcella later went to Austria and then moved to Amsterdam. One of his brothers, Petro, was a merchant in Izmir, while another, Stephanos (Etienne), became the intendant of the Prince of Moldavia.<sup>112</sup>

In 1803 Marcella married Susanna d'Isay, the daughter of Stephano d'Isay, one of the most important Greek merchants in Amsterdam, and his Dutch wife Geeretry van Houten. In Amsterdam, Marcella had a business partner in the person of George Tomasachi and traded with his brother

<sup>110</sup> NA 2.01.08, 347, 13.08.1804. An unreadable photo of this letter was published in Çelikol, De Groot, and Slot, *Lale ile başladı*, 214.

<sup>111</sup> Vas. V. Sfiroeras, *I Dragomani tau stolou. O thesmos ke I foris* (Athens, 1965), 123–129. In the *Nederland's Patriciaat* Mavrogenis is spelled as "Marragène" (see Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie. "Marcella," in *Nederland's Patriciaat* (The Hague, 1919), 241) Not all lists of the princes of Wallachia include the name of Nikolaos Petrou Mavrogenis. (See for example Horia C. Matei, et al., *Chronological History of Romania* (Bucharest, 1974), 451–452). During the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, a number of Mavrogenises, including Nikolaos, functioned primarily as chief dragomans of the Ottoman navy: Nikolaos Ioannou Mavrogenis (1744–50, 1756–59), Stefanos Ioannou Mavrogenis (1765), Nikolaos Petrou Mavrogenis (1770–86), Stefanos Dimitriou Mavrogenis (1786–90), and Konstantinos Nikolaou Mavrogenis (1811–16). (Sfiroeras, *I Dragomani tau stolou*, 174). I am indebted to *hocam* Alexander H. de Groot for providing me with Sfiroeras's book and many other precious sources.

<sup>112</sup> "Marcella," *Nederland's Patriciaat*, 241 fn; O. Schutte, *Repertorium der buitenlandse vertegenwoordigers residerende in Nederland 1584–1810* ('s-Gravenhage, 1983), 577. Schutte indicates that Nicolas Marcella also served as the Prince of Wallachia. However, this seems to be a misreading of the information given in *Nederland's Patriciaat*, on which he bases this information.

Petro in Izmir.<sup>113</sup> His partnership with Tomasachi continued up to Marcella's death in 1814.<sup>114</sup> This brief account of Marcella shows that he was very well rooted in the Greek community of Amsterdam and appears to have the required connections at the Porte to effect his appointment as the Ottoman consul in Amsterdam.

The Dutch authorities were caught unprepared, however. The Dutch diplomatic presence in Istanbul, which dated back to 1612, was something usual for them. But an Ottoman *şehbender* in the Netherlands was a novelty which required getting used to. It was again the job of the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul to explain to the home authorities that a *şehbender* was nothing other than a consul general, and that the Porte had already appointed a number of them to Mediterranean ports such as Marseille, Naples, Venice, and Trieste.<sup>115</sup> The directors had some difficulty coming to terms with the fact that the Porte had appointed Marcella without waiting for the decision of the Dutch government on the memorandum presented by the *re'is efendi* in December 1802.<sup>116</sup>

As soon as the Dutch Foreign Affairs Department was informed, they addressed the issue to the DLH and asked the directors' opinion on how to respond to the appointment.<sup>117</sup> The DLH responded with a rather long report on several aspects of the appointment. They clarified that it would not be appropriate to reject the appointment of an Ottoman consul when there were already several consuls of other nations in the republic. However, they pointed out the extensive privileges of Dutch consuls in Ottoman dominions and noted that the Porte might have the same privileges in mind for its own consul. They also summarized the earlier Ottoman demands concerning the privileges of Greek merchants in Amsterdam, as well as the Dutch demands for free trade in the Black Sea. As these issues had not been settled yet, they advised the Foreign Affairs Department to acknowledge Marcella's appointment, but also to make it clear that neither Marcella nor other Greek merchants in Amsterdam were to be exempted from local taxes by this recognition.<sup>118</sup>

In October 1804, the Dutch Foreign Affairs Department made its decision on the issue. Marcella had applied to the Dutch authorities with his

<sup>113</sup> "Marcella," *Nederland's Patriciaat*, 241 fn; Schutte, *Repertorium*, 577.

<sup>114</sup> GA 5075, 19503, 28.02.1816.

<sup>115</sup> RGP 115, 705, 09.06.1804, François Testa to the DLH.

<sup>116</sup> RGP 115, 703n1, 03.07.1804, the DLH to François Testa.

<sup>117</sup> NA 2.01.08, 42/456–457, 23.07.1804, resolution of the department of foreign affairs.

<sup>118</sup> NA 2.01.08, 184, 16.08.1804, the DLH to the secretary of foreign affairs.

documents and requested recognition of his new status. To the surprise of the Dutch authorities, Marcella's documents did not make the least mention of his authority to deliberate on either Ottoman demands for the privileges of Greek merchants in Amsterdam or Dutch demands for free trade in the Black Sea. Therefore, the department decided to recognize Marcella as the Ottoman consul under the condition that he would remain liable to all local ordinary and extraordinary taxes and impositions, as well as to Dutch criminal and civil code.<sup>119</sup>

The conditions of his recognition apparently did not satisfy Marcella. He sent a copy of the decision of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Department to Istanbul, where it shocked Ottoman statesmen. On 15 December, the *re'is efendi* presented the document to the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul and told him satirically how he felt about the Dutch conditions for recognition of the Ottoman consul in light of the privileged position of Dutch consuls in Ottoman dominions. The *re'is efendi* made it clear to the charge d'affaires that since the Dutch had welcomed the Grand Signior's consul in such an offensive manner, the Porte would soon issue an imperial order whereby the Dutch consuls will be declared liable to all taxes levied on Ottoman subjects, including the poll tax (*haraç*). Even worse, the same destiny awaited the charge d'affaires as well! As the charge d'affaires had not received any instructions on the issue and was not prepared for such a confrontation with the *re'is efendi*, he tried to manage the crisis by appealing to kindness, begging the *re'is efendi* not to take recourse to such severe measures until the charge d'affaires received instructions from home authorities. Two weeks later, the charge d'affaires wrote the home authorities again that they would expose themselves to the Porte's reprisals if they did not act promptly.<sup>120</sup>

Meanwhile, upon the Porte's response, on 29 January, Marcella wrote a letter to the Dutch Foreign Affairs Department, informing them that he would not act with consular authority until an agreement was reached. In response, the Foreign Affairs Department addressed the issue to the DLH and asked their advice again.<sup>121</sup> The DLH responded with an extensive report, arguing that it was apparent that the Porte's demands were not based on a mutual agreement, but it was also clear that even the most reasonable arguments would not convince the ministers at the Porte,

<sup>119</sup> NA 2.01.08, 42/656–658, 08.10.1804, resolution of the department of foreign affairs.

<sup>120</sup> RGP 115, 709–710 and n1, 24.12.1804, 10.01.1805, Testa to the DLH.

<sup>121</sup> NA 2.01.08, 43/84, 04.02.1805, resolution of the department of foreign affairs.

because they had already been misled by misinformation about conditions in the Netherlands. Therefore, the DLH suggested approaching the issue from the perspective of Dutch interests in the Levant. For the DLH, it was clear that if the privileges enjoyed by Dutchmen in Ottoman dominions were to be applied reciprocally to Ottoman subjects in Amsterdam, this would have a rapid adverse effect on Dutch navigation. Therefore, the ultimate goal of the Porte to achieve reciprocity must be handled with the same circumspection with which the Dutch treated the *re'is efendi's* threat of reprisal. The DLH went on by delineating the privileges that the Dutch consuls and merchants enjoyed in Ottoman dominions and pointing out that although such extensive privileges were not normal in the republic, there were certain exceptions for diplomats, like the tax exemptions accorded the French commissioners by the provincial administration of Holland. Taking into account the considerable Dutch interest in maintaining their position and privileges in the Levant, the DLH suggested making some concessions, perhaps comparable to the tax exemptions accorded to the French commissioners. These concessional privileges, however, should be based only on Marcella's activities in his consular capacity, as separate from his mercantile activities. If this important distinction were not drawn, the *re'is efendi* might be satisfied but other Greek merchants in Amsterdam would seek similar privileges. The directors also advised the department to inform the charge d'affaires that he must emphasize to the *re'is efendi* that Marcella was being recognized only as a consul. This was because the DLH felt that the Porte also saw a diplomatic character to Marcella's mission in Amsterdam.<sup>122</sup>

The dilemma was apparently too difficult for the department to solve, and it remained idle for some time. Meanwhile, Testa, the Dutch charge d'affaires, wrote from Istanbul that the *re'is efendi* had appointed the dragoman of the divan to speak with him about the issue.<sup>123</sup> The Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs decided to provide Testa with their resolutions concerning the recognition of the Prussian and Portuguese consuls, so that he could use them to explain to the Porte that the conditions attached to Marcella's recognition were the ordinary practice in the Netherlands.<sup>124</sup> Soon afterward, the department received a letter from Marcella in which the latter explained that because Testa had promised a prompt solution

<sup>122</sup> NA 2.01.08 184, 04.04.1805, the DLH to the secretary of foreign affairs.

<sup>123</sup> NA 2.01.08, 43/130, 14.06.1805, resolution of the department of foreign affairs.

<sup>124</sup> NA 2.01.08, 43/195–196, 02.06.1805, resolution of the department of foreign affairs.

to the Porte, Marcella had been ordered to resume his consular authority, without submitting to Dutch demands on controversial issues such as the payment of local taxes. Marcella also related that he had received new notices from the Dutch authorities, demanding new impositions from him. As he had to comply with the orders of the Porte, to avoid such payments until a settlement was reached, he demanded that the department take the necessary precautions to avoid any unpleasant consequences resulting from his refusal to pay the impositions. According to Marcella, when one took into account the privileges enjoyed by Dutch consuls in Ottoman dominions as well as the privileges accorded to the Spanish, French, and Russian consuls in the Netherlands, his demands were not unreasonable. In return, the department wrote to Marcella that they had already sent instructions to the Dutch charge d'affaires in Istanbul to arrange a solution, but that the charge d'affaires had not yet received the audience he had demanded to deliberate on the topic. Therefore, the department had to await an answer from the Porte before making a decision. They also told Marcella that the *raadpensionaaris* (grand pensionary) was already informed about the content of his letter and promised him that they would inform him immediately when news arrived from Istanbul and the *raadpensionaaris* made a decision on the issue.<sup>125</sup>

It is clear that the deliberations and correspondence on the issue continued at least until the end of 1805. But the available data do not allow us to clarify how the issue was finally settled.<sup>126</sup> Neither is this point of crucial importance for the purpose of this study, since it is clear that the Porte was not indifferent to the activities of its merchant subjects in Amsterdam—who had counterparts in several Mediterranean and other European ports after the weakening of French and English monopoly regulations. Thus in the aftermath of the period addressed in this study, Ottoman merchants continued to play an increasingly important role in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe in general and the Netherlands in particular. When the Ottoman government sequestered the belongings of the Greeks during the Greek revolt, the Dutch merchants and textile producers in Amsterdam made a huge claim of LD 1.8 million for the wares they had under the Greek merchants.<sup>127</sup> It seems that the rather harsh precautions

<sup>125</sup> NA 2.01.08, 43/306, 29.06.1805, resolution of the department of foreign affairs.

<sup>126</sup> During the period of the Batavian Republic (Bataafse Republiek 1796–1806) there were frequent and far-reaching reorganizations of the administrative structure of the state; therefore it is not always possible to trace a series of events to their final solution.

<sup>127</sup> RGP 120, 1111, 31.01.1824, Jac. De Hochepleid to the DLH.



which the Ottoman government took during the revolt forced some of these Greek merchants to urgently seek the protection of the Dutch government.<sup>128</sup> Only a couple of them seem to have joined the Dutch Philhellenists' activities, even establishing connections with the cadres of Filiki Eteria.<sup>129</sup> Nevertheless, the transformations that took place during the nineteenth century undoubtedly also brought changes with regard to the role of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants in Ottoman-European economic interactions, the study of which remains outside the scope of this work.

One of the suggestions of this study is that the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* requires interpretation within the context of the developments investigated here. It is not surprising that the *Avrupa tüccarı* program was launched in August 1802<sup>130</sup> in the immediate aftermath of several attempts by Ottoman merchants to escape European consular dues and local taxes in Amsterdam. While they were trying to widen the scope of their "privileges" so that they resembled those of the European merchants, they inevitably came into conflict with the interests of the latter. The Porte, at least by the final decades of the eighteenth century, appeared ready to back the endeavors of its merchant subjects operating abroad, despite being caught legally between their interests and the letter of the capitulations. Under the specific circumstances of the beginning of the nineteenth century, the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* seems to be an innovative solution to this dilemma. Therefore its establishment should be considered the product of a policy which itself emanated from a process of cooperation between the Porte and the Ottoman merchants, rather than the Porte's response to the process of alienation of its subjects which started with the abuse of *berats*.

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<sup>128</sup> Van den Boogert, "Ottoman Greeks," 145–146.

<sup>129</sup> The Filiki Eteria was an organization founded in Odessa in 1814 to struggle for the independence of Greece. Daniel Koster, "Dutch Philhellenism and the Greek Merchants of Amsterdam," *Pharos: Journal of the Netherlands Institute in Athens* 6 (1998): 25–59.

<sup>130</sup> For an evaluation of different dates suggested by various authors for the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı*, see Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayrı-Müslimler*, 62 and note.

## CONCLUSIONS

Scholars have interpreted the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* against the background of the abuse of *berats*, rather than examining it in relation to these merchants' increasing role in the Ottoman Empire's trade with Europe. The former approach needs fundamental revision. I have shown that prior to the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı*, by the end of the eighteenth century, Ottoman international merchants, predominantly Greek, were in fierce competition with their European counterparts and sought the support of the Porte on a number of occasions. In the context of Ottoman-Dutch trade, these merchants first sought to avoid consular dues which Dutch (and other European) consular authorities collected when they loaded their goods onto Dutch (and other European) ships (1796). This initiative was followed by claims by Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam for reciprocal extra-territoriality for themselves under the pretext that they were genuine subjects of the Porte (1797). In November 1802 the Porte announced its intention to appoint an Ottoman consul to the Netherlands, which it did in May 1804.

The fact that these developments followed each other within less than a decade and, more importantly, that they were the product of the Ottoman merchants' own initiatives argues for analyzing the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* against the background of the rise of the Ottoman merchants to economic prominence, their growing role in Ottoman-European trade, and the Porte's increasing concern to support their enterprise. The apparent interrelationship between these developments and the actions of the Porte—increasingly in their favor—is also noticeable in the recurrent rhetoric employed by the Porte in documents studied in this book.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I have excerpted the following sentences as examples of this recurrent rhetoric. The first sentence is from the imperial order that exempted the Ottoman merchants from consular dues. "... bir müddetten berü Devlet-i aliyem tüccân refte refte Frengistân'da olan şerikleri ma'rifetleriyle Memâlik-i Devlet-i aliyem ve Bilâd-ı sâireye ve Memâlik-i İslâmiye'den Efreñç memâlikine emtia ve eşya nakl ve bu vechile Avrupa ticâretine izhâr-ı meyl ve rağbet itmekde olup..." BOA ED 22/1, 493/2199, evâhir-i Muharrem 1213/4–14 July 1798, order to the qadi of Izmir. The second sentence originates from the document proclaiming the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı*. "... el-hâletü hâzihi berren ve bahren Avrupa ticaretiyle me'luf olanlar, ve bundan böyle izhâr-ı hâhiş ve arzu eden Devlet-i Aliyye'nin ehl-i zimmet reâyâsını..." Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde*, 64, Gurre-i R.Âhir 1217/August 1802. And the last sentence is taken from the letter of the grand vizier to the Dutch office of

In these documents the way in which the Porte referred to the international trade of the Ottoman merchants is remarkable, as a novel situation that emerged without the intention or intervention of the Porte. Nevertheless, the documents reveal that the Porte was ready to support and continuously nurture its subjects' international trade.

How then can we explain the interpretations of the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* which emphasize the abuse of *berats* and neglect the background summarized above? The relevance of this question to the conclusions of this book emanates from the fact that the findings of this book require a revision of the underlying assumptions that led to the earlier interpretations. The excessive emphasis on the abuse of *berats* in the earlier interpretations emanated from the assumption that the capitulations placed Ottoman merchants at a great disadvantage vis-à-vis European merchants, who then sought the protection of one or another of the capitulatory nations, which in turn alienated the Ottoman merchants from Ottoman state and society. The adoption of the protection of one or another European nation has conventionally been confused with the adoption of citizenship of these nations. Moreover, as conventional interpretations of state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire do not give any credit to the influence of these merchants on the Porte's relevant decisions and policies, the Porte's establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* could only be viewed as a response to an emergent problem (abuse of *berats*), but not as a result of the influence and demand of the merchants in question. Furthermore, these earlier interpretations defined the position of Ottoman merchants in relation to their "cooperation with the Europeans" and their access to the metropolises of Europe. Their adoption of European protection was interpreted as evidence of this cooperation. As the historiography on Ottoman-European trade presents the activities of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects as supplemental to the role ascribed to European merchants (such as interpretership, brokerage, intermediary), they also emphasize the fields of cooperation rather than the (potential) fields of contestation. This, in turn, sustains the notions that define the role of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants in relation to the European presence in the Ottoman Empire rather than the economic system of the empire itself. With its focus on two main fields of contestation between Ottoman and

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foreign affairs announcing the appointment of Nicolas Marcella as the Ottoman consul to the Netherlands. "...bir müddetten berû Devlet-i Aliyye'ye tâbî' tüccâr tâifesinin Avrupa ticâretine meyl ve hâbişleri ziyâde olduğu umûr-ı ma'lûmeden..." NA 2.01.08, 347, 19 August 1804, letter from the grand vizier to the Dutch foreign office.

European merchants, and Dutch merchants in particular, this book offers fundamental revisions of these underlying assumptions. Let us now assess these revisions in relation to the research questions studied here.

Although the capitulation system has often been assumed to have regulated all aspects of Ottoman-European trade, study of the European and more specifically the Dutch presence in Ankara, as well as the expansion of Ottoman merchants' activities to Amsterdam, has shown that the capitulations were based on a division of labor between local (Ottoman) merchants and European merchants, and that they regulated neither European activities in the interior of the Ottoman Empire nor Ottoman merchants' activities beyond the "well-guarded dominions" of the sultan. Dutch consular authorities as well as the Ottoman administration cited the articles of the capitulations in documents pertaining both to European activities in Ankara and to Ottoman merchants' activities beyond the boundaries of the empire. However, we have seen that in such cases these articles could be interpreted in contradictory ways and that the Ottoman administration did not hesitate to order the expulsion of European merchants to cities on the shore when their presence disturbed the local social and economic balance or undermined treasury revenues. For European activities in the interior of the empire, the Ottoman economic system and the principles of the "Ottoman economic worldview" remained more relevant than the capitulation system, while Ottoman merchants' activities beyond the boundaries of the empire were left totally outside the sphere of policy making during most of the eighteenth century. There is considerable evidence that the competing parties were well aware of this situation and therefore presented their requests to the Porte so as to fit into the provisionist, traditionalist, and fiscalist priorities of the Ottoman administration. The parties fit their arguments to the principles of the Ottoman economic worldview sometimes by manipulating facts, and other times by taking recourse to the testimonies of local officials such as tax collectors and qadis. The endeavors of the parties to justify their requests in the framework of these principles show that these principles enjoyed popular consent as well, and functioned as a kind of hegemonic discourse.

This is not to say that the Porte's decisions relied exclusively on these general principles. Like the capitulations, Ottoman legal practice did play its part. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence that the parties' interpersonal relations at the Porte also played a crucial role in shaping its decisions. In this book, the role of these interpersonal relations is visible in the developments in Ankara as well as in the Porte's increasing concern

and support for Ottoman merchants' activities beyond the boundaries of the empire. The fact that the (Greek) dragomans of the Ottoman imperial divan frequently interfered with the relevant matters should be considered, and interpreted within this context. I borrowed this emphasis on interpersonal relations from Michael E. Meeker, who argues that these relations opened the way for inhabitants of the eastern Black Sea region to imperial participation, especially through religious learning and conscription into the imperial army. The case of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants indicates that there were other channels as well that made imperial participation possible for different segments of Ottoman society during the eighteenth century. In the case of Greek merchants, their interpersonal relations must have reached the Porte through the Phanariote families. Without such interpersonal relations it is difficult to imagine how the letters of a group of Greek merchants in Amsterdam could have made their way to the highest offices of the Porte and persuaded the highest officials of the empire to advocate for their rights and privileges. Correspondingly, interpersonal relations with high dignitaries of the Porte must have helped to maintain these merchants' affiliation to the Ottoman Empire, even though they were operating beyond the sultan's domains. Though in this respect, their dependence on trade with western Anatolia as well as their local connections there must have played a prominent role.

In the absence of the intermediate structures of civil society, these interpersonal relations seem to have been crucial for maintaining the integrity of the empire during the eighteenth century, which has been characterized as a period of decentralization of the empire and the rise of the *a'yân* in the provinces. The *a'yân* (Müderriszâdes) seem to have been the element most ambivalent toward the European presence in Ankara, even though the Müderriszâde was singled out in 1757 as the sole oppressor of Europeans. An examination of the expansion of Ottoman merchants' activities beyond the boundaries of the empire indicates a similar ambivalence toward the Karaosmanoğlus in Izmir. Europeans there were generally favorably disposed toward the Karaosmanoğlus, while at the same time recognizing them as the patrons of the cotton producers in the area. There are also traces of partnerships or at least cooperation in the cotton trade between the Karaosmanoğlus and the Ottoman merchants trading with the Netherlands. Unfortunately, the available information does not allow a comparison between the estates of the Karaosmanoğlus in Izmir and the Müderriszâdes in Ankara, the former being reasonably well documented while the latter remains unstudied. However, there are clues that the Müderriszâdes, as well, were engaged in the mohair industry in Ankara,

as they engaged in a dispute with the *damga emîni* concerning a dye house and a polishing loom in the town. In the absence of more detailed information about their estates it is difficult to analyze the position of the Mûderriszâdes with respect to the European presence in the town. However the available information on the estates of the Karaosmanoğlu and their position with regard to the competition between Ottoman and Dutch merchants seems to have been quite comparable to that of the textile producers in Amsterdam. Both the textile producers in Amsterdam and at least the Karaosmanoğlu, if not the *a'yân*s in general, produced export-oriented goods and therefore were likely to cooperate with anyone who could help them sell their products in foreign markets. In this respect, scholars interested in local elements who may have cooperated with European capital in the eighteenth century should focus on the *a'yân* rather than on the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants.

Although there were fundamental differences between the rise of the *a'yân* and the non-Muslim merchant elite during the eighteenth century, there were also striking similarities. Both of these social groups operated outside the realm of the administrative machinery, despite their extensive interactions with it. More interestingly, both of these groups had gained some kind of official recognition by the early nineteenth century; the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants with the establishment of the *Avrupa tüccarı* (1802) and the *a'yân* with the *Sened-i İttifak* (Charter of Alliance) of 1808. In his search for an explanation of the absence of intermediate civil societal structures, Şerif Mardin points to the *a'yân* as a group that had the potential to produce "the type of autonomous power won by western townsmen."<sup>2</sup> However, as these notables "held on to a share in existing structures of domination in the cities," rather than "developing independent sources of power based on economic enterprise," they failed to acquire the position of their western counterparts.<sup>3</sup> The crucial element that was absent, and thus prevented the *a'yân* from acquiring a function comparable to the western townsmen was in fact present in the case of the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, who did develop independent sources of power based on economic enterprise. However, in the context of Ottoman social formation, which was not neutral with respect to religious affiliation, it is difficult to imagine that the function of intermediate

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<sup>2</sup> Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture," 267.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 268.

civil societal structures in its western sense could have been fulfilled by the non-Muslim merchant elite.

It may be suggested that it was the non-Muslim merchants' alienation from the Ottoman Empire that prevented them from fulfilling such a function. However, I have shown that this alienation, if it occurred at all, did not exist during the eighteenth century. In fact it is not clear what certain authors mean when they speak of the alienation of the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants from the Ottoman Empire. If they mean an alienation from the Ottoman polity, my findings do not support this stance. If they mean the non-Muslim merchants' alienation from their local connections and familial ties within the Ottoman Empire, I provide plenty of evidence to the contrary. Probably the main reason for such interpretations is the fact that numerous non-Muslim subjects of the Porte adopted the protection of European embassies and consulates during the eighteenth century. Therefore, it is useful to discuss the extent to which the adoption of foreign protection entailed alienation before moving to my concluding remarks on the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, their local connections, and Ottoman polity.

In this work, I have found that the fiscal advantages of the capitulations for European merchants did not reach a rate that prevented Ottoman merchants from competing with their European counterparts. Nevertheless, it is clear that Ottoman regulations pertaining to customs dues did favor European merchants over non-Muslim Ottoman merchants. Even this minor advantage should have been enough to motivate non-Muslim Ottoman merchants to acquire *berats* through European embassies, since this would have helped them to maximize their profits by minimizing their costs (customs dues). These *berats* and the concomitant fiscal privileges were not, however, the main factor in the success of the Ottoman merchants, since their success in the Dutch Levant trade predated the widespread use of these documents. Moreover, even if the fiscal disadvantages emanating from the Porte's policies had been enough to alienate non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, there were other reasons for them to become alienated from French, English and, to a lesser extent, Dutch policies, since the regulations of these nations also discriminated against Ottoman merchants.

My investigation of the evolution of Dutch trade policies confirms earlier findings<sup>4</sup> that there was a clear-cut distinction between adopting

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<sup>4</sup> Van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, 115.



foreign protection and adopting the citizenship of that nation. Even the adoption of foreign citizenship did not necessarily imply a shift in allegiance, since it may have been adopted for practical reasons (fiscal advantages). It is clear that adopting European protection entailed, in theory, a shift from Ottoman jurisprudence to European consular jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Ottoman merchants' adoption of foreign protection cannot be attributed to their willingness to adopt European jurisprudences, as Timur Kuran suggests. Kuran argues that the main motive of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants in adopting European protection was their aim to continue their commercial ventures in the context of western commercial law.<sup>5</sup> However, the practical implications of leaving Ottoman jurisprudence for European consular jurisprudence remained very limited. Even being a 'proper' foreigner, much less a protégé, did not ensure immunity from Ottoman jurisprudence in cases involving Ottoman subjects. As most commercial cases in Ottoman ports did involve parties belonging to different nations including (non-protégé) Ottoman subjects, commercial activities of Europeans and their protégés fell under both Ottoman and European consular jurisprudence. During most of the eighteenth century (when the protégé system began to be utilized extensively by non-Muslim subjects of the Porte) the Ottoman state had the leverage to implement its verdicts in the face of European consular jurisprudence. It can be argued that during the later period, given the changing international balance of power, the leverage of European consular jurisprudence increased to the detriment of Ottoman jurisprudence. But this does not explain non-Muslim subjects' adoption of European protection during the eighteenth century, when the leverage of Ottoman jurisprudence was paramount. More importantly, I provide concrete evidence that Ottoman merchants considered Ottoman jurisprudence much more favorable for themselves and preferred it to the jurisprudence of capitulatory nations in many cases.

Thus the implications of adopting foreign protection during the eighteenth century do not justify interpretations suggesting that this phenomenon entailed a shift in allegiance. These subjects of the Porte were probably seeking to maximize their profits by reducing the taxes they paid and also securing a social standing in their relations with Ottoman officials, especially with those at the customs house. It is most likely this

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<sup>5</sup> See Timur Kuran, "The Economic Ascent of the Middle East's Religious Minorities: The Role of Islamic Legal Pluralism," *Journal of Legal Studies* 33 (June 2004), 475–515.

pragmatic attitude that led Ottoman merchants in Amsterdam, by the end of the eighteenth century, to seek the protection of the Porte.

Although the Porte's support for non-Muslim Ottoman merchants' activities beyond the boundaries of the empire did not materialize until the end of the eighteenth century, this does not mean that the interests of the Porte and non-Muslim merchants had clashed until then. Especially with regard to guarding the integrity of the Ottoman economic and fiscal system, the interests of the Porte and those of the Ottoman merchants who controlled the trade from the interior to the ports of the empire were congenial. The Porte, with its provisionist, traditionalist, and fiscalist priorities, had in these merchants keen guardians of these priorities against infringement by Europeans. While Armenian merchants were opposing the European merchants in Ankara to maintain their control over the mohair trade to Izmir, their endeavors contributed to the preservation of the traditional network of order with their own traditional role in it. Similar endeavors ensured that the Porte's provisionist priorities were upheld, since angora wool would have been totally lost to European markets before the local manufacturers were properly supplied. It is highly probable that if the Armenian merchants' control over the mohair trade had been replaced by European merchants' control, the stimulation of the latter's capitulatory privileges combined with market forces would have entirely deprived the Ottoman central administration of its means of control over this product. Likewise, the fiscal privileges of European merchants, even if they were limited, would certainly have deprived the imperial treasury of these revenues. The Armenian merchants, utilizing every means to curb the European presence in Ankara, were thus allies of the Porte in maintaining these priorities.

A number of incidents surveyed in this book have shown that the Porte remained, for the most part, indifferent to developments that posed either an immediate or gradual threat to its "economic" priorities. Even certain expansionist moves by Dutch merchants seem to have been backed by the Porte, as was the case with the imperial orders allowing Dutch merchants to settle in Ankara. It is quite interesting to observe that in such expansionist moves the Dutch first created a *de facto* situation and afterward defended it at the Porte on the grounds that it was the status quo; they also took recourse to the vague articles of the capitulations, which suited every need. However, it is clear that to the extent the Dutch were able to widen the scope of their privileges, enabling them to become firmly entrenched in the market, they became alienated from the priorities of the Ottoman administration.

The Porte's indifference in such cases might be seen as testimony to the irrelevance of the principles (provisionism, traditionalism, fiscalism) to the Ottoman polity. However, I think what is at issue is the means of maintaining these priorities, rather than their relevance. That is to say, the Ottoman administration did not maintain these principles by means of extensive surveillance and enforcement throughout the empire, but rather left their maintenance to local social and economic elements that profited from these priorities. Consumers in the marketplace were the Porte's natural allies in maintaining provisionism; social and economic elements that profited from traditionalism (guilds, for instance) helped enforce traditionalism; and tax collectors and other officials appear to have been the main agents of Ottoman fiscalism. All these elements functioned as a kind of siren, warning the Porte when something was threatening the status quo and pressuring it to put things right. Consequently, this alliance of local social and economic elements enabled the Porte to implement its priorities and policies much more effectively than the practical power vested at the capital would have allowed. The power of the Porte was indeed limited by the circumstances which limited every early-modern state apparatus, but it was enhanced by its ability to find allies throughout the empire. Therefore, the commanded nature of the Ottoman economy emanated not so much from the extensive power of the center but rather from the cooperation of various local social and economic elements.

The developments in Ankara show that neither the Ottoman central administration nor the Armenian merchants were alone in their struggle to maintain prevailing economic relations in the town against European infringement. When these merchants took the initiative against European merchants, they were able to form various local coalitions. It is of crucial importance to note that the ability of Armenian merchants to call on local elements to intervene, and their ability to form these coalitions, shows that they were firmly entrenched in the local economy. More importantly, the Armenian merchants in Amsterdam continued to depend on the mohair trade, which is clear evidence that their ventures beyond the boundaries of the empire did not develop at the cost of their local connections, but rather as an extension of these connections. Greek merchants' dependence on the cotton trade in Amsterdam should also be viewed in this way. Their ventures beyond the boundaries of the empire should be considered not as an indication of their alienation from their local connections but rather as a function of their connections in the Izmir region from where the cotton they traded originated.

The study of the developments in Ankara as well as the expansion of the activities of the Ottoman merchants to Amsterdam shows that the clash of interests, rather than cooperation, dominated relations between Ottoman and Dutch merchants. In certain areas the potential for cooperation did exist, as in the partnerships between Ottoman and Dutch merchants in Izmir or transactions between Ottoman merchants in Izmir and Dutch merchants in Amsterdam. However, both Ottoman and Dutch merchants had certain notions about their privileges and roles in Ottoman-Dutch trade, and opposed any development they considered an infringement on these "privileges." As the commercial activities of both Ottoman and Dutch merchants had expansionist tendencies at the same time, it was inevitable that these merchants would "trespass" on each other's fields of activity, provoking fierce competition that also included administrative precautions. When Ottoman merchants began to expand their activities to the Netherlands, Dutch merchants sought protection from the Dutch authorities, alleging that "our trade" (*onze commercie*) was being controlled by the subjects of the sultan. Likewise, when European merchants made their way to Ankara, the Armenian merchants responded in a manner indicating that they considered this field of activity theirs.

During the eighteenth century, the Ottoman merchants proved to be the stronger party in this competition, as they were able to oust the Dutch merchants from Ankara and later dominated the Ottoman-Dutch trade as well. The power of the Ottoman merchants emanated mainly from their entrenchment in the local economy of western Anatolia and their dependence on the trade of certain goods in which they had gained expertise. In our preliminary conclusions we argued that the Ottoman merchants made use of these local connections and transformed them into protection rent. In the 1970s Niels Steensgaard<sup>6</sup> used Lane's terminology to explain the success of the English and Dutch India companies against the traditional networks of intercontinental trade between Asia and Europe. He argued that the companies internalized protection costs and were able to overcome the competition of the traditional forms of international trade. The picture was rather different in the Levant. Our investigation of the Ottoman-Dutch trade in the eighteenth century shows that in the absence of "companies" with their efficient use of gunboats, new forms of intercontinental trade could enjoy little advantage over the traditional

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<sup>6</sup> Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* (Chicago, 1974).

forms. However we should also take into consideration the reality that no company could flourish in the Levant as the English and Dutch Indian companies did, especially with respect to the latter's internalization of protection costs. Although European ships operating between the Levant and western Europe were furnished with considerable equipment to minimize the risks of corsair attacks in the Mediterranean, they still remained liable to various protection costs, such as European and Ottoman taxes, and convoy expenses which they paid to their governments for being provided with war ship escorts during wartime, as well as to extraordinary expenses such as they encountered in Ankara.

Ottoman merchants also profited from the diversity of interest orientations among Dutch Levant traders. While the Ottoman merchants in Izmir began to establish themselves as business correspondents of Dutch merchants in Amsterdam, the Dutch merchants and consuls in Izmir opposed the development, but their opposition was not supported by the directors of Levant trade, who represented the interests of Amsterdam merchants. Amsterdam merchants had no complaints about these new business correspondents in Izmir because they offered a less expensive and more efficient alternative to the Dutch merchants there. Only after the Ottoman merchants also became sound competitors of Dutch merchants in Amsterdam did Dutch "protectionism" begin to develop. By then, however, the interests of Amsterdam textile producers and more importantly the competition of new alternative markets like Leghorn, Flanders, and Hamburg counterbalanced the "protectionist" tendencies of the Dutch trading community. Moreover, by that time, both England and France, who offered a greater market for Ottoman entrepreneurial skills, had commenced the liberalization of their trade with the Levant. In the context of these developments the Dutch merchants had to be content with their role on the margins of Ottoman-Dutch trade, which by the end of the eighteenth century was clearly dominated by Ottoman merchants employing Dutch agents in Amsterdam in return for a two percent commission if they did not want to trade with their compatriots there.

Throughout this book I have paid extensive attention to issues of taxation, to show the tension between the capitulations and the Ottoman fiscal system. As Dutch merchants and consular authorities frequently applied to the Porte on issues of taxation which they considered an infringement on their capitulatory privileges, the study of these issues proved to be very productive in delineating the limits of fiscal privileges enjoyed by Europeans in the Ottoman Empire. The same investigation has in fact given us further insight into the causes of these repetitive disputes between European

merchants and Ottoman customs officials. Numerous letters and reports written by European consuls and ambassadors speak frequently about arbitrary actions and malpractices of Ottoman customs officials. These allegations were frequently repeated in imperial orders issued by the Porte in response to European ambassadors' complaints. Although the available literature on Ottoman-European trade notes these allegations, no one had yet provided an adequate explanation of the phenomenon. My findings indicate that many of the customs officials' actions that were seen by Europeans as extortion, often turn out to have been routine practices in accordance with Ottoman fiscal regulations. Therefore, the difference between the attitudes of the Europeans and the Ottoman customs officials should be attributed primarily to the fact that the customs officials were bound to Ottoman fiscal regulations, whereas the Europeans viewed the customs officials' actions exclusively from the perspective of their capitulations. A remark by a Dutch ambassador on imperial orders received by Europeans from the Porte and the behavior of customs officials makes the point:

Although the Porte never issue imperial orders which contradict the capitulations directly, the *tefterdar* (sic. *defterdâr*) does give contrary orders to the customs officials who succeed in eluding the imperial orders, because these imperial orders are mostly arranged ambiguously so that they appear to support the capitulations while at the same time they (imperial orders) can be interpreted in favour of the customs officials.<sup>7</sup>

The very ambiguity of the Porte's orders has led many Ottomanists to believe that the fiscal privileges enjoyed by European merchants in the Ottoman Empire were greater than they actually were. We have seen that these ambiguous imperial edicts ordered local authorities mainly to act "in accordance with the capitulations and the ancient practices" and often sparked off further disputes between Dutch merchants and local authorities rather than providing solutions. The eighteenth century witnessed a gradual change in this respect. While the orders issued during the earlier part of the century display ambiguity, those issued during the latter part of the century were more explicit. Unlike the earlier orders, the later ones included clauses explaining that the relevant departments had been consulted on the issue and that the final edict was based on that information. This gradual process implied a bureaucratization prior to the *Tanzimat* reforms, but also entailed a degree of centralization, since the "ancient

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<sup>7</sup> RGP 115, 91, 02.04.1768, De Weiler to the DLH.

practices" were vested at the local level while the written regulations originated from the center. Consequently, to the extent that the "ancient practices" were replaced by the concrete orders of the center, the relations between European and local merchants came to depend increasingly on the relations (power balance) between the Porte and European powers.





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